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Over the past few decades the transportation infrastructure of the United States has been 
globalized by the shipping container, an object that carries vast amounts of global commerce. 
Best known for traveling over the ocean, the container’s ability to move in trucking and railroad 
infrastructures is equally crucial. As its intermodal capability allows for easy transfer between 
transport modes without its contents being loaded and unloaded, a container is able to follow a 
global trajectory through the use of multiple infrastructures. Consequently the domestic 
American transportation system has been integrated into the worldwide network of 
containerized freight movement. 
The American trucking and railroad systems have moved containers since the 1920s, and 
larger modern containers since the 1950s. Paralleling the dramatic rise in global trade, in recent 
decades the container has been widely carried by these two domestic infrastructures, and has also 
traveled on inland waterways sporadically. Trucking and railroads have been altered in many 
ways by containerization, both in terms of the necessary equipment and the routes of movement. 
Furthermore, the container’s proliferation in the U.S. transportation network has necessitated the 
development of intermodal terminals, large facilities at key junctions of road and rail where 
containers are transferred from one transport mode to another. 
Yet the U.S. national infrastructure has kept many of its longstanding characteristics, for the 
container does not replace or transform it but rather depends upon it. The container’s impact is 
substantial and results in some important changes, as American transportation systems must 
accommodate its physical qualities and other characteristics, but the fundamental nature of 
domestic infrastructure generally remains in place. In this regard containerization is typical of 
many processes of globalization, in that change is largely carried out within and through existing 
frameworks of the nation-state. The way the container impacts American transportation, 
therefore, is deeply affected by the historical, geographic, social and political realities of the 
nation and its infrastructure. Globalization is not a top-down transformation in which the 
worldwide scale inexorably dominates national, regional and local contexts, but rather is a 





Chapter 1 ~ Introduction 
 
This dissertation examines how the American transportation infrastructure has been 
altered—in a sense “globalized”—to accommodate the internationally standardized shipping 
container. This process has taken place from the introduction of containerization in shipping in 
the 1950s up to the present day, and seems likely to continue. Over this period of time the 
domestic infrastructure within the American territory, well established and possessing its own 
distinct qualities, changed in many ways to suit the container. The United States, like so many 
other countries, has been integrated into the global networks of container movement and supply 
chains. Yet during this process American infrastructure retained many of its characteristics, for 
the container is designed to work within existing transportation systems already in place. So 
while it is the case that the container impacted U.S. infrastructure in certain ways, the global 
infrastructure of containerization has largely operated through national systems rather than 
transforming or replacing them. This does not mean globalization has failed to transpire, but 
rather that global processes are shaped by national and local circumstances and are carried out in 
ways that vary depending on specific contexts. Globalization is not a generic trend that flattens 
particularities of place, but instead coexists with these varied contexts and at times is even 
generated by them. 
The bulk of the dissertation provides a historical account of the shipping container’s effect on 
the American transportation system. The container’s presence within the United States has been 
most prominent in two infrastructures, trucking and the railroad. From the early days of 
containerization until roughly the late 1970s these two infrastructures were relatively lightly 
affected by the container, and in the years since they have been far more deeply altered due to the 
massive growth in container traffic. The spatial and material qualities of trucking, railroads and 
the container itself have played a key part in this process. An additional component of this 
infrastructural transformation, especially since the 1980s, has been the development of large 
intermodal terminals where containers are transferred between train and truck. Placed 
throughout the country, the terminals are strategically sited at infrastructural junction points. The 
rising tide of containerization in trucking and rail has also led to a system of domestic containers, 
larger than the global (that is to say, normal) containers, that are restricted to traveling within 
North America. On the other hand, the American network of inland waterways, which has a vital 
(albeit often overlooked) role in moving freight, has failed to attract more than a pittance of 
container traffic. 
In narrating this historical process, the dissertation explores how the preexisting character of 
American infrastructure was critical to the way it accommodated the container. The dissertation 
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also delves deeply into the theoretical aspects of its subject. These generally revolve around two 
basic themes. The first is that of containerization as an infrastructure. As the container cannot 
form an infrastructure in its own right (as opposed to, say, the automobile or railroad), but 
instead depends on transport systems already in place that it links together, containerization is an 
unusual type of infrastructural network. The second theme concerns the globalization of the 
nation-state, and local regions and places inside it, through infrastructural connections and larger 
worldwide systems. Containerization reveals this to be a nuanced process, with power and 
agency wielded at multiple scales. 
The shipping container is a curious object. For a piece of technology so powerful and 
influential, its appearance could hardly be more banal. A long rectangular box of corrugated 
metal with swinging doors at one end, there is nothing about it to catch the eye. Its dimensions 
and other characteristics are set at the international level, and there are just a few standard sizes. 
The most common container size is 40’ long, 8’ wide and 8’-6” high, and there are also many 20’-
long containers of the same width and height. A few 45’-long containers, also 8’ wide and 8’-6” 
high, are in use, but this size never really caught on. In addition there are numerous “hi-cube” 
containers, which come in any of these lengths (but most often are 40’ long), the same 8’ width, 
and a 9’-6” height. A few other variations exist but are extremely rare. There are also containers 
used only in certain national or regional infrastructures, with sizes more appropriate to those 
contexts; the domestic containers of North America for instance are 53’ long, 8’-6” wide and 9’-6” 
high. Containers possess fittings at each corner, known as “corner castings,” that have holes to 
allow for easy attachment to trucks, trains, ships, cranes and other containers. Every container in 
active transportation use has a unique identifier, a series of numbers and letters, clearly marked 
upon it. 
The logic of the container, and its remarkable success, lies in how it links different modes of 
transportation together, often across national boundaries, and moves between them without the 
necessity of unloading and reloading cargo. Rather it is the container that gets moved, generally 
by some sort of crane, between transport modes. Hence containerization connects multiple 
infrastructures so that one container can bring freight all the way from origin to destination. 
Containers typically are carried on ships (primarily over the ocean, but also on inland 
waterways), trucks and trains. In theory they can also be transported by airplane, but this is 
almost never done. (There are other types of containers used to carry air freight, which are far 
smaller, customized for that purpose, and do not move by other transport modes.) The success of 
containerization testifies to the value of the intermodal approach to transportation. 
Intermodalism is a strategy whereby the overall journey (of a cargo or person) is viewed in its 
entirety across multiple transport modes, and so improving the links between modes can be as 
important as the modes themselves. 
A typical container looks so generic that it fades into the background. For a long time the 
container’s importance was similarly overlooked, but no longer; in today’s heightened awareness 
of globalization, the container is perceived as significant. In practical terms the container is now 
understood as a key device enabling global trade, while on a symbolic level it has become an icon 
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of globalization. At this point the general history of the container has been chronicled by several 
writers in a flurry of books and articles published during the past decade.1 Most narratives of 
containerization concentrate primarily on the shipping industry and oceangoing trade. Indeed, it 
was shipping lines that took the lead during the 1950s and ‘60s by introducing various types of 
containers that gradually evolved into the globally standardized shipping container, while port 
authorities, governmental agencies, and nongovernmental institutions (especially the 
International Organization for Standardization, known as the ISO) also played a crucial role. The 
business of shipping was transformed by the need to build new ships and overhaul existing ones, 
develop better and larger ports, install new equipment, and fundamentally revise many practices. 
All this has been well documented in histories of the container. Some accounts also explore the 
tremendous growth of international trade and commerce since the 1960s, a phenomenon 
integrally tied to containerization as rising trade has both exploited the container and been 
enabled by it. 
The intent of this dissertation is different, as should be already evident, for it examines 
containerization in the context of the domestic infrastructure of one particular country, the 
United States (with occasional coverage of Canada as well), and in the process ponders the 
container’s significance at the national, regional and local level. The dissertation posits that the 
impact of the shipping container on domestic transport modes—primarily the railroad and 
trucking industries—is every bit as important as its effect on global shipping. I would argue 
globalization perhaps matters most when it reaches deepest into the nation-state, or into regional 
or local settings. In these accommodations between an overarching global network that aspires to 
universality and particular national, regional or local systems that reflect their own contexts, a 
worldwide infrastructure is shaped and implemented. It is important to realize containers would 
serve little purpose if their journeys began and ended at ports—the container’s ability to move 
overland, in national territories on domestic infrastructures, is integral to its value. 
As it depends on the basic transportation infrastructures of shipping, trucking and railroads, 
the worldwide network of containerization represents an atypical sort of infrastructure, one 
unified in some respects yet fragmented in its functioning. Seen in this light, the container’s most 
distinctive feature is the way it links together preexisting infrastructures. Essentially a giant steel 
box with no distinguishing features or special technologies of its own, it gains central importance 
                                                 
1 Examples include: Marc Levinson, The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World 
Economy Bigger (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); Arthur Donovan and Joseph Bonney, The 
Box That Changed the World: Fifty Years of Container Shipping—An Illustrated History (East Windsor, NJ: 
Commonwealth Business Media [The Journal of Commerce], 2006); Brian J. Cudahy, Box Boats: How 
Container Ships Changed the World (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006); Richard Cook and Marcus 
Oleniuk, Around the World in 40 Feet: Two Hundred Days in the Life of a 40FT NYK Shipping Container (Hong 
Kong: WordAsia [NYK Group], 2007); Stewart Taggart, “The 20-Ton Packet,” Wired, Vol. 7, No. 10 (October 
1999), pp. 246-255; BBC News website, “The Box.” 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/business/2008/the_box/default.stm, accessed 6/23/11). Levinson’s work 
is the only one to gain mainstream recognition and is probably the best single source, though Donovan and 
Bonney’s book is quite good also and has the benefit of being well illustrated. The BBC video series has been 
widely viewed. The Wired article is ideal as a brief introduction to the container. 
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through its ability to be carried by basic modes of transportation. As it can also be so easily 
transferred between those transport systems, the container in effect constructs a cohesive 
network out of disparate parts. Scholars refer to such an infrastructure, which both links together 
and depends on more basic existing infrastructures, as a “second-order system” or 
“internetwork.” Such second-order systems can be physical or informational, and seem to be 
proliferating for a variety of reasons in contemporary life.2 
A device, object or tool that enables a second-order system by making the interconnection 
between different infrastructures possible, working with each separate existing (“first-order”) 
system, is termed a “gateway.3 Not every second-order system has a specific gateway that can be 
identified, but the container obviously is the gateway for the worldwide network of 
containerization, and as such is an extraordinarily important object. It is not an incidental or 
trivial part of the system, but pivotal to it. Global containerization is only able to accomplish what 
it does, creating a worldwide network of rapid, cheap, efficient and nearly seamless freight 
movement, by functioning as a second-order system with the container as its gateway. Its 
fragmented parts—ocean shipping plus two land-based transport modes in a multitude of 
nations—could not be bound together otherwise. In its dependence on these constituent systems, 
the worldwide container network is perhaps different from our conventional notions of 
infrastructure. As a second-order system, it derives much of its value from tying together basic 
systems that are already in place. 
A gateway on its own is usually not sufficient to create a second-order system, for existing 
infrastructures must be modified to acquire the capability of accommodating the gateway. The 
degree of difficulty involved in this may well determine how widely the second-order system 
spreads. In its dimensions and other characteristics, the container was explicitly designed—and 
for the most part, well designed—to be carried by the shipping, trucking and railroad transport 
modes, but this does not mean it has been an effortless process. The greatest challenge was 
undoubtedly in ocean shipping, both in terms of the ships themselves and the ports they dock at, 
but that is outside the main focus of this dissertation. For our purposes it is the U.S. trucking and 
railroad systems that are the main object of study. Both have been significantly changed in order 
to handle containerization, but in general these changes did not involve fundamental alterations 
or dramatic overhauls. Instead, devices that I characterize as “interfaces” have been developed to 
                                                 
2 The concepts of second-order system and internetwork are described in: Ingo Braun and Bernward Joerges, 
“How to Recombine Large Technical Systems: The Case of European Organ Transplantation,” in: Jane 
Summerton (ed.), Changing Large Technical Systems (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 25-51; Paul N. 
Edwards, “Y2K: Millennial Reflections on Computers as Infrastructure,” History and Technology, Vol. 15, Iss. 
1-2 (1998), pp. 11-14 (these page numbers for pdf version at http://pne.people.si.umich.edu/articles.html); 
Greg Downey, “Virtual Webs, Physical Technologies, and Hidden Workers: The Spaces of Labor in 
Information Internetworks,” Technology and Culture, Vol. 42, No. 2 (April 2001), pp. 209-235. 
3 The idea of the gateway is discussed in: Tineke M. Egyedi, “Infrastructure Flexibility Created by 
Standardized Gateways: The Cases of XML and the ISO Container,” Knowledge, Technology, and Policy, Vol. 
14, No. 3 (October 2001), pp. 41-54; Paul A. David and Julie Ann Bunn, “The Economics of Gateway 
Technologies and Network Evolution: Lessons from Electricity Supply History,” Information Economics and 
Policy, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 (1988), pp. 173-191. 
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allow the existing infrastructures to carry containers. These basically function as an interface 
between the global system of containerization and a particular national system (either trucking or 
rail), and are crucial in that they allow each system to exist more or less independently even as 
they work together. 
The development of such interfaces is a key part of this dissertation’s historical narrative. In 
trucking, the interface is the trailer chassis, which is specifically designed to hold the container 
and connect to the tractor (i.e., of a typical tractor-trailer setup). The trailer chassis in its workings 
and physical configuration simultaneously accommodates the global container and the domestic 
trucking system. For the railroads, the interface is a specially designed railcar that carries 
containers; as with the trailer chassis, this railcar makes the necessary connection between the 
global and domestic systems. Linking into each infrastructure, it (like the trailer chassis) is an 
interface between them in both a literal and metaphorical sense. Over the decades these interface 
devices have grown increasingly sophisticated, so as to carry the burgeoning quantity of 
containers more efficiently. In the 1950s and ‘60s in fact they were often merely slightly modified 
flatbed trailers or flatbed railcars, or other jerry-rigged solutions. They have since become far 
more customized for their purpose, which comprises not only holding the container but allowing 
it to be quickly put in place and secured, or removed. An especially important step in this 
evolution was the development of the double-stack railcar in the late 1970s and ‘80s (and its 
widespread use since), which holds containers one atop the other and greatly increases the 
capacity of a train hauling containers. 
This double-stacking is of particular interest because it has forced clearances along many 
American railroad corridors to be raised so two containers can fit. This qualifies as a significant 
alteration in the railroad system, wherein its fundamental qualities are changed. The impressive 
amount of money and effort involved reveals the power of global containerization—or to be 
more specific, the profits railroad companies see in it. In this case the container deeply alters the 
preexisting infrastructure, whose characteristics are transformed. But this is a fairly rare example; 
in general the container works within systems and does not force this sort of wrenching change. 
Another type of transformation is the creation of new transport routes to handle container traffic, 
the Alameda Corridor in the Los Angeles region being the best known. But this is also 
uncommon, and such corridors are not especially long—most often these projects are meant to 
resolve bottlenecks at particular points. Flows of container movement are generally funneled 
through the country’s existing transportation network. 
Infrastructure functions on a broad scale; by its nature an infrastructural system pervades a 
large territory and/or group of users, and has a universal aspect to it. Yet for each user, and at 
every point where it functions, an infrastructure is particular or local in nature. This seemingly 
paradoxical duality of particular user and place versus broad overarching scope is inherent to 
infrastructure. Scholars Susan Leigh Star and Karen Ruhleder make the perceptive claim that “an 
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infrastructure occurs when the tension between local and global is resolved.”4 Along similar 
lines, Stefan Timmermans and Marc Berg use the concept of “local universality,” which implies 
that an infrastructure does not simply impose itself on local conditions and users, but rather is an 
ongoing negotiation between the local and particular on one hand and the large-scale and 
universal on the other.5 Such insights are especially relevant to this dissertation, as the container 
network so clearly depends on other infrastructures that are embedded in local, regional and/or 
national conditions. The universal and particular are in constant interaction. 
The shipping container is an object whose dimensions, as already noted, are standardized at 
the global level. Its length, width and height are fundamental to how it is can be held, carried or 
used, and how much freight can fit inside it—in short, this is an object whose size is its key 
characteristic, and that is tied to space and materiality in the most evident sense. As a box that 
encloses cargo and is held and moved by a plethora of devices and machines (ships, trucks, 
trains, cranes, etc.), the container’s physical qualities, particularly its dimensions, are central to its 
use. The dissertation describes how this has played out in practice, in the context of American 
infrastructure, over the years. In particular I focus on how the container’s spatial qualities 
intersect with those of the U.S. railroad and trucking systems, emphasizing that the way those 
infrastructures accommodate the container is inherently spatial in nature. I introduce and apply 
the concept of the “spatial regime” to describe how a particular set of spatial and/or material 
characteristics can be fundamental to certain infrastructures, bureaucracies, systems or 
regulations. During the history of the container, its spatial regime has intersected with the spatial 
regimes of shipping, trucking and railroads in complex accommodations necessary to make the 
entire network function; the result is an interlocking set of material systems, the result of precise 
spatial negotiations in which a mere inch can be critical. 
This dissertation also deals with space at the far larger scale, that of geography. The insertion 
of the container into U.S. infrastructure extends along transportation corridors hundreds or even 
thousands of miles long that span great expanses of the vast nation. These routes and pathways 
are embedded in the history and character of the country, and are also affected by topography 
and other factors inherent to American geography. Some of the alterations made necessary by 
containerization must be implemented throughout these networks. As containers move along 
them, the role of the routes is augmented: formerly segments of the purely domestic 
infrastructure of the nation-state, they now become components of much longer global networks 
in addition. The container depends on these existing pathways of the nation-state, for it would be 
too difficult (and also unnecessary) to construct a wholly new system. The basic coherence of 
national infrastructure remains, even as the container enters into and in some ways modifies it. 
The persistence of the nation-state’s historical infrastructure in this new globalized reality is 
due in part to the enduring quality of infrastructure in general. Infrastructures are embedded in 
                                                 
4 Susan Leigh Star and Karen Ruhleder, “Steps Toward an Ecology of Infrastructure: Design and Access for 
Large Information Spaces,” Information Systems Research, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 1996), p. 114. 
5 Stefan Timmermans and Marc Berg, “Standardization in Action: Achieving Local Universality Through 
Medical Protocols,” Social Studies of Science, Vol. 27, No. 2 (April 1997), pp. 273-305. 
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social, political, economic and cultural milieus and do not change easily—minor adjustments 
frequently take place, but fundamental alterations are another matter. In this regard 
infrastructure represents far more than merely the use of technology, which can evolve quickly. 
A new technological capability is one thing, but implementing it through an infrastructure that 
the bulk of society actually uses is quite another matter. All this is true for the container network, 
with the added factor of the material, physical and spatial character of transportation systems. 
(The relevance of this materiality for the container itself has already been noted.) Nearly all 
infrastructures, even informational ones, have some physical manifestation, but transportation is 
especially material in its workings in terms of the devices that move, the cargo or people they 
carry, and the routes along which travel occurs. This physical quality gives transport 
infrastructures an additional inertia, an enduring quality over time; they do not change in the 
absence of compelling circumstances. 
Containerization requires that infrastructures accommodate a standardized object, the 
container itself, but it is also constructed upon these multiple systems. Hence the container 
network is deeply affected by the characteristics and conditions of the nations and localities it 
passes through. The dissertation examines this phenomenon in the American context, arguing 
that this “globalization” of the nation’s freight transport infrastructure is carried out in a 
distinctly American way, even while it becomes part of a universal worldwide network. The way 
containers move through the U.S. reflects the history, geography and particular qualities of the 
nation, and also of particular regions, cities, towns and routes within it. Historian of technology 
Thomas Hughes uses the concept of “technological style” to refer to how infrastructures, rather 
than being purely objective engineering solutions, embody aspects of national culture, politics 
and tradition.6 The idea is applicable to containerization, and this dissertation puts an additional 
focus on preexisting infrastructures and geographical factors. 
Certain infrastructural systems, such as roads for movement and aqueducts for water supply, 
have existed since the dawn of civilization. But the concept of infrastructure seems to encompass 
something more modern, more systematic and advanced. (The word “infrastructure,” not 
incidentally, is of twentieth-century derivation.) Infrastructural systems are the organized 
frameworks that support modern human societies, which do not merely use them but depend 
upon them; they provide an invaluable foundation upon which other activities take place. In this 
role infrastructure is linked to another key component of modernity: the nation-state. Historically 
speaking, modern infrastructures—the first examples being the railroad and telegraph—played a 
major role in helping the emergent nation-states establish their power, territorial integrity and 
national unity. The scholar Michael Mann refers to the wide range of infrastructural, 
                                                 
6 Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1983), pp. 405-407; Thomas P. Hughes, “The Evolution of Large Technological 
Systems,” in Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch (eds.), The Social Construction of 
Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1987), pp. 68-70. 
 8 
organizational and bureaucratic tools the modern nation-state draws upon as “infrastructural 
power.”7 
A nation-state is a remarkable assemblage of elements—governmental, social, cultural and 
economic—all unified in the same geographic space defined by national borders. This situation, 
with so many aspects of human existence spatially congruent under one system, was in no way 
typical until the rise of the nation-state; the more common historical pattern has been for these 
elements to coexist and overlap in different realms and territories. Our globalized future could 
once again see such a divergence. Yet only time will tell how the situation unfolds—over roughly 
the past decade the seeming inevitability of many aspects of globalization has been punctured by 
ongoing events. But certain trends continue, in particular the prevalence of worldwide trade in 
which the container plays such a prominent role. Given the nation-state’s continuing 
fundamental importance in so many respects, the path towards globalization (and the means by 
which it proceeds) is by no means clear, and there is no institution of worldwide unity or power 
that is currently a match for the nation-state. 
The shipping container, this dissertation argues, represents an exemplary case of how 
globalization is carried out in these circumstances. Many of today’s global networks are woven 
from separate national infrastructures that when linked together can function in a somewhat 
cohesive manner (to a varying or lesser degree depending on the actual case). The container 
network is a perfect example. As a second-order system the infrastructure of container movement 
is well suited to function globally. As already described, a second-order system works through 
more basic, already existing, “first-order” systems. This is an ideal way to succeed at a worldwide 
scale, given the multitude of preexisting national infrastructures so deeply set in place. The 
fragmentation of the world’s transport systems need not pose an insurmountable obstacle; on the 
contrary, those infrastructures are exploited by the container. The process is not without its 
strains and difficulties, as this dissertation will illustrate in the American context, but is far easier 
than creating new infrastructures from scratch would be. (Containerization is by no means the 
only second-order system to function on a worldwide scale—in fact the most celebrated global 
infrastructure of all, the internet, can be described as a second-order system.) Such a second-order 
global infrastructure reconciles the requirements of national and local conditions with the 
necessity for universal standards and an overarching international framework. 
The coexistence of global, national and local infrastructures in this age of globalization has 
been the focus of much scholarly attention since the 1990s. The most prominent school of thought 
is represented by “splintering urbanism,” introduced in the book of that name by Stephen 
Graham and Simon Marvin.8 The concept has been influential and is broadly emblematic of a 
certain way of thinking, widespread among scholars, about infrastructure in this period of 
                                                 
7 Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results,” in: Neil 
Brenner, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones, and Gordon MacLeod (eds.), State/Space: A Reader (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2003), pp. 54-55. 
8 Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin, Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities 
and the Urban Condition (London: Routledge, 2001). 
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neoliberalism and global connectivity. Splintering urbanism posits that neoliberal doctrine and a 
lack of social cohesion has led to the splintering of once unified national infrastructures, as the 
modern ideal of universally available infrastructure has faded away, replaced by tiered services 
and exclusionary enclaves. According to this view, wealthy elites are increasingly tied into 
premium global networks while others are left with deteriorating systems or nothing at all. 
“World-class” cities and elite enclaves gain ever better access to superior infrastructure, engaging 
more and more with the rest of the globe even as they disengage from regions and 
neighborhoods around them. 
Splintering urbanism presents a vision of simultaneous access and fragmentation, 
encompassing expanding worldwide networks and the deterioration of infrastructure and social 
unity. This resonates with real-world trends that are increasingly evident. It also recognizes the 
growth of local and regional autonomy in many places—at the expense of the nation-state—as 
such locations either link themselves into global networks or go into decline. But splintering 
urbanism has been criticized for romanticizing the modern era of supposedly universal 
infrastructure, exaggerating the nation-state’s decline, and cherry-picking contemporary 
examples to present an overly grim view. The case of containerization reveals a somewhat 
different situation, it being a global network that pervades the entirety of so many national 
infrastructures rather than being limited to certain places, enclaves or territories. Yet splintering 
urbanism’s vision is to some extent in sync with how this dissertation presents containerization: 
the container network allows national, regional and local qualities to coexist with an overarching 
global reality, and hence encompasses both fragmentation and unity. 
The best accounts of global infrastructure take into account the agency of the national and the 
local, and understand globalization as the results of many actors operating at a variety of scales. 
Here splintering urbanism often falls short, as do many other theories of globalization both 
scholarly and popular, because it tends to assume neoliberalism and other global trends are 
imposed in top-down fashion or become pervasive in some unstoppable way. The activities of 
those in the local, regional and national spheres consequently are limited to how they respond to 
these larger outside forces. In this paradigm, power and agency invariably come from 
somewhere else, some mysterious distant location. While splintering urbanism is valuable in its 
attention to local scenarios, too often it fails to grant them their own measure of power and 
agency. This dissertation attempts to go further by regarding the local, regional and national not 
merely as recipients of globalization, nor as inevitably resisting it, but as active agents in the 
construction of the global. I draw upon the ideas of several scholars in advancing this view with 
regard to infrastructure. Two of particular value are Steven Erie and Julie Cidell. In his book 
Globalizing L.A., Erie narrates how the Los Angeles region has actively built up key 
infrastructures in order to make itself into a global node.9 In a series of articles, Cidell shows that 
                                                 
9 Steven P. Erie, Globalizing L.A.: Trade, Infrastructure, and Regional Development (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2004). 
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the growth of the logistics industry in exurban areas outside Chicago (and elsewhere) depends on 
the character of those places, and the decisions made by their leaders and citizens.10 
A problematic aspect of some globalization literature is a tendency to oppose global “space” 
with local “place”—the former portrayed as a smooth abstract matrix upon which capital and 
other global actors operate, the latter as the repository of cultural heritage and human-centered 
life. In this vision it is inevitably global space that is proactive and represents the future, while 
local place can only react and symbolizes the dying past. Curiously, both proponents and critics 
of globalization typically reinforce this simplistic view, disagreeing only as to whether it is a 
good thing or not. More perceptive writers look deeper. The work of Erie and Cidell on 
infrastructure has been noted, but of course many insightful scholars on globalization are based 
in the social sciences and do not study technology or infrastructure at all. Two of note are 
Michael Peter Smith and Doreen Massey. Smith’s work on the world-spanning networks of 
immigrant groups demonstrates that the global and local are intertwined rather than opposed, 
and that globalization is often constructed from below rather than above.11 Massey’s widely read 
essay “A Global Sense of Place” gives a thoughtful and nuanced view of how local place 
intersects with globalization, arguing against static and traditional conceptions of place.12 
My account of the shipping container’s position in American infrastructure is indebted to 
such work, as I argue containerization in the U.S. context has not invariably transpired in a top-
down manner from the global to the national and local. Rather, rising container use has been 
shaped by the existing qualities of American infrastructure, geography, and even society and 
politics. This has not just happened at the national level, but also at regional and local scales—
that is to say, different regions and localities adopt the container in their own particular ways. 
They are certainly not free to ignore it, but have great flexibility and agency in terms of how they 
handle this new infrastructural object. In the course of making and carrying out these decisions, it 
is national, regional and local actors, rather than amorphous global forces, that actually do the 
bulk of the work in implementing globalization. In emphasizing this point, my argument owes 
much to the ideas of Saskia Sassen.13 The agency of the national is especially pronounced in my 
narrative because the U.S. actually played a foundational role in the creation of the globally 
                                                 
10 Julie Cidell, “Distribution Centers Among the Rooftops: The Global Logistics Network Meets the 
Suburban Spatial Imaginary,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 35, Iss. 4 (July 2011), 
pp. 832-851; Julie Cidell, “Flow and Pauses in the Urban Logistics Landscape: The Municipal Regulation of 
Shipping Container Mobilities,” Mobilities, Vol. 7, No. 2 (May 2012), pp. 233-245; Julie Cidell, “From 
Hinterland to Distribution Center: The Chicago Region’s Shifting Gateway Function,” in: Peter V. Hall and 
Markus Hesse (eds.), Cities, Regions and Flows (Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge, 2012), pp. 114-128. 
11 Michael Peter Smith, Transnational Urbanism: Locating Globalization (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001); Michael 
Peter Smith, “Power in Place: Retheorizing the Local and the Global,” in: Jan Lin and Christopher Mele 
(eds.), The Urban Sociology Reader (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 241-250. 
12 Doreen Massey, Space, Place and Gender (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), pp. 146-
156. 
13 Saskia Sassen, A Sociology of Globalization (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007); Saskia Sassen, 
Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages [updated ed.] (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2008). 
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standardized container. The container, at least in its contemporary form, has essentially 
American origins; European containers existed also, but the global standards for containers 
(especially for their dimensions) that developed in the mid-1960s derived primarily from 
American standards set only a few years earlier. 
This dissertation seeks to be attentive to the interplay between longstanding national 
infrastructure and emerging global infrastructure. It is not a narrative of the national and local 
being subsumed by global forces, but neither does it deny the remarkable power of globalization. 
I argue that globalization, despite the excessive rhetoric that at times accompanies it, is a 
profound and powerful phenomenon taking place, and that the shipping container is one of its 
signal tools. Yet I emphasize that the network of global container movement is built upon the 
existing domestic infrastructures of the nation-state (except for the segments of travel by ocean-
going ships). Because the container depends on particular modes of transportation for its actual 
movement, the container infrastructure by necessity must be constituted by those systems. The 
infrastructures that bind nations together possess their own distinctive qualities, and the 
container for the most part works within them, even though it also carries out alterations upon 
them. Globalization in this case does not act as an all-encompassing force that sweeps away all 
before it and creates a new reality from scratch, arising out of some qualities inherent to the 
global dynamic itself. On the contrary the global is often built upon, and shaped by, the 
characteristics and histories of national and local places. The national and local cannot ignore 
global forces completely, but they do possess the agency to reshape the global, or to determine 
their place within it. The process of globalized containerization has been a complex negotiation 





Chapter 2 ~ The Rise of the Container as a Global Standard 
 
The shipping container’s rise to prominence as a global standard has been rapid, paralleling 
many other transformations associated with globalization in the postwar era. A brief account of it 
will be provided in this chapter, so as to put the specific narrative of the dissertation—the 
container’s place in American infrastructure—in its larger context. The spatial aspects of the 
container, especially its particular spatial dimensions, will be emphasized, because this object’s 
importance is inherently spatial and material. The container works so well with multiple modes 
of transportation around the world due to an interlocking series of spatial systems that involve 
the spatial qualities not only of the container but also of the transport infrastructures that carry it. 
In the so-called “knowledge economy,” the container’s success reminds us of the enduring 
importance of the material realm. This is doubly the case because containers carry products and 
goods that are most assuredly physical and material in nature. 
There were sporadic early types of containers in Europe and the United States in the 
nineteenth century, used for goods that were transferred between trains and wagons, or between 
trains and barges that traveled on inland waterways. (Obviously the motor vehicle was not yet in 
use.) These containers were fairly small, generally between four and eight feet in each dimension, 
and constructed of various materials. Various innovators and transportation providers came up 
with their own designs, so broader standardization was out of the question. Around the turn of 
the century, the shipping industry began to use containers known as “lift vans” to transport 
household goods; these were larger, roughly 10’-20’ long with a width and height of five to eight 
feet, and moved on ships, trains and wagons. All these instances of containerization were quite 
limited in scope—there was no widespread adoption or use. In general the modes of 
transportation remained unchanged; the container would ride on a normal train flatcar, a normal 
flatbed truck, or a normal ship or barge. The typical procedures for holding and securing large 
freight objects in place were used, which was often time-consuming and labor-intensive. Use of 
the container was not sufficiently widespread to make it worthwhile to design railcars, wagons or 
ships specially for it. The transfer of early containers from one mode of transportation to another 
was also cumbersome and somewhat ad-hoc, usually involving cranes or some other mechanized 
device. Until the 1920s these efforts to use containers were tentative and quite limited.1 
Broadly speaking, this early evolution of the shipping container proceeded along two lines. 
One approach was the gradual enlargement of boxes and crates, so that they eventually morphed 
                                                 
1 John H. White, Jr., “The Magic Box: Genesis of the Container,” Railroad History, No. 158 (Spring 1988), pp. 
75-78; Frank B. Norris, Spatial Diffusion of Intermodal Rail Technologies, PhD Dissertation, University of 
Washington (Geography), 1994, pp. 30-32. 
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into something bigger, a shipping container. The other approach stemmed from the desire to 
carry a wagon or truck by rail or ship, coupled with the realization that the wheels were a waste 
of space and so one could merely carry the portion holding the freight itself, which amounted to 
a shipping container. In either case, one essential quality of the container was its ability to keep 
its cargo protected from all sorts of weather; unlike most boxes and crates, which are meant to be 
placed inside trailers, boxcars or ships’ holds while they travel, the container was, and of course 
still is, designed to be exposed. This ties to another basic and important quality of the container 
that was evident from the start: it is fundamentally an object that is attached to a transport device, 
such as a railcar or truck, rather than being held within that device. (In shipping admittedly this 
is not so much the case, but most containers on a ship are still exposed to the elements.) The use 
of cranes, and other mechanized devices for lifting and moving containers, was also crucial in the 
development and use of these early containers, as the strategy of containerization obviously fails 
if the transfer of freight between transport modes is too burdensome. Unlike most boxes, crates, 
sacks and so on, the shipping container even in its earliest (and smallest) iterations was typically 
too heavy to be lifted by human muscle power. 
In these halting early attempts at containerization, the beginning of the intermodal approach 
to freight transportation is visible. Intermodalism is a way of handling transportation that seeks 
to improve the transport infrastructure by making the varied modes of transportation work 
better with each other, in cooperation rather than competition. The intermodal vision, which is 
applicable for both freight and passenger transportation, sees the overall transportation 
infrastructure holistically in its entirety, and focuses not on bettering individual modes but rather 
improving the overall system. This involves better coordination of the overall network, and most 
of all it involves the development of better transfers and connections between the various 
transport modes. Intermodalism as a new practice of transportation is discussed in greater depth 
near the end of the dissertation, in chapter 12. What should be understood here is that intermodal 
transportation is by its nature far more seamless than traditional approaches, because the links 
between different transport infrastructures are no longer barriers that are costly and time-
consuming in nature, but instead function to quickly shift people or cargo from one mode to 
another. With regard to freight transportation, what makes these links nearly seamless is 
primarily the use of techniques, containerization being by far the most important, that render it 
unnecessary to unload and reload the freight itself. (In fact, in American freight transportation 
today the term “intermodal” usually refers to use of the container, or to the hauling of 
containers.) 
By the 1920s the railroad companies, dominant in overland transportation since the mid-
1800s, were under competition from rapidly expanding automobile use. In the business of freight, 
the railroads could not ignore the growing threat from trucking. The animosity between the two 
modes made cooperation difficult, but railroads in both the U.S. and Europe made some efforts to 
gain traffic by coordinating with, rather than competing against, trucking. (It was primarily the 
railroads that carried out this strategy, as they were large corporations with deep pockets and 
long-distance networks while trucking firms were usually small.) There were—and still are—
 14 
basically two ways to do this, both falling under the intermodal concept. The most obvious is by 
carrying entire truck trailers (or even entire trucks) on train flatcars. (A similar practice was 
occasionally done earlier, before the days of the motor vehicle, with wagons being carried on 
trains—the horses were put in a boxcar, or new horses were used at the destination.) The other 
method is to utilize the shipping container, a giant box analogous to a trailer without its wheels 
and other external fittings. In either case the objective is for each transport mode to do what it 
does best: the train carries its cargo a long distance over a fixed route economically, while the 
truck picks up cargo at its origin and/or drops it off at its destination, moving flexibly as needed. 
The key advantage is that the cargo need not be unloaded and reloaded, and is shifted quickly 
from one mode to another. Some clarification of terminology is in order here: when a trailer is 
carried on a railcar this is termed trailer-on-flatcar or TOFC, though it is more widely and 
informally known as “piggyback,” and when a container is carried on a flatcar this is termed 
container-on-flatcar or COFC. 
The first use of piggyback in the U.S. came in 1926, when it was introduced by the Chicago 
North Shore and Milwaukee Railroad.2 By this time some large trucks were composed of a tractor 
and trailer rather than consisting of one unit, and so it was logical for the train to only carry the 
trailer, not the tractor with it. Another driver and tractor would be arranged to pick up the trailer 
once it arrived at the end of its rail trip. Containers that were interchanged between trains and 
trucks had entered service slightly earlier in the decade, and came to be used by a few carriers 
during the 1920s and ‘30s. These containers were small, generally between four and ten feet in 
each dimension. The two most prominent container users were the great rivals the New York 
Central Railroad and the Pennsylvania Railroad, each of which introduced and utilized its own 
particular system. The idea of containerization though promising was generally not profitable 
during these years, and container use declined over the course of the 1930s. But the practice of 
piggyback rose concurrently, indicating the benefit of the intermodal approach. The use of 
containerization and piggyback in the 1920s and ‘30s is described in much greater detail in 
chapter 5, in the context of the American rail infrastructure, as it was the railroad companies that 
generally developed and controlled these systems. 
Another explanation of terminology will be made. In the freight transportation business, 
particularly in industry and professional journals, the word “shipper” refers to the company or 
person whose goods are being shipped (and who is paying for the shipment), not the 
transportation company actually moving the goods. In the real world of course the term is used 
more loosely and broadly, but in this dissertation I try to be consistent with the way the word is 
used in the industry. The word “shipping” refers in the most general sense to the act of moving 
freight, packages, goods or cargo by any transport mode. As the word has transcended its origins 
in water-based movement, there is some ambiguity about how to refer to the companies that 
                                                 
2 Brian Solomon, Intermodal Railroading (St. Paul, MN: Voyageur Press [MBI Publishing], 2007), pp. 27-29;  
David J. DeBoer, Piggyback and Containers: A History of Rail Intermodal on America’s Steel Highway (San 
Marino, CA: Golden West Books, 1992), pp. 17-18. Some sources give later dates (even in the 1950s) for the 
first piggyback service, but they are incorrect. 
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provide ocean shipping. Within the industry the terms “steamship company” or “steamship line” 
are considered proper and often used, although these are something of an anachronism since the 
ships no longer actually use steam engines. The terms “shipping company” or “shipping line” are 
also used for this purpose, and though their meaning is arguably ambiguous with regard to the 
mode of transportation it seems sufficiently self-evident that I use this option. Thus in this 
dissertation I generally refer to a company that operates ocean-going ships as a “shipping 
company” or “shipping line.” 
Driven by the need for efficient, rapid and well-organized freight movement at a worldwide 
scale, the U.S. military has often played an innovative role in cargo transport. Today’s global 
freight networks possess a similarity to the approaches pioneered for warlike purposes, and it is 
no coincidence that the term “logistics” has a military derivation. The unitization of cargo 
progressed during World War II thanks to the tremendous demands of the American military as 
it sought to fight a worldwide war on two fronts. The main result was a huge boost in the use of 
the forklift and the pallet, two intertwined technologies. But there was some experimental use of 
containers also, and in the late 1940s and early ‘50s the American military continued with this, 
introducing the small CONEX container (known in early iterations as the “Transporter”) with an 
8’-6” length, 6’-3” width and 6’-10½” height, and a capacity of about 9,000 pounds. CONEX 
containers were carried by ship, train and truck on global routes of movement, and were used 
during the Korean War and well into the Vietnam War (when their use overlapped with the 
newer full-size containers that ultimately replaced them). They could be stacked three-high and 
were generally carried by normal ships, trucks and trains, usually exposed to the elements (such 
as in a gondola railcar, flatbed/pickup truck, or ship’s deck) as they were weatherproof. 
Eventually the military explored a few ideas for trucks and other equipment specially designed 
to carry these containers. The use of CONEX containers appears to be the first large-scale 
network of containerization operated on a worldwide basis over multiple transport modes.3 
In the 1950s both piggyback and containerization reemerged in the domestic U.S. railroads, 
thanks partly to the “Twenty Questions Case” in which the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) reversed an earlier ruling and made intermodal cooperation involving trains and trucks 
easier. Consequently a few railroads began using containers again, most notably the New York 
Central Railroad with its Flexi-Van container. But the event of more lasting significance during 
this decade was the introduction of containers in ocean shipping. This was not a completely new 
phenomenon, as already noted, for the lift vans of the early 1900s usually traveled by ship, and 
the U.S. military was using CONEX containers on multiple modes including ships. A variety of 
other large boxes and crates that were sometimes categorized as shipping containers were also 
used in the marine industry. But the ocean-going containers introduced in the 1950s were used 
                                                 
3 Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Transportation, “CONEX: A Milestone in Unitization” (“TC 
in the Current National Emergency: The Post-Korean Experience”), March 27, 1957; Joseph Bykofsky, 
“Conex: A Milestone in Unitization,” National Defense Transportation Journal, May-June 1958, pp. 49-73; U.S. 
Army Transportation Museum [website], “History & Development of the Container.” 
(http://www.transchool.eustis.army.mil/MUSEUM/CONEX.htm, accessed 6/8/08). 
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on a far larger scale—especially when, as quickly became the case, they were carried on a 
container ship (sometimes written as one word, i.e., “containership”) specially designed to hold 
them. A container ship is not just a ship that happens to be carrying some containers on deck or 
even in its hold, but a ship entirely designed for carrying containers. 
Though the shipping industry introduced these marine containers, they were meant to travel 
by domestic modes of transportation as well. The objective was for the cargo to journey from 
origin to destination, not merely from port to port, in keeping with containerization’s ability to 
utilize multiple transport modes and speed up the transfer of cargo between them. The container 
also served the purpose of loading and unloading ships faster, more cheaply, and with far fewer 
workers—compared to traditional “breakbulk” methods of loading shipboard cargo, the 
container is dramatically more efficient. This was highly desirable to the shipping lines, but less 
appealing to legions of dockworkers whose jobs would ultimately be lost. The decimation of 
longshoremen’s employment through containerization and automation was not coincidental, but 
integral to the new object and the technologies surrounding it. 
The new generation of containers that emerged in the 1950s, including those introduced by 
both the shipping companies and railroads, were generally much bigger than their predecessors, 
mainly because truck trailers (whose dimensions were pivotal to container size, as will be 
described later in the dissertation) had grown larger. Hence these containers were generally 
about 8’ wide and 8’ high, and anywhere between 20’ and 40’ in length. Smaller containers like 
CONEX did linger for a time—and a few new container designs were small, as will be noted—
but the general trend was for larger units. In various European countries, where containerization 
also gained modest impetus in the 1950s and ‘60s, the size of containers did not make this leap 
and typically remained small. This was the case in Japan as well. The United Kingdom was an 
exception, as British Railways introduced larger containers in the mid-1960s. 
It was several companies in the Pacific Northwest that first carried containers in large 
quantities over the water—albeit in coastal shipping rather than across the ocean—and 
interchanged them with land-based transportation networks. One was the White Pass and Yukon 
Corporation of Canada, a railroad that began to develop an interest in containerization in the 
early 1950s, and in 1955 initiated container operations. The company even commissioned its own 
ship, the Clifford J. Rogers, which was specially designed to carry containers (along with some 
other cargo) and surely ranks as one of the first true container ships.4 With the involvement of 
                                                 
4 There is surprisingly little consensus on the identity of the first container ship. Norris argues that it was the 
Clifford J. Rogers; see Frank B. Norris, “Cargoes North: Containerization and Alaska’s Postwar Shipping 
Crisis,” Alaska History, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 1992), p. 24. But this appears to be incorrect, as Levinson points 
to container ships introduced by a Danish shipping line in 1951, which carried food and beer between 
Danish ports, as the first. See Marc Levinson, The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and 
the World Economy Bigger (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 31. Van Ham and Rijsenbrij 
describe these two Danish ships and their small wooden containers in slightly more detail, noting that the 
ships also carried passengers. See Hans van Ham and Joan Rijsenbrij, Development of Containerization: Success 
Through Vision, Drive and Technology (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2012), pp. 6-7. Levinson also mentions (in an 
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trucking as well, the White Pass and Yukon created a remarkable and well-coordinated network 
of container movement that utilized all three modes of transportation. The company’s containers 
were small, however, being 8’ x 8’ x 7’ in size.5 Another pioneer was the Alaska Steamship 
Company, known as “Alaska Steam,” which ran between Seattle and several Alaskan ports. In 
1951 it started a service in collaboration with the trucking firm Ocean Van Lines carrying 30’ 
containers, and in 1953 abandoned this partnership and began working with the Alaska Railroad 
to move much smaller containers. In 1956 Alaska Steam began carrying 24’ containers, also in 
cooperation with the Alaska Railroad. Meanwhile the trucking and barge company Alaska 
Freight Lines took possession of many of the Ocean Van Lines containers and began its own 
containerized operation.6 
These innovations were still limited to a fairly small scale, but in 1956 a more important and 
influential figure emerged: Malcom McLean, who began his Sea-Land container service in that 
year. (His original first name was Malcolm but for some reason he changed the spelling to 
Malcom in 1950.) A former trucker and trucking executive, McLean was well suited to perceive 
the merits of more efficient freight transfer between land and water; by his own account he came 
up with the concept of the container while waiting impatiently at a port for his truckload of cargo 
to be placed on a ship. Often called the “father” or “inventor” of the shipping container, McLean 
does not merit such a title (as should be already evident) by any reasonable criteria. It was his 
impetus, however, that played a key role in building the gradual momentum for successful, 
profitable and widespread container use around the world. The trend to container use was 
clearly growing over the course of the 1950s, and McLean in a sense was only one of many, in 
both ocean and land-based shipping, who innovated with containers. But his greater degree of 
success and larger scale of operation represented a turning point.  
Sea-Land’s earliest container runs were between the Northeast and the Southeast, generally 
from Newark to the Gulf Coast or Florida; as with the pioneers of the Pacific Northwest, McLean 
initially engaged in coastal shipping. (Originally these container operations were part of 
McLean’s Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation and merely branded “Sea-Land,” but the 
corporate name was soon changed to Sea-Land Service.) His first ship, the Ideal-X, was a 
converted tanker that carried 33’-long containers upon a special deck designed for them, but the 
containers were not stacked nor were they carried in the ship’s hull. The Ideal-X’s first voyage 
carrying containers was in April of 1956. About a year later Sea-Land introduced its first true 
container ships, with vertical “cells” in the hull where containers, now 35’ in length (as Sea-Land 
containers would remain for a long time), were stacked upon each other. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
endnote) that some identify the Alaska Steamship Company’s Susitna, which carried small containers, as the 
first container ship; see Levinson, The Box, p. 292 (endnote 25). 
5 Canadian Transportation, “The Ms. Clifford J. Rogers,” Vol. 59, Iss. 1 (January 1956), pp. 48-49, 51; Canadian 
Transportation, “The Year in 1954 for White Pass and Yukon,” Vol. 58, Iss, 8 (August 1955), pp. 425-427; 
Norris, “Cargoes North,” pp. 22-24. 
6 Norris, “Cargoes North,” pp. 19-22; Edwin M. Fitch, The Alaska Railroad (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 




Figure 2.1: Early Sea-Land containers being loaded on the ship’s deck 
 
Source: Arthur Donovan and Joseph Bonney, The Box That Changed the World: Fifty Years of Container Shipping—An 
Illustrated History (East Windsor, NJ: Commonwealth Business Media [The Journal of Commerce], 2006), p. 60 
 
Not long afterwards another domestic marine shipper began using containers, as the Matson 
Navigation Company introduced containerization on its routes between Hawaii and the West 
Coast. Matson unlike Sea-Land was a well-established shipping line, having long engaged in 
both passenger and freight transport. The company had been considering containerization for 
several years, and news of Sea-Land’s innovations in the East was probably an additional spur. In 
1958 Matson started carrying 24’-long containers on the decks of its existing ships, while 
continuing to carry most cargo in the holds below. Finding that containerization did not mix well 
with the traditional breakbulk style of carrying freight, Matson introduced container ships in 
1960. Though Matson was moving containers on domestic routes (Hawaii being part of the U.S.), 
these voyages across the ocean differed from the coastal shipping of Sea-Land; where coastal 
shipping was a substitute for rail or road-based transportation, a voyage over the sea was another 
matter. The next logical step was to carry containers across the ocean between different 
continents, but one problem facing such an idea was how to move containers in the domestic 
land-based infrastructures on each side. 
The challenge of moving containers on such global trajectories was taken up by others in the 
early 1960s. Morris Forgash, president of the United States Freight Company, was already one of 
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the foremost proponents of intermodalism. As a freight forwarder Forgash could not implement 
container use entirely on his own, but his experience was in working with freight transport 
companies and linking them with customers. In 1960 he started moving containers from the U.S. 
to Japan; the cargo traveled from New York to Los Angeles by rail, across the Pacific to 
Yokohama by ship, and to its final destinations in Japan by truck. Forgash emphasized that his 
new service gave shippers the simplicity of one single bill of lading for the entire journey.7 In 
1959 the Flexi-Van containers of the New York Central, already in extensive domestic use by rail 
and truck, began to be carried on ships across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. By 1964 this service 
was established on a regular basis, with several shipping lines carrying the containers.8 A few 
other types of containers were also traveling on international voyages by the mid-1960s, at least 
on a sporadic basis. United States Lines, one of the major shipping companies, experimented with 
carrying containers that had been put into use by the Southern Railway, and the American 
military began moving containers across the Atlantic to support its Cold War presence in 
Europe.9 But none of these transnational services involved container ships; the containers were 
carried as special cargo on regular ships and generally placed on the deck, being waterproof by 
design and furthermore too large to pass through the hatches into the hold. It was not until 1966 
that container ships would enter international shipping, making possible the advent of large-
scale containerization on a worldwide basis. 
The greatest obstacle to global use of the shipping container ultimately was not the need to 
build container ships, nor any other technical challenge. Rather, the primary challenge was that 
of standardizing the container on a worldwide basis, so users around the globe would be 
working with the same object, and could handle containers from any source with assurance that 
the containers would fit their equipment. Into the mid-1960s, the tendency was for multiple types 
of containers to exist—each company, whether a shipping line, railroad or other innovator, 
designed its own container, one ideally suited to its own needs. The differences between 
container types were not great, but nonetheless enough to prevent interchange between users. 
Each system was therefore a closed system—a container ship designed to hold Sea-Land 
containers could not handle Matson containers, a railcar meant to carry a Flexi-Van container 
could not accommodate an Alaska Steam container, and so on. This was acceptable so long as 
containerization was a limited phenomenon only carried out by a few isolated users, but as it 
become widespread the inefficiencies were obvious. The various corporations could not agree on 
standards, nor could industry trade groups; the need for government and institutional 
intervention was obvious, however bitterly some in the private sector might oppose it. 
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The U.S. Federal Maritime Board began the first initiatives towards container standardization 
in 1958, and its role was soon taken over by the American Standards Association (the ASA, later 
to become the American National Standards Institute or ANSI), the nonprofit organization that is 
preeminent in establishing and maintaining standards in the U.S. With its powerful influence and 
widespread acceptance among businesspeople, bureaucrats and engineers, the decisions of the 
ASA were likely to be definitive. After vigorous debates, the ASA in 1961 announced standard 
container lengths of 10’, 20’, 30’ and 40’, and a standard width and height of 8’. U.S. trucking 
regulations of the time were crucial to this, as the maximum length for a trailer was 40’ and the 
maximum width 8’, if it were to travel on the roads of every state. The 8’ height was the product 
of various considerations, including how the vertical clearance on U.S. roads would relate to a 
container being hauled on a flatbed trailer. (The ASA also intended for containers to move on 
railroad flatcars, but the smaller allowable dimensions for trucking in comparison to rail made it 
the limiting factor.) In short, the dimensional qualities of the American trucking and road 
infrastructure at the dawn of the 1960s determined the size of this shipping container. Sea-Land 
and Matson objected to the new standards, which did not fit with the containers they were using, 
and though they gained some measure of relief they would in the long run gradually switch to 
the standard dimensions. It was the ASA’s specified height that proved most controversial, as 
most of the shipping companies preferred a height of 8’-6”, since a container of that height was 
within U.S. road clearances if it were carried on a chassis appropriately designed for it.10 
The International Organization for Standardization, better known as the ISO (not an acronym 
strictly speaking, but a sort of abbreviation), started its own effort to create a globally 
standardized container soon after the ASA standards were in place. This was an even greater 
challenge, as it was necessary to anticipate the issues containers might face under varied 
conditions in a multitude of countries. Although North America and Europe exerted the greatest 
influence, and were clearly most likely to adopt containerization swiftly, the ISO’s objective was 
for the container to be able to function in the infrastructures of nations all around the world. ISO 
committee TC-104 handled this process over the course of the 1960s, with final agreement more 
or less being reached in 1967. Deciding on the container’s size was the biggest challenge. The 
Europeans in general permitted slightly wider trailers on their roadways than Americans, and 
furthermore an 8’-wide container was not wide enough for two of their standard-size pallets to 
rest side-by-side. Naturally they campaigned for a wider container, but since most countries 
around the world adhered to a maximum trailer width very close to 8’ the Europeans had to give 
way on this point, and the ISO set a width of 8’. The multiple ASA standards for length of 10’, 20’, 
30’ and 40’ were also accepted by the ISO; in the long run it would be the 40’ and 20’ lengths that 
came to be widely used, while the 10’ and 30’ options never gained traction and faded away. 
Height became a point of contention once again, as most shipping lines were ignoring the ASA’s 
8’ height and using 8’-6” high containers instead. Generally the 8’-6” height was workable in 
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Europe, though a few railroad bridges were only high enough for the 8’ height. The ISO initially 
chose to adhere to the 8’ height, making it the standard. But many shipping lines and other 
container users continued to use 8’-6” high containers, even as they gradually adopted the other 
ISO standards for the container. Consequently the ISO in 1969 reversed course and made the 8’-
6” height a standard as well, and it quickly became the dominant height while the 8’ dimension 
was essentially abandoned. The ISO also approved and made standard two “alternative” types of 
containers: one that duplicated containers used in some Soviet Bloc nations, and another similar 
to containers used on certain European railroads. These containers were of a smaller size and not 




Figure 2.2: A typical 40’ ISO global shipping container 
 
Source: Matt Hannes, The Intermodal Container Web Page (http://www.matts-
place.com/intermodal/part1/images/nc/nyku6572194.jpg, accessed 9/21/09) (Note: There 
is no connection between this person and the dissertation author, in spite of their similar names.) 
 
The new ISO standards, therefore, replicated the ASA sizes (and also used the corner castings 
set forth by the ASA, based on a design already in use by Sea-Land). However, the ISO did 
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conclude that some improvements in strength were necessary, so the new ISO shipping container 
was not an exact copy of the ASA version.12 Nevertheless it followed the ASA container closely, 
especially in terms of size—and the ASA container had in turn derived precisely from the 
American trucking system. So a key point should be stressed: the standard global shipping 
container in use today, numbering in the millions and traveling around the world and into nearly 
every country, reflects in an exact way the allowable dimensions (at least in terms of length and 
width) for a trailer on American highways in the early 1960s. It is a subtle yet revealing instance 
of the global influence of the U.S. in what is sometimes termed the “American Century.” 
When an invention evolves into the foundational component of an infrastructure it is far 
more than a technological accomplishment, as it becomes enmeshed in a complex and 
multifaceted system involving social practices, bureaucratic regimes, and organizational 
structures. This is especially true for the container—after all, there was no technical innovation 
involved in creating this generic steel box, and so it was primarily about standardization and 
cooperation, with all the bureaucratic, social and political factors that implies. While the idea was 
innovative, containers were used in the 1920s and precursors go back to the nineteenth century, 
so the concept itself evidently meant little until other necessary factors ripened in the 1950s and 
‘60s. Where most inventions are created laboriously through some sort of scientific or 
technological breakthrough—often later molded into an inspiring narrative of a solitary inventor 
struck by inspiration and persisting through hard work—this was not what transpired with the 
shipping container. There simply was no technology to invent. 
This is obviously not the case with many of the systems and devices underpinning 
globalization, which usually have involved fundamental technological and/or scientific advances. 
The internet is at present presumably the most obvious example, but of course numerous others 
can be identified. Such inventions and technologies do not directly bring about globalization in a 
purely deterministic sense, but they certainly make it possible—if not probable. Some are not so 
obvious. For example, the giant and fast-moving ships containers travel on have been made 
possible by the diesel engine, which represented a great advance over previous engine 
technologies. This enabled a tremendous and unprecedented movement of cargo over the 
world’s oceans—not only by container ships, but also oil tankers and specialized bulk carriers.13 It 
was a technological breakthrough, followed by constant improvements, that made all this 
feasible. With the container the matter is entirely different; the notion of invention, at least in the 
technological sense that one typically associates with “invention,” is hardly relevant. Rather the 
main issues involve gaining cooperation between transport providers, creating the technical 
capacity around containers (such as cranes), adjusting the domestic infrastructure to carry 
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containers (new railcars, trailer chassis, etc.), and transforming the shipping industry (both ships 
and ports) to handle containers. Standardization is a central part of these processes. 
With the ISO standard finally in place assuring the worldwide uniformity and 
interchangeability of containers, their worldwide use started to pick up markedly in the late 
1960s. It did take some time for the ISO container to become dominant, though, as Sea-Land and 
Matson, the two largest container users among the shipping companies, continued to use their 
own closed systems. Meanwhile in Europe it took some time for smaller containers to be phased 
out. On the other hand, many of the shipping lines and other innovators had already begun using 
the new standard in the early 1960s, as soon as (or even before) the ASA officially put it in place. 
Morris Forgash’s aforementioned container service for global shipments that began in 1960, for 
example, used 20’ and 40’ containers compatible with the ASA standards under development at 
that time.14 
Governments, global organizations and nonprofit institutions played crucial roles in 
standardizing the container; their presence was critical in boosting container use on a global 
level. The container would have achieved worldwide success and uniformity through a far 
longer, more protracted and painful process had it been left up to the private sector. The point is 
especially relevant because common narratives of the container’s development tend to assign a 
heroic role to Malcom McLean, giving credit almost entirely to this corporate innovator. This 
facile interpretation fits a myth of free-market innovation, enshrined comfortably in neoliberal 
ideology. Many governments and nonprofits were in fact every bit as important as the private 
sector in establishing the container, and furthermore were equally innovative in its use. For 
example, Malcom McLean was only able to establish his original container service in 1956 thanks 
to the foresight of the Port of New York Authority (later the Port Authority of New York and 
New Jersey), which saw the concept’s potential and agreed to construct a special container 
terminal at Newark. This case is exemplary, for it reveals that the public and private sectors each 
had a vital role to play, and that rather than being separate or opposed they were often 
intertwined. 
The struggles of engineers and policy-makers to decide on a particular container standard, 
especially in terms of its size, strength and fittings, were very substantial, and spanned several 
years, first in the U.S. and then globally through the ISO. The ultimate result reflected conditions 
and needs from all over the world, but particularly revealed the input of First World nations and 
most especially the power of the U.S. There was nothing inevitable about the container’s final 
form—it did not reflect an ideal solution, but rather a process of cooperation, compromise and 
contestation. Clearly it was an adequate solution, but in such a case there is no way to precisely 
define the perfect, logical solution. (The ISO’s decision to create a standard that comprised 
multiple, modular sizes, i.e., the 10’, 20’, 30’ and 40’ lengths, was an acknowledgment of this, and 
a wise way to hedge their bets.) But once the standard was in place it acquired a massive 
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technological momentum of its own. Nations and transportation providers around the world had 
no choice but to accept the container’s size and other qualities as instituted by the ISO. 
The standardization of the shipping container by the ISO was essential to its global success. 
For containerization to really take off at a worldwide level standardization was necessary, and it 
is no surprise that large-scale global container movement began in the late 1960s, the same period 
when the ISO was wrapping up its standardization process. In 1966 several shipping companies 
began carrying large volumes of containers on the North Atlantic routes between the U.S. and 
Europe. The first was Moore-McCormack Lines, which in February of that year placed 130 
twenty-foot containers on the deck of a ship traveling between the U.S. and Europe, and 
announced that this would be done on a regular basis. This still does not qualify as a true 
container ship, however, for even though the containers were stacked on each other they rested 
only on the deck, and most of the ship’s cargo was down below stored in breakbulk fashion.15 
In the meantime the prominent shipping company United States Lines (generally known as 
U.S. Lines) was at work secretly converting four of its breakbulk ships into container ships, 
complete with cells for containers below deck. These ships were able to carry 206 twenty-foot 
containers, of which roughly half were carried in the cells below the deck and half on the deck, 
while they could handle some traditional cargo in addition. In March of 1966 one of these ships, 
the American Racer, embarked from New York to Europe, and the other three ships entered 
service soon after. Though sources are vague (and differ slightly) with regard to how much of 
their cargo was in containers versus breakbulk in these early voyages, these ships are classified as 
container ships because they had cells in their holds for carrying containers, and the American 
Racer’s initial voyage is generally seen as the start of full-fledged international container 
shipping.16 (Two earlier examples of the transnational use of container ships should be noted. 
First, as already mentioned, a few container ships were involved in coastal shipping between the 
U.S. and Canada in the 1950s and ‘60s. Second, the New York-based Grace Line in 1960 began a 
service to Venezuela using its own 17’-long containers and two container ships, but 
longshoremen in that nation refused to cooperate, hardly any containers were loaded or 
unloaded, and the company eventually gave up and sold the ships to Sea-Land.17) 
Sea-Land had also been making preparations, spurred on by Malcom McLean’s eagerness. 
Unlike U.S. Lines, Sea-Land had no tradition of shipping to Europe, but it did have the most 
extensive experience with containers of any line. Indeed, rumors of Sea-Land’s imminent 
container service between Europe and the U.S. was a factor motivating several other companies 
to prepare for containerization in the North Atlantic. In April of 1966 Sea-Land’s Fairland, 
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converted from a conventional cargo ship into a container ship with a capacity of 226 containers, 
departed Elizabeth, New Jersey for Europe. This was the first all-container ship to cross the 
Atlantic, and marked the beginning of Sea-Land operations involving four ships.18 European 
shipping companies lagged only slightly behind their American competitors, as a group of 
European carriers created the Atlantic Container Line (ACL), a joint venture, in 1966. (Such 
consortiums helped spread out the costs of container shipping, which were substantial—ships 
had to be converted or new ones built, cranes and other new equipment had to be installed either 
on ships or at ports, and port terminals needed to be redesigned.) During 1967 a host of other 
lines joined the fray and container shipping across the Atlantic became well established; in this 
and the following years it would achieve dramatic gains and make large inroads into the 
breakbulk business.19 
Container service between North America and Asia was not far behind. In 1967 Sea-Land 
began working with the U.S. military to use container ships to bring supplies to the makeshift 
and badly congested ports of Vietnam; this rapidly grew into a booming business for the 
company and a valuable advance in logistics techniques for the military. Just a few months later 
in the same year Matson started the first commercial container ship service to Asia, hauling 
freight between Japan and the U.S. In 1968 the opportunistic McLean began carrying exports 
from Japan in containers as well, on ships that had to return across the Pacific from Vietnam 
anyway. Other shipping lines, both American and Japanese, quickly followed suit and adopted 
containerization during the late 1960s and early ‘70s. A bustling container trade between Asia 
and Europe also developed. Additional ports in Hong Kong, Singapore, the Philippines, Taiwan 
and South Korea started to receive container shipments, and before long Australia too was part of 
this Pacific network.20 The export-oriented economies of East Asia would exploit the container 
with great effectiveness in the years to come. 
Sea-Land and Matson continued for many years to use their own containers (35’ long for Sea-
Land, 24’ long for Matson) in their global shipping networks. Hence their systems were closed 
and incompatible with the ISO container system. But even as those two corporations pursued 
their own plans—and complained bitterly about standardization—virtually every other shipping 
line entering into containerization went with the ISO standard in the late 1960s, and most 
assuredly in the 1970s. Since Sea-Land and Matson enjoyed a head start in containerization, for a 
period in the late 1960s and early ‘70s a significant proportion of global container shipping was 
carried out with nonstandard containers, but nevertheless the overall trend was most definitely 
for the ISO standards. The existence of these global standards gave shipping lines, ports and 
policy-makers the confidence to plan, budget and build for a future of container use. (Sea-Land 
and Matson would eventually change over to the ISO standards as well.) 
                                                 
18 Levinson, The Box, pp. 164-165; Donovan and Bonney, The Box That Changed the World, p. 102; Cudahy, Box 
Boats, p. 87. 
19 Donovan and Bonney, The Box That Changed the World, pp. 102-105; Levinson, The Box, pp. 166-167. 





Figure 2.3: A contemporary container ship in port 
 
Source: Arthur Donovan and Joseph Bonney, The Box That Changed the World: Fifty Years of Container Shipping—An 
Illustrated History (East Windsor, NJ: Commonwealth Business Media [The Journal of Commerce], 2006), p. 161 
 
Once containerization was solidly established, and growing rapidly, the next step was to tie 
the disparate transport modes more tightly together, in particular bringing land-based domestic 
journeys more closely into the overall scheme of container movement. The other logical step was 
to exploit advances in information technology to better track, coordinate and control containers 
throughout their global trajectories. During the late 1970s and ‘80s the American shipping line 
American President Lines (APL) became a leader by addressing both issues. APL was not one of 
the original innovators in containerization but the company quickly made up for lost time, 
especially after W. Bruce Seaton became its president in 1977. Seaton and his fellow executives 
and technocrats realized the container had begun to make distinctions among modes of 
transportation, and between national territories, less relevant, as this object moved across all 
transport modes and into all nations. APL worked hard, and quite successfully, to gain greater 
control over its containers as they moved domestically within national territories, and to set up a 
systems of information-driven logistics that truly functioned effectively at the global scale. 
Regulatory shifts also made this approach possible, as it became allowable for a shipping 
company to issue one single bill of lading that covered an entire container voyage, rather than 
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just the waterborne segment.21 The high level of coordination that APL instituted was 
revolutionary, and presaged today’s tightly controlled supply chains. But APL’s heightened 
involvement in land-based transport modes rarely extended to direct ownership or formal 
control, and in general this has remained the case in the decades since; actors in the various 
infrastructures focus on their core expertise, and work within the geographic scale they are 
embedded in, even while cooperating extensively and sharing information with each other. 
Since the 1980s use of the shipping container has seen extraordinary growth that has been 
nearly constant aside from a few brief periods of stagnation during recessions. This is due to two 
factors. The first is the rapid and continuous growth in global trade, which obviously works to 
the benefit of the container. The second is the container’s progressively larger share of 
oceangoing cargo movement, as breakbulk has nearly disappeared on major routes. Nearly all 
normal freight goods moving by ship now travel in containers; only bulk freight such as oil, 
liquefied natural gas, coal, ore, cement, gravel, certain minerals, grain and some other food 
products move in ships designed specifically for them. (It should be noted these bulk goods 
constitute a very substantial portion of ocean shipping, both in terms of volume and value. 
Automobiles imported to be sold are also generally carried on ships specially designed for that 
purpose.) Advances in information technology have augmented the capacity to coordinate and 
optimize container movements. Ships have become progressively larger, reaching massive sizes, 
so that a typical container ship today holds several thousand containers. Ports likewise have 
grown greatly in size and complexity, and are increasingly located in exurban areas so they can 
sprawl over vast expanses of land. Just-in-Time manufacturing techniques, depending on the 
perfectly timed movement of parts and supplies, are applied at a global scale, and major retailers 
now run their worldwide movement of goods with equal precision. The shipping container is a 
key object in the complex, precise and fast-paced supply chains that encompass the globe, as it 
helps make swift and reliable transnational transportation, over numerous infrastructures, a 
reality. 
In addition to their dominant position in shipping over the ocean, containers have reached 
ever more deeply into domestic territories, moving along national infrastructures and exerting an 
impact upon them. Consequently containerization extends the reach of globalization deep and 
pervasively throughout national space. This topic, in the American context, is of course the 
subject of this dissertation. The container’s impact on these land-based domestic transport 
networks should not be seen as secondary to, or merely deriving from, its role in ocean shipping, 
for the container is fundamentally designed to function in these multiple infrastructures—it is not 
an object intended for shipping that by happy chance also can be carried on land. Indeed, it is 
arguably most fundamentally linked to the truck, not only because its dimensions come out of 
trucking (as has been detailed) but also because most container journeys begin and end on a truck 
(that is to say, the origin and destination are served by truck). 
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The most powerful and pervasive global infrastructures do not merely link nations together 
but also penetrate far inside them so that a multitude of places gain a connection to the global. 
The global becomes embedded at the local, regional and national scale. I argue the shipping 
container is a remarkably pertinent example. The container is successful by riding upon the 
existing domestic infrastructures of trucking and railroads (and to some degree barge shipping 
on inland waterways) in addition to ocean shipping. The most basic and fundamental qualities of 
these national infrastructures generally need not be altered to accommodate the container. But 
other aspects of the domestic transport systems must be modified or augmented. In the case of 
the railroad, for instance, the track gauge and a host of other dimensions can remain the same—
what must be developed is a railcar to carry the container. Normal flatcars can be used in the 
beginning if nothing else is available, but to carry containers in large quantities a railcar designed 
for that purpose is necessary. Such a railcar, customized for the container, can be regarded as an 
interface between the global infrastructure of containerization and the national infrastructure of 
the American rail network. The concept of an interface can be metaphorical, but this railcar also 
interfaces between the two systems in a very literal and physical fashion; it has connections and 
fittings, as well as the appropriate spatial size, to carry the container upon it, and meanwhile it 
has wheels and other equipment (such as inter-car connections) that fit with the national rail 
infrastructure. It works spatially with both the national railroad system and the global container 
system. 
The container represents a transportation network that is global rather than national (or 
regional, such as NAFTA or the European Union) in scale. This seemingly simple object’s ability 
to move in so many parts of the world is an extraordinary achievement. But, as already 
emphasized, the container achieves this success by working within the transport systems of 
nearly all nation-states. The container’s simple stripped-down quality—just a steel box, with no 
wheels, special details or unusual attachments—makes it amenable to being carried or handled 
by many different types of equipment. The result is an emerging global unity that depends on 
existing infrastructures which can remain in all their variety. This is eminently sensible, for to 
create a brand-new unified transportation system at a global scale (leaving aside the issue of the 
oceans that separate nations), whether through building new infrastructure or altering existing 
infrastructure, would be patently impossible. The challenge would be not only in the physical 
nature of the infrastructure itself—such as harmonizing the track gauges or making all highway 
lanes the same width—but also the equipment that runs upon the infrastructure, and the 
practices, regulations and traditions that go along with it. The container provides a better and far 
more feasible alternative, as a way to achieve globalization that functions through the preexisting 
national infrastructures and modes of transportation. As will be discussed in chapter 3, one way 
to understand this duality of containerization, a system in its own right that works entirely 
through other infrastructures, is to see it as a “second-order” system or “internetwork.” 
While the container’s original dimensions come out of U.S. infrastructure, the acceptance by 
the ISO of those dimensions would seem to indicate they were amenable to engineers and policy-
makers representing many nations. But given the sheer number of nations involved, it was 
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inevitable the container’s size would conflict with standards in a few places. The issue arose most 
commonly with trucking, as a few countries did not permit 8’-wide loads on any of their roads, 
even the highways. Switzerland and Paraguay were two examples.22 These nation-states were 
forced to give in (Switzerland did, and though information is lacking it is probable Paraguay did 
also) and alter their spatial constraints, at least on certain major roads. The difference was only a 
matter of an inch or two, so the change was primarily bureaucratic and regulatory—the roads did 
not need to be rebuilt. Modernizing export-oriented countries, such as those in East Asia, have 
built new infrastructure since the 1980s (if not earlier) with at least some awareness of the 
container and its dimensions. American infrastructure by contrast was obviously perfectly suited 
for the container, given that the container was developed with it in mind. Yet over time an ironic 
turnabout has taken place: the U.S. trucking and road system has become less ideal for the 
container, while the railroad system has been heavily modified to better accommodate it. The 
allowable dimensions for American trucks have expanded so greatly since the introduction of the 
container that today a truck hauling a standard global 40’ container is relatively inefficient. 
Meanwhile the double-stacking of containers on trains means that the vertical clearances of many 
U.S. rail lines have had to be raised, at great expense and effort. Subsequent chapters of the 
dissertation will describe and analyze these processes in detail. 
This new global infrastructure, the network of container movement, utilizes the existing 
transport pathways of the nation-state, which are embedded in the national scale and possess 
their own character that relates to the history and geography of the U.S. Their meaning is altered 
slightly as containerization ties them more directly into a worldwide network, especially when 
the desire to accommodate the container leads to particular changes. A previously little-used 
railroad line may find itself of heightened importance due to container traffic, leading to 
extensive modifications such as the addition of a second track and improved signaling. A 
highway may be extended many additional miles so as to provide a link to a port city previously 
not seen as meriting such a connection. Specific nodes and bottlenecks along these routes are also 
important, especially when congestion, caused largely by container traffic, creates the need for 
them to be improved or reconstructed. The dissertation will explore numerous examples of such 
routes and nodes. This geographical scenario reveals that for the most part the container succeeds 
by using preexisting systems. Yet the way in which it does so is revealing, and the modifications 
that are made to those systems are of importance. It could be a trailer chassis that holds a 
container just a few inches lower than otherwise, allowing it to fit within vertical highway 
clearances—or it could be extensive work along a railroad line hundreds of miles long, to bring it 
to a higher standard for more efficient container movement. Either way, the American 
infrastructure is adjusted to better suit the container. 
By its very workings, and in its historical development, the shipping container reveals 
something of the nature of globalization. The place of the nation-state in this ongoing process is 
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significant, as should already be evident. The new global network of containerization is not 
imposed fresh upon a slate wiped clean to receive the brave new world of globalization. Instead 
the container system is strung together out of national infrastructures, along with ocean-going 
shipping, to form a whole that is composed of disparate and place-specific components. This is 
somewhat different from the historical process of nation-building in which so many of our basic 
and most important infrastructures were forged. No matter how incremental the creation of a 
national infrastructure may have been, the final result was typically a unified system. Such unity 
at present being nearly impossible to achieve globally, the container network relies on a 
worldwide assemblage of these national systems, in tandem with ocean shipping, to create a 
system that in spite of its patchwork nature is surprisingly cohesive. Chapter 4 will deal with this 
topic, investigating the differing types of infrastructure at the national and global scales. 
Containerization creates an unusual network, an infrastructure (if we can call it such) that, as 
already discussed, depends on other basic infrastructures in order to function. As the trucking, 
railroad and shipping systems are what actually move containers, the container network works 
by linking together these three modes of transportation, along with facilities and sites for the 
transfer of containers between the modes, into an overarching whole that possesses a certain 
degree of unity. This is a remarkable system that uses a rigidly standardized object, the shipping 
container itself, as the heart of a worldwide network of great flexibility. The result would seem to 
represent an unusual type of infrastructure, in terms of how it links together other more “basic” 
infrastructures, and also the way the container is the entity that carries out this linkage by fitting 
into these infrastructures. The container’s ability to do so of course depends on its particular 
dimensions and other spatial and physical characteristics—containerization is a deeply material 
infrastructure. So the concept of containerization as an infrastructure is one that bears further 
examination, in light of what scholars have written about infrastructures, networks and technical 





Chapter 3 ~ Containerization as an Infrastructure 
 
The network of shipping container movement constitutes, or at least can be understood as, an 
infrastructure. Containerization though does not fit easily into conventional notions of what we 
regard as infrastructure. Rather, as should be evident from the previous chapter, the shipping 
container succeeds by binding several infrastructural systems together—those of shipping 
(including both over the ocean and on inland waterways), trucking, and railroads. These 
infrastructures are in fact independent of each other, and the container certainly does not alter 
that. But containerization does form a new network—in a sense, an infrastructure—that is 
supported by those three modes of transportation, along with the facilities for container transfer 
between them. Since the container itself is a spatial and physical unit, along with the freight 
within it, that goes in a nearly seamless manner from origin to destination across multiple 
infrastructures and through various nations, its network of movement represents an 
infrastructural system in its own right. But if containerization’s ability to create a cohesive, 
unified and global network out of three distinct modes of freight transportation makes it an 
infrastructure, it is an unusual one. This chapter considers what sort of infrastructure 
containerization really is, and what the scholarship on infrastructures and technical systems, 
within the field of science, technology and society (STS), can tell us about the container network. 
A scholar who laid key foundations for the study of infrastructure, not merely as a 
technological phenomenon but with consideration of its social and political ramifications, was 
Thomas Hughes. Hughes did not merely seek to incorporate such factors, but to establish a 
comprehension of infrastructure in which the technological and the socio-political were integral. 
As he possessed the scholarly bona fides of a historian but also a high level of technological 
knowledge, Hughes was well positioned for this endeavor. (While Hughes rarely uses the word 
“infrastructure” as a conceptual category in his writings, generally preferring to speak of 
“systems” or “technological systems,” clearly these terms are, in a general sense, synonymous 
with infrastructure.) The concept of the “large technical system,” often known as an LTS, is 
associated with Hughes. He wrote most extensively about one such a system in his first and most 
influential book, the groundbreaking Networks of Power, published in 1983, which covered the 
historical development of electrical infrastructures in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.1 (Hughes actually did not use the term “large technical system” in this book. He began 
referring to the “large technological system” in the late 1980s, and it would seem he and other 
                                                 
1 Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1983). 
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scholars then swiftly switched to the “large technical system.”2) In Networks of Power Hughes 
proposes a five-phase model, which will be outlined here, of how an LTS evolves from its 
invention into a full-fledged infrastructure.3 While Hughes does not seem particularly insistent 
on this model in an exacting or detailed fashion—his description of it only occupies four pages in 
a lengthy book of 474 pages—it is nonetheless useful and has been followed and referenced by 
many others. (In a later article he would complicate matters by adjusting the model, adding, 
altering and/or subtracting some phases.4 Other scholars have also tinkered with the model, and 
with the particular phases, while following its general gist.5) 
Hughes’ first phase6 is invention and development. Here an inventor comes up with a 
technological breakthrough, which then becomes the basis for the development of a full-blown 
system, overcoming many obstacles along the way. In some cases the inventor is able to maintain 
control of the technology and carry out implementation of the system, with the support of others 
like managers, engineers and financiers. A classic example, which Hughes explores in detail, is 
Thomas Edison, who was not merely an inventor but an avid system-builder. In other situations 
the invention is taken up by others more talented (or more motivated, or with superior access to 
funding) in system-building. At the end of this phase the system is still a very long way from 
being universal (i.e., from being an infrastructure), for it is particular to a specific location, group 
of users, purpose or setting. But its promise is evident, for it has been shown to work in a 
particular context. This first phase is the most glamorous stage of infrastructural development, 
marked as it is by exciting and groundbreaking technological breakthroughs that often stem from 
fundamental scientific advances. It is also generally characterized by arduous efforts at 
implementation to get the initial system off the ground and running, often in the teeth of fierce 
resistance and heavy obstacles. In popular histories and media accounts this first phase usually 
receives the bulk of the attention, and subsequent phases are likely to be ignored, or seen as 
inevitable and hence mundane. Those who seriously study infrastructure know better. 
The second phase is technology transfer, wherein the system is put into place more widely. 
Having achieved success in its original setting, the technology of the system is now adopted and 
used by others, who may modify it slightly or even significantly for their own purposes. Each 
context will have its own preferences and needs, and this becomes especially evident when the 
                                                 
2 It appears Hughes first wrote of “large technological systems” in: Thomas P. Hughes, “The Evolution of 
Large Technological Systems,” in Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch (eds.), The Social 
Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1987), pp. 51-82. Usage of the term “large technical system” seems to have effectively 
commenced with Renate Mayntz and Thomas P. Hughes (eds.), The Development of Large Technical Systems 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988). 
3 Hughes, Networks of Power, pp. 14-17. 
4 Hughes, “The Evolution of Large Technological Systems,” pp. 51-82. 
5 Paul N. Edwards, Steven J. Jackson, Geoffrey C. Bowker, and Cory P. Knobel, Understanding Infrastructure: 
Dynamics, Tensions, and Design, Report of a Workshop on “History & Theory of Infrastructure: Lessons for 
New Scientific Cyberinfrastructures,” January 2007, pp. 8-11. 
6 These five phases are presented in Hughes, Networks of Power, pp. 14-17. In other writings Hughes 
modified the phases slightly, as did other scholars. 
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system moves outside its country of origin. In his original formulation Hughes assumes 
technology transfer happens geographically: a system might first be established in New York, 
and then re-created in Chicago, London, Paris, etc. (One may think of regions or nations rather 
than cities, but the geographic concept is the same.) For information-based systems though this 
dynamic could be non-geographic in nature—and that is especially the case in recent decades 
with computer networks, where the original setting is typically not geographic, but rather 
consists of a particular group of users or assemblage of institutions. In the phase of technology 
transfer, the new systems are likely to be separate from each other and from the original system. 
In this phase businesspeople, financiers, governments and corporations begin to take a 
substantial role in the systems, but the main emphasis is still on developing and implementing 
the technology. 
Hughes’ third phase is system growth. This blurs somewhat with the second phase of 
technology transfer, in that it is a period of multiple systems expanding, getting larger and 
acquiring more users. These numerous systems are more likely to become interconnected, or at 
least to share various practices and standards—though they may also be growing increasingly 
apart in some ways, and becoming more fixed as they grow more established. It is also a stage in 
which particularly troublesome technical problems are resolved; Hughes refers to these as 
reverse salients, and focuses on them because often they are key obstacles holding back systems 
otherwise ready to grow rapidly. Consequently a reverse salient attracts attention from 
engineers, scientists and technicians, until either it is successfully resolved or an alternate 
approach that bypasses the problem entirely is found. Aside from such reverse salients, in the 
phase of system growth technological issues become less important, and larger social, political 
and economic realities loom large. The importance of non-technological actors—businesspeople, 
financiers, governments, regulators and corporations—steadily grows. The engagement of users 
is also critical, as they become a critical variable and may engage with the system in unexpected 
ways. 
The fourth phase is momentum. With technological challenges resolved and the practicality, 
usefulness, profitability and/or desirability of the system established, use at the widest scale 
ensues. Rapid growth arrives, as what was originally an experiment, then a luxury, is now 
perceived as a necessity, something to be put in place universally. The impetus feeds on itself and 
becomes unstoppable; the system is transformed into an infrastructure, with all that entails. The 
system by now is firmly established in both its technological and organizational aspects, and 
these factors propel it forward to gain more users and greater geographical span. As important as 
previous phases are, the phase of momentum is actually (in most cases) the period in which the 
majority of the system’s users come on board. Technical obstacles are now no longer a barrier, 
though the character of the technology will always remain important. Consequently innovation—
or at any rate, technological innovation—is no longer part of the story; businesspeople, 
governments and institutions take center stage, as do users. Politics and economics, along with 
social and cultural factors, are preeminent. Within the system itself, control now usually lies with 
managers rather than inventors or engineers. 
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Hughes is imprecise in terms of what to call his fifth phase, and in fact in later writings he left 
it out—as have other scholars. His description is also rather vague, and very brief (just one 
paragraph in Networks of Power7), but it seems to be a period when the system, now an 
infrastructure that is well established and universal, inevitably fluctuates within larger political, 
social and economic forces. No longer new or exciting in any way, the system is taken for granted 
in everyday life and what it provides is simply a mundane commodity. Whatever challenges 
(which again could be seen as reverse salients, according to Hughes) that arise are likely to be 
financial, bureaucratic and/or political, rather than technological. The system’s large scale and 
universality becomes a factor in its own right, both as an advantage and drawback. 
An additional phase has been added by scholars other than Hughes: postmodern splintering 
and decentralization.8 In this stage the ideal of infrastructural unity and universality, which went 
hand-in-hand with modernity, is abandoned and the system is fractured into disparate 
subsystems of varying quality and price. Those who can pay get the best service, while those who 
cannot get little or nothing; it is an ominous neoliberal vision of people as consumers, not 
citizens, and of fragmentation as opposed to even the aspiration to unity. This phase is also 
characterized by a tendency toward decentralization and even self-organizing systems, fueled 
both by a more individualistic era and the new capabilities unleashed by digital communication 
technologies. The shift to decentralization can be a positive force, especially inasmuch as it allows 
for greater user involvement and innovation, but it also can mask the dismantling of 
infrastructural systems that previously served an entire citizenry. (It also must be kept in mind 
that in spite of the widespread current rhetoric about the virtue and inevitability of decentralized 
and bottom-up systems, many infrastructures are still tightly-organized and largely top-down—
and must remain so in order to function properly.) 
Perhaps one last phase is worth noting, though Hughes does not broach it in his original 
model: obsolescence and abandonment. Infrastructural systems often linger surprisingly long 
past their prime, but at a certain point a system is liable to be surpassed by new and better ways, 
and in particular by superior technologies. (Even when an infrastructure has been superseded, 
however, it may persist to a surprising extent in some cases, coexisting with its replacement. On 
occasion such an infrastructure, having lost its original function, morphs into something else. 
Passenger transportation by ship over the ocean gradually disappeared once air travel emerged, 
but the business of running cruise ships for vacationing subsequently developed. The once 
mighty telegraph company Western Union now survives as a money transfer operation.9) While 
in the most general sense some infrastructures are enduring, such as the network of roads and 
streets on which we travel, a particular infrastructural system built on specific technological 
capabilities is bound to fade someday. The system of animal-powered overland transport was 
superseded by the railroad and automobile, the telegraph was made outmoded by the telephone 
and fax, and so on. It is hard to conceive how some of our current systems will become obsolete, 
                                                 
7 Hughes, Networks of Power, p. 17. 
8 Edwards, Jackson, Bowker, and Knobel, Understanding Infrastructure, p. 11. 
9 Paul Edwards pointed out the example of Western Union to me, in a comment in April 2013. 
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or what will replace them, but no doubt the railroad and automobile were equally hard to 
imagine in the eighteenth century. Such infrastructural abandonments are not necessarily only 
technological in nature, as political and social forces may also be factors. 
Hughes’ focus on the entire process of system-building helps him avoid devoting excessive 
attention to the moment of invention, the technological breakthrough that, although undeniably 
of vast importance, can be a distraction in the study of infrastructure. For Hughes it is the 
development of the system that matters most. Such a perspective is especially suited to 
containerization, for in the case of the container there was practically nothing—in the purely 
technological sense anyway—to invent. (There was also no clear-cut moment of invention, but 
rather a gradual evolution; it is almost impossible to identify the first shipping container.) Instead 
the breakthrough was in building and operating a containerized system of freight transportation. 
This is where the early innovators of containerization excelled, especially the entrepreneurial and 
driven Malcom McLean (often incorrectly called the inventor of the container). But as a corporate 
leader there was only so much McLean, or his counterparts at Matson and other container 
innovators, could do. After all he only had direct control of one company, Sea-Land. The larger 
process of worldwide infrastructure building had to be carried out collectively by governments, 
institutions and corporations, with the ISO’s role probably the most crucial of all. 
In addition to his five-phase model, Hughes emphasizes a few concepts in particular as 
integral to system-building. One is the reverse salient, which as already noted is an obstacle or 
problem that holds up progress in the development of an LTS. Hughes primarily thought of 
reverse salients as technological in nature, though he saw the concept as possibly encompassing 
other factors too. Because a reverse salient represents a significant obstacle to a system reaching a 
key level of functionality or completeness, extraordinary effort is often expended to solve it.10 In 
the development of the shipping container network it would seem the most important reverse 
salient was the lack of a global standard for the container, and once that was overcome in the 
1960s, thanks to the ISO, international container use could proceed unchecked and dramatic 
growth followed. This particular reverse salient was organizational rather than technological, but 
that is entirely fitting for the container which is not a technical innovation anyway. (There is 
another way to think of the reverse salient in terms of containerization, however. Perhaps the 
container itself was the solution to a reverse salient in the evolving postwar global network of 
freight transportation. By this logic, the growth of worldwide trade was running up against the 
bottleneck of breakbulk shipping methods, which represented a reverse salient that was solved 
by containerization.) 
Another vital concept for Hughes, in his vision of system-building, is technological style. In 
essence he argues, in Networks of Power, that the way electrical systems were implemented in the 
United States, Britain and Germany reflected social, political and economic factors particular to 
those nations, as well as their histories and traditions. Hence the technology itself does not lead to 
                                                 
10 Hughes, Networks of Power, pp. 14-15, 79-81; Hughes, “The Evolution of Large Technological Systems,” pp. 
73-76. 
 36 
one inevitable, preferable solution, but rather the resulting infrastructures are socio-technical 
constructs. Hughes uses the term “technological style” to describe this process. By introducing 
the issue of style, traditionally applied to the arts, Hughes vividly (provocatively, perhaps) opens 
up the way one can comprehend an infrastructure. In opposition to reductionist ideas of 
technological progress, he sees a technological system or infrastructure as evolving in many 
possible ways, limited only by outright technological, scientific or material constraints.11 
Hughes’ attention to this issue of technological style is followed throughout Networks of 
Power, though he rarely explicitly refers to the concept. Perhaps more than anything else, it was 
this perspective that made the book so noteworthy on its appearance in the 1980s. By putting a 
focus on how technology is affected by social, cultural and political factors, Hughes points 
towards a view of technological history in which there is no inevitable way to implement 
technological solutions, where technology itself does not inherently possess or embody any ideal 
solution. He argues instead that how a corporation, society or government brings technology to 
bear will reflect many non-technical factors. (But Hughes does not take an extreme social 
constructivist stance, wherein technology is merely a tool to other ends; his understanding of 
technical and scientific details is impressive, and he gives the nature of the technology a central 
place in his narratives.) This position was not entirely new in the larger discipline of science, 
technology and society (STS), but it was valuable in opening the door to more thoughtful 
research on infrastructural systems. A whole field of scholarship revolving around large technical 
systems (LTSs) has emerged in the years since Networks of Power. 
As this dissertation emphasizes, the shipping container gains its ubiquity largely because it 
can fit so well into the existing national transportation systems of trucking, railroads and inland 
waterways. The container typically moves along preexisting routes of movement, so while the 
infrastructure of containerization is new it depends on older domestic networks that possess their 
own qualities. These qualities reflect the history and character of their particular nation-state. 
Hence the notion of technological style, in the context of the national (just as Hughes used it, 
though presumably the idea could be used in other ways too), is quite appropriate for the 
container, which depends so heavily on these national infrastructures. This dissertation only 
focuses on the way the container has been used in one nation, the United States (with some 
coverage of Canada too), so it is not possible to do a comparative study of different countries. 
Rather, the dissertation intensively investigates how containerization in the U.S. has transpired in 
a fashion deeply affected by the American transport infrastructures of trucking, railroads, and 
inland waterways. While the container itself is universally standardized and obviously does not 
change in different contexts, the way containerization is carried out varies significantly from 
nation to nation. The process in the U.S. has followed a path that is distinctively American. This is 
due to the decisions American transportation providers and institutional bureaucrats have made, 
                                                 
11 Hughes, Networks of Power, pp. 405-407; Hughes, “The Evolution of Large Technological Systems,” pp. 68-
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the preexisting characteristics of the domestic transport network, and the geographic qualities of 
the country. 
Another important concept for Hughes is that of technological momentum, the process by 
which a system, or certain aspects of it, becomes locked in over time. This is somewhat 
comparable to the notion of path-dependency; in the beginning multiple options are available, 
but eventually one design, standard or technological method wins out. (Particularly famous are 
cases where the inferior competitor triumphs, as with VHS versus Betamax videocassettes, or the 
QWERTY versus Dvorak keyboard layout.) Hughes pursues a nuanced approach, rejecting 
technological determinism on the one hand and social constructivism on the other, as he takes 
into account the character of the technology itself while also examining social, political and 
economic factors and the particular historical process. He argues that society and politics may 
play a key role in the beginning, but once a particular technology acquires momentum then its 
system becomes an actor in its own right, and it gets harder to pursue alternatives.12 This 
paradigm applies well to containerization—the initial design of the container was contingent on 
many factors of the time, but once established by the ISO it foreclosed other options and exerted 
great force in its own right. 
In his original formulation of LTS development Hughes studied and described systems 
under the control of a particular individual or corporation. Later scholars extended his ideas to 
look at LTSs where power is coordinated and distributed among multiple participants—some 
corporate, some institutional or governmental.13 Hughes himself also investigated such situations 
later in his scholarly career, primarily by focusing on systems built in the postwar era, and 
likewise stressed the collective nature of system-building for particularly complex and 
multifaceted projects.14 (His use of the term “system” broadened in these later writings, to 
encompass situations that did not necessarily involve an infrastructure, but any sort of collective, 
well-organized and specific technological effort.) This way of viewing an LTS is better aligned 
with the container’s history; in the development of containerization numerous participants and 
transportation providers across many nations occupied key roles. The largely anonymous 
engineers and policymakers participating in the ISO’s deliberations were arguably the most 
important of all. (Yet their decisions were not entirely definitive, for widespread practices could 
counter them, as with the ultimate triumph of the 8’-6” dimension for container height despite 
the ISO’s initial endorsement of 8’.) In containerization, system building has been a truly 
collective process. 
                                                 
12 Thomas P. Hughes, “Technological Momentum,” in: Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx (eds.)., Does 
Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), pp. 
101-114; Hughes, Networks of Power, pp. 15-17, 140-174. 
13 Erik Van Der Vleuten, “Understanding Network Societies: Two Decades of Large Technical System 
Studies,” in: Erik Van Der Vleuten and Arne Kaijser (eds.), Networking Europe: Transnational Infrastructures 
and the Shaping of Europe, 1850-2000 (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications/USA [Watson 
Publishing International], 2006), p. 305. 
14 See Thomas P. Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998). 
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Indeed, many of the key figures in containerization are those who shepherded new standards 
and practices into fruition. Writing about a somewhat similar process in the realm of computer 
systems, Paul Edwards points out that such people or institutions can be termed “protocol 
builders,” in contrast with Hughes’ “system builders.” Edwards adds: “Unlike the system 
builders, very few of the network builders nor the protocol builders have become well-known 
public figures, perhaps precisely because protocols are infrastructural, lying beneath the horizon 
of salient uses.”15 Protocols lack the glamour of new technological advances, hence they gain less 
recognition, and in addition crafting protocols is usually a collaborative process and so it is 
harder to identify a specific innovator. The container itself can be regarded as a protocol in the 
worldwide system of freight transportation. In the context of this dissertation and the specific 
topic of containerization, though, it is the container’s dimensions, fittings, tolerances and other 
characteristics that constitute protocols. 
Scholars following Hughes’ lead have more deeply scrutinized the various types of 
infrastructure. Hughes uses the word “system” (or the phrase “large technical system”) to 
identify an infrastructure, no matter how big or small, particular or universal it may be, but other 
writers choose to distinguish between a system and a network. A network, in their schema, was 
once a system or series of systems but has been enlarged beyond the bounds of any single 
system-builder into an infrastructure. Often the network evolves out of multiple systems that 
were formerly separate but gradually grew linked together. Such a network is subject to impacts 
from multiple causes and is not entirely under the control of one person or institution; as an 
infrastructure it becomes embedded in social, political and economic contexts. This inevitably 
pulls it away from the sort of centralized control or organization (though there may still be some 
measure of both) that a system is liable to have. As Paul Edwards remarks, “although 
infrastructures can be coordinated or regulated to some degree, it is difficult or impossible to 
design or manage them, in the sense of imposing (from above) a single vision, practice, or plan.”16 
A network, by this definition, is comparable to the later stages of the development of a 
system or LTS in Hughes’ terminology; what Hughes calls the momentum phase would probably 
be the period in which several systems merge or become interconnected to form a larger, 
universal network. This distinction between a system and network was made by Paul David and 
Julie Ann Bunn in a 1988 article about the evolution of electric infrastructure—though they do not 
make the difference entirely explicit and their usage of the terms blurs on occasion.17 (In the same 
article David and Bunn introduce the concept of the “gateway,” an entity or device that mediates 
between or connects previously separate systems, allowing them to work together and hence to 
form a larger infrastructure. This idea is also highly relevant to the container and has been further 
                                                 
15 Paul N. Edwards, “Y2K: Millennial Reflections on Computers as Infrastructure,” History and Technology, 
Vol. 15, Iss. 1-2 (1998), pp. 12-13. (These page numbers for pdf version at 
http://pne.people.si.umich.edu/articles.html) 
16 Paul N. Edwards, A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), p. 12. 
17 Paul A. David and Julie Ann Bunn, “The Economics of Gateway Technologies and Network Evolution: 
Lessons from Electricity Supply History,” Information Economics and Policy, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 (1988), pp. 170, 172. 
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developed by other scholars; it will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.) In the late 1990s 
Paul Edwards, a scholar focused on information and computer technology, extended David and 
Bunn’s work in his article “Y2K: Millennial Reflections on Computers as Infrastructure” by more 
clearly defining the difference between a system and a network, and also introducing the 
additional category of an internetwork or web.18 
Edwards is particularly focused on the internet and other computer-based communication 
technologies, but he seeks to bring these into a larger conceptual scheme encompassing all types 
of infrastructure. His division between a system and network is more specific than that of David 
and Bunn, and he stresses that the central control and system builders that characterize a system 
must give way in a network or internetwork to more distributed control, with a larger number of 
participants exerting sway in different ways and a far broader group of users. A network, not a 
system, can possess the universality that an infrastructure must have. An internetwork forms 
when the process is taken to the next level and a series of networks (or as Edwards puts it, a 
“network of networks”), though distinct in their actual technological functioning, become 
interlinked and work together to accomplish certain tasks.19 This may or may not be regarded as 
an infrastructure. Identifying an internetwork is slightly more subjective than a system or 
network, but still fairly commonsensical; Edwards introduces and expands on the idea that the 
internet is an internetwork. He also notes that containerization can be viewed as binding the 
three separate infrastructures of shipping, trucking and railroads into an internetwork.20 Another 
scholar using this division of system, network and internetwork is Greg Downey, whose 2001 
article “Virtual Webs, Physical Technologies, and Hidden Workers: The Spaces of Labor in 
Information Internetworks” likewise is oriented to information infrastructures, but with an 
added interest in their physical manifestations and associated labor practices.21 
In an internetwork very different infrastructures, consisting of fundamentally different types 
of technology, are connected. In the case of the shipping container, for instance, the truck, train 
and ship networks obviously remain, by their very nature, separate and distinct. This is quite 
different from the situation with a system and a network, where the presumption is that a 
network ties together multiple systems of the same basic type. For example, various system-
builders could create a plethora of railroad systems, each using a different track gauge—as was 
the case in the U.S. into the late 1800s. The rail infrastructure that results is a fragmented 
collection of systems, lacking unity or cohesion at the larger scale. But once the track gauge is 
standardized at the national level (as eventually happened in the U.S. and most countries) then a 
true network results, and it is clearly one unified infrastructure, not a collection of systems or 
infrastructures that are merely interconnected. With an internetwork however the constitutive 
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19 Ibid., pp. 11-14. 
20 Ibid., p. 13. 
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parts, the networks, retain their identities and roles as distinct (and perhaps very different) 
infrastructures. They may in fact serve numerous other purposes, apart from the particular 
internetwork that is our focus. This is assuredly the case in the container internetwork, since 
moving containers is only one of the tasks the trucking, railroad and shipping networks perform. 
It should be noted that the terminology put forward in the preceding discussion is generally 
not followed in this dissertation, in which the terms “system” and “network” are used more or 
less interchangeably, and “internetwork” is hardly used at all. That is to say, a more normal 
usage of the words is followed in the dissertation. But the essential insight—that containerization 
works by connecting distinct infrastructures—runs throughout the dissertation and is vital to its 
arguments. So while the dissertation does not adhere to the system-network-internetwork 
terminology (which would be burdensome and awkward to maintain in such a long text), the 
paradigm is an important one to comprehend. 
Another key concept relating to the network of container movement is the “second-order 
system.” Such a system is one that functions by utilizing several more basic systems, termed 
“first-order systems” in this paradigm, which work together in a collective and highly organized 
manner for a specific purpose. Obviously this idea is somewhat similar to the internetwork, 
though it is applied in a slightly broader manner. The second-order system (which may also be 
thought of as a “second-order infrastructure” or “second-order network,” as the terminology of 
the “system” is not crucial here) may be a traditional infrastructure. But usually the concept is 
used more broadly for an organized system, one not typically regarded as an infrastructure in its 
own right but which exploits multiple infrastructures or other networks (i.e., first-order systems) 
to achieve a particular end. Bureaucratic organizations, or other institutional or social entities, are 
generally integral to the way a second-order system works, for it is a construct rooted in both 
technology and people. Hence the concept of the second-order system is especially valuable 
because it brings in so many factors; drawing on this expansive framework helps one see the 
system as socio-technical in nature. 
The idea of the second-order system apparently originated with Ingo Braun, a German 
sociologist, and was introduced by him in 1994.22 Braun utilizes it to elucidate the European 
network of organ transplants, by necessity very tightly organized, that began to take shape in the 
late 1960s and has greatly developed since. But he also describes the concept of the second-order 
system broadly, as being possibly applicable to many cases and situations.23 It seems the first to 
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was apparently written first, since it is cited in the English article. 
23 Braun and Joerges, “How to Recombine Large Technical Systems,” pp. 25-51. 
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point out that containerization constitutes a second-order system was Joachim Radkau, another 
German scholar writing at the same time.24 Fortunately some accounts of the second-order 
paradigm have appeared in English (in particular an article by Braun and Bernward Joerges, and 
a brief discussion by Dutch scholar Erik Van Der Vleuten), and these form the basis for its use in 
this dissertation.25 
A second-order system works with and builds upon what exists, the first-order systems 
already in place, rather than creating basic new systems. Yet the final result is something 
essentially new. Given that governments and societies in many developed countries are less and 
less capable or motivated to build new infrastructures, for a plethora of reasons, second-order 
systems offer a valuable way around growing limitations by improving efficiency through better 
interconnections and use of information technology. As Ingo Braun and Bernward Joerges point 
out, “much of today’s large technical systems’ expansion and transformation can be interpreted 
as superimposing second-order large technical systems on more or less stabilized classic 
infrastructural systems.”26 This is particularly the case with transportation systems, and hence the 
intermodal strategy (described extensively in chapter 12) has come to prominence—manifested in 
passenger transportation through various approaches, and in freight transportation primarily by 
the container. Indeed, Erik Van Der Vleuten points out that “as LTS [large technical systems] are 
currently running out of space for expansion (air, ground and underground are rapidly ‘filled 
up’), their future development may take the shape of material interlacing of existing material 
networks to create new functions or uses.”27 
As already noted, the concept of the second-order system is similar to that of the 
internetwork, and both ideas have been applied to the global container network. But the 
frameworks are subtly different, at least in how they are presented. An internetwork is generally 
described as a series of networks linked together, which gains greater power and use through 
this multiplication of connections. It is often described as spanning “across” various networks. A 
second-order system is envisioned as a strategic use of infrastructures to form something 
broader, and phrases like “superimpose,” “superstructure,” or “on top of” are often used in its 
description. The idea of the second-order system also leaves a bit more latitude for imagination in 
conceiving what we regard as an infrastructure or system; Braun’s case of the organ transplant 
network, for instance, would not typically be viewed as an infrastructure. An internetwork is a 
slightly tighter and more restrictive concept, at least in the way Edwards and other scholars use 
it. 
Another concept similar to the second-order system and internetwork is the “meta-system,” 
as used by Janet Abbate. Though Abbate uses the term only briefly (and her focus is on 
                                                 
24 Van Der Vleuten credits Radkau with this; see Erik Van Der Vleuten, “Infrastructures and Societal 
Change,” p. 405. He cites Joachim Radkau, “Zum Ewiger Wachstum Verdammt? Jugend und Alter 
Grosstechnischer Systeme,” in: Braun and Joerges (eds.), Technik Ohne Grenzen, pp. 50-106. 
25 Van Der Vleuten, “Infrastructures and Societal Change,” pp. 404-406; Braun and Joerges, “How to 
Recombine Large Technical Systems,” pp. 27, 39-49. 
26 Braun and Joerges, “How to Recombine Large Technical Systems,” p. 27. 
27 Van Der Vleuten, “Infrastructures and Societal Change,” p. 405. 
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information technology), she explains that it refers to a system composed of a combination of 
previously separate networks that now converge or overlap, and hence comprise a somewhat 
unified whole still composed of separate and disparate parts.28 While the freight transport modes 
were never entirely separate, as cargo has long been transferred between them, the container 
introduced an entirely new level of convergence that has amalgamated these infrastructures, 
even as they remain basically distinct, into a unified overarching system. Hence the concept of a 
meta-system is applicable to containerization. Abbate’s description of the challenge of linking up 
these diverse infrastructures, as she notes the struggle to “reconcile differences between systems 
with entrenched technical methods, work practices, and organizational cultures,”29 could easily 
be a description of the issues present in adopting the container in various contexts. 
Concepts like the second-order system, internetwork and meta-system point to a key aspect 
of containerization: domestic national infrastructures can retain their own characteristics, and 
carry out their well-established roles, even as they now in addition constitute segments of a far 
bigger global network. Containerization does not represent an effort to build a new system from 
scratch, yet neither is it merely a group of infrastructures cobbled together that gains no greater 
unity from their interconnections. Rather it works within these existing infrastructures and 
simultaneously creates something larger and cohesive out of them. National, regional and local 
conditions can remain in all their variety, so long as they are able to move the container. It is not a 
top-down system but rather one of nuance, though crucially it does include one truly universal 
and standardized object, the container itself. Yet these national infrastructures cannot be entirely 
unaffected, for as container use becomes pervasive the domestic transport systems must adjust in 
many ways, some minor and others more fundamental, to accommodate it. In the process the 
global—represented by the container—turns into a driving force for change within the space of 
the nation-state. The bulk of this dissertation narrates how this has transpired in the American 
context. The process, however, is one where agency is exerted by local, regional and national 
actors, and where the existing qualities of American infrastructure, deriving from the character, 
history and geography of the U.S., are crucial in shaping how this globalization happens. 
Clearly the container’s success derives largely from being an object that bridges between 
different transport infrastructures. In this vein, the scholar Tineke Egyedi has referred to the 
container as an example of a “gateway” or “gateway technology.” As should be evident by this 
point, the container’s role as such a gateway is innately tied to its spatial characteristics, 
especially its dimensions. The container constitutes a spatial object, globally standardized, that 
interlocks with a plethora of national systems that possess their own diverse and varied spatial 
characteristics. These innumerable domestic infrastructures, in combination with ocean shipping, 
are able to link together to form a larger and impressively cohesive global network thanks to the 
container. (A gateway however need not be spatial—another example Egyedi discusses is XML, a 
                                                 
28 Janet Abbate, “From Control to Coordination: New Governance Models for Information Networks and 
Other Large Technical Systems,” in: Olivier Coutard (ed.), The Governance of Large Technical Systems (London: 
Routledge, 1999), pp. 116-117. 
29 Ibid., p. 116. 
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software standard for the World Wide Web.) As Egyedi explains, a seemingly inflexible object 
like the container actually provides for tremendous flexibility, once it has been standardized on a 
universal basis, because it only demands a few simple qualities of the things—truck chassis, 
railcar, container ship, crane, etc.—that it interfaces with.30 We commonly envision 
standardization as inherently rigid and inflexible, but the reality is more complex. Some people 
in the freight industry over the years have expressed a similar understanding of the container’s 
gateway role, and its inclusive simplicity, through the metaphorical idea of the container as a 
“common denominator” for the various infrastructures.31 
In describing the container as a gateway technology, Egyedi draws upon the work of Paul 
David and Julie Bunn, who (as already noted) first used the term. But there is a difference 
between the two uses. David and Bunn present, as their primary example of a gateway 
technology, the rotary converter whose introduction in the 1890s allowed AC and DC electric 
systems to coexist for a few decades before AC became completely dominant.32 As they describe 
it, a gateway makes it possible for two systems that are of the same basic type yet incompatible to 
work together. In such a scenario the two systems fulfill the same function, and it would be 
possible (perhaps desirable) to have just one unified system that does it, but for some reason 
(historical contingency, competing corporations, political factors, etc.) multiple systems have 
emerged. Hence a gateway serves a useful role, but would not be necessary if only the system 
were unified—in the case of electricity, if AC had simply triumphed from the start. The other 
examples David and Bunn give seem to confirm this interpretation of a gateway: a special plug 
that allows an electrical appliance from one nation to work in another nation where outlets have 
a different configuration; an adapter ring that permits a camera lens with a particular type of 
mount to attach to a camera with a different mounting; and a railcar with multiple wheels that 
can handle varying track gauges.33 In each case the two incompatible systems are of the same 
type, and the incompatibility is not necessary in any fundamental sense—it would be possible to 
have a unified system that obviates the need for the gateway. 
Egyedi on the other hand puts forward three possible types of gateway technologies, 
dedicated, generic and meta-generic, and defines them by their level of standardization. A 
                                                 
30 Tineke M. Egyedi, “Infrastructure Flexibility Created by Standardized Gateways: The Cases of XML and 
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33 Ibid., p. 170. 
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dedicated gateway, of which the AC/DC rotary converter is an example, has a low degree of 
standardization. She even claims that a dedicated gateway is typically “improvised” or “ad-hoc” 
in nature, and while these terms seem like exaggerated descriptions, they do hint at a certain 
specificity in a dedicated gateway, which meets a very particular purpose. Most if not all of 
David and Bunn’s examples are dedicated gateways. A generic gateway possesses a medium 
degree of standardization; it is essentially standardized, and thus can connect innumerable 
subsystems rather than being limited to those of a specific nation, corporation, etc. The two cases 
Egyedi discusses at length, the shipping container and the internet standard XML, are both 
generic gateways. A meta-generic gateway has a high degree of standardization. This is a rather 
more slippery concept, but she refers to it as a standard at “the level of reference frameworks” 
that has “meta-generic properties,” and cites the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference 
Model.34 (Perhaps we can regard a meta-generic gateway as a collection of guidelines for how to 
set and standardize gateways.) 
In her analysis of the container and XML, Egyedi applies the concept of the gateway to a 
mechanism or device that bridges between systems fundamentally different in nature. The 
container for instance differs from what David and Bunn discuss because it links systems that by 
their nature and function could not possibly be compatible. Railroads, trucking and shipping are 
entirely separate modes of transportation that could not possibly be merged into one 
technological system (unless one imagines a fanciful high-tech machine that can transform itself 
from one to another, à la Tom Swift or James Bond). It is not a matter of disparate standards or 
approaches existing for the same basic type of technological system, as in David and Bunn’s 
examples. Rail, trucking and shipping are simply different infrastructures, and while the 
container binds them into one overarching network in a certain fashion, they remain separate in 
their essentials. Drawing on the system-network-internetwork terminology of Edwards and 
Downey, it would seem gateways like the container and XML are between networks and thus 
create internetworks, while David and Bunn’s gateways are between systems and bring about 
networks. More generally, it appears a dedicated gateway helps form a system, while a generic 
gateway assists in creating a second-order system or internetwork. (Edwards also notes, albeit in 
passing, that a gateway can bind systems into networks, or networks into internetworks; he states 
that “gateway technologies and standards spark the formation of networks,” and adds soon after 
that “in a later phase, new gateways may connect heterogeneous networks to one another.”35 His 
meaning is clearly that this connecting of heterogeneous networks constitutes the creation of an 
internetwork.) 
Gateways are crucial in the development of global or transnational infrastructures. It is 
exceptionally hard to impose or create any sort of unity at the worldwide scale, due to the 
existence of nation-states that exert such power within their territorial domains. In addition the 
simple power of path dependence is tremendous; the existing national systems are firmly in place 
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35 Edwards, A Vast Machine, p. 11. 
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and hard to alter. Infrastructural unity was generally only achieved inside nation-states with 
great difficulty and over long durations. To achieve it across the worldwide community of 
nations is, for the time being and in the foreseeable future, simply not possible. (There are a few 
exceptions. For instance, global air travel is highly unified, largely by necessity, with tight 
worldwide standards and even English as the universal language of air traffic control.) Instead 
gateways, links and interfaces must be put in place to make global networks possible. The 
apparent cohesion of these global systems, which are often in effect internetworks or second-
order systems, belies their underlying fragmentation—they consist of multiple systems cobbled 
together, and it is gateways that make them possible. The shipping container is a perfect example 
of such a gateway. 
Many national infrastructures also depend on gateways for certain functions—but 
globalization ups the ante. Consider global telephony. Each nation has its own distinct telephone 
system, with particular technical and bureaucratic characteristics. Some might be quite similar 
(the U.S. and Canada, which share the same area code scheme), while others may vary 
dramatically. The presence of cell phones, and various other innovations in recent years, further 
complicates matters. Yet it is possible (with a few exceptions and caveats) to call any number in 
the world from any other number in the world. It is an astonishing global infrastructure, resting 
on a whole host of technological and organizational link-ups (by now almost entirely taken for 
granted, except for those in the industry) that allow the assemblage of nation-states to 
interconnect their distinct systems. The internet is a more dramatic example. Just in the U.S., it 
depends on a variety of systems: phone lines, cable lines, fiber-optic networks, T1 connections, 
wireless systems like wi-fi, satellites, etc. Combine that with all the systems it must utilize in 
other nations, and the internet truly contains incredible diversity in the technology of its “pipes.” 
In addition there are the servers and other devices, the software systems and protocols (including 
XML, discussed by Egyedi), and the bureaucracies and organizations. The remarkable final result 
is that (again, various caveats apply) one can send an email from one nation to another, or pull 
up any website from any location. A whole host of complex links and accommodations—
technical, organizational and even social—make such a network possible. Concepts like the 
gateway, second-order system, and internetwork are of value in explaining how this happens. 
One of the central arguments of the dissertation is that the way containerization is carried out 
is fundamentally dependent on national, regional and/or local context. A seemingly universal, 
worldwide infrastructure intersects with particular conditions at smaller scales, and these 
conditions ultimately are formative in the character of the overall network. The concept of “local 
universality” is useful in illuminating this. Introduced by Stefan Timmermans and Marc Berg, the 
idea of local universality illuminates how universal large-scale systems or infrastructures have 
local nuance—and how such local variations are not flaws or trivial details but rather are 
constitutive of the overall system. While Timmermans and Berg are specifically concerned with 
standardized medical procedures, the way they conceptualize the local versus the universal has 
relevance for discussions of the local and/or national versus the global with regard to the 
container: 
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Local universality emphasizes that universality always rests on real-time work, 
and emerges from localized processes of negotiations and pre-existing 
institutional, infrastructural, and material relations. ‘Universality’, here, has 
become a non-transcendental term—no longer implying a rupture with the 
‘local’, but transforming and emerging in and through it.36 
So local and national actors do not simply obediently adhere to the standards and practices 
imposed on them by the ISO, or by overwhelming American influence. The global container 
network is built upon their actions and agency. While this would be true for any “universal” or 
“global” network, it is particularly the case for containerization since it is a second-order system 
that depends on the basic transport modes. So local and national practices—the railroad and 
trucking infrastructures—are inevitably crucial in how containerization can be implemented in 
specific places. The decisions of local and national actors, and the constraints of preexisting 
systems, are critical. 
Scholars Susan Leigh Star and Karen Ruhleder present a somewhat similar case for 
understanding an infrastructural system as a conglomeration of users and scales, one that is 
woven together by its many and diverse users who interact with it in various ways. Such a 
network cannot be entirely imposed from the top down, because users relate to it in their own 
ways—or choose not to connect with it at all. In short, the user experience matters deeply; it is not 
just an inconvenience that arises at the end when the completed system must be tweaked to be 
more “user-friendly” or to mollify a few recalcitrant participants. Star and Ruhleder make these 
arguments in their 1996 article “Steps Toward an Ecology of Infrastructure: Design and Access 
for Large Information Spaces.”37 The article has been influential, largely because it introduced an 
extended multiple-point definition of infrastructure that has been widely referenced since. It is 
worth presenting here, in Star and Ruhleder’s words: 
 Embeddedness. Infrastructure is "sunk" into, inside of, other structures, social 
arrangements and technologies. 
 Transparency. Infrastructure is transparent to use, in the sense that it does not have to be 
reinvented each time or assembled for each task, but invisibly supports those tasks. 
 Reach or scope. This may be either spatial or temporal—infrastructure has reach beyond a 
single event or one-site practice. 
 Learned as part of membership. The taken-for-grantedness of artifacts and organizational 
arrangements is a sine qua non of membership in a community of practice. Strangers and 
outsiders encounter infrastructure as a target object to be learned about. New 
participants acquire a naturalized familiarity with its objects as they become members. 
 Links with conventions of practice. Infrastructure both shapes and is shaped by the 
conventions of a community of practice, e.g. the ways that cycles of day/night work are 
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affected by and affect electrical power rates and needs. Generations of typists have 
learned the QWERTY keyboard; its limitations are inherited by the computer keyboard 
and thence by the design of today’s computer furniture. 
 Embodiment of standards. Modified by scope and often by conflicting conventions, 
infrastructure takes on transparency by plugging into other infrastructures and tools in a 
standardized fashion. 
 Built on an installed base. Infrastructure does not grow de novo; it wrestles with the “inertia 
of the installed base” and inherits strengths and limitations from that base. Optical fibers 
run along old railroad lines; new systems are designed for backward-compatibility; and 
failing to account for these constraints may be fatal or distorting to new development 
processes. 
 Becomes visible upon breakdown. The normally invisible quality of working infrastructure 
becomes visible when it breaks: the server is down, the bridge washes out, there is a 
power blackout. Even when there are back-up mechanisms or procedures, their existence 
further highlights the now-visible infrastructure.38 
This far-ranging definition encompasses many aspects of infrastructure, but clearly for Star 
and Ruhleder the role of the user is especially important. Hence local scale is crucial, since every 
user ultimately experiences the infrastructure as a local user. Yet Star and Ruhleder are not 
making a naïve argument about users superseding all other factors, or that the local is all that 
matters. Rather they argue that an infrastructure is fundamentally about both the global and the 
local. (They use the terms “global” and “local” to refer not so much to geographic scale, as this 
dissertation usually does, but to a universal system versus a particular user, yet the idea is 
analogous.) The quandary of infrastructure, Star and Ruhleder point out, lies in the “tension 
between local, customized, intimate and flexible use on the one hand, and the need for standards 
and continuity on the other.”39 Later they state, in a brief summary of the article’s core argument, 
that: “An infrastructure occurs when the tension between local and global is resolved. That is, an 
infrastructure occurs when local practices are afforded by a larger-scale technology, which can 
then be used in a natural, ready-to-hand fashion.”40 
Star and Ruhleder add that “with the rise of decentralized technologies used across wide 
geographical distance, both the need for common standards and the need for situated, tailorable 
and flexible technologies grow stronger.”41 Although their focus is more oriented to information 
technology, this statement—aside from the reference to “decentralized technologies”—captures 
the situation of the container, as it represents a global and universal standard that is used in 
widely varying ways in different places and by different users. The container’s status as part of a 
global infrastructure, rather than a national, regional or local one, only makes this point more 
crucial—to establish such a global network, both the universal standard and local flexibility must 
be present. While Star and Ruhleder could perhaps be more attentive to how power is manifested 
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in or through infrastructure (the same issue applies to Timmermans and Berg’s work), their 
emphasis on the local and the user is a good counterweight to more conventional narratives of 
infrastructural development. This dissertation seeks to draw on such insights, though in the 
context of the container the local “user” is generally not a person but a corporation or institution 
acting at the local, regional or national scale. Alternatively, the local, regional or national scale 
itself can be understood as the “user” that intersects with the global scope of containerization. 
One more salient aspect of the container infrastructure is the eminently physical character of 
containerization, and of the transportation infrastructures that undergird it. Indeed, this physical 
or material quality is inherent to any transport system, including both the objects in motion (cars, 
trains, etc.) and the routes they travel upon (roads, tracks, etc.). While virtually every 
infrastructure or network has at least some physical dimension, the extent of this materiality 
varies greatly. The network of telephony, for instance, is supported by a multitude of wires, 
cables, cell towers, underwater fiber-optic lines, communications satellites and switching stations. 
This is an important and extensive system of physical components that is integral to the 
functioning of telephony, but at the physical level does not possess quite the same heft, the same 
material and physical presence, as the system of roads, streets, highways, driveways and parking 
lots, along with the innumerable cars and trucks, that constitute our motor vehicle infrastructure. 
Infrastructures that involve knowledge and communication are, in general, less deeply material 
in their workings than most other infrastructures. Obviously exceptions exist—and no absolute 
dividing line should be drawn, as virtually every infrastructure has elements of both the physical 
and the informational—but the basic point is that some infrastructures have a greater physical 
manifestation than others. Those of transportation are examples of highly material 
infrastructures, but there are obviously many others. The water and sewer infrastructures for 
instance have a large physical presence. Electricity has an extensive though not hefty physicality 
in its distribution network (being somewhat like telephony in this regard), but possesses more 
material substance in the components that generate it, such as coal-burning plants, dams, nuclear 
power plants, solar arrays, wind farms, etc. 
Obviously containerization is a very physical and spatial infrastructure, both in terms of the 
container itself and the cargo it holds within. As this dissertation demonstrates, this physical 
character, especially the container’s exact dimensions and carrying capacity (in both volume and 
weight), are integral to how containerization functions. Furthermore the three transport modes 
the container depends on are equally physical. These material qualities have many ramifications 
for the container, especially in terms of its tendency, as will be emphasized throughout the 
dissertation, when traveling domestically (rather than over the ocean), to follow the established 
preexisting routes of transportation that are embedded in the space and workings of the nation-
state. Transportation infrastructures have a hefty presence in the material world that makes them 
difficult to alter, and even in this era of the “information age” and “knowledge economy” such 
physical realities loom very large indeed. 
The consistency of the container’s spatial and material qualities, the same for every ISO (i.e., 
global) container everywhere, is fundamental to its success. There are many comparable 
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examples, especially in the realm of infrastructure, of standardized dimensions that possess great 
importance and power. Sometimes these dimensions are arbitrary in nature, rather than 
stemming from technological imperatives. For instance, the standard gauge of 4’-8½” used by 
most of the world’s railroads has no particular technical advantage, and a figure a few inches 
smaller or larger would work equally well. In other circumstances a dimension has a more logical 
rationale; obviously the standards for highway lane width were not set arbitrarily, but were the 
result of the width of cars and trucks already in use. (Those automotive dimensions in turn 
derive from the width of two human bodies seated side by side.) 
The dimension or spatial attribute that is standardized gains importance through its presence 
in physical reality. I will use the term “spatial regime” to describe such a system of dimensional 
standards and/or physical practices, a series of interlocking spatial and dimensional attributes 
that compels conformity.42 While the examples in this dissertation involve transport 
infrastructures, one can think of a spatial regime in many contexts. The required dimension of a 
water pipe, the expected height of a telephone pole, the mandated width of a doorway—these 
can all be regarded as specific instances of spatial regimes. Such a regime can be produced by 
government regulations, engineering standards, bureaucratic traditions, longstanding vernacular 
practices, and many other causes. These various factors will typically comprise some that are 
more technological and/or scientific in nature, and others that are more social and/or political. 
Sometimes the distinction can be hard to draw, or perhaps (as some social constructivists might 
argue) even irrelevant. In addition, the spatial regime should be viewed not as an entirely 
independent category, but rather as interwoven with other non-spatial aspects of a particular 
system or infrastructure. One key attribute of many spatial regimes is that once they are deeply 
embedded in a system it can be extremely hard to alter them; in this regard their materiality is 
important—a change must be implemented and carried out in the physical world. 
Dimensional measurements and physical standards often appear to possess a bland 
technocratic aspect. Yet they can embody political, social and economic agendas. A classic 
example are the bridges on Robert Moses’ Long Island parkways, built with a clearance too low 
for buses to pass through. This had the effect of restricting the reach of public transit—which 
Moses was notorious in his opposition to—and the mobility of the poor and minorities.43 
Historians still debate whether or not this was consciously intended by Moses and his engineers, 
but the result is the same regardless—the bias is inherent in the bridges themselves. A simple 
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dimensional measurement may possess all sorts of larger implications, far beyond the technical 
or scientific. (The example of Moses’ bridges actually has particular resonance to the container, 
which—as will be described in later chapters—often bumps against its own problems of vertical 
clearance.) The container’s spatial regime obviously does not possess as clear-cut an agenda as 
Moses’ bridges, but the dissertation will point to some of its implications, and how they play out 
in particular situations. 
Within a nation-state particular spatial regimes often hold across the entire national territory, 
and this is one factor making the unity of the nation-state so powerful and the borders between 
nations so significant. The slightest difference may have tremendous significance. For example, 
the rail gauge of Spain differs from the rest of Europe, and this discrepancy has long been an 
issue for movement between Spain and France. (But the new high-speed rail network in Spain 
uses standard gauge, like other European countries.) The subdivision of land can also be 
regarded as a spatial regime. A classic example is the grid imposed upon so much of the 
American Midwest through the Land Ordinance of 1785; later expansions of the U.S. also 
generally used grids for the platting of land. A spatial regime can be at the opposite scale, dealing 
in miniscule dimensions. In premodern Europe, for instance, there were variable techniques for 
specifying the size of many units—such as a bushel, a volume often contested between peasants 
and manorial lords—that varied between localities and over time. The centralized state faced the 
challenge, which it eventually surmounted, of bringing about a uniform spatial regime by 
standardizing such measurements. The development of long-distance trade and manufactured 
goods also played a part in this transition, but the role of the state was crucial.44 Hence there is 
frequently a correspondence between a spatial regime and national identity. 
The physical infrastructures of transportation, water and sewer provision, electric power, and 
oil pipelines, among others, can be regarded as “heavy” in terms of their relative immobility and 
sheer physical size. Even informational infrastructures depend on material components, as 
already noted—the internet relies on undersea cables, cell phone networks require cell towers, 
and so forth. Hence an infrastructure is likely to be a long-term presence in a territory, landscape 
or urban setting, difficult to alter in terms of time, effort and money. While people, goods, 
resources or information may move swiftly along it, the actual physical manifestation of an 
infrastructural system (a bridge, undersea cable, rail corridor, gas pipeline, highway, telephone 
pole, etc.) is typically fixed in place and very hard to change. It has a geographical and spatial 
inertia, and tends to organize things around itself rather than adjusting to change.45 Therefore a 
spatial regime is a particular type of standard, one whose materiality and dimensionality is not 
incidental but of basic importance in the way it endures and how (or whether) it can be altered. 
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This is all the more reason for new flows to travel along the corridors and nodes of systems 
already in place—as has been the case for containerization. 
The rhetoric of globalization, and of the post-Fordist condition, often uses terms like 
“flexible,” “light” and “nimble” to describe contemporary networks, or infrastructures likely to 
come in the near future. Such a vision no matter how appealing is largely an illusion. Logistics 
systems, for example, are indeed nimble and flexible in many ways—containers can be easily 
rerouted, held or sped up—and they are pervaded with information and communication in 
parallel with the movement of physical goods. But they also depend on massive components of 
infrastructure that have many inflexible qualities, being fixed in place and representing massive 
investments. The purely material and spatial realm continues to be of immense importance, and 
most infrastructures are far more heavy than light. Even information networks greatly depend, as 
already noted, on certain physical qualities. In addition, systems of information possess their own 
distinctive types of inertia and momentum, described by concepts like “data friction” and 
“computational friction.”46 Consider, for instance, how much time, resources and money go into a 
new version of a major piece of software. Further, the social, cultural and political aspects of an 
infrastructure usually embody tremendous inertia as well—people get accustomed to behaving 
in a certain way, and form social (or cultural, or political) frameworks structured around the 
infrastructure. Humans often find it hard to alter their ways, or may have a vested interest 
against change. The disadvantages of the QWERTY keyboard, for example, are well known, but it 
is hard to replace because it has become deeply entrenched in user habits. These sociopolitical 
dimensions are every bit as inherent to an infrastructure as its technological qualities. 
One can regard this infrastructural inertia as a sort of heaviness, as already noted—once a 
system is in place it is difficult to change. (Another way to conceive of it is as path-dependence, 
or as Hughes’ aforementioned concept of “momentum.”) While information systems and social 
practices, as already noted, can embody great heaviness in their own right, it would seem the 
material, spatial world possesses a unique type of inertia due to its physicality. Things in physical 
existence, with size and bulk in actual space, resist transformations in an eminently tangible way. 
This dissertation—being, after all, an architecture dissertation—asserts that there is a special 
quality to physical, spatial and material infrastructures. As Hughes points out, “technological 
systems…are bureaucracies reinforced by technical, or physical, infrastructures which give them 
even greater rigidity and mass than the social bureaucracies…”47 The task of reconfiguring such 
infrastructures, or altering their spatial regimes, is arduous in terms of money, effort and time. 
Transportation systems are a perfect example. This dissertation will describe a few instances 
where great efforts were successfully made to overhaul an infrastructural link or create a new one 
for the sake of accommodating the shipping container. These examples reveal the powerful 
impact of the container on American infrastructure, especially over the past two decades or so. 
But more often the dissertation will show how the presence and inertia—again, a very physical 
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and material heaviness—of preexisting infrastructure have caused containerization to be carried 
out within their constraints. In such cases the container brings about significant adjustment, but 
not wholesale change. Thanks to this infrastructural inertia, the history and character of the 
existing nation-state is central to how containerization unfolds within its borders. 
In terms of the way the container network takes shape, two spatial and material aspects of 
the national infrastructure stand out. The first is the spatial regime of U.S. transportation, in 
particular the railroad and trucking systems (but also the inland waterways). This comprises 
factors like track gauge, lane width, vertical and horizontal clearance, allowable weight, and a 
host of other standards that possess some spatial or material quality. These derive from the 
evolution of the infrastructures, reflecting American history and practices including some social 
and cultural factors. The second spatial aspect is at the larger geographical scale, relating to the 
location of major hubs of movement and especially the corridors that connect them. These also 
reflect the vicissitudes of U.S. history, but in addition they stem from the inherent geographical 
character of the nation. Certain pathways through the landscape are ideally suited for particular 
transportation routes. Both of these spatial aspects will be described in great detail in the 
dissertation. 
While this dissertation only deals with the U.S. (and to some extent Canada), the larger 
argument is applicable for all nations. The example of the U.S. is complicated slightly—and made 
more interesting—by the container’s historical evolution, as it has a largely American origin. But 
the basic narrative could apply anywhere. The dissertation puts forward a thesis that parallels 
Hughes’ ideas about technological style, arguing for the importance of comprehending national 
or local context in any account of technological adoption. The nature of containerization makes 
the point even more fitting; the container’s dependence on using preexisting domestic transport 
systems means that inevitably national context will shape how containerization plays out. The 
worldwide container network is given form within the setting of the nation-state. 
This issue of the national and/or local scale versus the global scale, of national infrastructure’s 
place in global infrastructure, is dealt with in the next chapter. In an increasingly globalized 
world infrastructural networks are more likely to have a worldwide span, or to tie into global 
infrastructures in some fashion. The mythology of globalization still tends to promote a top-
down vision of worldwide networks imposing a new zeitgeist upon nation-states and local 
settings, which can only react to these overarching changes. This vision of ongoing global 
changes is reflected not only in neoliberal tracts, where its presence is predictable, but also (albeit 
more subtly) in much of the serious scholarship dealing with globalization. The way 
containerization works, however, reveals a more nuanced dynamic of globalization, in which the 
character of national infrastructure plays a formative role in how global infrastructure operates. 





Chapter 4 ~ Globalizing the Infrastructure of the Nation-State 
 
Perhaps the most important theme running through this dissertation is the way the ongoing 
creation of a global infrastructure—the worldwide system of containerization—is carried out 
within the territory of a nation-state, in this case the United States. A key issue to consider is how 
the development of this global infrastructure differs from the creation of the national 
infrastructures that were constructed in the recent past and endure today. Infrastructure has 
often been at the scale of the nation-state, for the era of truly widespread and encompassing 
infrastructural development, with a high level of organization and technology, occurred more or 
less in parallel with the development of the nation-state and the era of modernity. The railroads 
were the first such modern infrastructure, followed shortly by the telegraph and a host of other 
inventions and systems. Even before the railroad, however, the construction of roads and canals 
played an important part in nation-building in the late 1700s and the 1800s. All these networks 
represent examples of how infrastructure can be wielded to bind together a territorial space, 
turning it into a nation-state. Infrastructural connections helped define the territory of the nation, 
making it seem natural and inevitable—and continue to do so today. National infrastructures of 
transportation, power, communication and water (among others) transform abstract lines on a 
map into unified cohesive territories, and people into citizens. The nation-state is a construct—
but one undergirded by, among other things, powerful physical systems. Indeed, “the nation-
state has historically been…[infrastructure’s] most common geographic scale, its principal 
financier, and in almost all cases the ultimate source of its governance.”1 
American history is in part a narrative of infrastructural expansion, and the early 
development of the United States was marked by efforts to create public works projects that 
would help stimulate—or at least keep up with—westward growth. Roads and inland waterways 
were the transport infrastructures of the day, and the young government, along with some of the 
states acting independently, worked to develop both. Historical details of this process are 
provided in chapter 6 (for roads) and chapter 10 (for inland waterways). Progress was punctured 
by periodic debates about the proper role of the federal government, or of government in general, 
but it was the exponents of a more centralized and active government (Alexander Hamilton in 
particular) whose vision for the most part won out over the long run. George Washington himself 
was a supporter of building both roads and canals. A key document promoting American nation-
building through infrastructure was the “Gallatin Plan” of 1808, written up by Albert Gallatin, 
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President Jefferson’s Secretary of the Treasury, which reveals the ambitions of the young nation 
both to bind itself more closely together and continue expanding westwards.2 Thomas Calhoun, 
at this point in his career a strongly nationalistic Congressman, proclaimed in a similar spirit in 
1816 to his fellow legislators: “Let us…bind the Republic together with a perfect system of roads 
and canals. Let us conquer space.”3 
Arriving on the scene in the mid-1800s, the railroad was one of the key infrastructures to 
support many of the modern nation-states during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
This was particularly true of the U.S., as will be discussed in chapter 5. Certainly those who lived 
in the glory days of this technology were keenly aware of its power to unify nations; an 
Argentine statesman proclaimed, during his nation’s early burst of railroad building, that: 
[The railroad] will unify the Argentine republic better than any congress. A 
congress can declare a country one and indivisible; but without the iron road, 
which draws together a nation’s far-flung extremes, the country will for ever 
remain divisible and divided in spite of all legislative mandates. Thus political 
unity must begin with territorial unity, and only the railroad can make a single 
area out of two places separated by 500 leagues.4 
Such an attitude was particularly fitting for a young nation like Argentina or the U.S., whose 
period of nation-building took place largely during the railroad era and thus was driven by the 
railroad itself. But the more well-established European countries also seized on the railroad with 
alacrity, wishing to further unify and develop their national territories. The construction of a 
railroad bridge on the border between England and Scotland, for example, prompted a 
contemporary to describe it as “the last act of Union” between those two regions.5 
Over the past few decades there has been a scholarly trend, alongside the “cultural turn” in 
the humanities and social sciences, to describe the creation of the national in social and cultural 
terms, and this has resulted in some noteworthy scholarship. Benedict Anderson in his influential 
book Imagined Communities emphasizes that the nation-state’s development depended upon 
creating the concept of community, of nationality.6 Another example of such thinking is Eugen 
Weber’s highly regarded Peasants into Frenchmen.7 But territorial space and physical systems also 
possess vast meaning and power, and so the identity of nation-states is embedded in such 
physical and spatial factors, not merely in cultural or social forces. (Weber incidentally is hardly 
ignorant of infrastructure’s role; one of his chapters is titled “Roads, Roads, and Still More 
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Roads.”) As Manu Goswami argues in Producing India, culture, infrastructure and territory work 
jointly to craft the identity and dimensions of the nation-state. Goswami’s account of the role of 
the Indian railroads, initiated by the British but soon adopted by the Indians as both a symbol 
and tool of their evolving national unity, is particularly relevant.8 The nation-state is “produced” 
and unified by a host of factors, including physical infrastructures, bureaucratic regimes like law 
and language, cultural identity and beliefs, educational norms, military forces, etc. The focus of 
this dissertation of course is on infrastructure, which is admittedly merely one of many factors, 
yet is (as Goswami argues) one whose importance should not be overlooked. 
Though this dissertation concentrates on a type of infrastructure that is eminently physical, it 
should be noted that many key infrastructures are information-based, such as telephones, 
newspapers, magazines, fax machines, television and the internet. In addition there are particular 
bureaucratic regimes, and laws and shared practices, that can be considered an infrastructure of a 
conceptual sort. These are also central in the construction of national coherence. Michael Mann, in 
his discussion of the “infrastructural power” of the state, uses the word in this broad sense. He 
argues that infrastructure, both physical and organizational, is fundamental to the modern state’s 
power. In this regard he notes that state power has grown over time, in tandem with advances in 
technology, literacy, bureaucracy, record-keeping, organization, etc.9 Older states were 
commonly dictatorial, but limited in their infrastructural reach: “Great despotic power can be 
‘measured’ most vividly in the ability of all these Red Queens to shout ‘off with his head’ and 
have their whim gratified without further ado—provided the person is at hand… [but] once you 
were out of sight of the Red Queen, she had difficulty in getting at you.”10 The modern state’s 
power, Mann posits, is less arbitrary and more systematic (or rationalized, in any event), and is 
implemented through infrastructures both physical and conceptual. 
James Scott’s Seeing Like a State is a definitive account of how the state organizes the activities 
and people within it, and the techniques Scott describes are similar to those discussed by Mann 
under the broad rubric of “infrastructure.” It is striking that many of Scott’s examples are spatial 
in nature, such as the urban planning of Brasilia, the collectivization of agricultural land under 
Stalin, and the creation of the ujamaa towns in Tanzania. We can regard these methods of 
organizing space as infrastructural, and it is significant that (as Mann points out) they are 
characteristic of modern states—or states seeking to be modern. While Scott’s case studies deal 
with disastrous state projects his insights about modern state practices are more broadly 
applicable, as Scott himself emphasizes. The state seeks to make its territory, people and economy 
“legible” (in Scott’s terminology) so its bureaucrats can control, adjust and monitor what takes 
place while local knowledge possesses no advantage. Standards and information are also crucial 
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tools in this process—as with physical infrastructure, such systems play a key role in configuring 
the modern nation-state and enabling its powers.11 Another scholar dealing with such issues is 
Timothy Mitchell; in his study of Egyptian modernizing efforts, Colonising Egypt, Mitchell 
ponders the implications of such efforts towards order in behavior, practices and spatial 
arrangements, including urban planning and architecture. For Mitchell, working in a more 
Foucaultian vein, these types of order possess a larger cultural significance; modernity was not 
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Even infrastructures that at first blush seem more limited in scale frequently possess a 
national quality. Water and sewer systems in the U.S. are typically local or regional, for 
instance—they are not intertwined into a national network, but rather each one stands apart. The 
regulations, standards and practices of American water and sewer infrastructure, however, are 
largely national. An engineer working in one place could easily make the transition to another, as 
could a plumber. The measurements and dimensions of the equipment, the bureaucratic 
procedures, the engineering techniques, the affordances for health and safety—all these have a 
national aspect, despite some variations. One could make a similar point about electric power: it 
is not national in it scale, as the nation is divided up into a few giant regions for power 
generation and distribution, but in terms of its essential characteristics it possesses a national 
uniformity. Transportation infrastructure, even when built strictly for local purposes, also has 
this national quality. A town might be building a new intersection where two local roads meet, 
but the procedures of construction, the materials used, and the dimensions are likely to come out 
of nationally standardized regulations and practices. Furthermore those local roads ultimately tie 
into the national system, as one can follow a local road to an arterial, and an arterial to a 
highway. 
In infrastructure’s fundamental linkage to the modern nation-state, perhaps we can perceive 
a role for infrastructure that cuts even deeper, into the heart of modernity itself. One of the basic 
characteristics of modern life would seem to be the extraordinary prominence of technology in 
nearly every aspect of life. While the use of technology is obviously nothing new—since the 
dawn of history humanity has developed and applied technologies—what is novel in modernity 
is the way technology has become pervasive in human existence, and the extent to which people 
are entirely dependent upon it. These vital technologies are naturalized, taken for granted in the 
background, and people swiftly lose awareness of them over time. Gradually they are applied on 
a large scale and combined into systems that undergird, support and structure many aspects of 
modern life—at which point they are not merely technologies but infrastructures.13 As such they 
also become linked to the laws, bureaucracies, classifications, standards, systems and formalized 
practices associated with modernity. As Paul Edwards puts it, “building infrastructures has been 
constitutive of the modern condition, in almost every conceivable sense.”14 He emphasizes that 
these infrastructural systems do not merely bring about or construct modernity, but also are 
shaped by it. No matter how modern life, and the modern nation-state, evolves, transforms or 
fragments, infrastructure seems sure to maintain its central role in modern (or postmodern) 
existence. Similar arguments are made by others; Bernward Joerges notes “the fundamental fact 
that modern, or if one prefers post-modern, societies irreversibly depend on the maintenance of 
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these [infrastructures].”15 Philip Brey opens an essay by simply stating that “technology made 
modernity possible,” then adds the inevitable corrollary, further down the page, that “the 
converse also holds: technology is a creation of modernity.”16 
Standards are central to these infrastructures of modernity. Standardization is part of a 
process by which knowledge and/or action can be carried out over a large territory or group of 
people. One scholar notes that “without common standards all knowledge would be local 
knowledge,”17 and this also applies to instrumental action. (Likewise all infrastructures would be 
locally bounded if not for standards.) Merchants operating over larger geographical spans began 
to develop common currencies, weights and measures even in the earliest days of modernity.18 
Standardization “was given an enormous boost by the grand universalizing project known as the 
Enlightenment,”19 and in the wake of this epochal shift the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
saw the widespread implementation of standards and standardization, particularly in the West. 
It is no coincidence this transpired during roughly the same period, the era of modernity, that 
infrastructures were developing and expanding. In addition to the aspirational character of the 
Enlightenment, and the modernizing ambitions of government and science, the Industrial 
Revolution was also crucial in furthering standardization. Manufacturing made standards 
critical, as manufacturers used standardization and uniformity to assure the rapid production of 
goods at a consistent level of quality and sameness.20 
One of the key actions that government often performs in order to create unity within its 
national territory is the setting of these uniform standards, protocols, systems and regulations. 
Many of these standards relate to infrastructure, and some are spatial, material and/or 
dimensional, often depending on great precision for their effectiveness. As described in chapter 3, 
these can be seen to constitute “spatial regimes.” A classic example is railroad track gauge, the 
distance between rails. Here there can be no wiggle room or flexibility whatsoever, for a unified 
system must have the same track gauge throughout. Nearly every nation’s rail network does in 
fact have this unity. This was not the case in the early days of the railroads, as different railroad 
companies built different tracks with their own gauges, as their engineers saw fit or as strategy 
demanded—sometimes the differing gauges were intentional, to prevent competitors from using 
the tracks. But over time the track gauges were made consistent, sometimes at great expense and 
effort, within national territories; in the U.S. this process was largely complete by the close of the 
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nineteenth century.21 Other standardized dimensions, such as for vertical and horizontal 
clearance, are also critical to successful railroad operations across the nation. 
Likewise the Interstate highways depend on a consistent set of spatial dimensions and 
physical characteristics, such as for lane width, minimum turning radius, grade, drainage slope, 
and vertical clearance. (This uniformity also of course applies to normal American roads in a 
general sense; a person accustomed to driving in Pennsylvania will have little trouble doing so in 
Texas, due to a rough national uniformity in spatial layouts, signage, rules and other practices.) 
In comparison with the railroads, the highways were developed in a far more top-down and 
uniform way across the entire nation, and likewise the standards that govern them were put in 
place in a more wholesale fashion. Nevertheless a certain amount of adjustment did happen over 
time; early American highways like the Merritt Parkway, Taconic State Parkway, Arroyo Seco 
Parkway and Pennsylvania Turnpike represented initial efforts, and the lessons learned were 
applied on a nationwide basis with the Interstates. 
The concept of the nation-state bases itself on the claim that a particular physical territory, a 
clearly demarcated expanse of geographic space, belongs to a certain group of people that is 
defined culturally and socially as being of a specific nationality. Further, and crucially, this 
territory is unified under one government that exerts exclusive and sole power within its borders. 
(The idea of exclusive national sovereignty, whereby each state is acknowledged to possess its 
own autonomy and to have legitimate power over its territory and people, is known as the 
“Westphalian system” or “Westphalian sovereignty.”) Thus space and land are central to the 
nation-state’s existence. All the land, people and resources within its territory are part and parcel 
of the nation-state, which is unified (or at least seeks to be unified) in terms of laws, 
transportation, culture, society and national identity. All these qualities, under the aegis of the 
nation-state, exist within the same enclosed geographic space—little wonder that expressions of 
patriotic identity often draw on the word “land,” as in “homeland,” “heartland,” “motherland,” 
and “fatherland.” Space in this sense is not something that just receives the nation, but is actively 
implicated in state strategies and logics. The unity of the national is not merely carried out within 
a particular space, but through the effective use of that space; as Henri Lefebvre puts it, “the state 
tends to impose a rationality, its own, that has space as its privileged instrument.”22 
A powerful congruence exists here, wherein a multitude of political, economic and social 
characteristics are all unitary at the same scale, that of the nation-state, which is defined most 
fundamentally through its territory. The two key characteristics that must go hand in hand are 
government power (the state) and citizen identity (the nation). Peter J. Taylor emphasizes that the 
nation-state joins together these two factors through its territoriality: 
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A given state does not just exist in space, it has sovereign power in a particular 
territory. Similarly, a nation is not an arbitrary spatial given, it has meaning only 
for a particular place, its homeland. It is this basic community of state and nation 
as both being constituted through place that has enabled them to be linked 
together as nation-state. The domination of political practice in the world by 
territoriality is a consequence of this territorial link between sovereign territory 
and national homeland.23 
It should be kept in mind that the nation-state, and its territoriality, can be a limited prism 
through which to understand the world. This is the key point made by John Agnew’s influential 
1994 article that introduced the notion of the “territorial trap,” in which he argues against a 
geographical view that assumes the nation-state is a rigid unit with complete sovereignty within 
its space and posits national territories and powers as given rather than constructed or 
contingent. The “trap” for Agnew is the tendency for scholars to invariably draw on the 
framework of the national, and the bounded territory it encompasses, as the default unit of 
analysis in political, social and/or economic studies. In raising such issues in the mid-1990s 
Agnew was perceptive, and ahead of his time, as he noted some emerging trends that pointed to 
a more transnational existence, one where the nation-state’s basic territorial integrity remains yet 
it is opened up to a host of globalized dynamics, influences and networks.24 
The nation-state’s ability to unify so many aspects of human existence in a defined 
geographic space is so ingrained in our thinking that “it becomes difficult to remember that it is 
only one, relatively recent, historically contingent form of organizing space in the world.”25 
Earlier systems of governance, power, economics, belief, society and culture were not marked by 
this convergence whereby nearly every sort of unity exists at the scale of the nation-state. In 
medieval Europe government and power worked at a series of scales, with the peasant living 
under a feudal lord who in turn was vassal to a monarch. Meanwhile religious belief was at 
another scale, with most of Europe sharing a common Roman Catholic faith centered on Rome. 
Saskia Sassen discusses some of the nuances of territorial space and its control during the Middle 
Ages: 
In Europe the Middle Ages was a period of complex interactions among 
particular forms of territorial fixity, the absence of exclusive territorial authority, 
the existence of multiple crisscrossing jurisdictions, and the embedding of rights 
in classes of people rather than in territorially exclusive units… The prevalent 
pattern in medieval times was one of crisscrossing jurisdictions, thus keeping 
territorial fixity from becoming exclusive territorial rule… There was a kind of 
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central authority during feudalism arising out of the church and the empire. But 
it was not based on territoriality—exclusive territorial authority. Their respective 
forms of authority could coexist with feudal jurisdictions, and with each other, 
albeit with frequent conflicts… Key actors controlled geographic spaces, such as 
the fiefs and the ecclesia, and in that regard we could describe the landscape as 
marked by scattered de facto mini-sovereignties in a vast system of often loose 
overlapping jurisdictions. But even where lords had jurisdiction over manors 
and lands granted to them, they lacked exclusive territorial authority.26 
Sassen hypothesizes we may be entering a similar period today—similar in that we are 
starting to see certain “crisscrossing” and “overlapping” territorial arrangements, rather than the 
exclusive authority and unity of the nation-state over its space.27 Yet she argues that it is actually 
the state itself that somewhat paradoxically puts into place many of the conditions of 
globalization.28 In spite of the numerous multinational corporations and international institutions 
(such as NGOs) that possess newfound power, the nation-state is still preeminent and continues 
to play a crucial role in binding geographic space together, even if in the process it undermines 
its own power in certain ways. Hence the state helps create the new global existence; Sassen 
draws attention to “the ways in which the state participates in setting up the new frameworks 
through which globalization is furthered.”29 
This dissertation draws on and extends Sassen’s insight, arguing that it is not merely the state 
that plays this key role in implementing globalization but also many actors embedded within the 
national scale, such as corporations, nonprofit organizations, industry trade groups, professional 
associations, and citizen advocates. With regard to the shipping container’s presence in U.S. 
infrastructure it is evident that American corporations and trade groups, essentially acting within 
the confines of the national, have played a role every bit as important as government. The usual 
narrative of containerization stresses the importance of the shipping lines, businesses that are 
inherently actors at a transnational scale (though still based in locations within particular 
countries) who possess a global orientation. While their role certainly was significant, this 
dissertation will demonstrate that many of the key transformations to U.S. infrastructure 
associated with containerization have been carried out by corporations with a purely American 
identity, acting entirely inside the national territory. 
From a larger historical viewpoint it is entirely fitting to emphasize the role of corporate 
actors, for capitalism, like the modern state, has been a powerful force in the homogenization of 
space and the development of infrastructural unity. Markets, commerce and corporations have 
unified and abstracted space and materiality in many forms, especially during the modern era. In 
Nature’s Metropolis, William Cronon gives a masterful account, in the context of Chicago and the 
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Midwest during the second half of the nineteenth century, of how capitalism and its 
institutions—with governmental involvement too, but to a decidedly lesser degree—
homogenized and abstracted space and the material world, particularly the natural world.30 
Similar concerns appear in the work of James Scott, who states that: 
…large-scale capitalism is just as much an agency of homogenization, 
uniformity, grids, and heroic simplification as the state is, with the difference 
being that, for capitalists, simplification must pay. A market necessarily reduces 
quality to quantity via the price mechanism and promotes standardization; in 
markets, money talks, not people. Today, global capitalism is perhaps the most 
powerful force for homogenization…31 
Such issues have been a particular concern of the geographer and theorist David Harvey, 
who uses the term “the spatial fix” to describe how capitalism is compelled to expand constantly 
over territory to develop new markets and exploit additional resources. Harvey further argues 
that capital dominates space at the expense of actors tethered to local places.32 Early in his 
scholarly career Henri Lefebvre was also concerned with how capitalism “produces” space; later 
he turned his focus to how the nation-state does likewise. (Goswami borrows her terminology of 
“producing” India from Lefebvre.) Ultimately Lefebvre sees capitalism and the state as partners 
in the process; as Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden explain, “for Lefebvre, the homogenized, 
hierarchized, and fragmented spaces of capitalist modernity are produced not only through 
capitalist strategies…but just as crucially…through the variegated regulatory strategies of the 
state mode of production.”33 The state works in partnership with capitalism to control and exploit 
space. 
Some other scholars, less theoretical than Lefebvre but more grounded in the particulars of 
their fields, concur with this viewpoint. The rise of capitalism was roughly contemporaneous 
with the development of the nation-state, and the two are linked in many ways. The most direct 
connection is that the market, private actors and corporations rely on the state to set the 
parameters of commerce and regulate its workings. More broadly, capitalism requires a force for 
order and stability, i.e., a government that enforces contracts, creates social stability, provides 
education, builds infrastructure, has a monopoly on the use of force, and does many other things 
the market cannot accomplish on its own.34 This remains the case in our globalized present. As 
Ellen Meiksens Wood argues, “there is little evidence that today’s ‘global’ capital is less in need 
national states than were earlier capitalist interests. Global capital, no less than ‘national’ capital, 
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relies on nation states to maintain local conditions favourable to accumulation as well as to help it 
navigate the global economy…”35 Later she adds that: “The economic imperatives of capitalism 
could be said to have created a global order more integrated than ever before…but to sustain this 
vast impersonal network requires close social and legal controls, such as those provided by the 
nation state.”36 
As Wood notes, it now appears that in certain respects the process of globalization is, for 
better or worse, generating a new kind of global unity. Many have written about this ongoing 
scalar shift. One of the more prevalent tropes is of a “flat world,” as grandly announced in 
Thomas Friedman’s superficial bestseller The World is Flat.37 This presents a fundamentally 
misleading understanding of globalization, as though it were simply the historical process of the 
nation-state happening all over again at a larger scale. The opposing dystopian viewpoint is to 
see in the contemporary condition one of fragmentation and chaos, where the ravages of 
predatory capitalism and factional hatreds lead to disintegration. But this approach ignores what 
globalization has actually achieved thus far to interconnect the world. It is evident that a more 
accurate understanding lies between these two extreme and ideologically-driven positions, but 
difficult in practice to comprehend how globalization transpires. The example of the shipping 
container may be helpful. 
Railroads and highways helped “produce” nation-states, as did countless other 
infrastructures, bureaucracies, organizations, procedures, codes, regulations and practices. 
Arbitrary spaces on a map, bounded by equally arbitrary lines that mark their borders, were 
given real unity and significance. The constructed nation-state was naturalized, and each nation-
state came to seem inevitable. The currently emerging global spatial order is likewise produced, 
not natural, inevitable or innate, and clearly the container is one of the tools used to bring about 
this new global terrain. But there are some crucial differences, which one can tentatively identify, 
between the nation-building process and the presently unfolding dynamic of globalization. 
The nation-state, ascendant during the era of modernity, generally sought to minimize or 
eliminate difference and impose a unity over its space and people. To return to the example of 
track gauge, the early American railroads operated with a variety of gauges, but a key part of the 
nation-building process was the gradual conversion to standard gauge throughout the network 
across the entire national territory. While these early railroad routes were not erased, they were 
converted wholesale to the uniformity of gauge necessary to establish a seamless domestic 
network. In countless other respects, including spatial dimensions, engineering details, and 
bureaucratic practices, the rail system gained a certain consistency, and new routes were built in 
accordance with this regime. The process involved not only governmental regulation, persuasion 
and coercion, but also the cooperation of the railroad companies who increasingly viewed this 
progress as synonymous with their self-interest. While generalization is risky, it is fair to say 
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most other national infrastructures followed a somewhat similar pattern. Those infrastructures 
that came later, such as the Interstate highways, in fact often had their uniformity imposed earlier 
in their development. One way or another, the nation-state (and/or the actors within it) was 
successful in crafting cohesive and uniform infrastructures. 
National infrastructural unity was not a preordained, inevitable outcome. It took time to 
develop, beginning as fragmented systems before gradually, in halting steps, taking cohesive and 
unified shape at the national scale. It was constructed by various forces and actors, most 
importantly the governments of nation-states. Infrastructure helped create the modern nation-
state, and the nation-state helped create modern infrastructure. The process to unity was not 
smooth, nor was it clearly planned from the start in most cases—in other words, it was 
historically contingent. Often national infrastructures were cobbled together out of diverse 
fragments, but these fragments eventually were molded into more unified and systematic 
networks, because the nation-state ultimately (though not initially) possessed the power to do so. 
Indeed, it was often the development of improved infrastructure in the first place that helped 
give the state this unifying power; thanks to modern infrastructure, the conditions were in place 
to allow the nation-state to develop and gain coherence over a large territory. 
This evolution from fragmented systems to national infrastructural networks happened in 
various ways. In the case of the railroads, as already discussed, the plethora of early systems 
were essentially regional in nature, linking cities to nearby cities, or else cities to hinterlands. In 
many other cases the tendency was for infrastructure to develop first in major cities, and then 
expand outwards into towns and the countryside. Given that cities have typically been sites of 
technological innovation and development, and possess greater resources of funding and power, 
along with larger concentrations of people, this pattern is not surprising. In Splintering Urbanism 
Graham and Marvin basically posit such a paradigm, at least in the West; they see modern 
infrastructure beginning in cities like Haussmann’s Paris, and later New York and Chicago, 
before expanding to cover entire nations, a process they view as exemplary of the modern 
infrastructural ideal.38 This is a reasonably valid way to understand the development of many 
infrastructures, though it should be kept in mind that the hinterland around the city was often 
relevant from the start, at least for its resources. Modern water and sewer systems generally came 
to urban areas first, but the water itself was usually brought in from far off; likewise electricity 
developed in cities first, but generally depended on resources to power it (like coal) brought in 
from elsewhere. In addition, Graham and Marvin’s viewpoint overlooks an earlier wave of 
infrastructural growth at the national scale in the mid- and late 1800s, in particular the railroad 
and telegraph. 
In analyzing the process by which fragmented infrastructures coalesce into a more unified 
one that spans a nation-state, the categorization discussed in chapter 3 of the system and network 
is useful. In this conceptualization, a system is an infrastructure at an early stage of development, 
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when it is particular or localized and lacks breadth. Such a system often is the result of a new 
technology that makes the infrastructure possible, and hence represents a revolutionary 
innovation. Through technology transfer more systems of the same type are introduced in other 
places, resulting in numerous separate infrastructures, and as these gradually expand outwards 
their fragmentation becomes a problem. Eventually the diverse systems are unified into a 
national infrastructure, which at this point can be termed a network. (A network is not invariably 
national in scope, however—it is an agglomeration of systems, at no set scale—but for the 
purposes of this discussion let us assume this national extent.) This generally happens only 
through great difficulty, as a whole host of standards and procedures must be agreed upon, and 
furthermore power struggles inevitably emerge. The difference between a system and network is 
not merely one of scale, for a network, unlike a system, is deeply enmeshed in a multitude of 
political, social and economic factors. Where the system is an innovation that covers a limited 
sphere, the network covers most of the nation’s population and/or territory, and becomes an 
essential underpinning of the workings of the nation-state. A system is typically controlled and 
run by a particular system-builder, but control of a network is more complex, as governments, 
corporations and users become entangled and each gain a certain measure of power. A network, 
in short, is a true infrastructure, part of the framework of modernity and the nation-state. 
While a national infrastructure may originate as a loose group of limited and incompatible 
systems, the end result is usually a coherent and unified network. Uniform standards and 
practices are imposed on the fragmented systems, technologies are upgraded or retrofitted, 
connections are improved, and the infrastructural network becomes national, both reflecting and 
reinforcing the state’s territorial, political and social unity. It remains to be seen whether a similar 
process will transpire at the global level, but this dissertation argues that it certainly has not 
happened yet and is unlikely to occur in the near future. Global infrastructures do exist—and 
containerization is merely one example—but they differ fundamentally from national 
infrastructures, because unity and cohesion are so hard to achieve given the persistence of the 
nation-state. 
Thus far globalization has tended to establish itself by knitting together preexisting 
networks—and generating something on a larger scale out of them—rather than imposing 
uniform systems. The global dynamic is more adept at working with variations than eliminating 
them or superimposing new ones. (Perhaps one can regard the infrastructures of the nation-state 
in their uniformity as exemplars of modernity, while those of globalization, consisting of 
assemblages of disparate parts, are more typically postmodern.) Yet what makes a global 
network remarkable is that it achieves a measure of consistency and seamlessness nevertheless. 
The World Wide Web is probably the paradigmatic example, running over local and national 
networks yet to a large extent (though certainly not entirely) universally consistent in its 
appearance and workings. A shipping container is likewise the same everywhere, even as it 
moves through different national territories and infrastructures that retain their own 
particularities. 
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Many scholars have difficulty grasping such nuances; they may scorn the simplicities of 
Friedman’s vision in The World Is Flat, yet their own work shares some of his basic assumptions. 
Neil Smith presents the idea of “scale bending,” in relation to globalization, to describe how 
tightly global forces have tied the world together. In capturing the new worldwide scale of 
interconnections that link far-flung places ever more directly to each other, the concept is 
insightful and helpful. But Smith falters slightly when he draws a parallel with the creation of 
national scales, pointing out that “the earliest nation-states were the ultimate exercise in scale 
bending.”39 This is true as far as it goes, but obscures some key nuances; global scale bending 
differs from that of the national because it allows the differences of nation-states to coexist, even 
as it binds them more tightly together and allows local actors to jump scale. A similar issue 
clouds some of Keller Easterling’s work on the shipping container. She comments that “today, 
perhaps, the spatial currency for the reorganization of commercial production and distribution is 
calibrated in part against the container and the new patterns of global trade that it both follows 
and helps to propagate,” and continues by adding that the container is “a generic box capable of 
streamlining production according to a common format.”40 This is a reasonably accurate stance, 
yet such phrasing implies a top-down view of globalization, where the container as a global 
object decisively orders the spatial and material world around it. In this paradigm the past is 
conveniently ignored or seen as irrelevant, as are the specificities of national and local context, 
and we are presented with the new zeitgeist, the brave new world of globalization. 
One widely held scholarly view of the ongoing spatial form of globalization emphasizes the 
emerging spatial divisions of “splintering” and “enclaves,” which are largely carried out through 
infrastructure. The leading exponents of this view are Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin, 
primarily through their book Splintering Urbanism, and many other scholars now work through a 
similar paradigm.41 The essential argument is that the modernity of the nation-state sought to 
establish uniformity and cohesiveness, while global dynamics today lead to fractured space and 
exclusions based on power and wealth. There are separate spaces and separate infrastructures, a 
hierarchy of intentional inclusion and exclusion. While elites are plugged into global circuits of 
knowledge and travel, thanks to their access to cutting-edge digital networks and superior 
transportation systems (such as air travel, high-speed rail, toll roads, etc.), the poor and working 
class must make do with second-rate systems. In developing countries the divisions are even 
starker, as the wealthy barricade themselves in secure enclaves served by the expected modern 
infrastructures of water, power, transportation and communications while the vast mass of the 
populace struggles to gain access to the most basic services. It is emblematic of a shift—to put it 
broadly—from the Fordism and modernism dominant until the 1970s to the Post-Fordism and 
postmodernism of today, and most of all it reflects the power of neoliberal ideology and the 
fading of social cohesion, the welfare state, and the ideal of the public good. Much of this 
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“splintering” research examines infrastructure in the developing world, contrasting elite enclaves 
with slum conditions; Erik Swyngedouw for instance has written of the politics and distribution 
of water in poor countries.42 In a First World context, Neil Brenner’s New State Spaces describes 
how certain cities in Europe are increasingly engaging with global commerce and flows while 
they lessen their ties to the actual nations where they are located.43 
The “splintering” thesis has some applicability to containerization, for it is wealthy countries 
that have the best access to container networks of movement, and the best internal infrastructures 
to link themselves into this global trade. In the business of shipping and logistics it is a common 
complaint that in certain places it takes longer, and costs more, to move a container a few 
hundred miles inland than it does to move the same container several thousand miles across the 
ocean. A 2010 New York Times article about India’s congested railroads opens by declaring that 
“S.K. Sahai’s firm ships containers 2,400 nautical miles from Singapore to a port here [Mumbai] in 
four or five days. But it typically takes more than two weeks to make the next leg of the journey, 
870 miles by rail to New Delhi.” The expense of the overland trip, the writer adds, is about three 
times more than the ocean voyage. The article goes on to comment that “as the world looks to 
India to compete with China as a major source of new global economic growth, this country’s 
weak transportation network is stalling progress.”44 The ports themselves, key points where the 
shipping network meets the domestic infrastructure, likewise are crucial for a nation-state’s 
chances to be properly plugged into world freight commerce; Marc Levinson states that “a 
country cursed with outmoded or badly run ports is a country that faces great obstacles to 
finding a larger role in the world economy…it will receive the maritime equivalent of branchline 
service on a single-track railway.”45 By the splintering argument, alterations to domestic 
infrastructure are merely part of an effort to link up the space of the national with that of the 
global, as national infrastructure is oriented to the imperatives of globalization. There is (so the 
argument would go) no longer an effort to build a unified national space, but rather a priority on 
creating links that connect points deep inside the national territory with the larger global 
networks. This is reminiscent of the condition of a colonized country, and raises the provocative 
idea that perhaps neoliberal globalization imposes a sort of colonial status on every nation. 
To a certain extent this dissertation makes an argument similar to the splintering paradigm: 
containerization has caused American infrastructure to be more integrated into global networks, 
and in some ways subordinated to them. The splintering view is especially promising because it 
attempts to account for different scales, and considers how local, regional and/or national 
systems connect (or fail to connect) with the global infrastructure. Yet the splintering thesis 
suffers from some drawbacks, and is not entirely valid for the case of American containerization. 
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The success of the container lies in its ability to move virtually throughout a nation’s domestic 
infrastructure, not merely in certain fragments of the national territory. The reasonably successful 
nations, furthermore, have been quite limited in their progression into splintering; it is no 
coincidence that it is in the poorest countries where the splintering thesis is most applicable. A 
larger issue with the splintering argument is its emphasis on neoliberalism and the power of 
corporate and elite actors to the exclusion of all else. In this paradigm governments are merely 
carrying out the wishes of businesses, global capital and wealthy elites, and ordinary citizens are 
nearly powerless. The splintering thesis also tends to succumb to the fallacy noted earlier, of 
assuming globalization is a novel and inexorable force that has no connection to the past and 
renders existing conditions irrelevant. The agency of local or national actors, in the splintering 
schema, is severely limited. Many splintering scholars have undertaken thoughtful investigations 
of local conditions, and yet the underlying assumption almost invariably is that these localities 
can only respond to the all-powerful global.46 (Though in fairness, this way of thinking has 
become common if not prevalent—it is hardly limited to splintering urbanism.) The example of 
the container demonstrates an interplay between different scales, rather than one being 
predominant. The global may dominate in some circumstances, but at other times it is reshaped 
by the local, regional or national. In addition the dynamic of globalization typically occurs within 
the structures already in place in nation-states. The flows of container movement, for instance, go 
through preexisting transport systems that were built as unified national infrastructures—and 
which still to a large degree play such a role, even as they now accommodate global cargoes also. 
The way containerization exploits existing infrastructures is characteristic of a second-order 
system or internetwork, two very similar concepts explained in detail in chapter 3. A second-
order system or internetwork is essentially one that uses existing systems to construct a brand-
new and more complex network. The new network, i.e., the second-order system or 
internetwork, links these existing systems together into a broader infrastructure, one that gains a 
certain measure of seamlessness thanks to the effective interconnections it crafts between the 
systems. Previously separate infrastructures are bound together by a particular entity or device 
(such as the container), and/or by an information-based system that helps coordinate them. The 
remarkable result is that the container network is cohesive at the global scale, but only because it 
utilizes the independent and entirely separate national infrastructures that each possess their 
own distinctive qualities. The seeming impossibility of creating a worldwide infrastructure out of 
different—and often incompatible—domestic infrastructures is finessed by the approach of the 
second-order system or internetwork. Hence it is evident that the global container network 
depends on national transport systems, which are of great importance for that reason. 
Furthermore, this global network is formed in a fashion that is as much bottom-up as top-down, 
contrary to the assumptions of the splintering thesis which tends to posit that the global scale 
imposes itself on the national and local. 
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Paul Edwards advances the terminology of infrastructural globalism to describe the 
development of such world-spanning infrastructures, and while his particular focus is on the 
worldwide collection and analysis of meteorological data, the concept is broadly applicable.47 
Edwards stresses that a global network cannot be top-down or tightly controlled in its workings, 
inasmuch as so many participants in different nations are involved. Admittedly this point about 
the inevitability of shared control and broad participation applies to any infrastructure, at least to 
some degree, but it is especially the case for a global one. Edwards comments that an instance of 
infrastructural globalism is likely to be an internetwork, adding that it will be “a network of 
networks that behaves, at least for many relevant purposes, as if it were a single unified 
system.”48 This description certainly fits worldwide containerization. While an internetwork (or 
second-order system) is not necessarily global in nature, the concept is well suited to describing 
worldwide infrastructures that bind together a diverse array of separate national networks. 
One characteristic of globalization, and of global infrastructures, is that entities at a variety of 
scales are increasingly able to interact with each other. The local can link up with the global on its 
own, without needing the prism of the state. Likewise the global can more and more easily 
penetrate into the local, bypassing or passing smoothly through national borders. The state loses 
its primacy as the only scale of action, the only scale able to interact with the global, for new 
innovations and practices like the internet and the container allow for the local to scale up more 
directly to the global (and for the global to scale down to the local). One strength of the 
“splintering” thesis is that it does capture how cities and regions within states are interacting 
directly with global flows and dynamics. Adherents of splintering are by no means the only ones 
to describe this dynamic. A similar metaphor is Neil Smith’s concept, introduced earlier, of “scale 
bending.” Writing of social and political concerns, not infrastructure, Smith’s points are 
nonetheless fitting, as he notes that recent events “suggest intense ‘scale bending’ in the 
contemporary political and social economy. Entrenched assumptions about what kinds of social 
activities fit properly at which scales are being systematically challenged and upset.”49 The 
phrases “glocal” and “glocalization,” which have become popular in discourses on globalization, 
capture a similar concept—that of the local directly linked to the global. 
The extent of state weakness, as its boundaries are penetrated and its cohesion undermined 
by globalization, varies depending on the characteristic at stake. The prevalence of many 
economic global flows—the shipping container among them, but also worldwide flows of money, 
the outsourcing of jobs, the spread of business ideas, and the global scale at which many 
corporations operate—reveals the extent to which national economic identity has been 
punctured. Yet when it comes to society and politics the nation-state is more resilient. It actually 
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seems to be experiencing something of a comeback, as shown by the greater border security of 
post-9/11 existence, problems and potential fragmentation in the European Union, backlashes 
against immigration, and a resurgence of nationalism in many places. Political power of course 
continues to be exercised almost entirely at the national scale (except when it is handled locally). 
The shipping container works primarily at the economic level, where globalization is strongest, 
and much of its success derives from this. Yet it cannot entirely avoid interacting in the social and 
political realms, where its power may be more limited. 
The flows of container movement constantly intersect with situations at the national, regional 
and local scales. In an article about how Will County, Illinois, (roughly 35 miles southwest of 
Chicago) has adapted to the massive new intermodal terminals located there, along with giant 
distribution centers and the resulting increased traffic, Julie Cidell captures this interaction and 
some of the tensions associated with it, while undercutting facile “flat world” notions. She notes 
that “what appears to be one global economic system, extending through nodes and networks 
across featureless space, is actually located within multiple scales of government.”50 A key node 
on a global network is also a discrete place with its own history, conditions and conception of 
itself: 
…each municipality has unique characteristics that mediate the kind of 
development it gets: a restricted amount of land to work with, shaped by rivers, 
wetlands, freeways, and railroad tracks… They also have individual 
histories…of near-bankruptcy, legal disputes with neighbors, or rerouting 
federal highways to redirect traffic flow around their historic downtowns that 
shape city staff and elected officials’ willingness to pursue particular paths of 
development.51 
It is not only a matter of local governance (though that is Cidell’s primary focus in her case 
study), but a whole host of these “unique characteristics” that matter deeply at the local level and 
do not merely modify or obstruct global infrastructure but play a formative role in its 
development. 
More normative accounts of containerization unfortunately tend to miss this sort of dynamic, 
and assume local or national variations are problematic and should gradually fade away. Even if 
they acknowledge this will not happen in the foreseeable future, they persist in viewing 
variations as inefficiencies. A typical example is a 2004 article, quite knowledgeable in its details, 
by the Canadian geographers Robert McCalla, Brian Slack and Claude Comtois that describes the 
challenges of implementing consistent practices for land-based container movement, contrasting 
the increasing uniformity of container shipping over the ocean with the widely divergent 
approaches and situations in different nations and regions. The authors are careful not to predict 
an inevitable whittling away of these differences, instead stressing how firmly entrenched they 
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are, yet still refer to them as “constraints” and “impediments,” clearly assuming that container 
logistics would be more efficient without them.52 Such a viewpoint is so common that it may 
seem self-evident unless subjected to further examination. This dissertation proposes that instead 
of viewing national space and infrastructure, or local conditions, as an obstacle to the successful 
workings of the global container network, we understand them as foundational to it. At times it 
may even be the case that the local scale actually takes precedence, and the national and global 
may be merely constituted by a multiplicity of localities.53 In any case, no scale should be seen a 
priori as dominant, and it is certainly an error to assume the global scale invariably takes 
precedence and can only be mediated by the local.  
Perhaps scholars in the humanities and social sciences, attentive to the social and cultural 
dimension, are more attuned to how the local, national and global are interlaced and overlaid. In 
her perceptive and stimulating essay “A Global Sense of Place” Doreen Massey ponders such 
questions and argues that we must hold onto a sense of place, but stresses this does not imply a 
view of place as conservative and tradition-bound in opposition to the dynamism of cutting-edge 
globalization. Actors in particular places are linked into global networks, she demonstrates, and 
the two are not contradictory.54 Michael Peter Smith makes similar points in his own work, 
explaining that the supposed dichotomy between the global and local does not hold up to closer 
examination, and that local actors do not merely partake of globalization but actively help 
construct it. Smith is especially insightful in his discussion of David Harvey and Manuel Castells. 
For all their apparent differences—Harvey is dedicated to a Marxist paradigm while Castells sees 
technology as formative—each is guilty of essentializing both the global and the local. They view 
the global as top-down, universal and well-nigh unstoppable, while the local is steeped in culture 
and tradition and can react to global forces but ultimately is unable to contest them. Smith 
contests such simplicities.55 
Another helpful concept in comprehending such nuances within national territory and the 
built landscape is that of the “palimpsest” or “layered pasts,” which has been used by some 
scholars to contest the assumption that national space is unchanging, and that the unity of this 
space is a natural condition. To view the territory of the nation-state (or any spatial unit) as a 
palimpsest is to argue for a long history whose relevance continues, comprising numerous factors 
predating the nation-state that possess enduring importance.56 Extending the idea to the 
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contemporary case of global forces and the nation-state, one might argue the new wave of global 
networks is only the latest in this series of layers, and just as the nation-state did not entirely 
erase previous legacies, so globalization does not cover up earlier inscriptions but adds to them. 
These previous realities are not merely remnants to be vaguely perceived—though the metaphor 
of the palimpsest might imply this—but factors that possess their own agency. The national as a 
crucial scale endures to the present as a powerful and important entity, not as a sub-scale 
subsumed within the global and somehow secondary to it or powerless against it.57 
The national, and for that matter the regional and the local, are by no means powerless in the 
face of global dynamics. Nations and cities can boost their presence in the global order through 
strategic initiative or simply random good fortune. (Likewise through incompetence or bad luck 
their status in the global system can be lowered.) They can alter or even redraw the lineaments of 
the global. They can also choose, to some extent, how deeply and in what ways they will enmesh 
themselves in globalization. Global power is exerted from particular places, by specific actors, 
and likewise global networks are constituted by national and local components. Admittedly the 
global can seem, to local residents or even national governments, like an overwhelming outside 
force. But this dissertation argues that on occasion local and national actors have reacted quite 
skillfully to the problems and opportunities posed by the container, and at times have even been 
proactive in shaping the development of containerization. Within the category of local and 
national actors, it should be noted, are not just governments but also institutions and 
corporations—anyone who acts primarily within a local or national framework. 
As mentioned earlier, Saskia Sassen’s recent work emphasizes the role that actors embedded 
within the scale of the state often play in carrying out globalization, and Neil Brenner describes 
how local governments are active in linking their cities and/or regions into the global dynamic. 
Such points fit well with the thrust of this dissertation, which investigates how various 
participants in the American transportation system have adopted the container and developed 
their own roles within larger global networks and supply chains. The general tendency has been 
for the complex and tightly organized global supply chains to be composed of multiple 
participants, all working in a coordinated fashion but nevertheless independent of each other.58 
Each transportation-oriented company is able to specialize in what it does best, in the context 
where it is most familiar. This is logical, since a U.S. trucking company (for example) can handle 
the American road portion of a container trip far better than a Korean shipping company or a 
German railroad. Yet though this allows participants to focus their activities within their own 
particular scales, such a situation does encourage them to gain a newfound awareness of the 
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larger worldwide networks they are now enmeshed in. This can affect their strategy and behavior 
in diverse ways, and may even lead them to pursue contacts and partnerships abroad. 
Today’s global networks of containerized freight movement utilize the well-established 
pathways, often created with great effort, of the nation-state. Some of these national 
infrastructures were originally built for very different purposes, but no matter; today they serve 
both national and global agendas. Acknowledging the importance of the nation-state in the 
development of these global routes of container travel raises the role of history and geography. 
The nation-states are the result of a long historical process and are embedded in particular 
territories. Hence the form of globalization, and specifically the routes of container movement, 
follow a long and intricate heritage, with particularities that vary by place and circumstance. As 
Sassen points out, “as the national becomes a more complex site for the global, the specific and 
deep histories of a country become more, rather than less, significant and hence produce 
distinctive negotiations with the new endogenous and external global forces.”59 To comprehend 
the pathways of container movement, it is necessary to delve into the historical and geographic 
context of the nation-state. 
Take, for example, the transportation routes that run east-west across upstate New York. The 
Appalachian Mountains, extending from north Georgia all the way to Maine, pose a great 
obstacle to movement in an east-west direction, but the Mohawk Valley, running west from 
Albany north of the Catskills and south of the Adirondacks, offers a passage through. The Native 
Americans of the region had long used it for travel. In the early 1800s the Erie Canal was built 
through it, helping New York City surpass its eastern urban rivals like Boston, Philadelphia and 
Baltimore. For water-based transportation of course the issue of topography is crucial, given the 
necessity of having a nearly flat route. By the same reasoning the corridor was also an inevitable 
path for a major railroad line—the logic of topography was compelling, as trains prefer to run on 
nearly level ground and tunnels are expensive to construct. Eventually this became a major route 
for the New York Central Railroad, carrying freight and passengers, and it remains a key rail 
corridor today. Later the highway would follow a similar path, with the New York State 
Thruway (Interstate 90) running more or less parallel to the railroad and canal. For the Mohawk 
Valley, and the area west of it all the way to Lake Erie, geography made the development of 
transport infrastructures along its path almost inevitable. The presence of cities that grew rapidly 
thanks to the Erie Canal (Albany, Utica, Syracuse, Rochester, Buffalo, etc.) further reinforced the 
logic of placing later generations of infrastructure along the route, for these cities in their own 
right required transport connections.60 Today large quantities of containers travel by both train 
and truck through this corridor of transport infrastructures, which serves local, regional, national 
and now global purposes. 
Similar narratives could be told elsewhere. Chicago owed its early growth to being at a 
location where portage between the Great Lakes watershed and Mississippi River watershed was 
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as short as possible. Superb natural ports made it inevitable San Francisco and New York City 
would grow into major metropolises. The Central Valley of California, a natural north-south 
corridor surrounded on either side by mountains, attracted transport infrastructures of rail and 
road (and is expected to receive high-speed rail in the near future), along with a chain of cities 
running from Bakersfield to Sacramento. Sometimes geography is indeed destiny. 
Yet contingency and agency are also crucial—the abstract logic of geography does not apply 
willy-nilly. While Chicago was founded for waterborne movement the city’s great boom came 
thanks to the railroad, an infrastructure that had no compelling reason to make that location a 
hub as many other cities in the Midwest would have been equally suitable. The city’s boosters 
and business leaders worked indefatigably to promote Chicago, and sheer historical accident (the 
initial failure of St. Louis to appreciate rail’s importance, for instance) also played a part.61 Los 
Angeles is an even more extreme case, as the entire history of the city and region is one of 
overcoming natural and geographical disadvantages—the most celebrated and notorious 
example being in the provision of water. While the history of water supply in Los Angeles is 
more well known, not to say controversial, the city’s success with ocean shipping is no less 
remarkable. The region has no natural port whatsoever, in contrast to San Francisco to the north 
and San Diego close by to the south, yet over the years Los Angeles and adjacent Long Beach 
have constructed the largest and most successful port complex of the West Coast. Los Angeles 
also benefited greatly from being selected by the railroad companies to be the western terminus 
of the second transcontinental railroad, and much later of course it was very energetic in 
buildings its roads and highways for the automobile.62 Such legacies live on today in many ways. 
(In particular, the Chicago and Los Angeles regions are now the two largest nodes of container 
movement in North America.) 
So it is an error to assume today’s “global flows” (such as containerization, the internet, etc.) 
constitute a placeless and inexorable logic that puts networks and nodes down on helpless spots 
on the map. Global networks are actively shaped by a plethora of local and national factors. It is 
equally important to understand that globalization possesses its own history and does not derive 
from some overarching zeitgeist too pervasive to be fully understood or for its origins to be 
unpacked. Yet such subtleties tend to be overlooked. Manuel Castells has been one of the 
foremost thinkers on the subject of global networks in recent decades, and his concept of the 
“space of flows,” which describes how global infrastructures both physical and information-
based intersect with space, has rightly been influential. Yet even he indulges in this type of 
rhetoric, claiming that “because function and power in our societies are organized in the space of 
flows, the structural domination of its logic essentially alters the meaning and dynamic of 
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places.”63 Such a statement essentializes global networks and puts local or national settings into a 
subservient position, as largely helpless. Castells goes on to refer to the space of flows as 
“ahistorical.”64 To the contrary, the current shape of globalization is deeply historical, being 
rooted in a historical process and influenced by specific places and events. 
The shipping container is not something that appeared out of nowhere, or that developed 
through some pervasive global dynamic, but rather an object with a particular heritage stemming 
from the spatial regime of U.S. trucking and highways in the early 1960s. Likewise the global 
routes of commerce are formed (and over time constantly reshaped) by the conditions and 
histories of particular cities, regions and nations, as well as by actors working in those scales. This 
is a constant process, and one in which the local, regional and national can possess their own 
kind of agency. As Stephen Ramos points out, in the context of Dubai: “Much of the ‘networked 
city’ literature presupposes that with global connectivity, international flows will enter cities 
unidirectionally and reconfigure their spatial logics… [but] urban form, facilities, character, and 
policy can be precisely the decisive elements that attract global activities to a particular city.”65 
Over the past few years some scholars, like Cidell and Ramos, have formulated arguments that 
critique the “splintering” (or “networked city,” as Ramos puts it here) thesis, in particular its 
assumption of infrastructural globalization occurring in a top-down manner. Broader criticism of 
the splintering paradigm is not particularly new, for as already noted scholars in the social 
sciences like Massey and Smith have long been poking holes in it—or, more broadly, in the top-
down view of globalization that splintering is in accord with. But writers like Cidell and Ramos 
are more specific in that they deal with infrastructure itself. Several articles in a themed issue of 
Geoforum in 2008 (the theme’s title being Placing Splintering Urbanism) also contest many aspects 
of the splintering thesis, through detailed investigations of infrastructure in specific places. The 
articles vary in their tone and conclusions, but most argue for at least a more nuanced version of 
splintering and some reject it outright.66 
This dissertation likewise seeks to advance a more nuanced approach, one that draws on the 
insights of the splintering paradigm while contesting some of its simplicities. The role of history 
is central in this effort, as the dissertation demonstrates that the ongoing development of the 
network of shipping container movement, in the American context, is shaped by the nation’s 
infrastructural past—a past that endures in concrete form in today’s transportation corridors. 
Geography is also relevant, as the topography and borders of the U.S., the pattern of its rivers 
and lakes, and the location of its major cities, have been (and continue to be) pivotal in the 
formation of its infrastructure. But most of all the dissertation argues that the development of 
global infrastructure, as illuminated by the example of containerization, differs in some key ways 
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from that of national infrastructure; the latter is cohesive and unified in a fundamental sense, 
while the former is an assemblage of disparate networks that nevertheless gains a measure of 
cohesion. The congruence of government, economics and society within the territory of the 
nation-state has not necessarily ended, but it certainly has been complicated by globalization, and 
so more flexible views of space, territory, scale and infrastructure are needed. The ideas of 
scholars like Sassen, Massey and Cidell, among others, can help us advance along these lines, as 
we recognize the power of the global, but also the agency of the national and local scales, in the 





Chapter 5 ~ The Reluctant Railroads 
 
This chapter will discuss the early history of containerization on American railroads, from 
the 1920s through the ‘50s, and the growing use of the globally standardized shipping container 
by these railroads in the 1960s and ‘70s. During these periods of time trains served to carry 
containers in moderate quantities on rail routes, but the container did not have a deep impact on 
the railroad industry. The rail network existed in its own right, a system with its longstanding 
history and practices and firmly embedded in the American landscape. As container movement 
was until the late 1970s a very small part of the railroad business, there was no need to make 
significant changes for the container’s sake. Containerization still represented a fairly minor 
incursion into the territory and infrastructure of the U.S.; the infrastructural unity of the nation-
state, set apart from the outside world, remained firmly in place. In the 1980s this would begin to 
change dramatically, as the container entered into the railroad network in greater numbers and 
became a key object about which the rail system oriented itself—that is the focus of chapter 7. But 
this chapter focuses on a period when the container for the most part had to fit into the existing 
rail infrastructure. 
The railroad occupies a vital place in U.S. history, being the crucial infrastructure that tied the 
country together during dynamic years of growth, development and consolidation, particularly 
in the second half of the nineteenth century. From east to west across an entire continent, the 
railroad network converted a vast and lightly-settled frontier territory into a cohesive, 
interconnected and advanced nation. The consequences were technological, economic, political, 
social and cultural in nature. In numerous other countries the railroad played a similar role, 
binding territories together more tightly. But the American case is somewhat different, for in the 
U.S. the rise of the railroad coincided closely with the westward expansion, progress and 
development of the country itself. While in other nations rail helped unify a national space that 
was already well established, in the U.S. the railroad played a formative role in establishing that 
space in the first place. (This was by no means a unique situation, as a similar dynamic existed in 
many other newfound nations of North and South America. In colonial settings meanwhile the 
railroad was often a key instrument in establishing the territories of imperial control.) Writing 
about the place of both the river steamboat and the railroad in U.S. history, Wolfgang 
Schivelbusch comments that: 
The mechanized transportation system became, as it were, a producer of 
territories, in the same way that mechanized agriculture became a producer of 
goods. Since American history really began with the industrial revolution (all 
else being colonial pre-history), that revolution is a constituent part of American 
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national and cultural identity to a far greater degree than it is in Europe. Steam 
power [the steamboat and railroad] was perceived as a guarantor of national 
unity…1 
The railroad was the first infrastructure of modernity, transforming life in a multitude of 
ways. This was most evident of course in terms of transportation itself—the train was 
exponentially faster and more reliable than any previous mode of transport, and could carry far 
greater numbers of people and larger quantities of goods. The railroad was revolutionary in 
terms of technology, and in this it was linked to the Industrial Revolution, whose machinery 
created a break with the past in so many ways. No longer was civilization dependent on animal 
muscle power, wind, or water currents for its transportation. But the influence of rail ultimately 
went far beyond even this. The massive railroad companies are often regarded as the first 
modern corporations, their tremendous scale and tightly coordinated operations and 
bureaucracies necessitated by this new technology.2 The growth of rail travel also made it 
necessary to standardize time—one of the most fundamental qualities of how we experience 
human existence—changing a plethora of local and informal times into broad and standardized 
time zones. There were other far-reaching social and cultural shifts as well. 
For a railroad system to function successfully it is necessary there be a host of standards, 
many of them spatial in nature. Probably the most obvious is the distance between the tracks, 
known as the track gauge or rail gauge; as should be evident, a unified rail network must have a 
common track gauge throughout. Consequently this is a key dimension in the workings of 
railroads, and in the history of their development, with ramifications that are not merely 
technical but occasionally political. The most widespread track gauge is 4’-8½” and is fittingly 
known as standard gauge—this is used in the U.S. and indeed about 60% of the world’s railroad 
routes.3 Another important dimension is the loading gauge, which is the maximum height and 
width that are allowable for the train. This determines the clearances that must exist both 
vertically and horizontally for the train to move safely. The vertical clearance is especially crucial, 
as it determines the height of overpasses such as bridges, and the height of tunnels. It is usually 
extremely expensive and difficult to alter the vertical clearance on a rail line, especially one with 
many tunnels. The issue of vertical clearance became critical beginning in the 1980s for American 
railroads that sought to carry containers in a “double-stack” configuration, as will be discussed at 
length in chapter 7. There are many other dimensions and physical qualities that also must be 
standardized, or at least controlled and monitored: the minimum turning radius, length and 
weight of a railcar, details of connections between cars, etc. Of course there are also railroad 
standards that are not at all spatial in nature, such as the method of propulsion, the type of 
signaling, the braking technology, and so forth, but our main concern here is with the more 
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spatial aspects, which are so relevant to the container’s presence in the rail system. Using the 
concept of the spatial regime introduced in chapter 3, one can regard the host of spatial factors 




Figure 5.1: Across the Continent (“Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way”), 
Currier & Ives lithograph 
 
Source: About.com, “19th Century History” (http://history1800s.about.com/od/steam 
locomotives/ig/19thcentloco/acrossthecontinent01.htm, accessed 4/15/13) 
 
The nature of standardization varies depending on the dimension in question. When it comes 
to track gauge, clearly there is no room for flexibility—every rail corridor must accept the 
standard, or else the network is irretrievably fragmented. (Sometimes there are narrow gauge 
railroads on specialized routes, such as for mining, but these are isolated and now very rare.) The 
loading gauge is another matter; in this case absolute consistency is not needed, for a train that is 
set for one particular loading gauge can obviously travel on a line designed for any loading 
gauge larger than that one. In practice though there is a need for a standard minimum for the 
loading gauge, so that railcars of that size (or smaller) can be assured of traveling freely across 
the national network. Currently in the U.S. and Canada this minimum loading gauge is identified 
as AAR Plate B, and a train that meets its requirements for a height of 15’-1” and width of 10’-8”, 
in addition to a few more technical considerations, can essentially move freely throughout the rail 
system. (However, AAR Plate C, with a 15’-6” height and 10’-8” width, now exists so widely that 
it is arguably the de facto standard.) Beyond this minimum there are significant variations, 
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manifested in several other larger standards for loading gauge, and most of the major rail 
corridors in the U.S. meet one of these larger standards thus allowing bigger and more profitable 
railcars to pass through them.4 (While the loading gauge is the maximum height and width of the 
trains, there is also a dimensional standard known as the structure gauge which is the minimum 
height and width of the clearances. Obviously the structure gauge must be slightly larger than 
the loading gauge, so as to provide an adequate margin of safety.) 
In the beginning of the railroad era, during the early and mid-1800s, the assorted American 
railroad companies set their own particular spatial regimes, each choosing as it thought best. The 
most common track gauge was the 4’-8½” standard gauge that originated in Britain, but it had 
plenty of competition. Tracks in the Southeast were generally at a gauge of 5’, though 5’-6” was 
also used there, and the Erie Railroad in upstate New York used a 6’ gauge. Gauges of 4’-9” and 
4’-10”, bizarrely close to standard gauge, also existed. In the mid- and late 1800s there was a 
short-lived flurry of excitement among engineers over the supposed advantages of narrow gauge 
(i.e., under 4’), and so several narrow gauge lines were built, primarily in the West. Sometimes a 
railroad intentionally used a different gauge as those around it in the hope of wielding greater 
control over its traffic (though this strategy often backfired as the line became isolated). More 
commonly early railroad builders simply did not anticipate the need to link up with other lines, 
since they regarded their routes as local or regional in nature.5 In addition, some people had an 
interest in keeping the network fragmented: 
In 1861, because of different gauges, eight changes of cars were necessary for a 
trip from Charleston to Philadelphia. Impediments to through traffic were 
caused not only by the absence of over-all planning but also by the presence of 
strong local economic interests. Tavern keepers, teamsters, and porters were 
happy that no single rail line entering either Richmond or Philadelphia made a 
direct physical connection with any other railroad entering the city.6 
As early as the 1830s some foresighted engineers already were arguing for the use of one 
uniform gauge throughout a nation, and in 1846 Britain passed legislation mandating the use of 
standard gauge for most future construction. Others were less perceptive. In discussing the 
gauge of the projected first transcontinental railroad, several American senators in 1863 voiced 
doubts about the necessity of a standard gauge throughout the system, some even claiming that 
the periodic transfer of goods was advisable for safety.7 Senator William Fessenden of Maine 
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claimed that “the idea that the same cars will be run over this immense length of road and from 
one end of the country to another is not a very probable one.”8 But as the system grew ever more 
interconnected and sophisticated, and train trips got longer and faster, the need for 
standardization and unity in the track gauge became evident to all. Various awkward devices 
were introduced to allow railcars to move on multiple gauges, but none worked well—there was 
simply no substitute for having one consistent gauge. Given the expense of retrofitting, and the 
interests standing in the way, though, that was not easily accomplished. As of 1861 only about 
half of the nation’s tracks were standard gauge. The triumph of the North in the Civil War helped 
pave the way to unity of gauges, and the use of standard gauge in the contruction of the first 
transcontinental railroad, completed in 1869, was an added impetus. By 1880 roughly 80% of the 
country’s tracks were standard gauge, with only the Southeast remaining largely the exception. A 
watershed moment was the decision of several Southern railroads in 1886 to change to a 4’-9” 
gauge, which was consistent with the Pennsylvania Railroad and close enough to standard gauge 
to allow interchange. By about 1900 even this minor discrepancy had been eliminated, and 
virtually all trackage (except for a very few minor and isolated narrow-gauge railroads) was 
standard gauge.9 
The unity of the national railroad infrastructure had essentially been cemented by 1890. The 
triumph of standard gauge while crucial was but a part of this larger process, which included not 
merely physical tracks and trains but also a host of institutional innovations like time zones, 
through tickets (for passengers), and through bills of lading (for freight). Throughout this 
evolution, various actors—governmental, corporate, and among the general public—sought 
either to advance or delay this unity, but also, and most importantly, to influence its eventual 
form. The qualities of national infrastructural unity ultimately reflected the desires of those who 
proved most powerful in the process. The decision setting the first transcontinental railroad’s 
gauge serves as a good example. President Lincoln made the initial decision in 1862 to set the 
gauge at 5’, consistent with that of railroads already existing in California, but the dominant 
eastern railroad companies immediately lobbied Congress for standard gauge instead. They 
argued quite logically for the value of a unified and seamless national system—but of course they 
wanted it on their own terms, with the gauge most of them were already using. The senators of 
the Northeast and Midwest were easily persuaded, outvoted those of California and Oregon, and 
passed legislation making the gauge 4’-8½”, with the House of Representatives following suit 
soon after.10 (Due to the ongoing Civil War, the South was not represented at all.) In this as in so 
many other ways, numerous interests and preferences became embedded in the eventual 
character of national infrastructural unity. 
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In addition to the spatial and physical factors inherent in issues like track gauge and loading 
gauge, the interior dimensions of railcars are also important since they determine the quantity of 
goods carried. The railroad brought a new order to the packing and movement of goods, as each 
railcar and its contents became a spatial unit. William Cronon in Nature’s Metropolis gives an 
example of this, while discussing the movement of grain: “Compared with other modes of 
transportation, railroad cars moved grain more quickly and in standardized carloads of medium 
size. With whole freight cars, for instance, carrying nothing but wheat, shippers and railroad 
managers soon came to think of grain shipments not as individual ‘sacks’ but as ‘carloads’ 
consisting of about 325 bushels each.”11 The principle obviously can apply to any cargo moving 
by train. In his book about the history of A&P, and the American chain store more generally, 
Marc Levinson repeatedly notes the advantages (for A&P and other chain stores, and also large 
wholesalers and jobbers) of being able to buy products by the train carload, rather than in smaller 
quantities as was the case for independent grocers.12 The spatial capacity of the railcar, in short, 
became a standard in terms of volume (and hence quantity and weight for particular products), 
and therefore was a conceptual unit in its own right. A similar phenomenon would later happen 
with the truck trailer, and with the shipping container itself. Among the various types of railcars, 
the most important such standard was the boxcar, a versatile all-purpose enclosed car that 
carried all kinds of goods. (Boxcars are still widely used, but are no longer dominant as various 
more specialized railcars have become prevalent.) Railcars are also conceptual units from the 
viewpoint of railroad operations, as the cars can be moved back and forth between trains, and 
added to or removed from a train. 
The paths of the railroad corridors, laid across the land, had a formative impact on American 
space and geography, and on the location of cities and towns. Even many cities that today are 
dominated by the automobile owe their original importance and early growth to the train—
Atlanta and Los Angeles are examples. The rail pathways are integrally tied to topography and 
other features of the landscape, as a train is quite limited in the slope it can climb, far more so 
than an automobile. (There are exceptions such as cog railroads, but they are not widely used.) So 
the railroad builders selected reasonably flat corridors—valleys and flatlands were appealing 
while mountainous regions were avoided if at all possible. With land relatively cheap in the U.S. 
and labor relatively expensive (compared to Europe), American railroads were particularly 
motivated to avoid building trenches, tunnels, bridges or viaducts, instead routing the tracks 
long distances around topographic obstacles and bodies of water.13 The rail corridor across 
upstate New York known as the “Water Level Route” is an exemplary instance of the way 
railroad builders sought out the most topographically convenient path. The Mohawk Valley to 
the west of Albany forms an accessible route through the Appalachian Mountains, and it was 
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fully exploited by the New York Central Railroad for this purpose, ultimately becoming part of a 
main line (the Water Level Route) between New York and Chicago. In the Southwest the U.S. 
government even purchased land from Mexico (the Gadsden Purchase of 1853) in order to make 
possible a route through southern Arizona and New Mexico that avoided mountains to the north. 
Crossing rivers could also be an issue; railroads would go long distances to find the easiest 
crossing, or delay building a bridge and instead depend on ferries to move their passengers and 
goods across the water. 
But sometimes the railroads made choices unrelated to such factors. The lines looked to 
choose the most profitable routes—or those where they could be persuaded or induced to come. 
Cities and towns were often desperate for a rail connection, realizing their economic future 
depended upon it, and accordingly offered all sorts of incentives. In their novel The Gilded Age 
Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner give a memorably comical account, exaggerated yet 
broadly accurate in spirit, of such a case.14 Sergio Leone’s film Once Upon a Time in the West also 
gives a glimpse of the conflicts (albeit playing out more violently than was usual) that could 
surround the siting of a railroad station. Major cities were at least assured of receiving some 
service, but sought to have a few competing lines instead of just one monopolistic provider. The 
strategies and considerations of the corporate railroad barons could be quixotic. When in the 
1870s the powerful Southern Pacific Railroad was building routes into Southern California from 
both the north and east, the logical terminus was San Diego, the city with the best natural harbor 
in the region. But Southern Pacific had extensive real estate interests along the shores of the San 
Francisco Bay area, and the company’s executives feared the value of their holdings there would 
be diminished if San Diego were to grow into a West Coast rival to San Francisco. So instead they 
chose to end their routes in a city of relatively little importance at the time: Los Angeles. Not 
inclined to generosity, however, the railroad imposed steep conditions on the city in return for 
this valuable access.15 Thanks to these new connections Los Angeles rapidly grew, quickly 
outstripping San Diego. 
A metropolis that was enterprising—or simply lucky—could outrace its competitors, and one 
such case was Chicago. Founded in the early 1800s due to its location at the most convenient 
portage from the Great Lakes to the Illinois River (that river giving access to the entire 
Mississippi River watershed), the young city grew thanks to its location at this point in the water-
based transportation system. But it lagged far behind some of the other major water-based cities 
of the Midwest, such as St. Louis and Cincinnati, that had come to prominence earlier. It was the 
arrival of the railroad that boosted Chicago beyond these competitors and into the dominant city 
of the Midwest. While St. Louis confidently enjoyed its seemingly unassailable position just south 
of the confluence of the Mississippi, Missouri and Illinois rivers, and remained focused on 
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waterborne transportation, Chicago embraced the new railroad technology.16 Multiple railroad 
companies came to serve the city, and as some ran east and some west but none in both 
directions, Chicago grew entrenched as a giant hub for the movement of both goods and 
passengers. Geography had little to do with Chicago’s success in attracting the railroads, for it 
had no inherent advantage in this regard over other Midwestern locations. Rather it was the 
city’s initiative, along with the decisions of railroad executives in New York City and elsewhere, 
that proved crucial. 
In the early days of American history infrastructure often played a role that was more 
oriented to the rest of the world—and especially to Britain—than to unifying the young nation. 
This was quite logical when America was a mere colony of the British, but continued to a large 
degree into the early 1800s as the vast resources of the young and underdeveloped nation were 
largely funneled to Europe. The routes of railroads and inland waterways tended to run from the 
interior to the coast for this purpose. As the century wore on and the U.S. gained greater unity 
and a stronger identity—as well as a manufacturing base and large cities—the situation changed 
and infrastructure acquired a more unifying national aspect. During the construction of the first 
transcontinental railroad in the 1860s the widespread expectation was that it would serve 
primarily to expand American trade with Asia, but instead it generated growth in the western 
U.S., and promoted commerce throughout the nation. (The idea of Asian trade with the U.S., or 
passing through the U.S., goes far back in American history, to the earliest days of Western 
expansion and even the search for the Northwest Passage.17) One figure in the railroad industry, 
writing roughly 20 years after the completion of the transcontinental railroad, admitted that “we 
connected it rather with the notion of transcontinental communication and trade with China and 
Japan than with internal development, or what railroad men call local traffic.” He added that 
hopes of Asian commerce “have fallen far short of fulfillment,” while “the enormous 
development of local business has surpassed anything we could have ever dreamed of.”18 The 
American railroad network ultimately stitched the country together, encouraging development 
throughout and serving as a unifying force. (This vision of trade with Asia coursing through the 
nation’s western railroad lines did eventually come true, however, as chapter 7 will describe, and 
containerization had a lot to do with it.) 
Yet even as the railroads increasingly knit the nation together in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, much of the optimistic rhetoric of unity by rail faded. During the early 1800s 
the new technology was seen to embody the promise of national unity in multiple ways: 
economic development, cultural uplift, enhanced communication, social ties, military security, 
territorial expansion, etc. Encomiums to rail’s importance came from railroad entrepreneurs, 
predictably enough, but also from civic leaders, citizens groups, and journalists and writers. But 
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from about 1850 onwards the major railroad companies, growing ever larger and wealthier, felt 
more inclined to assert their own self-interest, while the public attitude towards the railroads 
grew negative. Dreams of unity and universal advancement took a back seat to ruinous 
competition on some occasions, and monopolistic behavior at other times and places. The larger 
companies were now extraordinarily powerful, well organized and far-flung, and their actions 
reflected this new reality.19 Consequently popular resentment was widespread. Yet in the midst 
of the constant controversy and strife, the railroad companies during the second half of the 
century continued to grow rapidly, and to build links among themselves. Standardized practices 
and interchange techniques, along with stations serving multiple lines, made the rail system 
more unified. One crucial part of this process, as already described, was the imposition of 
standard gauge throughout the national network. 
During the nineteenth century American railroads were crucial in supporting the nation’s 
military operations, of fundamental importance in the nation-building project. The railroad’s 
military role is best known in the context of the Civil War, where it helped revolutionize warfare 
and gave the North a key advantage. But rail was equally relevant to the conflicts against Native 
Americans associated with westward expansion. The army and western railroad companies 
found themselves in a symbiotic relationship, with the railroads depending on soldiers to protect 
their lines, encampments and construction crews, while the military needed rail to move soldiers, 
equipment and supplies quickly over large territories. Civil engineering was taught at West 
Point, and many of the leading railroad engineers and builders had a military background.20 
While the military justification for the building of the Interstate highways in the twentieth 
century would become well known, the railroads arguably were more integrally connected with 
the American military. 
American railroad companies have a long, albeit sporadic, history of pursuing intermodalism 
in the movement of freight—that is to say, applying strategies that involve using more than one 
transport mode to carry goods, with an easy transfer of cargo between the modes. Most often 
railroads have pursued these coordinated intermodal schemes with trucking firms. The benefit of 
coordination is that each mode concentrates on what it does best: the railroad carries the cargo 
economically a long distance over a fixed route, while more flexible trucks pick up the cargo at its 
origin and drop it off at its destination. There were, and still are, essentially two ways to carry 
this out. The most obvious method is to carry entire truck trailers on train flatcars, a practice 
widely known as “piggyback” and more technically called trailer-on-flatcar or TOFC. The other 
method is to utilize a solidly-built and weatherproof giant box—that is to say, a shipping 
container—that is interchanged between trucks and trains, with the container typically large 
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enough to be analogous to a trailer without wheels. This practice is termed container-on-flatcar or 
COFC. 
Early versions of both piggyback and COFC appeared long before the motor vehicle. In both 
the U.S. and Europe in the nineteenth century there were piggyback-like operations in which 
horse-drawn wagons were carried by train, with the wagon strapped onto a flatcar (and the 
horses carried in a boxcar or fresh horses provided at the other end). One widely referenced 
American example is a railroad that moved wagons with farm produce from Long Island to New 
York City.21 (With perishable food as the cargo evidently speed was of the essence, and so it made 
sense to avoid the delay of loading and unloading the goods at both ends of the rail journey.) 
Circus wagons sometimes traveled by train as well, and the technique used to load them, 
involving ramps, came to be known as “circus loading.” (The practice continued for a time after 
circuses switched from wagons to motorized trucks, as shown in the Cecil B. DeMille film The 
Greatest Show on Earth.) 
Likewise there were examples of containerization in the nineteenth century, in which 
containers were transferred between train and wagon, or in some cases between train and ship or 
barge. A variety of containers were created and used for this purpose in Britain and the U.S., 
though generally with limited success. As far back as the 1830s, railroad companies such as the 
Liverpool and Manchester Railway in Britain and the Camden and Amboy Railroad in the U.S. 
used containers in an intermodal fashion. Some manufacturers and shippers of particular 
products, such as ice, strawberries and bread, also invented and used large crates, boxes and/or 
chests that somewhat resembled containers in their use. Various inventors also patented 
container designs, though they typically went unrealized. While all of these early containers were 
small (by later standards) and arguably more comparable to oversize crates and boxes, they were 
large enough, and able to hold a sufficient weight, that cranes or other lifting devices were 
necessary to move them (though some were built with rollers and could be pushed from one 
mode of transport to another). They were sufficiently durable and weatherproof to be placed atop 
rail flatcars and wagons, rather than being put inside boxcars or covered wagons. Furthermore 
they were not abandoned after a journey, but remained in use.22 All these are key characteristics 
of the shipping container, and so these early containers can at least be regarded as its precursors. 
During the late 1800s and early 1900s an interesting use of rail freight arose in North America 
that—though not intermodal, strictly speaking—could be regarded as a precursor to today’s 
“Just-In-Time” containerized global supply chains. These were the “silk trains” that brought silk, 
an extremely valuable cargo at the time, from the West Coast ports of Vancouver, Seattle and San 
Francisco to the factories of New York City and northern New Jersey. The raw silk arrived on the 
fastest ships from Japan and China, and due to its value it was imperative to bring it as quickly as 
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possible to the locations where it was processed and used in manufacturing. Any delay meant 
money was lost; as with a supply chain today, the longer the cargo is in transit the larger the gap 
between payment at each end and the lower the profit. Not only did each mode of transportation 
carry the silk as swiftly as possible, but the entire worldwide journey was carefully coordinated—
somewhat like the modern movement of containers.23 (When American railroads began to carry 
containers from West Coast ports to the Midwest and East in “landbridge” trips in the late 1960s 
and ‘70s, in fact, some of them promoted their efforts by drawing a historical comparison with 
the silk trains.24) The American and Canadian railroads made every effort to get the silk across 
the continent without the slightest delay, and a romance grew up around these speeding trains, 
which carried armed guards and received top priority on their lines. The most widely recounted 
anecdote concerns when Prince George, the fourth son of King George V, in 1926 was traveling 
along with various other important passengers by a special Canadian Pacific Railway express 
train from Vancouver to Halifax, where he was to board a ship back to Britain. The prince had 
arrived from Asia on a ship that also carried silk, and it took a few hours to load the silk on its 
own train which thus left Vancouver slightly later than the prince’s train. But the silk train was 
the faster of the two, and somewhere in the Canadian Rockies the train carrying the prince was 
ordered to pull aside and halt at a siding so the silk train could pass it by!25 
The rise of the automobile during the early decades of the twentieth century brought an end 
to the supremacy the railroads had enjoyed. The car gave Americans a freedom and flexibility 
they relished, allowing them to explore the wide-open spaces of their nation, and to transform 
the way they lived as suburban development pushed outward from the old urban cores. The 
success of the motor vehicle was also reflected in the growth of trucking at the expense of rail-
borne freight. The truck had a capacity to travel door to door that trains lacked, being able to 
reach any location so long as it was served by a road. Railroad tracks formed an extensive web 
over the nation’s territory but could not possible compete with the breadth of roads, which 
rapidly improved as they were paved and modernized. Trucking allowed factories and 
warehouses to disperse over the landscape; no longer was it necessary to be located along a rail 
line, or to use a horse-drawn wagon to bring goods to the nearest rail depot. For these and other 
reasons, American railroads commenced a slow decline from about 1920 onwards. Nevertheless 
they remained of great importance during the 1920s and ‘30s, especially in long-distance travel 
and freight shipping. Motor vehicles generally could not compete in such long-distance 
movement, given the relatively primitive state of automotive technology and the lack of good 
highways, while air travel was still in its early days. 
So in the 1920s and ‘30s the railroad companies still possessed great power and importance, 
but increasingly were forced to reckon with competition from the automobile. In the freight 
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business a particular challenge for the train was that generally it could not offer the direct service 
trucks now provided. Some major warehouses, factories and other industrial uses were along rail 
lines or had their own spur lines, but most shipments needed a local provider of transportation to 
handle the distance between a freight depot and the source or destination of the journey. 
Traditionally this had been done by horse-drawn wagons, often known as drays. Trucks replaced 
them in the 1910s and ‘20s, for the most part, and then gradually began to offer freight shipping 
over longer distances. (This evolution is covered in greater detail in chapter 6.) In addition to this 
door-to-door capability, using a truck for the entire trip meant freight did not have to be 
unloaded and reloaded when it was taken on and off the train. So although the truck was still 
markedly less efficient than the train over long distances, it did possess certain advantages. Using 
the intermodal philosophy, with piggyback or containers, could combine the best of both 
worlds—the efficiency, capacity and speed of the train, and the flexibility and reach of the truck. 
It also obviated the issue of transferring cargo between transport modes, since instead the trailer 
or container was simply shifted. Given the occasional movement of wagons and containers by 
rail in the days before the automobile, it is not surprising similar practices sprang up once 
trucking became widespread. Despite the natural rivalry between the nascent trucking industry 
and the well-established railroads, the logic of cooperation through an intermodal approach was 
strong. While there were some in each industry who opposed it, being reluctant to share any of 
their business with the other, nevertheless during the 1920s and ‘30s many container and 
piggyback operations began. 
A container innovator named Benjamin Fitch emerged in 1917 in Cincinnati, where the 
movement of freight between different rail terminals was a problem. Fitch’s solution was a new 
container, larger than previous models, that could be loaded onto a truck that was basically 
similar to a flatbed truck, consisting of the motor, cab and chassis but no enclosed body to hold 
goods within. The container, once placed on the truck and attached securely, essentially became 
this enclosure containing cargo (and in fact was called a “demountable body”). Judging from 
photographs, these containers were (very roughly speaking) about six feet high and wide and 
fifteen feet long. As with a contemporary shipping container, the container essentially took up 
the entire volumetric cargo space available for a truck of the time. This containerized system was 
not intermodal, though, for the containers were only meant to travel by truck; the objective was 
to get the most efficient possible use of the few (expensive) trucks by having several (relatively 
cheap) containers available. Trucks carrying containers could constantly shuttle back and forth 
between the terminals while other containers were being loaded and unloaded—when a 
container was lifted off a truck by crane, another loaded container was ready to be put on the 
truck. The operation commenced in 1917 with one truck and nine containers and quickly 
expanded in subsequent years, though it would remain limited to the Cincinnati area.26 
Fitch also found that a few railroads were interested in the intermodal use of containers. In 
1921 the Cincinnati, Lawrenceburg and Aurora Electric Street Railroad began using his containers 
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on its 25-mile route, and transferring them to and from trucks. Later in the decade the Cincinnati 
and Lake Erie Railroad (also an electric railroad, incidentally) adopted a similar container 
operation advanced by Fitch that ranged much further geographically, as the railroad installed 
cranes to handle containers at terminals in Cincinnati, Dayton and Toledo, with trucks even 
carrying the containers into Michigan and Kentucky. The Cincinnati, Lawrenceburg and Aurora 
failed in 1930 and the Cincinnati and Lake Erie followed it into oblivion in 1939, but the 
undeterred Fitch continued on, developing a container system for carrying milk that was used 
from the late 1930s to the early ‘50s. In the early 1930s he also designed a container with 
dimensions of 8’ x 8’ x 20’ for the Pennsylvania Railroad that saw modest use.27 
Fitch’s container innovations were fairly minor operations, but in the early 1920s one of the 
nation’s biggest railroads, the New York Central Railroad, chose to enter into containerization. 
The man most responsible for this strategy was the president of the railroad, Alfred H. Smith (not 
to be confused with Alfred “Al” E. Smith, four-time governor of New York State), who involved 
himself closely with the development and use of containers until his death in 1924.28 The 
container’s primary purpose was to carry out LCL (less-than-carload) services in a more efficient 
and profitable way; LCL had long been a problem for the railroad companies, and by the 1920s 
truckers were taking much of the business. Containers were seen as a means to carry these 
relatively small shipments in a safe and secure manner, and also to transfer them easily to and 
from trucks that would make local pickup and delivery. So the system was fully intermodal, 
although in actual practice containers on occasion were loaded or unloaded at a rail depot rather 
than moving by truck. 
The New York Central’s containers were smaller than those Fitch had put into use, being 7’-
2½” wide, 9’-3½” long and 8’-2½” high. (Some other sizes were also built, for more specialized 
purposes.) Hence two or three containers could be carried on a flatbed truck, or on a truck’s 
flatbed trailer, though probably in some cases only one was actually hauled. Evidently the 
container’s dimensions were not oriented to the truck (as was the case with Fitch’s container and 
later with the postwar container), but to the ideal volume for LCL cargo. The container was of 
steel construction, weighed 2,600 pounds, and could hold 7,000 pounds of freight. When 
traveling by rail the containers were carried in low side gondola cars whose walls, along with 
various attachments, kept them in place. The New York Central initiated the operation in 1921, 
and soon founded the L.C.L. Corporation to take charge of the containers. Over the 1920s the 
business expanded as several other railroads—especially those that interchanged with the New 
York Central—began using the containers, as did many freight forwarders and consolidators. 
While the container was most commonly used for general merchandise, it also found a niche in 
carrying mail shipments. Special containers were designed for certain types of bulk goods like 
bricks, cement, lime and coal, as well as milk, produce and meat. Originally transfers between 
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modes were done by crane, but later versions of the container had short legs attached so they 
could be handled by lift trucks. By the mid-1930s nearly 4,000 containers were in use.29 
The New York Central’s great rival, the Pennsylvania Railroad, was taking note of these 
events, and started using containers of its own in 1928. In the following year the Pennsylvania 
Railroad created the Keystone Container Car Company to manage its containers, and by the mid-
1930s over 3,000 containers were circulating through its system. These containers had almost the 
same capacity as those of the New York Central, but the dimensions and fittings differed slightly 
and so the two systems were incompatible. The Pennsylvania Railroad’s containers were held on 
flatcars rather than gondola cars, and in fact generally only moved by train, rarely being 
transferred to trucks. At depots they were loaded and unloaded more or less as a boxcar would 
be. So the system actually was not intermodal—its goal was essentially to convert a railcar into a 
series of modules amenable to LCL cargo and protected from damage or theft. However, the 
containers were shifted between flatcars in the course of being routed to their destinations. This 
was perhaps the most interesting aspect of the operation: containers were routed through a 
central hub, a terminal in Enola, Pennsylvania, where each was switched from its incoming train 
to the appropriate outgoing train to its destination.30 (The workings of this facility are described 
more thoroughly in chapter 9.) 
The New York Central and Pennsylvania Railroad were the most important users of 
containers in this period, but others also adopted and used containers of roughly comparable 
size. The future of containerization however did not lie with these small containers, but rather 
with larger units of the type pioneered by Benjamin Fitch, containers of a design and size tied 
principally to the truck. Essentially such a container was like a truck body with the wheels, cab 
and engine stripped away. The spatial character of trucking during this period determined that 
this type of container would be about fifteen to twenty feet long. In addition to the intermodal 
containerized systems created by Fitch in the 1920s and ‘30s that have already been described, 
during the 1930s there were several other efforts to put containers of this size into use. In the 
early 1930s a trucker named Eugene Cassavant created two 18’-long containers for shipping by 
rail between New York and Worcester, Massachusetts. 20’-long containers designed by William 
Kellett for Acme Fast Freight were introduced and used in the mid-1930s by a few railroad 
companies. A similar container about 16’ long was introduced in 1932 by the Mt. Vernon Car 
Company, and in 1936 a 20’-long container known as the Cedarstrom freight handling device was 
demonstrated. The Security Storage Company began using containers of a similar size for 
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international shipments (traveling by ship, train and truck) of household goods, such as for 




Figure 5.2: Containers being transferred between train and truck in the 1920s 
 
Source: David J. DeBoer, Piggyback and Containers: A History of Rail Intermodal on 
America's Steel Highway (San Marino, CA: Golden West Books, 1992), p. 14 
 
Meanwhile over the course of the 1920s and ‘30s there was a rising awareness of the need to 
better coordinate the nation’s various modes of freight transport, especially railroads and 
trucking. A report by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, published in 1923, argued for greater 
cooperation, and specifically made the point that railroads should be allowed to discontinue 
some services, while truckers should restrict themselves to offering short hauls. A government 
report, issued by the ICC (Interstate Commerce Commission) in the early 1930s, came to similar 
conclusions about the need for better coordination, though it argued for a more regulatory 
approach. The unregulated status of trucking, as opposed to the heavy and complex regulations 
imposed on the railroads, was a frequent subject of debate, particularly inasmuch as the truckers 
were steadily gaining market share. (Federal regulation of trucking finally began in 1935.) In 
addition, trucks moved over roads built by the government, while the railroads had to maintain 
their lines. Some railroad companies saw the need for coordination, and unsurprisingly preferred 
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to control the trucking aspect of freight movement also; thus by the close of 1929 there were 55 
railroads operating trucks as well as trains.32 Trucking companies, though often flourishing, were 
generally small and lacked the capital to consider buying a railroad, and in any event hoped to 
cut out the railroads completely and provide door-to-door service on their own. 
In 1931 the ICC, notwithstanding its rhetorical support for coordinated transportation, issued 
a ruling blocking rail carriers from using lower rates for container cargo. Instead the price had to 
be set on the basis of the particular goods carried, as was generally the case in the established 
regulatory structure of railroad rates. This prevented railroads from charging a fixed rate for a 
container, i.e., setting a price depending only on the weight and/or mileage traveled rather than 
the goods themselves. The logic of the ICC’s ruling actually applied to both containerization and 
piggyback, and it had a restrictive effect on each since it seemingly eliminated their advantage 
over normal boxcars. As the 1930s wore on container use diminished for additional reasons. The 
Great Depression hurt the railroads particularly, as they saw more and more of their business go 
to truckers. The logical next step was to use bigger containers, but while some efforts were made 
in this direction (as already noted) the wholesale changes needed were too expensive.33 In the late 
1930s and ‘40s meanwhile a new and interrelated pair of technologies, the forklift and pallet, 
began to make freight interchange faster and easier, reducing the need for small containers that 
were only slightly larger than a pallet anyway. The American armed forces in World War II 
exploited forklifts and pallets very effectively, helping make their use widespread.34 
Another reason for the decline in containerization was the growth of the other type of train-
truck intermodalism: piggyback. As already noted, a form of piggyback had been practiced 
occasionally prior to the motor vehicle, with wagons riding on flatcars. The first American 
example of piggyback service for trucking came in 1926, when truck trailers 16’ long were hauled 
on rail flatcars by the Chicago North Shore and Milwaukee Railroad.35 By this point in time some 
of the larger trucks (by the standards of the time) were composed of a tractor and a trailer, 
making piggyback more feasible. (In piggyback operations typically the train only carries the 
trailer, with another tractor—and another driver—arranged to pick up the trailer once it arrives 
at the end of its rail trip.) A few other railroad lines initiated piggyback services in the late 1920s. 
The aforementioned ICC ruling served to temporarily dampen interest in the early 1930s, but 
several rail carriers introduced piggyback in the later years of the decade. The two that proved 
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most committed to it were the Chicago Great Western Railway and the New York, New Haven 
and Hartford Railroad (widely known as “the New Haven”), which would both run piggyback 
operations successfully for over 30 years. Yet many railroad lines held back, fearful that 
cooperating with truckers in this fashion would ultimately benefit the trucking industry more 
than the railroads.36 
World War II interrupted the course of events. The militarization of the nation generated an 
explosion in traffic for the railroads while restrictions on gasoline hampered trucking. With the 
nation moving goods and people at an unparalleled rate to support the war effort, the railroad 
companies (which were not nationalized on this occasion, as they had been in World War I) were 
pushed to the utmost and played a vital role. They also enjoyed substantial profits during the 
war years. With little need to cooperate with trucks, by the late 1940s the railroads’ interest in 
piggyback and containerization had nearly vanished, with only a few exceptions. The rising use 
of forklifts and pallets, as already noted, may have also motivated the railroads to abandon their 
intermodal innovations. But the railroads’ central role during the war proved to be their last 
hurrah, for once the fighting ended Americans returned to their cars with renewed passion, a 
trend supported by postwar economic growth. Trucking likewise boomed. The development of 
modern divided limited-access highways, which began as early as the 1920s and picked up speed 
in the 1950s due to the creation of the Interstate highway system, further ensured the power and 
ubiquity of motor vehicle transport for both people and freight. Another blow to the railroads 
was the rise of air travel for the general public after World War II, which ended the importance of 
the train for long-distance passenger journeys. The railroad industry began to suffer more deeply 
than it ever had previously.37 The logic of intermodalism, and the need to work with trucking 
companies, was once again evident. 
Consequently piggyback reemerged in the 1950s. The New Haven had been important in 
maintaining the viability of the practice through the years; a journalist writing about piggyback 
in 1953 stated that “the New Haven unquestionably leads the field.”38 Other lines were 
increasingly motivated to join in. The Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad commenced 
piggyback operations in 1950, and both the Union Pacific Railroad and Southern Pacific started 
services in 1953. A major participant was the Pennsylvania Railroad, whose new president James 
Symes was a proponent of piggyback, and in the mid-1950s the company entered the business by 
establishing its own service known as TrucTrain, and also through working with the Railer-
Trailer Company to bring in additional trailer traffic.39 Another factor in favor of piggyback was 
regulatory, for in the “Twenty Questions Case” brought by the New Haven in 1954 the ICC 
essentially reversed its rate ruling of 1931 and clarified several additional points. The new ruling 
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applied to intermodalism in general and thus was to the advantage of both piggyback and 
containerization, but the immediate impact was greater for the former.40 
Another crucial change in piggyback came in the mid-1950s when railroad lines began to 
interchange their railcars carrying trailers. Given that intermodal rail operations are most 
economic over longer distances, the logic of moving trailers beyond a single carrier’s region was 
evident, but until 1954 this was not done. Instead each railroad handled its own piggyback 
service, and did not cooperate with others in any sort of joint networks. In 1954 and 1955 this 
situation was altered as numerous companies established interline agreements, greatly 
expanding the geographical scope of piggyback.41 This was made easier in subsequent years by 
more standardized methods and equipment; whereas previously each railroad had its own type 
of flatcar for carrying trailers, and its own particular way of attaching the trailer to the flatcar, 
now some consistency began to emerge. The arrival of flatcars designed and built specially for 
trailers was important in this—previously piggyback was generally carried out using standard 
flatcars that were modified, often awkwardly, for the purpose. In 1953 General Motors 
introduced a 75’-long flatcar intended for piggyback and capable of holding two 35’-long 
trailers—over the years the standard trailer size had expanded greatly, and by this time a 35’ 
trailer was typical throughout most of the country. (The topic of trailer and truck dimensions is 
covered in more detail in chapter 6.) By the end of the decade 40’ trailers were in wide use, and so 
85’ flatcars for piggyback, again able to carry two trailers, were created by builders like Pullman 
Standard and General American Transportation and put into service. Flatcars of more ordinary 
length, usually 50’ or 60’ long and capable of holding just one trailer, also remained common. In 
1955 a number of railroads jointly formed the Trailer Train Company, which functioned to build 
and lease piggyback flatcars to the railroad lines.42 
Thanks to such trends and innovations, piggyback expanded rapidly in the mid- and late 
1950s as the railroad companies found it profitable. In 1955 there were 32 railroads operating 
piggyback services, with a total of about 168,000 carloadings, and by 1959 the numbers had 
grown to 50 railroads and roughly 415,000 carloadings.43 Still a tiny fraction of long-distance 
trucking, these figures were nonetheless substantial, especially for a railroad industry suffering in 
so many other respects and generally in decline. The number of piggyback facilities (i.e., where 
trailers were transferred between trains and trucks, often in or next to rail yards) rose 
dramatically as the piggyback network grew more extensive. Yet some railroad lines were still 
resistant, fearing that cooperating with truckers would only further weaken them. The trucking 
industry likewise was generally doubtful about piggyback, though many trucking firms 
participated in it. So even as the business boomed there remained plentiful reluctance on both 
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sides. Some railroads used trucking subsidiaries (as they had done in the 1920s and ‘30s) to keep 
their piggyback operations “in-house,” while others sought to work with existing trucking 
companies. 
While piggyback advanced over the course of the 1950s the shipping container also returned 
to the railroads, though to a more modest extent. The small containers of the 1920s and ‘30s were 
no longer practical or efficient, and so the new breed of containers measured about 8’ in width 
and height and between 20’ and 40’ in length, making them comparable in size to the truck 
trailers of the period. The first example of this new era of containerization may have been the 
service operated by the Illinois Central Railroad in 1948 and 1949, using 20’-long containers. A 
wave of interest emerged in the mid- and late 1950s as numerous other railroads across North 
America began container use. The Missouri Pacific Railroad was the first of these, debuting its 
service, which it termed a “demountable body system,” in 1956, and later in the same year the 
Texas and Pacific Railway (a carrier controlled by the Missouri Pacific) started a similar service. 
Near the end of 1956 the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad launched its “Convert-a-
Frate” containerization scheme. In 1960 the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, partly motivated by 
low clearances on one of its major corridors that made piggyback impossible, adopted the same 
container system as the Missouri Pacific and Texas and Pacific. (Because a container does not 
have wheels below it as a trailer does, a flatcar with containers on it has a lower profile than a 
flatcar carrying trailers.) The Baltimore and Ohio was able to interchange with those two carriers 
in St. Louis, and so the system could, at least in theory, move a container all the way between El 
Paso and the East Coast. The Southern Railway also faced clearance issues that precluded 
piggyback, and so it too joined the ranks of container users in the early 1960s.44 
The most successful of these innovators was the powerful New York Central, which 
introduced its Flexi-Van system in 1958. Flexi-Van containers, 36’ or 40’ long, were moved 
between train and truck by a system that used a combination of sliding and rotation; a container 
ideally could be transferred in three or four minutes. Specialized railcars and devices for the 
truck had to be purpose-built for this system, however. (Incidentally, when the New York Central 
was planning for the Flexi-Van, and trying to decide on a container design, one of the options 
considered and rejected was the new container that had been introduced by Malcom McLean’s 
Sea-Land in 1956.) As with the Baltimore and Ohio and the Southern Railway, a motivation 
propelling the New York Central to use containers was the existence of clearances too low for 
piggyback. Initially the Flexi-Van system was successful, and it grew during the late 1950s and 
early ‘60s; by early 1960 about 3,000 containers were being transported per month. Flexi-Van 
containers were used in sufficient quantities that certain trains called “Supervans” carried only 
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the containers.45 These unit trains streamlined operations, and were a precursor to today’s 




Figure 5.3: Flexi-Van container being moved between truck and railcar 
 
Source: Arthur Donovan and Joseph Bonney, The Box That Changed the World: Fifty Years of Container Shipping—An 
Illustrated History (East Windsor, NJ: Commonwealth Business Media [The Journal of Commerce], 2006), p. 38 
 
Several railroads partnered with the New York Central to carry Flexi-Vans, creating an 
extensive network of movement. In addition to this domestic success, the Flexi-Van was used in 
international shipping to Europe and Japan during the 1960s; this was experimental in the 
beginning, but eventually was done on a regular basis. These operations allowed American 
railroads carrying Flexi-Vans to offer more convenient service to points abroad. A number of 
shipping lines carried the containers, though they did so not with true container ships but rather 
using traditional breakbulk ships with a few containers placed on the deck.46 For a brief time it 
seemed possible the Flexi-Van could become the universal container, standardized for all users 
across all modes of transportation, that far-sighted industry observers and government officials 
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realized was needed. But piggyback continued to expand rapidly during the 1960s, and as it 
gained widespread use the Flexi-Van lost momentum. The problem was compounded by its 
somewhat awkward method of transferring containers between truck and train—in theory it only 
took a few minutes, but in practice (especially in bad weather) there could be issues. In the 
meantime it was the shipping industry that was taking the lead in designing and using 
containers. After the New York Central merged with the Pennsylvania Railroad to form the new 
Penn Central in 1968, Flexi-Van operations were phased out. The Penn Central’s bankruptcy in 
1970 was another blow, and by the mid-1970s the Flexi-Van was essentially defunct.47 
The container systems created by the railroads in the 1950s and early ‘60s featured a variety 
of mechanisms, devices and procedures for holding containers in place; sometimes the container 
was carried in a gondola railcar, in other cases on a specially modified flatcar (as with Flexi-Van), 
and occasionally on a normal flatcar. Likewise the means of transfer between truck and train was 
a challenge the rail carriers met in different ways. Some used overhead cranes, generally 
mounted on wheels or tracks—this was regarded as a “mechanized” system—while others had a 
system of sliding the container across, which sometimes involved rotating it as well (as with the 
Flexi-Van setup). Compared to piggyback, with its slow and laborious practice of circus loading 
(though occasionally trailers were transferred with cranes), the transfer of containers between 
railcars and trucks was quicker. There were drawbacks, however: a mechanized terminal was 
very expensive, and sliding methods proved awkward at times. Circus loading was cumbersome 
but it was also a tried-and-true system, and there were plenty of terminals and rail yards set up 
for it. 
An especially ambitious, though little-known, example of a container system introduced by a 
railroad was that of the White Pass and Yukon Corporation of Canada. This company, primarily 
a railroad though it engaged in other activities too, had long carried freight between Whitehorse 
in the Yukon and the port of Skagway, Alaska, and typically depended on shipping lines to make 
the connection between Skagway and Vancouver. In the early 1950s the company, in particular 
its president Frank Brown, began to see the logic of containerization. Like many Canadian 
transportation companies the White Pass and Yukon was willing to diversify, and so in 1955 it 
introduced a full-blown network of container movement by train, truck and ship, using small 
containers of 8’ x 8’ x 7’ size. Railroad flatcars were used, with special equipment to hold the 
containers in place, and specialized trailer chassis were introduced for the truckers. Most 
impressively, the White Pass and Yukon commissioned its own ship in 1955 to make the 
connection between Skagway and Vancouver: designed to carry 168 of these containers in 
addition to other cargo, the Clifford J. Rogers was one of the first container ships ever (as noted in 
chapter 2). By the end of 1955 the company had in place a remarkable container system that 
covered all three modes of transportation.48 (According to one source White Pass and Yukon 
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containers also traveled by riverboat or barge on the Yukon River.49) It was a pioneering 
accomplishment, but it seems to have had limited impact and gained little recognition at the time. 
The Pacific Northwest during this period was a hotbed of container innovation, and another 
railroad that participated in the early use of containers interchanged with ships was the Alaska 
Railroad. In its containerized operation the railroad worked with the Alaska Steamship Company 
(widely known as “Alaska Steam”), which ran between Seattle and several Alaska ports. In 1951 
Alaska Steam started using 30’-long containers in a service with the trucking company Ocean 
Van Lines, and then in 1953 terminated that arrangement and began cooperating with the Alaska 
Railroad instead. This joint operation expanded to carrying 24’-long containers (which were 
termed “cargo vans”) in 1956, and in the meantime the railroad also introduced piggyback 
service.50 The system was successful for quite some time, and in 1959 an army general described it 
as “the best example of integrated transportation in the United States.”51 (The Alaska Railroad 
incidentally was owned and operated by the federal government at this time—a reminder that 
government is as likely to innovate as private enterprise.) The early success of containerization in 
the Pacific Northwest probably stemmed from two factors. For one thing, labor in Alaska and the 
Yukon was scarce and expensive, making mechanization an appealing substitute. In addition, the 
operations of railroad companies like the Alaska Railroad and White Pass and Yukon were 
intrinsically tied to coastal shipping, as train and ship worked together to bring goods in from the 
wider world, and also to carry resources out. 
These examples of railroad lines hauling containers that also moved over water were limited 
in significance. The shipping of the Pacific Northwest was not large in scale, and the region was a 
somewhat special case. The Flexi-Van was sometimes carried on ships in global trade, as already 
noted, but not to a truly substantial extent. A few other containers, of widely varying sizes and 
characteristics, were interchanged between ship and train, but such practices were occasional 
rather than systematic. In general the railroad companies that pursued containerization 
concentrated on domestic journeys within the U.S. and/or Canada. Hence the containers of the 
railroads were unlikely to evolve into a global standard; instead it would be the shipping lines 
that introduced and developed containers that ultimately led to the worldwide standardization 
of the container. Into the mid-1950s, however, shipping was not demonstrating much initiative 
either, for it was an industry firmly rooted in tradition and few of its members grasped the 
advantages containerization offered. Furthermore, large investments would be necessary to 
reconfigure both ports and ships to handle containers, and there were longshoremen’s unions to 
deal with. 
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This changed forever in 1956, when container shipping received a key boost with the 
establishment of a coastal shipping service known as Sea-Land, under the leadership of former 
trucking executive Malcom McLean. Using converted tanker ships that carried containers 
attached to the deck, Sea-Land moved freight between the port of Newark (at that time a minor 
port) and a few ports in the Southeast and the Gulf of Mexico. As described in chapter 2, 
McLean’s initiative was a watershed moment when container shipping over the ocean began to 
take hold and acquire momentum, though few realized it at the time. In 1957 Sea-Land 
introduced true container ships (actually converted freighters), built to carry 35’ containers 
stacked in their holds. In 1958 the Matson Navigation Company, a major shipping line between 
Hawaii and the West Coast, began putting 24’ containers on the deck of its traditional breakbulk 
ships, and by 1960 Matson was also operating container ships. The efficiency of carrying 
containers over the ocean was swiftly apparent, the primary advantage being not in the ocean 
journey itself but the interchange with the land-based transport modes of rail and trucking, as 
well as the speed of loading and unloading at ports. By the early 1960s it was evident to some 
that containerization might well be the wave of the future. 
Despite McLean’s background in trucking he was not opposed to doing business with the 
railroads. Before entering the shipping industry, his objective had simply been to move freight 
more easily between the Southeast, where his trucking company was headquartered and most of 
its business was, and the Northeast. With Interstate highways still on the drawing boards, long-
distance trucking was an arduous business. Interested in the possibility of piggyback, he initially 
considered working with the railroads, and it was the refusal of executives of the Southern 
Railway in the early 1950s to consider this idea that may have led him to pursue the option of 
coastal shipping instead. (It is possible clearance issues were a factor in the Southern Railway’s 
rejection of McLean, for as noted earlier many of their lines had clearances too low for 
piggyback.) Once he entered into shipping, McLean chose to move his containers by truck for the 
relatively short inland trips to and from the ports.52 Matson also used trucks primarily for the 
land-based portion of container trips, but did draw on the railroads occasionally: in Hawaii its 
containers moved on the narrow-gauge Oahu Railway (albeit a very short distance), and in the 
continental U.S. a few containers traveled by rail to and from California ports. An operation 
between California and Chicago provided an opportunity for Matson, the Santa Fe, and Pullman-
Standard to test a hydraulic cushion frame mounted on a regular flatcar holding containers, so as 
to verify that the frame’s cushioning would reduce jostling and damage.53 
By the late 1950s and early ‘60s there were several American railroads using containers, as 
already described, but most of the railroads interested in an intermodal approach had concluded 
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piggyback was more useful for their purposes. The dynamic was entirely different in the 
shipping industry, where the logic of being able to stack containers was compelling. McLean 
originally did consider carrying trailers on his ships (a practice widely known as roll-on/roll-off 
or “RO-RO” and sometimes facetiously termed “fishyback” at the time), but trailers cannot be 
stacked and their undercarriages (i.e., the wheels) represent wasted space, so he went with 
containers instead. With the railroads generally neglecting the container, truckers predictably 
seized the bulk of the land-based container moves that a few shipping lines were now making 
available. Some observers saw the need for the railroads to capture a slice of this burgeoning 
business. A trade journal warned in 1960 that: “Some ship lines talk of landing as many as 1,000 
vans [containers] a week at New York port alone in the not-too-distant future; if they do, some 
land carrier [railroad] is either going to get set for inland moves or else sit by and watch the 
business go to contract or private trucks.”54 
Indeed, it was ocean shipping that would bring large quantities of containers into the 
American freight transportation system, and potentially to the railroads. More specifically it was 
international shipping that would play the key role, not the coastal shipping that Sea-Land was 
originally engaged in, or Matson’s commerce with Hawaii. The role of global trade, and of 
containers standardized at a global scale, was to be crucial. Factors internal to the U.S. were not 
sufficient (at least at this point in time) to bring about widespread container use, for the railroads 
and truckers had generally concluded that piggyback was more efficient and profitable. As of the 
1950s and early ‘60s, there was no compelling reason for rail carriers to move into 
containerization (with the exception of those dealing with clearance restrictions that prevented 
piggyback). What eventually altered this situation was the rapid growth in container use by the 
shipping lines, and the need for those containers to travel inland, over the domestic transport 
system. So it was this global object the shipping container—albeit invented in the U.S., then 
slightly altered into a global standard by the ISO—that would enter into and change the national 
railroad infrastructure. 
In 1966 container ships entered service between the U.S. and Europe, with U.S. Lines being 
the first shipping company with operations and Sea-Land following very soon after. Other 
shipping lines, both American and European, joined in quickly. (These events are described in 
greater detail in chapter 2.) Within about a decade, the marine trade in non-bulk goods (i.e., 
anything other than bulk cargo like oil, grain, coal, etc.) between North America and Europe was 
dominated by containers. It was a remarkable change that created opportunities for rail, as Marc 
Levinson explains: 
The surge in transatlantic container traffic, coming at a time when American 
factories were running hard to meet the demands of a wartime economy, offered 
a golden opportunity for U.S. railroads to regain their place at the heart of the 
domestic transportation system. Their business in conventionally packaged 
export cargo was dying. Thousands of containers were passing through New 
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Jersey and Baltimore every week, many of them going to or from factories in the 
industrial heartland of the upper Midwest. This huge scale offered no advantage 
to truckers, because, no matter how many boxes [containers] were being 
handled, one truck could pull only one 40-foot box. Scale could bring real 
savings aboard trains, giving the railroads a way to recover some of the export 
traffic they were losing.55 
Yet, as Levinson goes on to describe, the U.S. railroads were reluctant to grab a share of the 
action, and some were actively hostile. Many had heavily invested in piggyback, and it would be 
difficult and expensive for them to set up container systems. The New York Central was still 
using its Flexi-Van containers, and did not wish to switch to a different, incompatible container. 
In early 1967 the Whirlpool Corporation sought to have the New York Central carry refrigerators 
in containers from Indiana to New Jersey, where they would be loaded onto ships. When the 
railroad pushed to use boxcars instead, recommending the containers be loaded at the port, 
Whirlpool simply chose to move the containers by truck. Likewise when Matson attempted to 
have containers (filled with canned Hawaiian pineapples) transported by rail from the West 
Coast all the way to the East, the railroads shot the idea down because the rate between Chicago 
and New Jersey would have been lower than their normal rate for canned goods. Perhaps the 
most ambitious proposal was put forth by Malcom McLean in 1966. He offered to build rail yards 
in Chicago and St. Louis, as well as at Sea-Land’s port in Elizabeth, New Jersey, and proposed 
creating special railcars that would allow containers to be stacked one atop the other, with the 
railroads running trains composed entirely of these cars from Chicago and St. Louis to New 
Jersey. The railroad companies turned down the idea.56 (As usual McLean was ahead of his time; 
chapter 7 will discuss the development of such “stacktrains” in the 1980s.) 
While American railroad companies remained timid in their approach to the container, the 
state-owned European railroads proved more forward-thinking and entrepreneurial. Many were 
already using containers to a limited degree. The United Kingdom was particularly in the lead, 
since from the mid-1960s British Rail had been running its “Freightliner” container unit trains for 
domestic freight. Not surprisingly, British Rail was eager to work with Sea-Land to carry 
containers to and from the new container port at Felixstowe. Meanwhile railroads in France and 
Germany offered competitive flat rates to carry containers from ports to points far inland. In 1967 
a group of European railroads set up Intercontainer, a company that would coordinate the 
movement of containers long distances by rail, generally through multiple countries, both for 
containers only moving within Europe and those involved in ocean journeys as well.57 Some 
feared that clearances would be an issue for containers riding upon railcars on certain European 
lines, but in general this was not the case. It did prove to be an occasional problem, though: a key 
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rail line leading to the German port of Bremerhaven passed under a bridge that was too low, and 
so Sea-Land and the city agreed to split the cost of raising the bridge.58 In Asia on the other hand 
the railroads were generally less capable of handling containers. Container service across the 
Pacific to Asia began in 1967 and took off rapidly, but extending container movement into the 
domestic space of Asian countries was typically accomplished with trucks. 
Despite their growing use of piggyback, and other tentative efforts at modernization and 
adaptation, the economic situation of American railroads steadily worsened in the 1950s and ‘60s. 
In addition to the devastating competition they faced from cars and trucks, the railroad 
companies grappled with their own internal issues. They had become massive and sluggish 
entities, and their once-innovative character had stagnated. Hamstrung by bloated bureaucracies, 
giant labor forces, and byzantine government regulations, the railroads could not reverse their 
downward trajectory. They received little sympathy from the government or the general public, 
who well recalled their greed, abuses of power, and monopolistic practices of earlier days. The 
government subsidized the motor vehicle by building roads and highways (and by granting tax 
breaks for home mortgages, fueling suburban auto-centric growth) while the railroads had to 
maintain their own lines. Similar issues were evident in other parts of the world, but to a lesser 
degree. Europeans were not so powerfully motivated to pursue the individuality of the car and 
suburbia, since in comparison to Americans they possessed greater social homogeneity and 
exhibited more loyalty to their cities. Furthermore the denser cities of Europe made automobile 
use less practical, while the vast American territory provided ample room to suburbanize. The 
inhabitants of less wealthy countries simply could not afford automobiles, so they stuck with rail 
(while also using buses). In addition, many countries had nationalized their railroads, and this 
motivated governments to support and improve them. So most nations took a balanced 
approach, adopting the automobile but retaining a strong role for the railroads and also for 
public transit. While the previous dominance of the railroad was reduced nearly everywhere, its 
crisis in the U.S. was exceptional. 
The decline of the U.S. rail industry was relentless, marked by a steady drumbeat of route 
abandonments, bankruptcies and consolidations. In the late 1960s matters finally came to a head. 
The two greatest American railroad companies had long been the Pennsylvania Railroad and 
New York Central Railroad, fierce competitors through the bulk of their existence. Both were 
now in crisis and so they merged in 1968 to form the Penn Central Transportation Company, but 
it did no better, declaring bankruptcy in 1970. This was at the time the largest corporate 
bankruptcy in U.S. history, and it shocked the nation. Several other railroads followed suit. The 
provision of passenger service was particularly affected as railroads across the country moved to 
give it up, leading to the creation of Amtrak by the federal government in 1971. The freight 
business of the Penn Central, along with several other failed eastern railroads, would eventually 
be folded into the government-supported Conrail in 1976. The decade of the 1970s would be one 
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of survival and regrouping for the railroads. The one niche where they remained successful was 
in the transport of bulk goods like coal, iron ore and grain, which were too heavy to be 
economically carried by truck, but this was not a particularly profitable business.59 
In spite of these traumas the railroad business continued to evolve. During the late 1960s a 
new concept, one that reflected the increasing globalization of container journeys, was introduced 
and began to attract attention in the North American railroad industry. This was the idea of 
“landbridge” rail, in which containers traveling from Asia to Europe would move by ship over 
the two oceans and by rail overland across North America. In theory this allowed shipping lines 
to concentrate on the ocean they served best, the Pacific or Atlantic, rather than having to travel 
the whole distance and go through the Panama Canal. It also cut down on the distance and time 
involved, since the canal is a substantial detour to the south. The rail portion of the route 
represents a sort of bridge over land—hence the term “landbridge.” (The concept of landbridge is 
applicable in other contexts. The most prominent is a rail network running across the vastness of 
Russia from East Asia to Europe, used to carry containers since the 1970s.) One particularly 
appealing aspect of landbridge was that it might draw off much of the container cargo traveling 
between Asia and Europe through the Suez Canal. (Ironically, the Russian landbridge was also 
aimed at this cargo.) Another advantage of landbridge was that it did not require mechanized 
terminals (i.e., with cranes or other devices to move containers on and off trains) at points along 
rail routes within the U.S., but only at ports. 
As a strategy for freight movement landbridge is integrally tied to containerization, and 
would not be feasible without it. It is the container that allows these shifts in mode—from ship to 
train and back to ship—to be carried out smoothly and quickly. Without intermodalism the 
expense and time of unpacking and repacking cargo would make landbridge prohibitive. What is 
perhaps most interesting about landbridge is how clearly it globalizes the infrastructure of the 
nation-state, for it is explicitly evident that the rail trip across the nation-state (either the U.S. or 
Canada) is just one segment of a longer, international journey. Through landbridge, as one trade 
journal in the early 1970s described it, “railroads become an integral part of the world’s sea 
lanes.”60 The infrastructure of the nation-state loses its internal cohesion, in a sense, and its 
borders appear less meaningful; the vast landmass of North America becomes merely a portion 
of a route that has an origin and destination in other continents. 
Some of the major North American railroads began to plan seriously for landbridge, and 
made contact with possible shippers in Japan. Union Pacific even opened a sales office in Tokyo. 
Two major landbridge schemes were put forth by railroads within the U.S. The Santa Fe and 
Penn Central proposed in 1968 to carry containers between California and New York on an 
accelerated five-day schedule. Soon after, Union Pacific and the Norfolk and Western Railway 
came up with a plan to carry containers from a West Coast port to Hampton Roads, Virginia. 
Other railroads rushed to propose their own routes, even though nobody had actually begun 
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landbridge service. This little bubble of optimism soon burst, for by mid-1969 it was clear 
demand was insufficient to implement landbridge successfully. The U.S. rail system was too 
fragmented, and the process of transferring containers at ports was not so seamless, especially 
from a bureaucratic standpoint, as originally expected. In Canada on the other hand landbridge 
was implemented sooner, in large part because that country had two railroad carriers in 
Canadian National and Canadian Pacific that extended from coast to coast and even had a 
tradition of involvement in marine shipping. In 1967 Canadian National opened a landbridge 
route running from Vancouver to Halifax.61 
At least one shipping line had ambitious ideas for landbridge. Having pioneered container 
movement to Hawaii in 1958 and Japan in 1967, Matson was ready to think in larger terms. The 
company’s president, Stanley Powell, Jr., made plans to move containers by sea, train and truck 
in a network that would span Asia, North America and Europe, all under Matson’s control. Such 
ambitions of course included landbridge service. Matson attempted to buy U.S. Lines, one of the 
largest Atlantic shipping companies, and also U.S. Freight, a major freight forwarder actively 
involved with the railroads under its president Morris Forgash, an enthusiastic proponent of 
containerization. Neither purchase transpired, but Matson did buy Acme Fast Freight, another 
forwarder. Powell’s vision was far ahead of his time, and if successful could have given Matson 
an extraordinary global network, but he lacked the full support of the directors of Alexander & 
Baldwin, Matson’s parent company. In addition the business suffered some setbacks in these 
early years, especially since the Japanese lines entered into containerization far more quickly than 
anticipated. Alexander & Baldwin got cold feet and replaced Powell in 1970, and Matson pulled 
out of international shipping in 1971, keeping only its traditional routes connecting Hawaii with 
the West Coast.62 
In 1972 landbridge service finally began in the U.S., as the shipping company Seatrain (which 
had its own distinctive intermodal heritage, having once made a business of carrying railroad 
cars on ships) introduced a landbridge, operated by the Santa Fe and other railroads, for 
container traffic between Japan and Europe.63 Other carriers began landbridge arrangements 
gradually over the 1970s.64 But the concept never became a major factor in container shipping, 
and instead certain offshoots of landbridge became more significant. These were minibridge and 
microbridge. Minibridge is a system in which containers arriving by ship are carried over the 
entire span of land (i.e., from coast to coast) by train to a rail terminal serving a port facility, but 
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then are not transferred to another ship but instead are placed on trucks for travel to their final 
destination. Microbridge is similar, also involving both ship and train, but here the containers do 
not travel all the way to a port, but instead end their rail journey somewhere in the interior of the 
landmass, where they are transferred to truck for final delivery. Minibridge and microbridge 
journeys may also go in the reverse order from what has been described, i.e., they can start with a 
train route that is followed by shipping. 
Where landbridge generally cannot compete with the ease and simplicity of an all-water 
route, minibridge and microbridge are more logically suited to the normal routes of global trade. 
(Microbridge in particular describes such a typical practice—a container journey partly by water 
and partly by land—that the term is hardly used today.) This was already evident by 1969 to P. 
Laurin Cowling, an executive at the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad, better 
known as the “Milwaukee Road,” who argued that a combined rail-ship operation could not 
compete on price with a container ship making the whole trip on its own. Instead he saw a 
promising future for minibridge and microbridge (which he referred to as “little landbridge”), 
where trains hauled containers from the West Coast into the central and eastern regions of the 
U.S., in the process supplying some areas that had previously been within the hinterlands of 
eastern ports. As Cowling noted, the Milwaukee Road in 1969 was already running this type of 
service successfully.65 
During the 1970s it was minibridge that became popular. It had started as early as 1968, when 
Japanese carriers delivering cargo to East Coast ports began sending the containers to ports on 
the West Coast (that had less expensive labor costs), from which they were carried by train all the 
way to eastern ports, where the mechanized equipment was in place to move them from train to 
truck. The scheme had the advantage of fitting smoothly into preexisting patterns—the delivery 
was being made to the appropriate port, merely by train rather than ship. But eastern ports 
valued the business of shipping far more than a mere train terminating at or near the port, and 
objected strongly. Indeed, the practice made it possible not just to substitute one port for another, 
but one entire coast for another, and that proved especially relevant in late 1968 when a 
dockworkers strike impacted eastern ports. In 1971 a minibridge system commenced between the 
West Coast and Europe, when the Lykes Brothers shipping company and Southern Pacific 
collaborated on service between San Jose, California, and Antwerp, making the transfer from 
railroad to ship at Galveston, Texas. Several other minibridge arrangements between the West 
Coast and Europe were put in place in the following years.66 
The lack of a standardized approach to containerization had long plagued the railroads. 
During the 1950s and ‘60s carriers used a variety of container sizes and fittings, which proved 
hard to interchange amongst themselves and did not fit with the new containers introduced by 
the shipping companies. By the late 1960s most shipping lines were using the recently agreed-
upon ASA/ISO standard for their containers (except Sea-Land and Matson, who continued with 
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their original containers), but the railroads were slow to get on board. The Southern Railway did 
choose to use the ASA container design, but it had the advantage of entering containerization 
later than the others, when the ASA standard was in place.67 The railroads in the 1950s and ‘60s 
had also utilized a variety of different flatcar designs to carry containers —usually standard 
flatcars, modified flatcars, or designs similar to flatcars in some way, although occasionally 
gondola cars were used. Virtually none of these flatcars were actually designed solely for 
container use (except for the railcar that carried Flexi-Vans for the New York Central), though 
some built with piggyback in mind were also provided with the flexibility to haul containers 
too.68 The variation among carriers was not a major problem when domestic containers only 
moved on particular rail lines—each company could have its own closed system. But as 
containers moved longer distances on multiple lines, and in greater quantities, the need was clear 
for a better and more standardized system of railcar design. 
Gradually the situation began to change. The shipping lines were bringing in a growing 
quantity of containers, more and more of which met the new ISO specifications as the diverse and 
incompatible container systems began to fade away. This too made it logical to establish standard 
railcars, to be used all across the country, for carrying containers. Hence in the mid-1960s the 
Trailer Train Company, originally founded in the 1950s in order to build and lease railcars for 
piggyback operation (as described earlier), began to focus on the need to accommodate 
containers too. Trailer Train requested prototypes from four railcar builders for a new flatcar that 
could carry both trailers and containers, and in 1967 it was introduced and went on to become 
successful.69 Other railcars designed for containers in this era were also usually “all-purpose” cars 
capable of holding either trailers or containers. In the early 1970s Pullman-Standard developed a 
railcar called the Land Bridger meant solely to carry containers, but found it difficult to interest 
any railroads in such a specialized device and eventually modified it to carry trailers also.70 
The success of the new Trailer Train railcar marked an interesting moment at which the 
domestic infrastructure of the nation was adjusted to suit the new global object, the shipping 
container. Though there had been several previous railcars designed to handle containers, that of 
the Flexi-Van system being the most notable, they were primarily meant to carry domestic 
containers moving on domestic itineraries. When a railcar is created with the purpose of holding 
the global ISO container (even if it also can carry trailers) then the national railroad system has 
been modified to accommodate a global agenda. Yet the basic qualities of the infrastructure 
remain the same. In the case of the railroad, these basic qualities include elements such as the 
track gauge, loading gauge, signaling system and method of propulsion. It is very difficult, 
expensive and time-consuming to change such deeply embedded and fundamental 
characteristics of an infrastructure, and the container does not make it necessary. Rather, the 
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container’s success rests on its ability to work within existing infrastructures, for it is a singularly 
flexible and adaptable object in spite of its standardized rigidity. So this early change to the 
railroad system was not dramatic in nature, but still of some significance. (More fundamental 
alterations would come later, as described in chapter 7.) 
The global container infrastructure and national railroad infrastructure are able to maintain 
their basic fundamental qualities, and the railcar customized to carry containers plays a key role, 
acting as a sort of interface between them. The concept of the interface is actually played out 
quite literally by the railcar, as it physically makes contact with and fits into both the train tracks 
of the national system and the container of the global system. Essentially it mediates between the 
two infrastructures. On the one hand, the railcar’s wheels rest upon the domestic rails, its 
dimensions work within domestic limitations, and its structural capacities are within domestic 
expectations. On the other hand, the railcar has the fittings, shape and structural ability to 
securely hold the container, an object of global dimensions and characteristics, and to allow it to 
be taken on and off the car easily. Thanks to the railcar serving as an interface, the basic qualities 
of both the domestic infrastructure and global infrastructure can remain intact. 
The shipping container is a critical component in a network of global freight transportation, 
one that relies on many technologies and devices yet ultimately revolves around the container. 
The concept of the “gateway technology,” used by several scholars of science and technology (as 
described in chapter 3), helps elucidate how and why the container is central to this network, 
despite being a seemingly ordinary and unsophisticated object in its own right. Yet it is not 
enough to put the emphasis solely on the container, for it can only work with infrastructure that 
is able to carry it, and the basic freight transport modes of trucking, railroads and shipping 
cannot do so without some modifications. (The greatest overhaul in the design of a transport 
device, for the purpose of hauling the container, was undoubtedly directed at ships. The shift 
from a ship carrying freight in breakbulk fashion to one carrying containers represented a 
significant transformation, and occupies a leading role in most histories of containerization. But 
for this dissertation, in line with its focus on domestic transportation, the modifications to the 
truck and train are more relevant.) These alterations, carried out for the purpose of making 
container movement feasible or more efficient, have been crucial in the development of the 
containerized system. The resulting devices—the railcar for containers just described, and the 
trailer chassis that allows trucks to haul containers—can be understood (as already noted with 
regard to the railcar) as interfaces between the container and the domestic transportation 
network. (The trailer chassis, similar to a flatbed trailer, will be described at length in chapters 6 
and 8.) While they seem banal and unimpressive—much like the container, for that matter—these 
interfaces are of great importance, being every bit as essential in the working of the overall 
network as the container itself. A gateway requires an interface to function properly in each 
infrastructure it utilizes, and the gateway and interface are equally essential to the operation. The 
gateway and interface, in short, are both integral to the process by which several systems are 
linked together into a larger system. 
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A major obstacle to railroad container service—perhaps bigger than the challenge of better 
railcars—was the issue of terminal mechanization. A few railroads chose to shift containers by 
sliding them (including rotating, in the case of the Flexi-Van), but this generally did not work 
well. The ideal solution was some sort of crane or other lifting device (such as an oversized 
forklift-type machine), but that was expensive and rarely implemented. The lack of mechanized 
terminals had long been a drawback to containers, from the railroads’ point of view. To some 
degree this was the cause of the preference for piggyback over the container during most of the 
1950s and ‘60s, for the circus loading approach of piggyback was at least cheap and convenient, 
though awkward and slow, and the ramps for circus loading were in place by the late 1950s at 
numerous terminals and rail yards. At ports, on the other hand, cranes were usually available to 
transfer containers to and from railcars. (In practice containers rarely move directly between a 
ship and train, but rather a truck serves as intermediary. A crane or similar device would be 
available at the port to move the container between the truck and train.) The ports were large 
capital-intensive operations, emphasizing speed and efficiency, and could easily afford this 
expense. But once the train moved inland it was a lot harder to find a mechanized facility. For 
this reason much of the containerized rail traffic of the 1970s was oriented to minibridge, in 
which a port facility with its cranes was at each end of the journey. (For microbridge service it 
was not so easy. Piggyback being so entrenched and widely-used, an unusual solution was 
sometimes used: the container simply remained in place on a trailer chassis, and the chassis along 
with the container on it was circus loaded on the train and carried the same way a trailer would 
be in piggyback operation. Clearly this was inefficient—and the practice did not become 
pervasive—but it did at least work within the existing system.) 
Minibridge, and to a lesser extent landbridge, gradually gained ground, and by the mid-
1970s was well-established and being implemented on several different rail routes. A few unit 
trains were also operating in minibridge and landbridge service, indicating that a critical mass of 
container demand had been reached.71 The movement of containers within North America was 
rising rapidly, fueled by their success in global trade, and their land-based journeys were getting 
longer, extending beyond traditional port hinterlands. This was significant, for the longer the 
journey the more efficient a train is compared to a truck. Gradually the American railroads were 
getting into the container business in a serious way. The growth in container transfers at the 
Burlington Northern Railroad’s South Seattle intermodal terminal, serving the port of Seattle, 
demonstrates the trend. In 1969 this terminal (at that time operated by the Northern Pacific 
Railroad) received roughly 150 containers per month, and by 1972 the figure had risen to about 
1,500.72 
The Canadian railroads moved more quickly into carrying containers. As mentioned earlier, 
these companies had long been involved in diverse transportation ventures such as shipping, 
trucking and even air travel, and hence were inherently more receptive to coordinating multiple 
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transport modes. This was particularly the case for Canadian Pacific, which by the early 1970s 
was operating a trucking business in Canada and container ships on the ocean in addition to its 
railroad business. The company even ran its own port terminal at Wolfe’s Cove, Quebec, building 
a road to connect the port to the highway and extending its railroad tracks to the docks as well. 
Such an approach, combining different transport modes and controlling the entire journey of 
freight, had obvious advantages in a containerized operation. Yet it also led Canadian Pacific to 
regard its network as a closed one, and into the mid-1970s the company persisted in using its 
own unique containers (of which there were 17 types) rather than adopting the ISO standards.73 
By the late 1970s the presence of the container in the American railroad network was 
significant, but still minor in the larger scheme of things. The container for the most part was 
fitted into a preexisting system of domestic movement at the scale of the nation-state. The links to 
railroad service at several ports had been improved, and containerized global freight was flowing 
over the national border with a remarkable new seamlessness. But the force of globalization, in 
the shape of the container, was yet to transform the railroad industry, which continued in its 
normal practices while adding the container as a new cargo to carry. The space and infrastructure 
of the nation-state maintained a separate, distinct quality, and the global infrastructure generally 
did not overlap. But the container would bring about significant alterations to the American 
railroads in the near future, with the advent of double-stack railcars and the reshaping and 
expansion of many rail corridors. This process would start in the late 1970s and continue into the 
present, and is the subject of chapter 7. The next chapter is chapter 6, however, which examines 
the early impact of the container on American trucking. 
                                                 





Chapter 6 ~ Trucking Gets on Board 
 
This chapter describes the early history of the use of the shipping container in American 
trucking, until roughly the late 1970s, a narrative that encompasses not only the trucks 
themselves but also the roads and highways they move along. While the term “railroad” is 
generally taken to comprise the entire system of train, track, signaling and integral equipment, in 
road transportation a sharper distinction exists between the vehicle itself and the route it travels 
upon. But of course the two are still linked. Hence this chapter will discuss the development of 
the American road network into an infrastructure capable of supporting heavy automobile traffic, 
ultimately including the Interstate highways and the vast trucking business that thrives thanks to 
them. In the context of containerization this is particularly fitting because the modern American 
highways, i.e., the Interstate system, were built in roughly the same period that the container 
grew to become a major cargo to be carried in the domestic infrastructure. 
Surely the automobile is the most important mode of transportation of our time. Railroads 
are still essential, while air travel has been revolutionary, but on a routine day-to-day basis the 
motor vehicle is doubtless the key transport device used in the contemporary world. This is true 
both for passenger travel, with the car and bus, and for the movement of freight, with trucks of 
various types. In tandem with this transportation revolution has been a dramatic improvement in 
the quality of roads, and in particular the development of the smooth and durable paved roads 
that the motor vehicle depends on for its rapid movement. A host of other changes to the road 
network have also been necessary, such as traffic signals, new signage, and lane markings, in 
addition to extensive regulations and bureaucracies. Furthermore the development of a new type 
of road specially designed for high-speed travel over long distances, the divided limited-access 
highway, has been crucial. 
Given the importance of the motor vehicle in our era, it is no surprise the shipping container 
has been so tightly connected to it. The container’s dimensions are historically embedded in the 
spatial qualities of American trucking. The container must fit three modes of transportation: 
ships, trucks and trains. Of the three, it is the truck—or to be more precise, the truck trailer—that 
imposes the tightest spatial limits on the possible dimensions of the container. Hence the spatial 
regime of trucking is the determining factor for the size of the container. In its very form, its 
length, width and height, the container is a modular volume that directly derives from the 
American tractor-trailer. The truck is a crucial component of containerization in another way, for 
the beginning and end of each container journey is usually accomplished by truck. No matter 
how great a distance a container moves by ship and/or railroad, a truck is generally needed at 
both the origin and destination, for it is by road that most cargo starts its journey and reaches its 
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ultimate destination. The container is ultimately designed for the motor vehicle, and its success is 
linked to the dominant role of trucking in the movement of goods today. Yet ironically containers 
are associated principally with ships and ports, both in the mind of the public and in the bulk of 
the scholarship on containerization. When a container is carried by truck it tends to be nearly 
invisible, an object seen yet not really perceived, as the assembly appears much like a normal 
tractor-trailer to the untrained eye. 
A further irony is that trucking is probably the transport mode least impacted by the 
container. While containerization caused dramatic changes to the shipping industry and the 
ports, and powerfully affected the American railroad industry, its impact on trucking while 
significant has not been transformative to a comparable degree. Yet if the business of trucking has 
not been altered to quite the same extent as the railroads, it has nevertheless seen important 
changes. And if container movement by truck draws little notice or interest, that fact hardly 
denies its importance—infrastructure is often at its most significant when it stays in the 
background, structuring our world and our lives without drawing attention. A shipping 
container itself is a banal generic object, as is a truck, and so together the combination is distinctly 
ordinary, yet that should not blind us to its great importance. The most powerful and revealing 
forms of globalization, arguably, are those that extend their tentacles most deeply into the 
mundane fabric of the national and local, and yet escape notice in the process. The way the 
container works itself unobtrusively into the trucking system allows global supply chains to 
insert themselves smoothly into the domestic transport infrastructure, and territorial space, of the 
American nation-state. 
Central to the American image over the past century has been the prominence of the 
automobile and the roads and highways it moves so freely upon. But in its early years the United 
States was characterized by relatively poor roads that lagged behind those of several European 
counterparts. In the beginning it was waterways, not roads, that provided the most effective 
transportation through the vast American territory. The eastern half of the U.S. is particularly 
well-endowed with corridors for water-based movement, most significantly the Great Lakes 
system, the Mississippi River and its tributaries, and numerous smaller rivers that flow to the 
East Coast. Coastal shipping also flourished up and down the Atlantic, linking the cities of the 
East together, and in addition the construction of canals began in the late 1700s. (The history of 
the inland waterways is described in greater detail in chapter 10.) The long distances involved in 
American transport (as opposed to European nations) made road-based travel difficult and road 
construction arduous. Yet obviously waterways, whether natural or constructed, could not reach 
everywhere, and so movement by road was necessary. As Americans expanded westward, and 
especially as they sought to cross the Appalachian Mountains, these roads served to open new 
regions to settlement and growth. 
By the late 1700s a few such roads across the Appalachians existed, though they were 
invariably rough and sometimes little better than trails. In upstate New York there was the 
sequence of the Mohawk Turnpike and Great Genesee Road, in Pennsylvania there was the 
Forbes Road, in Maryland and Pennsylvania there was Braddock’s Road, and in Kentucky there 
 112 
was the Wilderness Road, famously blazed by Daniel Boone.1 George Washington took a 
personal interest in Braddock’s Road, for in the 1750s as a young British officer during the French 
and Indian War he traveled up and down its route, originally known as Nemacolin’s Trail, and 
even helped improve it. After the American Revolution he traveled west again in 1784 to carry 
out a survey and see how settlement was progressing. Elected president in 1789, he continued to 
press for better roads westward in the interest of national unity and expansion. But Washington’s 
vision of the configuration of this evolving national unity may have been influenced by loyalty to 
his native Virginia, neighboring Maryland, and the soon-to-be capital of Washington, D.C. In 
supporting the development of this particular route it is possible Washington hoped to make this 
region, rather than areas further north centered on Philadelphia and New York City, the starting 
point and chief beneficiary of western growth.2 
It was not until 1806, during the presidency of Thomas Jefferson, that the federal government 
passed legislation to create what was to be called the National Road, to pass through Maryland, 
Pennsylvania and Virginia (now West Virginia) to the Ohio border. Jefferson’s Secretary of the 
Treasury, Albert Gallatin, envisioned a national network of transportation corridors and played 
an important role in mustering support for the road. (His famous “Gallatin Plan” would appear 
in 1808.) The National Road—its very name connoting aspirations of nation-building and unity—
would begin at Cumberland, Maryland, which was conveniently located on the North Branch 
Potomac River and also connected by road to Baltimore. The route would roughly follow 
Braddock’s Road (by this time much deteriorated) in Maryland and Pennsylvania, but then 
continue further west through Pennsylvania and Virginia to Wheeling, on the border with Ohio. 
This represented a distance of 131 miles, mostly through lightly-settled areas and over 
mountainous terrain. It was already tentatively intended the National Road would continue 
through Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, but its location in these states was left undecided. The road 
was to be federally funded, and its exact path set by the federal government as well, as this was 
seen as necessary to pay for such a large project and also to overcome the sectional rivalries of 
different states and towns.3 
After a few years of surveying, mapping and planning, construction of the National Road 
began in 1811; plans called for a road 66 feet wide with a maximum grade of five degrees, 
stringent standards for the time. Thanks to these expectations, along with the hilly topography, 
the desire to apply good paving techniques, and the need to build many sturdy bridges, the work 
was laborious and slow. In 1818 the road finally reached Wheeling, and upon completion this 
stretch immediately attracted numerous settlers and great quantities of freight.4 In 1820 
surveying began on the continuation of the National Road across Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, with 
construction beginning in 1825, while two acts of Congress in the 1820s helped set the exact route 
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definitively. From Wheeling the road went west and slightly southward through Columbus and 
Indianapolis, and then bent a bit more to the south as it continued west to Vandalia, Illinois. This 
far longer stretch was at least easier terrain for road-building, characterized by flatlands and 
gently rolling hills, and was built with a width of 80 feet. As each segment was finished it drew 
substantial traffic, at least in Ohio and Indiana during the 1820s and early ‘30s. But even as 
construction on the National Road continued in the 1830s its significance diminished, as other 
transportation corridors of both road and water (and increasingly railroad too) competed with it. 
Originally meant to reach the Mississippi River, the road petered out in Vandalia in 1839 when 
Congress chose not to authorize additional funds.5 This decline notwithstanding, on both a 
practical and symbolic level the National Road played a vital role in the nation’s westward 
growth, and in maintaining a link between the burgeoning Midwest and the East. But riverine 
and rail-based movement eventually eclipsed it, and in the process the Northeastern metropolises 
(along with New Orleans) surpassed Baltimore. 
Given the vastness of the American territory and its relatively sparse population, its roads 
though important were limited in their reach. In the smaller and more densely populated 
European nations the situation was different. The British and French were preeminent in this 
regard, being pioneers in the technology of road-building and eager to tie together their national 
territories and carry out nation-building. In Great Britain the national project of road construction 
began in the late eighteenth century and proceeded apace in the nineteenth century, 
revolutionizing the nation’s transportation and mobility and also having substantial effects on 
society, economics and politics. Even before the railroad began to exert its great impact, the 
improved roads had brought a measure of modernity to Britain.6 In France during the same 
period there was a potent aspiration to achieve national unity through a variety of rationalized 
infrastructures, including roads.7 
By the mid-1800s the railroad was starting to make its presence felt, and travel by road, 
whether for passengers or freight, soon became for the most part an accessory of rail. During the 
second half of the nineteenth century, an era of dramatic American expansion as the nation 
pushed westward, it was the railroad that was the driving force of movement, making a 
profound impact on the geography of American settlement and transportation that still endures. 
(The story is told in chapter 5.) Consequently there was a lack of investment in roads, whose 
conditions generally remained shabby. But near the close of the century enthusiasm sprang up 
for a novel transport invention that did use roads: the bicycle. Battered by bone-jarring rides, 
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cyclists agitated for better roads and started the “Good Roads” movement.8 In the meantime of 
course a more revolutionary invention was underway for road-based travel, one that powered 
itself and consequently was called the “automobile.” While it was invented in Germany, the U.S. 
caught up swiftly. The first American gasoline-powered motor vehicle was introduced by the 
Duryea brothers of Springfield, Massachusetts, in 1893. If cycling created a desire for better roads, 
the automobile truly generated the need. The Office of Road Inquiry, in the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, was created in 1893 and in 1896 built the first of its many “object-lesson” roads, a 
stretch of smooth road a quarter-mile long in Atlanta. Over the next three years the office built 21 
object-lesson roads scattered about the country; as with the Atlanta example they were all 
extremely short and served primarily as demonstrations of the value of good roads.9 As 
automobile use grew the purpose of such road-building gradually shifted, from being oriented to 
wagons, carts and bicycles to a concern for motor vehicle movement as well. For the automobile 
to move easily it required better and smoother roads, and since it inflicted a pounding on road 
surfaces improved construction methods would be necessary. 
Early travel by motor vehicle was most definitely local in nature; the idea of moving a long 
distance was inconceivable due to the primitive nature of the technology and the awful condition 
of many roads, especially in the countryside. The story of one premature attempt at long-distance 
travel serves to illustrate the point. John and Louise Davis set out in 1899 in their new automobile 
with the intention of traveling from New York to Chicago. The slow pace of their progress, 
marked by breakdowns, can be gauged from their realization after about 300 miles of travel that a 
one-armed bicyclist passing them had left New York ten days after they did; little wonder the 
Davises abandoned the journey soon after.10 The first cross-country trip by automobile was in 
1903, when it took Dr. H. Nelson Jackson and mechanic/chauffeur Sewall Crocker roughly two 
months to laboriously make their way from San Francisco to New York. Jackson undertook the 
trip in order to win a bet, and upon returning to his native Vermont was fined for driving faster 
than six miles an hour.11 For obvious reasons, motor vehicle use remained primarily at the local 
scale. As such it did not yet present any challenge to the railroad—on the contrary automobiles 
(like wagons and carts) served as accessories to the rail network. Indeed, the railroad companies 
were supporters of the Good Roads movement, for they saw better roads as creating improved 
access to their depots and stations. With this motivation they established the Good Roads Trains, 
elaborate and well-publicized traveling road-shows that, during the first two decades of the 
twentieth century, spread the gospel of good roads through demonstrations of road-building 
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equipment.12 (Previously during the 1800s railroads had assisted road-building efforts that would 
improve wagon movement, for much the same reason.13) 
In the first decade of the century owning a car was almost exclusively the province of the 
wealthy, but this quickly changed as automobiles became cheaper and more rugged, the 
introduction of Henry Ford’s Model T in 1908 being a turning point. Designed to be eminently 
practical rather than stylish, in the stern spirit of Ford himself, the car was an astonishing success. 
In its method of manufacture the Model T was even more significant, for Ford and his associates 
pioneered the assembly line approach of mass production, with incalculable repercussions for the 
world. General Motors introduced its competing Chevrolet line, also aimed at buyers of normal 
means, in 1912. Automobile use grew dramatically, and by 1916 there were approximately three-
and-a-half million cars and 250,000 trucks in the U.S., though those figures were still dwarfed by 
the nation’s 21 million horses.14 
As with the car, use of the truck was growing quickly. In these early days trucking was 
typically practiced by very small firms, often consisting of just one owner-operator, and it sought 
to replace the local cartage of freight by horse-drawn wagons. This involved pickups and 
deliveries in cities and towns, as well as transfers to and from train depots.15 The importance of 
all this local traffic was immense, both in its own right and as a segment of long-distance freight. 
The railroads depended heavily on such local transport to handle the “last mile,” and before the 
coming of the motor vehicle the results were problematic, as an article in 1911 pointed out: “It is 
estimated that 90 per cent of all freight which the railroads haul is rehandled at one end or the 
other by horses, and to a large extent the unsatisfactory conditions in freight haulage, shortage of 
cars, warehouse congestions, and slow freight movement may be charged to their cause.”16 The 
advantages of the truck were evident, and over the course of the 1910s it made substantial 
inroads in the movement of local freight. 
Farmers also were early adopters of the truck, using it to carry produce to market or depot 
and bring supplies back. Trucks proved to be of military value in World War I as the army 
ordered 30,000 trucks, most of them from manufacturers in the Detroit region. With the railroads 
tied up handling war-related traffic, these trucks had to be driven all the way to the eastern ports. 
Such a long haul was almost unthinkable, and the condition of roads was so uncertain that at 
least one reconnaissance team was sent to scout a feasible route. Moving in convoys, the trucks 
made the trip at a top speed of 14 miles per hour.17 In the process their steel and solid rubber (i.e., 
not pneumatic) tires inflicted tremendous damage—one official called it “the simultaneous 
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destruction of the entire road system.”18 During the war freight transport by truck was also 
initiated over previously unprecedented distances of a few hundred miles. The Goodyear Tire 
Company even launched a run from Boston to San Francisco, and though this was largely for 
publicity purposes it appears to have been the first use of trucking to move goods across the full 
span of the nation.19 
Increasingly the vision of some road builders and drivers was of a national network of 
movement for the automobile. In 1912 the energetic Carl Graham Fisher, manufacturer of 
headlights and founder of the Indianapolis Speedway, proposed the Lincoln Highway, a 
transcontinental road from New York to San Francisco. Ultimately this would consist of 
numerous roads of varying quality marked under one name.20 Other long-distance roads, 
sometimes known as “auto trails,” soon followed, such as the Dixie Highway, Yellowstone Trail, 
Victory Highway and Jefferson Highway. Like the Lincoln Highway they essentially consisted of 
local and regional roads linked together under a common identity. The military also got 
involved, as Dwight Eisenhower, at the time a young lieutenant colonel, was part of a convoy 
that in 1919 crossed the nation from Washington, D.C. to San Francisco as an exercise to 
determine the state of the roads and the army’s ability to use them. The trip lasted two months, 
with the convoy traveling an average of only 58 miles a day due to the brutal condition of the 
roads, more than half of which were unpaved. In 1922 the army released the “Pershing Map” 
showing a proposed highway network for the nation, with General Pershing testifying to 
Congress that these roads could serve commerce, industry and personal travel, in addition to 
their military value.21 
During the booming 1920s both car and truck use shot up, as the motor vehicle morphed 
from a complement to the railroads into a dangerous competitor. It offered a flexibility and 
mobility that trains, restricted to their fixed tracks and set schedules, could not possibly match. 
As settlement patterns spread out and metropolitan areas expanded the automobile grew ever 
more essential while the railroad, more suited to compact cities and towns, began to lose traction. 
Thanks to trucking, factories and warehouses could be sited in a more flexible fashion, no longer 
requiring locations on rail lines and spurs. While the Great Depression brought an end to the 
days of prosperity, the automobile’s popularity and influence nevertheless continued to expand 
in the 1930s. The fictional Joads in The Grapes of Wrath, driving their battered car westward, were 
emblematic of Americans’ determination to hold onto their cars. In Robert and Helen Lynd’s 
famous sociological studies of “Middletown” (actually Muncie, Indiana) they found the 
automobile to be one of the few items resistant to cutbacks in family budgets during the 
Depression.22 The comic Will Rogers famously jibed that Americans would be the first people to 
go to the poorhouse in an automobile. Suffering from the competition, railroad companies began 
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to abandon certain routes as early as the 1920s, a trend that accelerated in the 1930s. The railroads 
were burdened by regulations that had once been amply justified but now put them at a 
disadvantage compared to trucking, which with the backing of pro-business courts and 
politicians fended off sorely needed federal regulation.23 A similar transition was unfolding in 
public transit, as subway systems, commuter railroads and especially streetcars began to decline 
in the face of competition from cars and buses. 
The design and construction of the truck progressed, as it became something clearly distinct 
from the car. While Ford and General Motors were the leading manufacturers, several other 
makers emerged, including Mack, White, Kenworth and International Harvester. Pneumatic tires 
were an especially useful advance, allowing trucks to be heavier and move faster with less 
destructive vibration, while the development of headlights made nighttime travel possible. 
(These two advances benefited cars as well.) Better frames made trucks more durable, and the 
creation of mechanical refrigeration allowed them to carry produce and perishable goods farther 
and in better condition. Improvements in suspension and shock absorption made for a less 
bruising ride for the driver and extended the life of the truck as well. Enclosed cabs and sleeper 
compartments also made long-distance travel easier for the driver. The development of better 
brakes was particularly valuable, since many accidents occurred when heavy trucks going 
downhill lost control.24 
Another important development was the creation of a new type of truck that separated the 
body of the truck into separate components: the “tractor,” mainly consisting of the cab and 
engine, and the trailer (technically a semi-trailer) that constitutes the bulk of the size and holds 
the cargo. The resulting combination truck is widely known, to Americans at least, as a “tractor-
trailer.” Until this point in time all trucks were composed of one discrete unit, which is termed a 
“one-body” design. The one-body truck of course did not go away, and remains the dominant 
type of truck in use today for a wide range of purposes, with one-body trucks being built in all 
sorts of sizes and shapes. But the tractor-trailer truck has become prevalent in long-haul trucking 
and is sometimes used for local or regional trips too; when the objective is simply to carry the 
largest possible quantity of freight from point A to B, the tractor-trailer truck is the logical choice. 
Because the trailer is able to rotate behind the tractor, a tractor-trailer truck can handle a turn 
much better than a one-body truck of the same length. Consequently the allowable legal length of 
a tractor-trailer truck is invariably longer than for a one-body truck, meaning that the tractor-
trailer can hold a larger volume of freight. As the trailer is detachable, its use brings other 
advantages too. A trailer can be dropped off and left for a while—at a loading dock, for 
instance—while the tractor and driver go off to do work elsewhere and return later to pick it up. 
A trailer can also be switched between different tractors as is necessary or convenient. 
One of the first makers of semi-trailers designed to be pulled by trucks was August Fruehauf, 
a blacksmith and carriage builder in Detroit. After having success in building several semi-
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trailers, he founded the Fruehauf Trailer Company in 1918 and opened a new factory in Detroit in 
1920 to handle the growing business.25 Another pioneer was John Endebrock, who built semi-
trailers in the 1910s while working for the carriage builder Sechler & Company, which introduced 
the Trailmobile brand of trailers and would eventually change its company name to Trailmobile 
in recognition of the brand’s success. (As will be described later, Fruehauf and Trailmobile were 
each to play a role in the development of the shipping container in the 1950s.) Most significantly, 
in 1918 Endebrock along with some other engineers came up with a scheme to better connect the 
trailer to the tractor: this involved a mechanism known as the “fifth wheel” at the rear of the 
tractor, along with the “kingpin” attached to the trailer. With the kingpin held in the fifth wheel 
the trailer and tractor are firmly attached, yet the trailer can rotate. The design was eventually 
improved so the trailer could be easily attached and detached, and is the basis for the system 
widely in use today.26 The spread of a standardized system for linking together tractor and trailer 
was crucial to the success of the tractor-trailer system, as it allowed truckers to switch trailers 
between different tractors. Gradually trucking firms worked out agreements for interchanging 
trailers from one company to another, a practice sometimes known as interlining, much as the 
railroad companies before had learned to interchange railcars. 
Trucks grew larger in the 1920s and ‘30s, a trend driven by technological improvements, 
better roads, and the economies of scale inherent in carrying the biggest possible loads. Trucks in 
the 1920s typically were under 20’ long, and trailers—on the rare occasions they were used at 
all—had a similar length. Gradually the size of trucks and trailers grew, such that during the 
1930s they advanced to over 20’ long. Even in the 1930s, though, the use of trailers was 
uncommon, as the majority of trucks were of one-body design. (But after World War II the use of 
tractor-trailers would become standard practice in long-distance trucking.) The business of 
trucking, including the size and weight of trucks and trailers, became increasingly enmeshed in a 
web of regulations that differed from state to state, while federal regulation was nearly 
nonexistent. The one spatial characteristic that was most uniformly imposed, even at this early 
point in time, was a maximum width of eight feet.27 (The persistence of this dimension would 
eventually cause it to become the width of the shipping container.) But otherwise there was great 
variation in the state standards, and this posed a problem for the burgeoning trucking industry 
whose routes increasingly extended over multiple states. The different state laws did not only 
relate to size and weight, but also to licensing fees, gasoline taxes and other bureaucratic details. 
Illegal “gypsy” truckers evaded the rules and undercut legitimate operators. The state 
governments though had sound reasons for many of the laws, as road conditions varied widely, 
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and there was little public sympathy for the truckers whose cumbersome vehicles clogged up 
roads and caused accidents. The railroads used their political sway to make the regulations as 
restrictive as possible at the state level (even as they could not persuade the federal government 
to impose regulations), and to otherwise harass the trucking business.28 
In the 1920s and ‘30s the mystique of American trucking developed—the idea of truckers as 
rugged independent owner-operators, modern-day cowboys who relish the freedom of the open 
road.29 Yet this was also a period—at least from the late 1920s onwards—when the industry 
began to organize itself. Several trucking associations and trade groups sprang up in the late 
1920s and ‘30s, as the previously individualistic industry, still dominated by small companies 
and individual owner-operators, grew more established and started to act collectively. The bigger 
trucking firms were especially active in these activities and in the 1930s began to push for cartels 
and/or regulations that would quash illegal truckers, and more generally would diminish 
competition and create stability. Their desire for regulation found a receptive audience with New 
Deal administrators. After an attempt at self-regulation in partnership with the National 
Recovery Administration (NRA) failed in the early 1930s, more firms became supportive of some 
form of government regulation. With passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 they received it, as 
trucking became a highly-regulated industry with significant barriers to entry.30 The new 
regulatory framework had the unanticipated consequence of giving drivers greater leverage in 
their efforts to unionize, and during the late 1930s the Teamsters Union (officially known as the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters) enjoyed tremendous success. Previously the union had 
focused on drivers in local haulage, but now it broadened to regional and long-haul drivers and 
by 1939 had grown dramatically to over 400,000 members.31 Wages and working conditions for 
drivers improved greatly. 
The railroad companies had also supported regulation of trucking, for the trucks were 
making ever-greater inroads on their business. Yet railroads and truckers were not invariably 
hostile. While most local deliveries were now done by truck, long-distance freight movement was 
still dominated by rail, and some innovative minds began to see the promise of intermodalism. 
Given the time and expense of shifting goods between the two modes, perhaps one might simply 
transfer a very large container, or an entire truck trailer, between train and truck, with the freight 
itself remaining inside the container or trailer. A few such schemes, some involving containers 
and others trailers, were tried with moderate success. As it was mainly the railroads that 
introduced these practices in the 1920s and ‘30s, the subject is covered more extensively in 
chapter 5. The shipping containers used in these systems were very small by later standards, 
measuring only four to ten feet in each dimension—though sometimes the length might be a bit 
longer. The trailers in use at the time were larger than this but still of modest size, as has been 
already detailed, and the practice of carrying them on rail flatcars soon became known as 
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“piggyback.” Neither containerization nor piggyback was able to make a major impact in this 
period, for there were drawbacks as well as advantages associated with them, but both were used 
regularly. 
In the meantime road construction and improvement continued apace. Until the 1920s road 
building was typically a local matter, handled in a manner that might reflect much effort but not 
a high level of organization, technical sophistication or coordination with neighboring 
jurisdictions. With the need for greater expertise evident and motor vehicles traveling longer 
distances, such practices were no longer feasible and more sophisticated organizational and 
technical approaches emerged. Just as the railroad had brought a new and more systematic 
approach that was formative in the modern corporation, so the new motor vehicle technology, 
and the more sophisticated roads necessary for it, led to new methods of governance. Expanded 
bureaucracies were important to these changes, and the role of engineers and the technical 
expertise they represented was crucial. In many ways road building was a step towards a more 
centralized, bureaucratic and modernized state.32 This did not reduce the political dimensions of 
road infrastructure, however, as multiple interests competed for their priorities; industry sought 
better roads in developed areas, farmers pushed for improvements in rural areas, and motorists 
focused on their own routes of travel and commuting. 
In 1924 planning began on a new system for naming the existing long-distance roads, now to 
be termed “highways,” which abandoned the colorful names of the auto trails for a numbered 
scheme in which each highway received the label of “U.S. Route” rather than a state identifier. 
(Bitter squabbling between Kentucky and its neighbors over which route would be numbered 60 
almost torpedoed the accord, until a compromise was reached that had the side effect of 
assigning the designation Route 66 to a series of roads from Chicago to Los Angeles.) New 
standards for road signs were also promulgated, involving typeface, color, shape and size; the 
iconic shield emblem for signs displaying highway numbers originates from this time. In 1926 the 
final plan, calling for 96,626 miles of highways, was officially released.33 As with the railroads in 
an earlier era, the motor vehicle and its roads were being utilized to construct a unity across the 
territory of the nation-state, as an exercise in nation-building. But here the role of government 
was larger and certainly more direct, and the process was happening more quickly. Furthermore, 
while the railroads had to some degree actually driven the process of American expansion, the 
new roads and highways worked to cement this vast national space more tightly, and to fill in 
regions rail had neglected. Yet even as a national vision was emerging, the planning and 
construction of roads and highways in this period was usually at the scale of a state or region. 
The highways of the 1920s and ‘30s gave automobile drivers a newfound ability to move 
about quickly, and allowed truckers to expand their business, but as traffic boomed the roads 
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were swiftly clogged up. These highways were impressive for their time, being paved and 
amenable to fairly high speeds, but generally consisted of just one lane in each direction, with 
cross streets and traffic signals that slowed movement. A solution was emerging, however: the 
limited-access divided highway with multiple lanes in each direction—what Americans today 
would regard as a real highway. Such a design is distinguished by a totally unfettered and 
continuous flow of traffic, thanks to its complete grade separation from any transport route (or 
other obstacle) that crosses its path. Such roads were originally known as parkways and were 
built with pleasure in mind as much as functionality, typically winding their way through a 
picturesque landscape. (The parkway actually originated in the late nineteenth century, as 
planners and designers, most notably Calvert Vaux and Frederick Law Olmsted, created the 
earliest parkways for horse-drawn carriages.) Arguably the first was the Long Island Motor 
Parkway, a private raceway built in 1906 by the absurdly wealthy racing car enthusiast William 
Vanderbilt, Jr. Work began in 1907 on the Bronx River Parkway, the first parkway built for the 
general public, though it would not be completed until 1923. In the 1920s Robert Moses, the 
builder of public works in and around New York City who would eventually rise to great fame 
and power, built a series of parkways in Long Island, and in the 1930s he proceeded with new 
parkways to the north of the city, most notably the elegant Taconic State Parkway. Other regions 
also initiated parkways: the Bureau of Public Roads began a parkway in Virginia in 1928, and 
then the Skyline Drive, also in Virginia, in 1930. The first segment of Connecticut’s Merritt 
Parkway, perhaps the finest and most attractive of all the parkways, opened in 1938. In the same 
year work began on the Arroyo Seco Parkway in Pasadena, California.34 
The parkways were limited in their reach, but some visionaries imagined longer ribbons of 
asphalt extending across the nation. The most persuasive presentation of such ambitions was 
Futurama, the famous General Motors exhibit designed by Norman Bel Geddes at the New York 
World’s Fair in 1939. It featured a giant 36,000-square-foot diorama showing a glittering vision of 
tomorrow, a futuristic high-tech landscape of city and country highlighted by highways with 
miniature cars and trucks shown moving along them. Geddes’ proposed “Magic Motorways” 
were massive for the time—the widest was fourteen lanes across—and spanned the countryside 
but also cut a broad swath through the cities. These were of another scale entirely from the 
parkways. They also connected smoothly into each other, with cloverleafs, entrance ramps and 
exit ramps designed for speeds of 50 miles per hour. It was an altogether dazzling display that 
left a deep impression on the public.35 
In the meantime the future had already arrived elsewhere, for in the 1930s the German 
autobahns, forming a modern highway network covering much of the country, were a 
revolutionary advance and a propaganda triumph for Hitler’s evil regime. But some actual 
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highway builders were dubious of the revolutionary visions embodied by Futurama and the 
autobahns. Robert Moses scorned proposals for a nationwide highway system and referred to 
Geddes’ Magic Motorways as “bunk,” arguing instead for regional parkways of the kind he had 
already been successful in building.36 Thomas MacDonald, the influential head of the Bureau of 
Public Roads, did not see the point of divided grade-separated highways, especially in rural 
areas. When President Franklin Roosevelt (an enthusiastic but terrible driver—his wife Eleanor 
refused to get in the car when he drove) proposed an ambitious scheme of highways spanning 
the nation, MacDonald issued a report pointing out that most traffic was local in nature and 
centered on cities. He also opined that Americans would not be willing to pay tolls on 
highways.37 
Such doubts were erased by the success of the Pennsylvania Turnpike, the first long-distance 
modern highway in the U.S., which was completed in 1940 and connected Pittsburgh to 
Harrisburg through the mountains of southwest Pennsylvania. Receiving support from the 
federal government in the form of a direct grant and the purchase of bonds—Roosevelt was eager 
to stimulate employment—the state began construction in 1938. It was a project of massive scale, 
inasmuch as its builders had to remold the landscape in order to build two traffic lanes in each 
direction with a median in between, a 200-foot right of way in total, at a grade never higher than 
3%. Construction of 114 bridges and viaducts was necessary, along with seven miles of tunnels. 
After two years of relentless often round-the-clock work, the highway opened to immediate 
acclaim and popularity. 160 miles long, the astonishing new roadway reduced the journey by five 
hours, and aside from such practicalities many found simply driving on it to be an extraordinary 
experience. Soon over 10,000 vehicles were traveling on the turnpike each day—exponentially 
more than the 715 that MacDonald’s Bureau of Public Roads had predicted. Operators of both 
cars and trucks showed little reluctance to pay the toll, and money poured into the state’s 
coffers.38 
Other states were eager to follow, but World War II delayed their progress. As soon as the 
war ended the pent-up demand for auto travel was set loose, and Americans returned to the road 
in droves. The railroads, which had done well during the war and played a vital role in the war 
effort, saw their fortunes quickly sag. From 1945 to 1950 the number of registered motor vehicles 
across the nation rose from 31 million to 49 million, the latter figure including 8.6 million trucks.39 
Road and highway builders scrambled to keep up. In 1947 Maine opened its turnpike, followed a 
year later by New Hampshire whose modest fifteen-mile turnpike was an extension of Maine’s. 
Construction of the New York State Thruway began in 1946, with the first part opening in 1954 
and other segments gradually following until its completion in 1957, while the New Jersey 
Turnpike started construction in 1950 and commenced operations in 1952. These Northeastern 
turnpikes were financially successful beyond expectations, and Midwestern states quickly 
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followed suit. The Ohio Turnpike was completed in 1955 and the Indiana Toll Road in 1956; these 
connected with each other, and also with the Pennsylvania Turnpike. Back in the Northeast, the 
Massachusetts Turnpike was finished in 1957 (except for a small segment into downtown Boston 
that would be added later) and the Connecticut Turnpike in 1958. Other states that built 
turnpikes in this period included Oklahoma, Kansas, Kentucky and West Virginia. (Florida began 
construction on its turnpike too, but the bulk of it would be built in the 1960s and ‘70s.) Shorter 
tolled highways appeared in Texas, Colorado, Illinois and Virginia. California was also energetic 
in building highways in the late 1940s and ‘50s but decided to avoid making them toll roads, 
choosing to fund them through state taxes instead. At the local and regional level new and better 
highways were also being created. In the 1950s Route 128 was built around Boston—the first such 
divided limited-access highway to encircle a metropolitan area. The Illinois Tollway similarly 
was built to provide access to the periphery of Chicago, as well as a bypass route around the city. 
The Detroit area, locus of the automobile industry, was predictably engaged in building 
highways, notably the Edsel Ford Expressway and John C. Lodge Freeway. In Los Angeles as 
well several new highways were built in the 1950s.40 
In the immediate postwar years the role of the federal government in road building, and 
especially highway building, was modest, reflecting President Harry Truman’s reluctance to 
commit substantial funding. While business groups and truckers in particular clamored for new 
and improved roads, and for reducing taxes on gasoline, the Truman administration held firm. 
(Those in favor of roads were hardly united; the business establishment and urban dwellers 
favored major highways, while farmers and rural inhabitants wanted better country roads.) The 
expense of the Korean War was an additional rationale for Truman to limit road construction.41 
Consequently the evolving network of modern highways was being cobbled together on a state 
by state basis, in spite of the nationally standardized identifying numbers and signage, and this 
led to problems. A particularly spectacular example received wide publicity in 1956 when the 
Kansas Turnpike opened, for it came to an abrupt dead end at a field on the Oklahoma border 
where an unfortunate farmer had to deal with about a crash each day on his land.42 
A unified national system could avoid such gaps, provide common standards, and offer a 
consistent travel experience across the entire nation. The need to create such a network was 
becoming evident to the public, the business community, and the government. The benefits of a 
national highway infrastructure for the military was another justification, given the prevailing 
Cold War mentality. President Eisenhower, elected in 1952, had long understood the importance 
of road transportation—his arduous 1919 cross-country trip in a military convoy has already 
been noted. In the closing stages of World War II he was astonished by the German autobahns, 
which the Americans exploited to advance rapidly into the prostrate nation. In one of his 
memoirs he noted how the German highways transformed his conception of the possibilities of 
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automotive movement: “The old convoy had started me thinking about good, two-lane 
highways, but Germany had made me see the wisdom of broader ribbons across the land.”43 
The Eisenhower administration worked to craft a strategy for a national highway system. A 
committee created by the president, headed by Lucius Clay, issued a report in January of 1955 
recommending the creation of an “Interstate Highway System” of modern (i.e., divided, limited-
access, multi-lane) highways, to be financed by federally issued 30-year bonds, with the federal 
government covering 90% of the cost of construction and the remainder falling to the states. But 
the Senate and House of Representatives were cool to the proposal, especially the notion of 
taking on debt by issuing bonds, and it went nowhere. Other ideas, including legislation that 
sought to pay for the highways largely through taxes and fees on gasoline, trucks and tires, also 
failed to advance through Congress in 1955. By the following year a sense of urgency had taken 
hold, and many in the automotive and trucking industries dropped their opposition to such 
taxes. Another motivating factor was a federal report titled General Location of National System of 
Interstate Highways Including All Additional Routes at Urban Areas. The “Yellow Book,” as it came to 
be more concisely known thanks to the color of its cover, contained maps showing where the 
proposed Interstate highways would be placed in every metropolitan area of any significance. 
The report was sent to members of Congress in late 1955 and this proved a clever tactic, for now 
they could see where the new roads would go and thus comprehend in a more tangible fashion 
the economic boost that would come from construction and higher property values.44 
Consequently 1956 proved more fruitful, as Congressmen George Fallon and Hale Boggs 
took the lead and sponsored new legislation, with Senator Albert Gore also eventually playing a 
key role. The Highway Trust Fund, supported by taxes on gasoline, diesel, oil, tires and trucks, 
was established to finance construction, while the idea of the federal government paying 90% of 
construction costs reemerged and became part of the new law. The House passed the legislation 
by a vote of 388 to 19, the Senate approved it by a voice vote, and on June 29th Eisenhower 
signed the historic Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. The U.S. Interstate highway system, 
officially named the “National System of Interstate and Defense Highways,” was now in 
existence.45 Next came the challenge of actually building the massive network; while the existing 
highways were incorporated into the Interstate system, the vast bulk of it remained to be built. 
This would primarily be carried out in the 1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s (though work lingered into later 
decades), and ranks as perhaps the largest public works project in history. 
The new Interstate highways were commonly laid out in existing transportation corridors, 
often parallel with railroad routes and preexisting roads and smaller highways. It was logical for 
the Interstates to serve major cities that already existed. So the new highway network reflected 
the history of the nation, its geography, and its transportation legacy. Countless examples could 
be enumerated. In upstate New York, the New York State Thruway ran alongside the New York 
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Central Railroad’s Water Level Route, which in turn had followed the Erie Canal. In southern 
Pennsylvania the Pennsylvania Turnpike roughly paralleled the old Pennsylvania Railroad Main 
Line. Between Maryland and Illinois Interstate 70 ran very close to the path of the old National 
Road, which previously had seen U.S. Highway 40 laid out along its route in the 1920s.46 In 
Nebraska Interstate 80 ran parallel to the Lincoln Highway, signed as U.S. Highway 34, which in 
turn had been laid out near the first transcontinental railroad. The legacy went further, for that 
railroad route was largely placed alongside the Platte River, which due to its value as a water 
source had been followed closely by the original settlers in their wagons.47 Likewise in the 
Southwest Interstate 40 traced a very similar path to Route 66, which in turn had largely followed 
the Beale Trail used by pioneers traveling from Arkansas to California. 
Occasionally the highways blazed new trails, even if they did so to connect existing 
metropolises. Interstate 80 was built straight through the mountains of central Pennsylvania, 
creating a more direct route from Cleveland to New York as it goes through relatively 
unpopulated areas. In the Central Valley of California Interstate 5 does not follow the chain of 
existing cities, already well-served by State Route 99, but rather is a bit to the west, making a 
slightly more direct connection between Los Angeles and San Francisco. But new corridors like 
these were uncommon, and it is noteworthy that they did not generate new cities. No American 
city has dramatically boomed due to a highway connection, in contrast to the growth once caused 
by the railroad in places like Chicago, Kansas City and Los Angeles. Compared to the railroad 
system the highway network is more spread out and diffuse, connecting a vast array of places 
and not having the dramatic centralizing effect that trains could endow to a place like Chicago. 
Perhaps more importantly, the highway network grew in an era of consolidation rather than raw 
creation. (Certainly many suburban and exurban areas have grown dramatically thanks to 
highways, but this phenomenon happened at the metropolitan scale, around cities that already 
existed.) However, the Interstates in spanning the nation did provide a certain equality of 
economic opportunity that helped “underdeveloped” regions, such as the Sun Belt and the West, 
and moderately populated rural areas in general, develop from the 1970s onward. 
Though actual construction of the Interstates would be done by the states, the U.S. 
government was charged with coordinating the entire effort and setting the basic guidelines. The 
Interstate highway system like so many American projects is a compromise between top-down 
federal control and state autonomy, but in its overall design it has a cohesion and consistency 
that gives it a national stamp. The space of the nation-state is made whole and unified by this 
remarkable infrastructure; it is crucially important the network has a sameness about it 
everywhere. Boring though this quality can be to many travelers, who lament the blandness of 
the highway landscape, this consistency helps make the Interstate highways comprehensible, 
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efficient and safe to its users. It negates local and regional variations, so that a person from one 
corner of the country feels comfortable—and need not learn any nuances of a different system—
in another region. As one historian comments, “standardization is the Interstate’s hallmark and 
perhaps its most important characteristic.”48 This standardization encompasses many spatial 
characteristics, such as the width of lanes, the minimum turning radius for curves, the maximum 
grade of slopes, the vertical clearance, and so forth. Of course a wide variety of other things are 
also standardized: the materials used in the asphalt paving, the color and typeface of the signage, 
the numbers used to identify the highways, regulations concerning driver behavior, allowable 
pollution emissions, etc. But our main concern here is with the dimensional details—along with 
certain other physical characteristics—for they are what constitute the spatial regime of American 
highways. 
The Interstate builders quickly got to work setting these standards. In 1957 a section of 
highway in Maryland not yet opened to traffic was used to decide on the color scheme of the 
highway signs; background options of blue, green and black, all with white text, were tested as 
hundreds of drivers went past and then voted for their favorite. Green won handily, and 
consequently the now familiar green signs would be instituted nationwide. The design of the 
highway identification signs, with their iconic shield shape, was also established in 1957. In the 
same year the numbering system for the highway names was put in place; to avoid confusion 
with the already existing U.S. Routes the new scheme reversed their system. The even numbed 
east-west highways would be numerically higher further to the north, and the odd-numbered 
north-south highways would be numerically higher to the east. Meanwhile in Illinois engineers 
and officials built an experimental highway seven miles long in order to test a wide variety of 
pavings, subsurface materials, and design approaches, creating a total of 836 segments each built 
in a different fashion. This road was completed in 1958 and then vehicles of various size and 
weight drove relentlessly over it for two years.49 
One standard that would have implications for the size of trucks and trailers—and ultimately 
the size of shipping containers too—is the vertical clearance. This is a key part of the spatial 
regime of American trucking. The creation of the Interstate system offered a chance to create a 
national standard, one that would initially apply to the highways but was likely to be subsumed 
into the construction of ordinary roads also. Originally a dimension of 14’ was recommended, but 
the military claimed its vehicles needed a 17’ clearance. In 1960 the federal government issued a 
compromise decision requiring 16’ in rural settings but allowing 14’ in urban areas, and leaving 
many preexisting clearances unaffected. Over time the military and several government agencies 
worked together to gradually create a continuous network of routes with 16’ clearances; most 
major urban regions therefore have at least one highway corridor with a 16’ clearance.50 
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(Presumably these debates and compromises are the source of the widely repeated anecdote, only 
partly true, that the Interstate highways were built with clearances too low for military use.) 
It is the 14’ clearance that has gradually become the nationwide standard for nearly all major 
highways and roads—standard in the sense that it is a minimum which can be assumed 
everywhere. (Any clearance lower than 14’ should be well marked with signage.) This figure has 
expanded gradually, and significantly, over time. Before World War II it was only around 10’, so 
trailers had to be lower than that height. By the early 1960s the typical clearance was up to 13’, 
and so a normal tractor-trailer truck was 12’-6” high. (A six-inch spatial buffer is generally 
expected.) In the later years of the decade the 14’ dimension became more established, at least on 
major routes, and most new trailers were built at a 13’-6” height, as is still the case today.51 As the 
container height of 8’-6” was originally established in the late 1950s and early ‘60s largely so that 
the container when carried on a trailer chassis could fit under the 13’ vertical road clearance of 
the time, the shift to a 14’ clearance meant another 12 inches was in play. (The initial standard 
container was actually 8’ high, but the 8’-6” height remained more common and eventually the 
standard was switched to that dimension. This is described later in this chapter.) Hence the 
American trucking infrastructure, at least, could accommodate containers 9’-6” high by the late 
1960s. The rest of the world was another matter of course, and so the container’s dimensions 
could hardly be altered merely for the sake of the American trucking spatial regime. But many 
years later this potential would eventually be exploited by domestic containers 9’-6” high, and 
also by global high-cube containers of a 9’-6” height. 
As highway construction advanced in the 1940s and ‘50s, and suburban sprawl developed 
rapidly, trucking grew more and more central to American freight practices. As noted earlier in 
this chapter, as far back as the 1920s manufacturers, warehouses and other industrial facilities 
began to disperse spatially as they found themselves less dependent on the railroad. The truck 
offered an alternative to the train’s longstanding hegemony. The process accelerated in the 
postwar era by leaps and bounds, as a rail connection simply became unnecessary for a wide 
spectrum of industrial sites. Increasingly it was highways and roads, along with the ever-larger 
and swifter trucks traveling on them, that provided the critical access. The truck was the key unit 
in the new network of freight movement. A railroad trade journal acknowledged in 1960 that “as 
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admirable a vehicle as the box car is, there is no denying that much of American commerce has 
found itself more comfortably secured inside a truck trailer.”52 
The truck’s newfound dominance, in particular its ability to reach all shippers, consignees 
and clients over the ubiquitous roads, made it advisable if not imperative for railroad companies 
to cooperate with it. Intermodalism between trucking and railroads in the form of 
containerization and piggyback had originally emerged in the 1920s, as previously mentioned. 
After nearly disappearing in the 1940s both practices returned in the 1950s, with trailers and 
shipping containers that were considerably bigger. (This is described in detail in chapter 5, as it 
was railroads that usually ran these operations.) For both piggyback and containerization the 
railroads sometimes founded their own trucking subsidiaries in order to better control this aspect 
of the journey—a form of competition the trucking industry did not welcome. In the late 1950s 
the railroads found piggyback to be more profitable, and their use of containers began to fade. 
Yet in the meantime containerized transport was being introduced by a few ocean-going 
shipping lines, with containers roughly comparable in size to those of the railroads (about 20’-40’ 
long, 8’ or 8’-6” high, and 8’ wide). The most important of the pioneers introducing these 
containers was Malcom McLean, a successful trucking executive who boldly abandoned that 
business in order to pursue containerization in the shipping industry. His Sea-Land service, 
initiated in 1956, was a success and so others companies cautiously followed suit, resulting in a 
flood of containers needing land-based transport to connect with their origins and destinations. 
(These developments are covered at length in chapter 2.) This presented obvious opportunities 
for truckers. 
A few innovators in the Pacific Northwest began to use containerization in the early 1950s, 
slightly before McLean made his momentous move into containerization. The most important 
was the White Pass and Yukon Corporation, a Canadian transportation company primarily 
known for its railroad operations that (as detailed in chapters 2 and 5) commissioned and began 
using a container ship in 1955 as part of an intermodal network including trains and trucks. 
Other pioneers included the Alaska Steamship Company (known as “Alaska Steam”) and the 
Alaska Railroad, but for this chapter’s purposes the ones of most interest were the trucking 
companies Ocean Van Lines, Alaska Freight Lines, and Garrison Fast Freight. In 1951 Ocean Van 
Lines began a cooperative effort with Alaska Steam to move 30’-long stackable containers 
between Seattle and Alaska, with the truckers hauling containers from Alaska ports into the 
interior of the state. The partnership was abandoned in 1953 when Alaska Steam chose to pursue 
containerization with the Alaska Railroad instead; in the meantime Alaska Steam augmented its 
container service by also carrying trailers on deck, which were hauled overland by the trucking 
firm Garrison Fast Freight. (Garrison Fast Freight was a division of Consolidated Freightways, a 
major trucking company that would later play a role in container standardization, as will be 
described.) In 1953 Alaska Freight Lines, a major trucking company that also ran several barges 
along the coast, began a container service between Seattle and various points in Alaska. For this 
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Figure 6.1: Ocean Van Lines containers 
 
Source: Ken Goudy’s Collection [Ocean Van Lines Collection] 
(http://www.hankstruckpictures.com/kg_ovl.htm, accessed 12/15/12) 
 
At this point a key aspect of container use in trucking, the trailer chassis, should be noted. By 
the 1950s the tractor-trailer had become dominant in American long-haul trucking, and so it was 
this type of truck that now moved containers. In order to do so it was necessary to create a type 
of trailer designed to hold the container. A normal flatbed trailer can do this but it is cumbersome 
and inefficient, and the attachments are difficult and slow to put in place. Furthermore if the 
container were 8’-6” high then the use of a flatbed trailer in the 1950s and early ‘60s could create 
occasional clearance issues with bridges and other obstructions above the roadway. If just a few 
containers are being used here and there, the awkwardness of a flatbed trailer is not such an 
issue, but with a larger number of containers involved it becomes worthwhile to design and build 
trailers specially intended to carry them. These are generally known as trailer chassis, and are 
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analogous to the railcars designed specifically for containers in that they play a key role as 
interfaces between the global container infrastructure and the domestic trucking infrastructure. 
This makes them profoundly important, this dissertation argues, even though they are simple 
devices without any remarkable technological characteristics. In spite of their simplicity and 
mundane quality, trailer chassis do have some interesting nuances and will be described in much 
greater depth in chapter 8, but here their purpose and significance are at least noted. 
The aforementioned efforts at containerization in the Pacific Northwest were pioneering but 
remained limited in scope and did not attract wide attention. It was Malcom McLean’s Sea-Land 
service, initially providing coastal shipping of containers between Newark and several ports in 
the Southeast, that proved to be the watershed event in the development of containerization. 
With his background in trucking, McLean used his previous experience and contacts to build a 
network of truck movement to carry Sea-Land containers to and from ports. Since the regulations 
of the time forced him to sell off McLean Trucking (the succcessful trucking firm he had founded) 
before pursuing his marine ambitions, and also prevented his new venture from contracting with 
McLean Trucking, McLean worked with various other trucking companies to pick up and deliver 
the containers. Due to the importance of having the containers moved quickly and reliably on 
land, the arrangements with truckers were made carefully. Since the Sea-Land network was 
geographically comparable to that of McLean Trucking—linking the Southeast and Gulf Coast 
with the Northeast—some of Sea-Land’s new customers had previously been served by McLean 
Trucking.54 The practical McLean saw his ships as providing an alternative to the road-based 
infrastructure of trucking; where previously McLean Trucking had carried goods between the 
Northeast and the Southeast, now it was through coastal shipping that Sea-Land moved freight 
between the two regions. As another figure in the shipping industry put it, many years later, 
“Malcom was trying to do trucking cheaper.”55 
Sea-Land’s new terminal in Newark offered connections to trucking and roads far better than 
the traditional piers in Manhattan and Brooklyn upon which the New York region had depended 
for so long. At those older facilities trucks had to make their way through overcrowded streets 
and endure long waits at the piers, some of which were so narrow a large truck could not even 
turn around. Newark’s port in contrast provided plentiful space for trucks and allowed them to 
get all the way to the water’s edge, right next to the ship. Furthermore there was convenient 
access to the New Jersey Turnpike, completed just a few years earlier in 1952. (Over the years to 
come, many other new or improved container ports, typically in exurban or at least somewhat 
more distant locations, would provide similar advantages over constricted intown terminals.) 
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McLean’s vision was still in many ways that of a trucker, using ships as intermediaries. 
Indeed, McLean originally wanted to carry trailers onboard, a practice known as roll-on/roll-off 
or “RO-RO,” before deciding containers would work better. He rhetorically asked one of his 
executives, who had previously worked with him in trucking, “did you ever see one tractor 
pulling 226 trailers?” then pointed to a new container ship and said “there’s one right there.”56 
The same person, recollecting his years at Sea-Land, said that for McLean “a ship was just a huge 
tractor.”57 McLean’s conception of the ship as an extension of the highway is reflected in a 1966 
advertisement for Sea-Land’s new service to Europe that featured a playful pastiche image of an 
imaginary highway stretching over the ocean from New York to Europe.58 Sea-Land persisted in 
referring to its containers as vans or trailers, and its ships as “trailerships,” into the mid-1960s. 
McLean’s trucking background was also revealed in his insistence that Sea-Land containers not 
be stacked at port terminals (even though they were of course entirely stackable), as he preferred 
each container stay on a trailer chassis for convenience in movement. This state of affairs 
persisted into the 1980s until it finally became impractical, and made a striking contrast with the 
terminal operations of other shipping lines which were characterized by stacks of containers. 
Commenting on this practice, so distinctive to Sea-Land, a trade journal perceptively commented 
in 1982 that “few other shipping lines have their services so firmly linked to an overall trucking 
concept…”59 
Sea-Land’s container service began in 1956. Initially the containers were 33’ long in order to 
maximize the space available on the deck of the ships Sea-Land used while also complying with 
highway regulations. (In other words, the length of the deck space was divisible by 33’, and the 
next highest figure it was divisible by was too long for highway rules.) Soon Sea-Land decided to 
introduce true container ships with containers stacked in cells inside the hold, and thus was able 
to select an ideal container size and design the ship around it. The company chose to use 
containers 35’ long, 8’ wide and 8’-6” high. This size was directly determined by trucking and 
road-related considerations, for the length and width were the maximum permitted for a trailer 
on roads in most eastern states, while the height was judged the upper limit for a container to rest 
on a modified flatbed trailer and fit beneath road clearances.60 The 35’ length would soon be a 
bone of contention for Sea-Land and other container innovators; most states gradually expanded 
the allowable trailer length to 40’ during the 1950s, but Pennsylvania, under the influence of the 
Pennsylvania Railroad which sought to hinder trucking, held the line at a 35’ length into the late 
1950s.61 For Sea-Land the situation in Pennsylvania was especially relevant given the amount of 
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containerized trucking the company sent into that state, just west of New Jersey. Once locked into 
this container size Sea-Land stayed with it for a considerable time, long after virtually all the 
other major shipping lines had adopted the globally standardized 20’ and 40’-long containers. 
Following quickly after Sea-Land, the Matson Navigation Company introduced shipping 
containers in 1958 on its routes between Hawaii and the West Coast, and chose to use 24’-long 
containers that were 8’ wide and 8’-6” high. The size was selected after extensive calculations by 
the Matson Research Department, under its director Foster Weldon, that incorporated numerous 
factors. A consideration of additional significance was that some Western states allowed trucks 
composed of two trailers each 24’ long, for it was assumed that hauling two containers at a time 
over the road would be a somewhat common practice.62 Like Sea-Land, in these early years 
Matson relied primarily on trucks for the overland segments of container movement. Another 
shipping line planning containerization in the late 1950s, the Grace Line, chose 17’-long 
containers because the company intended to serve Venezuela and judged that containers any 
longer would be hard to carry on the local roads there, which were not designed for very large 
trucks. (As noted in chapter 2, Grace Line was unable to permanently establish its container 
operation, thanks to the opposition of Venezuelan longshoremen.) This 17’ dimension was also 
desirable because it allowed two containers to be carried together on a trailer chassis in the U.S., 
as their combined length could fit under the aforementioned upper limit of 35’ for trailer length.63 
(Incidentally, the idea of a truck carrying two containers, though originally appealing for many of 
containerization’s innovators such as Matson and Grace, has rarely been carried out in actual 
practice.) These early examples make it clear that the spatial character of roads and trucking was 
a key factor determining the size of containers—in other words, trucking’s spatial regime had a 
formative influence on the container’s spatial regime. 
A few truck and trailer manufacturers played a prominent role in the design and 
construction of Sea-Land’s early containers. Once Malcom McLean decided his ships would carry 
containers rather than trailers, he contacted the Brown Trailer Company of Toledo, Ohio. Brown 
Trailer had built the 30’ containers for the aforementioned Ocean Van Lines’ containerized 
operations in the Pacific Northwest; these containers were stackable and meant to be carried by 
both ship and truck. Such a container closely resembled a trailer without its wheels and other 
apparatus, and in fact was often called a “van” or “demountable trailer.” So it is not surprising a 
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company that manufactured trailers would be in a good position to make containers. Keith 
Tantlinger, Brown Trailer’s vice-president of engineering, met with McLean and agreed to supply 
containers of a 33’ length. Soon Tantlinger joined Sea-Land to help with the difficult and novel 




Figure 6.2: Twistlock on a trailer chassis 
 
Source: Chassis King website (http://www.chassisking.com/products/ 
twist-locks/twist-locks-with-light-holes/, accessed 12/15/12) 
 
When Sea-Land in 1957 switched to 35’ containers that were stacked in container ships rather 
than merely placed on deck, the method of holding them in place was improved: an eyelet was 
built into each corner of the container—this is generally known as a “corner casting”—so that a 
twistlock device could hold the container in place. Such a twistlock mechanism can be part of a 
crane lifting a container from above, or a trailer chassis or railcar holding a container from below. 
Small twistlock devices are also used in the interbox connectors (IBCs) that hold containers to 
each other. It was Tantlinger who designed this remarkable scheme of twistlocks and corner 
castings.65 (In the 1960s the ISO would accept it as a fundamental part of the globally 
standardized container system, thanks largely to Tantlinger’s advocacy and also McLean’s 
willingness to release Sea-Land’s patent rights, and so it endures today in containers and their 
attachments everywhere.) As part of this shift to a new container design—with its new method of 
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connection and containers now two feet longer—a new type of trailer chassis was also necessary, 
and this too was designed by Tantlinger. The new chassis had built-in connections at each corner, 
which could attach themselves, in a fashion similar to the twistlock, into the container’s corner 
castings when the longshoreman turned a handle. Sea-Land’s previous method of attaching 
containers to chassis involved manually attaching iron chains at each corner, so the new 
approach was substantially faster and easier.66 
After its initial order of containers from Brown Trailer, Sea-Land switched to containers 
made by the Strick division of the Fruehauf Trailer Company. Fruehauf had been one of the 
dominant players in building truck bodies and trailers for a long time, and, as already described, 
had previously innovated in the design and construction of the early commercial semi-trailers. 
President Roy Fruehauf was impressed with the idea of containerization, so in addition to 
manufacturing containers for Sea-Land his company agreed to make the trailer chassis that were 
needed, and also to provide financing to Sea-Land for the purchase of these containers and 
chassis.67 In 1958 Tantlinger left Sea-Land and became chief engineer at Fruehauf, where he 
continued to work with containers. More importantly, over the years he played a key role in the 
process of container standardization, working extensively on a committee of the American 
Standards Association (ASA) and later being critically involved with the ISO’s efforts.68 
Along with Tantlinger, another major figure in the trucking industry who loomed large in the 
standardization process was Eugene Hinden, an executive at Strick Trailers. (Strick was bought 
by Fruehauf in 1956, but eventually sold off in 1965 due to government concern about the 
monopolistic nature of the two trailer manufacturers being under the same corporate umbrella.) 
Hinden worked with Tantlinger for several years on an ASA committee, and in the ISO as well.69 
In addition, a few more manufacturers of trailers and truck bodies got involved in early container 
design and construction. One was Trailmobile, well known in the trucking industry, whose 
engineers helped Matson develop its containerized system and built two 24’ containers, along 
with two trailer chassis to carry them, for Matson to test. Another was the Highway Trailer 
Company, which built the containers for Grace Line’s brief and ill-fated container service. Others 
included Dorsey, Great Dane and Trailmobile. In a brief survey of container makers that 
appeared in a trade journal in 1966, the majority were companies (or divisions) dedicated 
primarily to trailer manufacture.70 
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The railroads that introduced their own container schemes in the 1950s created varied 
designs for the containers, trailer chassis, and fittings and mechanisms to hold containers in 
place. The New York Central Railroad’s Flexi-Van was the most successful of these containerized 
systems, and in its design the railroad worked with the Strick division of Fruehauf—the same 
company that was building Sea-Land containers and chassis at about the same time.71 Flexi-Van 
containers were transferred between train and truck by a method of sliding and rotating the 
container; no crane was necessary and in theory the truck driver could do the transfer all by 
himself, but the process could be awkward and was especially problematic in wintry weather. 
While moving by truck the container did not rest on an entire trailer chassis, but rather only a 
bogie with wheels attached beneath it. Since the bogie did not extend to reach the tractor, it was 
necessary for the container itself to be attached to the tractor through additional equipment.72 The 
convenience of not using a full-length chassis was probably not enough in practice to compensate 
for the awkwardness of the separate bogie and all the equipment and fittings needed on the 
tractor, container, bogie and specially-designed railcar in order to carry out the transfer between 
truck and train. The other railroad companies practicing containerization in the 1950s and early 
‘60s generally chose to use a trailer chassis or flatbed trailer to carry the container by truck, and to 
do the transfer by crane or some other lifting device.73 All these container schemes would 
gradually lose favor, however, as the railroads found piggyback to be more profitable than 
containerization. In the meantime the containers introduced by the shipping companies would 
become dominant, especially after the ISO completed the standardization process in the late 
1960s, while those of the railroads faded away. 
When the United States Maritime Administration, known as “Marad,” commenced work on 
container standardization in 1958, one of its few easy decisions was that all containers would be 
8’ wide.74 All subsequent work on standardization would hew to that 8’ figure, which derived 
from the maximum allowable width of a truck or trailer in the U.S.—a dimension that as already 
noted was in place by the 1930s. This width turned out to have the added benefit of being feasible 
in nearly every part of the world. For this reason a global shipping container, whatever its length 
and height, is always eight feet wide; this has been the case from the beginning and is likely to 
remain so for the foreseeable future. As one industry veteran commented, “that eight foot width 
is about the only container dimension that has stayed to this day…the eight foot width for trucks 
on highways is highly standardized throughout the world.”75 Many of the European countries, 
however, originally wanted containers to be slightly wider than 8’, to match their own 
regulations and practices for trucks. (This remains a problem, especially since an 8’-wide 
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container cannot hold two standard European pallets side by side.) But since so many other 
nations limited the width of motor vehicles to 8’, the Europeans had to give way on this point. 
(Ironically the U.S. has since gone to a maximum width of 8’-6” in trucking, as will be explained 
in chapter 8; consequently domestic containers are 8’-6” wide.) 
The issue of height was far more contentious, and would continue to be debated in the 
standardization processes of both the ASA and ISO. Sea-Land and Matson were both using 
containers 8’-6” high, which when resting upon trailer chassis of a gooseneck design (the 
gooseneck will be described in chapter 8—basically it allows a container to be held a few inches 
lower) could fit with an adequate margin of safety beneath the 13’ vertical clearance that was 
common, as described earlier in this chapter, for roads and highways at the time. This 8’-6” 
container height was also sufficient to allow a forklift to work inside the container—a major 
advantage. But an 8’-6” high container riding on a normal flatbed trailer, or on a trailer chassis 
without the gooseneck design, would have clearance issues on some American roads and 
highways, especially in the East. If it was carried on such standard equipment, only a container of 
8’ height could be at (or reasonably close to) the upper limit of 12’-6” for total height, and thus 
acceptably below the 13’ vertical clearance.76 Many Europeans also preferred the 8’ height, 
arguing that in their countries an 8’-6” height likewise would lead to clearance issues. 
Consequently the 8’ height won out in the setting of standards at both the ASA and ISO, though 
amidst fierce debate. Discussing the decision-making process at the ASA, one participant 
recounted that “the controversy between an 8’ height and an 8’-6” height raged violently for 
months.”77 The result provoked heated objections from those like Sea-Land and Matson who 
were already using the 8’-6” height, but they would have the last laugh since in the late 1960s the 
8’-6” height was also made an ISO standard in recognition of the reality that the industry was 
using it anyway. It then became the dominant dimension for height, while the 8’ height was 
slowly abandoned. (Eventually the high-cube container with its 9’-6” height would become an 
additional standard.) 
Container length was also difficult to gain agreement on. The American Standards 
Association (ASA) began work on container standardization in 1958; where Marad was 
inherently more oriented to the shipping industry, the ASA’s process was also influenced by 
those in trucking and rail. A retired engineer named Herbert Hall was put in charge of ASA 
container standardization, and worked energetically to create a modular set of standard lengths 
of 10’, 20’, 30’ and 40’. Ultimately he was successful, in the face of much debate, as both the ASA 
and Marad agreed on these lengths in 1961.78 Hall’s insistence on the 40’ length (for the largest 
container, from which the other lengths derived) apparently stemmed from the realization that 
by the end of the 1950s this was the maximum allowable trailer length in nearly all the states, and 
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hence would soon be a trailer standard.79 So as with the earlier decisions on container size by Sea-
Land, Matson and Grace, the spatial regime of trucking and roads was the key consideration. 
Predictably the 40’ choice met with strong objections from Sea-Land and Matson, who had no 
wish to abandon their own container sizes, already embedded in their operations. While a few 
allowances were made for them, at least by American regulators, shipping would gradually 
coalesce around the 20’ and 40’ lengths that the ASA and later the ISO agreed upon. The 10’ and 
30’ lengths, though also put in place by the ASA and ISO, never gained popularity. (Not 
everything worked out Hall’s way: on the issue of height he strongly supported 8’ rather than 8’-
6”.) 
Another individual in the trucking industry who played a prominent role in container 
standardization during this period was E. B. Ogden of Consolidated Freightways, the largest 
American trucking company at the time. Ogden served as chairman of the ASA’s subcommittee 
on container dimensions during the decision-making process overseen by Hall. In a meeting of 
the subcommittee in 1959 he emphasized that since nearly all the states in the U.S. now allowed a 
40’ maximum trailer length, the logic of Sea-Land’s 35’ container no longer applied.80 It is unclear 
whether Ogden actually wished to foreclose the possibility of the 35’ length as a standard, but 
obviously Hall chose to do so. In the meantime Ogden remained involved in such issues; in 1961 
he presented a paper, at the SAE (Society of Automotive Engineers) International Congress and 
Exposition of Automotive Engineering, titled “What the Operator Wants in Containers” that gave 
a brief summary of the trucking industry’s concerns and priorities with regard to container use.81 
Given that the shipping container has become a global standard of enduring power it is 
worth understanding where its dimensions, of such fundamental importance to it, come from. 
Too often the literature on globalization, both popular and scholarly, views global dynamics as 
possessing their own inherent logic, somehow emblematic of the zeitgeist. This is a vision of 
globalization as a brave new world, often cast in a neoliberal tint, and represents a deeply 
ahistorical stance. Understanding the historical narratives behind global forces can counteract 
this attitude. In the case of the container, its dimensions in all three measures—length, width and 
height—derive from what was allowable for truck trailers on American highways in the late 
1950s and early ‘60s. The global practice of containerization is not innate to some mysterious 
essence of globalization, but stems from a particular time and place. This is a legacy of some 
significance; as with many aspects of globalization, the container comes in an American template 
that reflects the influence and power of the U.S. in the second half of the twentieth century. 
It was trucking rather than the railroads that initially benefited most from the rising tide of 
containers put into use by the shipping industry, as truckers provided the majority of the land-
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based movement of these containers. (This was particularly true since the railroads were getting 
less and less interested in containerization, concluding that piggyback was for them a better 
intermodal strategy.) Yet some trucking firms were resistant, even though these containers 
represented a promising source of business for them. While trucking companies were hostile to 
rail-based containerization, seeing it as a threat to their long-haul business, no such objection 
could be levied against containers made available by shipping lines. Still there were doubts about 
altering traditional trucking practices. Perhaps in order to overcome this reluctance, the shipping 
lines established the practice of supplying truckers with the trailer chassis necessary to hold the 
container. (In other nations it is typically the trucking companies that provide the trailer chassis, 
charging a higher price in return, and in recent years this has started to become the practice in the 
U.S. too, as will be discussed further in chapter 8.) Given that the trailer chassis could connect to 
the tractors that truckers already possessed, this made it easier for the trucking companies to 
accept this new business without having to rethink their own operations. Writing in 1973, 
shipping expert Eric Rath comments that: 
When trucks were initially presented with requests to accommodate containers 
for inland movement, the handling of trucklines’ interchange trailers was already 
a well-established system… Rather than recognizing the container as a system 
unto itself, it was forced into an already existing national transport system. As 
long as container movements remained small, this posed no problem. The motor 
carrier accepted the container on conventional terms, furnished by the steamship, 
on wheels [trailer chassis], then moved it through his normal system.82 
The trucking companies did not need to understand the full significance of this new cargo; 
they could participate in this emerging globalization while being oriented to their own business 
internal to American trucking. Nevertheless they raised objections. As Rath goes on to describe, 
the truckers were not fond of longer inland container movements beyond the vicinity of the port 
because it was hard to find freight for the backhaul. In addition many of the containers were 
between 20’ and 35’ long and these were regarded as inefficient sizes by truckers, whose trailers 
by now were typically 40’ long.83 Indeed, it appears some trucking firms were simply resistant to 
anything that did not fit with business as usual. Furthermore there was a sense of rivalry and 
competition between the different freight transport modes. But the rivalry seemed absurd in this 
case, because truckers and shipping lines could hardly be competitors; as Rath points out with 
dry wit, the truckers reluctance to cooperate “is difficult to understand since most water carriers 
would seem to have considerable difficulty in reaching the majority of inland destinations by 
themselves.”84 These frictions meant the container’s potential for seamless intermodal transport 
was slow in its realization; for instance, as of 1969 nearly half of the containerized cargo at 
Newark was still being moved into or out of the containers at the pier, where it was loaded or 
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unloaded into normal truck trailers.85 While there were a variety of reasons for this (including the 
longshoremen’s desire to hold onto their work), the resistance of truckers against altering their 
operations was a factor. 
One solution was to found new trucking companies that specialized in hauling containers. 
An example was True Transport, which started in 1968 carrying containers to and from Newark’s 
port to serve the surrounding region. Acknowledging the need to look beyond typical trucking 
practices, True Transport hired several people with experience in ocean shipping.86 Compared to 
a typical trucking firm of the period, therefore, the company was to some minor degree 
globalized—its expertise and knowledge extended, if ever so slightly, beyond the bounds of the 
national space. True Transport was for a time the nation’s largest trucking company under 
African-American ownership, and consequently there is more historical information about it. 
Founder Leamon McCoy, according to a 1974 article in Black Enterprise, “was one of the few in the 
industry to see…that if special new equipment and methods were justified for handling 
containers in the marine cargo business, the same had to be true for ground transportation.”87 His 
belief in the logic of a firm specializing in hauling containers for shipping lines proved valid, for 
True Transport thrived in the 1970s and into the ‘80s, serving the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic and 
Midwest, though it eventually folded in 1989.88 
Some established trucking companies also sought to get into the business of hauling 
containers. Eastern Express was a trucking firm based in Indiana that had participated in 
carrying import and export traffic since 1946, with several well-established routes linking the 
Midwest to Northeastern ports. Hence it was sensible for the firm to transition into hauling 
containers, as it did in the 1960s while also maintaining its domestic traffic. Eastern Express went 
further by taking on a measure of responsibility for the entire international container journey, 
even though it could only directly carry out the portion of the trip in the U.S. By the mid-1960s 
the company was quoting through rates on containers moving door-to-door between the U.S. and 
Europe, though regulations prevented it from providing a through bill of lading.89 The firm’s 
director of sales told a trade journal in 1966 that “we have traveled to Europe to set up working 
arrangements with carriers and agents there… One-carrier responsibility would greatly enhance 
the attractiveness of foreign trade for many more U.S. shippers and importers.”90 While Eastern 
Express had previously played a part in the global movement of goods, it had been within one 
particular national space; this new strategy was fundamentally different in its transnational 
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ambitions. The container, thanks to the way it makes possible a seamless door-to-door journey 
for its entire volume of cargo, facilitated such novel approaches. 
Another trucking carrier to pursue global containerization was IML Freight, which took 
charge of containers moving across the Pacific. In 1966 its vice-president said the firm was “line-
loading containers in Yokohama for one company, consolidating shipments from as many as 60 
vendors. We put them in a container, bring them back and deliver them directly to retail outlets 
in Kansas City and St. Louis.”91 IML also set up container services from Japan to Europe that used 
the continental U.S. as a “landbridge”—a practice that would soon be far more widely associated 
with the railroads. In addition IML made arrangements with two trucking companies in Europe 
to carry IML’s containers there, and set up the operation so freight would move on a single 
through bill of lading.92 But perhaps the most daring American trucking company to build an 
international network of container movement was DC International, formerly known as the 
Denver-Chicago Trucking Company. In 1965 DC International bought out the Dutch trucker 
West-Friesland Eurotransport, a company operating in several European countries, and became 
the first trucking firm to offer container transport by the same carrier in both the U.S. and Europe. 
The experiment was unsuccessful, however, and within a year DC International gave it up and 
sold off West-Friesland.93 
A similar leap was made by the trucking company Helm’s Express. The firm had already 
been active in domestic intermodalism, quoting rates for containerized freight from door to door 
within the Midwest and Northeast. (As such it was one of the few truckers to coordinate 
domestic container movement—usually railroads or freight forwarders did so.) Helm’s Express 
then became active in international containerization, creating subsidiary Helm’s International for 
this purpose in 1964. The company owned some of its containers, took responsibility for liability 
for the oceanic portion of the trip, and partnered with NW Konig & Co., a trucking firm in 
Rotterdam, to ensure its connection in Europe.94 In a talk at a conference in 1967 the president of 
Helm’s Express, Harry Werksman, mentioned that his company was essentially seeking to turn 
the shipping lines into “bridge carriers”; he envisioned a future where his firm would quote rates 
and handle all the other details directly with the shipper (i.e., customer), with the shipping 
company under contract and only concerned with carrying containers. However, Werksman 
noted the shipping lines were strongly resistant to the notion.95 Little wonder, for the idea would 
put the trucking companies in the driver’s seat. Given that the shipping companies were 
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powerful and their numbers limited (much like a cartel, in fact), they generally held the upper 
hand, and there was little chance their role could become so limited. 
The concept of such a “bridge” becomes logical with containerization, as the nature of 
container movement, spanning multiple transport modes, makes it likely some carriers will carry 
out an intermediate function while others have more contact with the actual shipper and 
coordinate the entire movement. Given the power and importance of the shipping lines it is not 
surprising they have generally maintained control and relegated others to such “bridge” status. 
(In chapters 5 and 7 this is discussed in the context of the railroads providing “landbridge” 
container movement.) Consequently Werksman’s vision has not been realized; in terms of global 
container movement American truckers have typically been relegated to minor “bridge” status, 
as relatively powerless carriers. From a position of weakness in a very competitive market the 
truckers contract with shipping lines, logistics companies, and third-party forwarders. On the 
other hand, a few major trucking companies have been successful in gaining a much larger role in 
domestic containerization since its emergence in the 1990s, frequently turning the railroads into 
“bridge” carriers. These trends will be explored in chapters 8 and 11. 
As container use grew during the 1960s and ‘70s, port hinterlands grew larger and truckers 
were called upon to extend the reach of overland freight movement. For the shipping lines 
containerization made it more profitable to call at just a few ports; rapid trips back and forth over 
the ocean were the new order of business, rather than stopping at several ports up and down a 
coastline. A few large ports that chose or were able to invest in building giant new container 
terminals benefited greatly, having achieved the necessary economies of scale, while others 
withered. The traditional notion of each port having its own hinterland that it exclusively served 
was no longer applicable. Containers were moving longer distances overland by truck, a trend 
enabled by the Interstate highways that now linked all major cities, and so a port could easily 
serve a far larger region than before. Port officials in Seattle were among the first to grasp the 
new reality, for as early as 1966 they imagined their port could serve not just its immediate region 
but a great extent of territory reaching to the Midwest. Reacting quickly to the new container 
traffic on the Pacific, Seattle opened new facilities at its port in 1970. Nearby Portland failed to 
keep pace and consequently found much of its international trade funneled to the road, as 
shipping lines found it more efficient to dock at Seattle only and use trucks hauling containers to 
make the link with Portland.96 Likewise in the Northeast the runaway success of Newark meant 
that Philadelphia and Boston, despite building container terminals of their own, saw an 
increasing amount of their trade in the 1970s moving by truck to and from the New York region.97 
(Ultimately this trend toward larger hinterlands, and longer land-based container journeys, 
would benefit the railroads even more, as described in chapter 7.) 
By the late 1970s the American trucking industry was deeply involved in carrying containers, 
which had grown from a niche business in the 1950s to a more substantial operation. It was still 
                                                 
96 Levinson, The Box, pp. 196-197. 
97 Rath, Container Systems, pp. 275-276. 
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very small in relation to the overall domestic trucking industry, but had become established and 
gained practices of its own. In the meantime the U.S. highway system had grown by leaps and 
bounds since the 1950s thanks to the development of the Interstate system, and trucking had 
eclipsed the railroads to become far and away the most important transport mode for freight 
movement. Thanks to the shipping container, this massive trucking infrastructure was now 
increasingly integrated into global networks, into the worldwide infrastructure of 
containerization. But this had not dramatically impacted the trucking business. As with the 
railroads during the same period, the tendency was to make do with existing systems, and to 
stick with what already worked. Besides, the quantity of containers moving by truck, though 
substantial, was miniscule relative to the entire trucking industry. The container by and large was 
shoehorned into the trucking infrastructure, which adjusted only slightly to accommodate it. 
More changes would transpire in the decades to follow, and that is the subject of chapter 8, which 
covers the impact of the container on American trucking from the late 1970s up to the present. 





Chapter 7 ~ The Transformation of the Railroads 
 
By the late 1970s the shipping container was an established cargo on American railroads and 
represented a growing business for them. But it had not altered the nation’s rail system in any 
significant way. Deeper transformations began to slowly get under way towards the end of the 
1970s, a process that has continued and strengthened in the decades since. These changes have 
globalized the railroad infrastructure of the United States in some important ways, and are the 
subject of this chapter, which traces the container’s ever-growing impact on the railroads from 
the late 1970s up to the present. The effect of containerization on rail has been significant and 
deep, and is evidence of globalization’s power to carry out changes deep within the domestic 
territory, in the basic workings of the nation-state. Yet important as these changes have been, 
they do not constitute a wholesale overhaul. The American railroad network gained its essential 
form and character over a century ago, and is embedded in the history and geography of the 
country. The global infrastructure of container movement, as it functions within U.S. railroads, 
works through this longstanding system for the most part, transforming it in particular ways but 
not completely reshaping it. After all, the existing system possesses the spatial and material 
inertia characteristic of physical infrastructures, and to alter it is consequently very hard. This 
means new global flows are more likely to move through the infrastructure already in place, 
especially since the container is designed to do precisely that. But where the inertia of materiality 
has been overcome and changes have taken place, such alterations reveal the power of 
containerization and globalization. American railroads have, in some ways at least, been 
significantly changed by containerization since the 1980s. 
U.S. railroad companies have seen their fortunes greatly improve since the dark days of the 
late 1960s and ‘70s. The rebound began in the 1980s, about the same time the container was 
becoming a substantial part of rail operations. This is not entirely coincidental, though it should 
be emphasized that many factors have contributed to rail’s success over the past few decades. 
The lines have been able to streamline and modernize their operations, helped by government 
deregulation (in particular the Staggers Act of 1980) and a series of mergers and buyouts in the 
industry. Growing congestion on the nation’s highways, along with shortages of qualified truck 
drivers, have also been a factor shifting freight to the rails, and rising gas prices and an enhanced 
environmental awareness have been an even more powerful impetus recently. The current 
railroad renaissance extends to passenger rail as well, for Amtrak is carrying more passengers 
than ever. But in the 1970s all this was far in the future, and the outlook was bleak; the industry’s 
hesitant embrace of containerization in this decade was taking place amidst a backdrop of great 
concern and uncertainty. 
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It was evident that railcars better customized for the container were needed. As described in 
chapter 5, a few railcars designed to carry containers and/or trailers had been introduced in the 
late 1960s and ‘70s, to modest success. A bolder idea also emerged in the 1960s, but had not been 
implemented: the double-stack railcar that would carry containers two-high. To make such a 
concept workable it is necessary to hold the bottom container as low as possible, so the top 
container can fit within clearances. (Because the bottom container is held so far down, double-
stack railcars are sometimes known as “well cars.”) The wheels cannot possibly fit in the minute 
space below the bottom container, and hence are placed farther forward and back, with the 
container resting between them. All in all, the double-stack car was a very different sort of design 
for a railcar. Malcom McLean proposed the idea to the unreceptive railroads in 1966 (as noted in 
chapter 5). Even in the early 1960s, according to the recollections of one former Sea-Land 
manager, McLean was already advocating for double-stack cars to move in unit trains.1 He was 
not the only one contemplating stacking containers on railcars at the time. The Rail-Trailer 
Company considered the idea, and the consulting firm A.T. Kearney came up with a somewhat 
eccentric proposal for a very large railcar that could hold stacked containers of a variety of sizes 
(20’, 24’, 35’ and 40’ lengths) and in several configurations. North of the border, the Canadian 
Pacific Railway introduced and tested its own design for a double-stack railcar, and slightly later 
in the early 1970s the Canadian National Railway did likewise.2 None of these concepts panned 
out, however. 
During the 1970s McLean sought to persuade the Southern Pacific Railroad, to which Sea-
Land was supplying large quantities of containers for minibridge routes from Southern 
California to the Gulf Coast, to create a double-stack car. Told that stacking containers would 
lead to issues with vertical clearance, McLean wondered how low it would be possible to hold 
the bottom container above the tracks in a railcar. One particular anecdote vividly reveals his 
interest. While at Union Station in Washington D.C. with his family, on their way to an event 
with the President, he noticed some nearby railcars had various equipment hanging down close 
to the rails, and promptly crawled amidst the cars to measure the distance between the rails and 
the lowest equipment. When he arrived at the White House later in the day, the condition of 
McLean’s clothing sadly reflected this little adventure.3 
By the late 1970s McLean was no longer involved in running Sea-Land—he sold the company 
to R.J. Reynolds in 1969 and left the R.J. Reynolds board of directors in 1977. Later he would pull 
out completely by selling his stock for $44.5 million in 1980. But it is possible his enthusiasm for 
                                                 
1 Ron Katims, Interview by Arthur Donovan and Andrew Gibson, Containerization Oral History Collection 
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the double-stack concept at Sea-Land outlived his actual leadership, or perhaps behind the scenes 
he continued to campaign for it. In any case, Sea-Land and Southern Pacific began to strategize 
jointly on a design for a double-stack railcar. As their work progressed, American Car & 
Foundry, a firm that actually built railcars, was brought on board to construct a prototype. Since 
stacking containers inevitably made for a very different and novel type of railcar, the design 
involved several innovative elements, and the high center of gravity was a source of particular 
concern. The prototype appeared in 1977 and was tested successfully, but by this time Southern 
Pacific had decided an articulated car would be more efficient than a single unit car. An 
articulated car is basically one that appears to be several cars, but is actually several units 
comprising one long car. The critical distinction is that the units cannot be separated—the links 
between them allow for pivoting, but cannot be undone—and hence are permanently connected. 
With these connections permanently in place, the wheel components (bogies, in rail terminology) 
can be shared by adjacent units, so only half as many wheels are needed. In addition there is less 
slack action when articulated cars are used in a train, resulting in a smoother ride and less 
damage to cargo. In 1979 a prototype of an articulated three-unit double-stack car arrived. 
Southern Pacific chose to keep tinkering, and in 1981 finally put another design, an articulated 
five-unit double-stack car, into regular use.4 It was a watershed moment for the American 
railroads. 
The obvious advantage of a double-stack car or unit over a normal container-carrying railcar 
is that it holds two containers instead of one. Though some extra length is required for the wheels 
(which as noted earlier cannot be underneath the containers, as is the case with a normal car), the 
result nevertheless is that far more containers can be carried by a train composed of double-stack 
cars. This is significant since freight trains must be within certain maximum lengths because of 
technical factors intrinsic to the trains themselves, and also due to the length of the sidings where 
trains at times must pull aside. (For some freight trains carrying extremely heavy cargo such as 
coal the limiting factor is weight rather than length, but this is not the case with relatively light 
containers.) Railroad companies wish to run as few trains as possible, in order to minimize labor, 
equipment and operational costs, so anything that increases the amount of cargo carried per train 
is embraced. On some busy corridors the maximum possible number of trains moving through is 
reached, making it even more imperative to maximize each train’s capacity. A train of double-
stack cars is also more fuel-efficient (by the measure of fuel consumption per container carried). 
The use of double-stack trains would be very profitable for American railroads; it is often stated 
in the industry that double-stacking makes otherwise marginal service profitable. This may or 
may not be true, for railroads in many countries around the world run trains carrying containers 
not stacked—the clearances in those places preventing double-stacking—and presumably have 
found it economical to do so. But certainly American railroad lines have fallen in love with 
double-stacking and the profits gained from it. 
                                                 
4 Gus Welty, “SP’s Entry for High Intermodal Stakes,” Railway Age, Vol. 178, No. 21 (November 14, 1977), 
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The greatest issue that has confronted double-stacking is vertical clearance. As explained in 
chapter 5, the clearances on rail corridors need not be rigorously standardized in the way some 
other dimensions of rail’s spatial regime—such as the track gauge (i.e., the distance between the 
tracks)—must be. The vertical and horizontal dimensions of a train are known as the loading 
gauge, and while it is obviously necessary that a certain minimum loading gauge be met 
everywhere, many lines have a larger loading gauge. This can be for various reasons, such as the 
policy of the railroad company that built the line, the type of freight and railcars originally seen 
as likely to travel it, the era when it was constructed, and the improvements carried out since. As 
described in chapter 5, at present the minimum loading gauge in North America is known as 
AAR Plate B, which has a height of 15’-1” and width of 10’-8”, in addition to a few more technical 
factors. A typical container being 8’-6” tall, the 15’-1” height of AAR Plate B is obviously 
inadequate for double-stacking. Fortunately most major corridors have a greater clearance than 
this, and in particular the western railroads, built more recently than those in the east, generally 
possess more generous clearances. 
When double-stack railcars entered use in the early 1980s, the clearances on a few major rail 
corridors from the West Coast to the central portion of the nation either were sufficient for the 
new railcars to pass beneath or only required minor modification. This was a key factor in getting 
double-stack operations off the ground. But to go further east was rarely possible. If the global 
infrastructure of containerization was to take the form of double-stacking on American trains, 
then it would run up against certain limitations in the domestic U.S. infrastructure. The two 
spatial regimes, one of the global container, the other of the American rail system, were in 
apparent conflict. It was an ironic situation, for the container was originally designed to fit 
American infrastructure before it was accepted globally, as described in chapter 6. Some of its 
specifications, details and fittings were modified slightly by the ISO, but the basic size, the three 
dimensions of length, width and height, remained constant. Now the container’s dimensions, 
paradoxically, represented an unexpected challenge in American space. It was a problem that 
could be solved, but only through expensive and laborious construction work on many routes to 
raise bridges and enlarge tunnels; in the adoption of the container by American railroads since 
the 1980s, nothing has been more important than the raising of clearances to accommodate 
double-stacking. 
This raising of clearances has been a crucial event in the utilization of the container in 
American infrastructure, as it represents a point at which the domestic infrastructure of the 
nation-state, its spatial regime in particular, is fundamentally changed by the container. The 
original introduction of the container on American railroads was not such an event, because the 
rail system could generally continue in its established fashion, with its standards and procedures 
intact. New railcars to hold the containers were necessary, but these though important were not 
deep changes. As noted in chapter 5, it is more accurate to regard a railcar like this as an interface 
between the global infrastructure of containerization and the existing railroad infrastructure of 
the U.S. nation-state, and as such it allows the more fundamental qualities of the rail 
infrastructure to remain as they are. The raising of clearances made necessary by double-stacking 
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is of a greater level of importance, as it represents an alteration being made to the fundamental 
nature of the railroad system, a key change to its entrenched spatial regime. 
Any such change would be difficult to carry out, and that is especially the case for raising 
clearances, which is expensive and time-consuming, especially on routes with many tunnels. A 
simple change in a dimensional value, of merely a few feet (or even a few inches), has vast 
repercussions. While double-stacking has not caused the minimum loading gauge established for 
North American railroads (AAR Plate B) to change, the expectation increasingly is that any 
freight railroad corridor of significance should accommodate stacktrains. The height of a double-
stack car carrying regular containers (i.e., with an 8’-6” height) is 18’-3”, and the height of a 
double-stack car carrying “high-cube” containers (i.e., with a 9’-6” height) is 20’-3”.5 Since the 
“high-cube” containers are in widespread use—and domestic containers are also 9’-6” high—the 
20’-3” figure has essentially become the vertical dimension for the loading gauge necessary for a 
line to accommodate stacktrain traffic. It should further be noted that while the loading gauge 
represents the maximum allowable dimensions of the train cars, it is the structure gauge that 
gives the actual required minimum dimensions of bridges and tunnels. Generally the structure 
gauge is six inches greater than the loading gauge, and so the necessary vertical clearance for a 
tunnel or bridge on a stacktrain route is usually given as 20’-9”. 
The cooperation between Sea-Land and Southern Pacific—a shipping line and a railroad 
company—would characterize other double-stack innovations, as international and domestic 
freight transportation became increasingly entangled, blurring the once-clear boundaries. With 
rapidly growing quantities of containers entering the country from the export-oriented 
economies of East Asia over the course of the 1980s, the shipping companies were interested in 
moving these containers in bulk by train. It was not a question of a train with a few containers 
here and there, but rather entire trains loaded with nothing but containers. When such a train is 
composed entirely of double-stack railcars, it is termed a stacktrain. Minibridge and microbridge 
(these terms are defined in chapter 5) were more and more the trend, and the West Coast ports 
profited from this. Where previously shipments to the Northeast, Southeast or Midwest had 
usually entered via East Coast or Gulf Coast ports, now shipments from Asia could avoid the 
Panama Canal, simply crossing the Pacific and letting the railroads handle the rest of the trip. (In 
addition, West Coast ports had lower labor costs.) The domestic infrastructure of North America 
was being reconfigured as part of a global infrastructure. International and domestic freight 
movement were gradually becoming enmeshed with each other, as opposed to their traditional 
separation; this was a logical consequence of the container, which could travel on both in its 
journeys and thus linked them together more tightly than ever before. Shipping companies 
started to get involved in what happened on land, rather than giving up responsibility for their 
cargo at the port, while domestic railroads began to think in global terms. 
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Sea-Land was not the only shipping line to perceive the benefits of double-stacking. 
American President Lines (APL) was also emerging as a container innovator in this period. APL 
was a well-established company, with a long history in the Pacific in both passenger and freight 
operations, but the former business had essentially disappeared due to air travel, and the once 
traditional line modernized and brought containerization to its freight business in the 1970s. In 
1977 APL appointed a new and innovative president, W. Bruce Seaton, a man with a background 
in the oil industry. Seaton and a few of APL’s managers perceived the value of using more 
systematic methods, including computers and better information technology, to track and route 
containers. They also began to think about inland connections, for it had become clear it was 
necessary to track and control container movements more effectively not just over the ocean but 
on land. The incompetence of the railroads was quickly evident to Seaton, and their problems 
were reinforced by fierce snowstorms in the Midwest and Northeast during the winter of 1977-
1978 that caused APL containers traveling by rail to be lost for weeks.6 
In 1977 APL hired Donald C. Orris, a manager with a background in the railroad industry 
and experience in its intermodal operations, to help organize rail services. Two years later the 
company introduced its coast-to-coast “LinerTrain,” a service that carried containers on railcars 
between West Coast ports and a terminal at South Kearny, New Jersey. These cars held the 
containers in traditional fashion (i.e., not double-stacked), and sometimes containers were even 
carried on their trailer chassis which rode the train in piggyback fashion. The service functioned 
in effect as a substitute for bringing shipments by water all the way from Asia to East Coast ports. 
As a primarily Pacific carrier, APL chose to save time and expense by using western ports, 
avoiding the Panama Canal and Atlantic Ocean, and having the railroads do the rest through a 
landbridge operation. APL got involved in the railroad business to an unprecedented extent by 
leasing railcars, setting train schedules, and acquiring inland rail terminals. The railroad 
companies were only hired to operate the trains—in other words, to move APL’s railcars over 
specified routes at particular times.7 
The logical next step for APL was to follow the lead of Sea-Land into double-stack 
operations. Along with railcar designers and makers Budd Company and Thrall Car 
Manufacturing Company, and with some involvement from the Union Pacific Railroad, APL 
worked on a slightly different type of double-stack car. Where the car used by Sea-Land and 
Southern Pacific had bulkheads at each end to hold the upper container in place, the new Budd 
Lo-Pac 2000 car relied on the use of interbox connectors (IBCs) to hold the upper container to the 
lower container. This obviated the need for bulkheads, making the car much lighter. As with the 
Sea-Land design, it was constructed as an articulated five-unit car. Once again it was APL that 
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acquired the railcars and provided them to the railroad companies.8 In 1984 APL started using 
the cars in regularly scheduled stacktrains running between the West Coast and Chicago, an 
operation that soon became coast-to-coast when it was extended to northern New Jersey. Rail 
yards in Chicago, in particular the Chicago and North Western Railway’s Wood Street rail yard 
(soon to become the Global I terminal, as described in chapter 9), functioned as key hubs for the 
stacktrains’ movement. Clearances though were an issue, especially to the east. As will be 
discussed later in this chapter, a little-used corridor in upstate New York with sufficient clearance 
provided a route for stacktrains to reach northern New Jersey. But rail corridors in most of the 
East simply lacked the necessary clearances (a situation that would gradually change, as will be 
described), and so it was necessary for containers headed to other eastern destinations to be 
removed from stacktrains at Chicago and placed on trains in a single-stack configuration. Even in 
Chicago itself, one low clearance blocked the most direct path from west of the city to the Wood 
Street yard, necessitating use of a secondary route that added three hours to the trip.9 
Stacktrains caught on quickly and enjoyed remarkable success, bringing traffic and profits to 
the railroad industry, which was beginning to come back after falling to its deepest lows during 
the 1970s. Thanks to both stacktrains and trains carrying containers one-high on more typical 
flatcars, container movement grew rapidly, leading the trade journal Railway Age to point out in 
1985 that “containerization is no longer just an offshoot of TOFC [piggyback].”10 Sea-Land soon 
extended its service all the way to the East Coast, running stacktrains to Little Ferry, New Jersey. 
By 1987 APL was running routes to and from Seattle-Tacoma, Oakland, Los Angeles-Long Beach, 
Chicago, South Kearny, New Orleans, Memphis and Atlanta, with 32 round-trip stacktrains per 
week. As of the same year, in fact, twelve shipping companies had stacktrains running over the 
American railroad network.11 An early drawback was that these containers had little or no cargo 
to carry on their return trips back to Asia, as the international traffic was imbalanced in favor of 
Asian imports, and so the stacktrains typically ran empty from east to west. As described in 
greater detail in chapter 11, APL and some others began to solve this in the 1980s by using the 
containers to haul domestic traffic westward across the U.S. for low rates. The distinction 
between global and domestic movement was further blurred, as the containers carried one type 
of freight in one direction and the other type in the opposite direction. 
Various designs for double-stack railcars have been utilized over the years, including a few 
that use the bulkhead approach and some that are single-unit cars. In addition, some ordinary 
(i.e., not double-stack) railcars capable of carrying both containers and trailers have been 
introduced—these are an updated version of the “all-purpose” flatcars described in chapter 5, but 
are lighter and usually in articulated multi-unit form. But the dominant method of transporting 
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containers on American trains has followed the template of the Lo-Pac 2000 introduced by APL: a 
double-stack articulated railcar (usually of three or five units) optimized to be as light as possible, 
and using IBCs rather than bulkheads to hold the upper container in place. Aside from the 
savings in weight, another advantage of doing without bulkheads is that a longer container can 
be carried above. Since 45’-long containers were eventually introduced for international use, and 
more recently domestic containers (i.e., for the U.S. and Canada only) of 48’ and 53’ lengths have 
become common, the ability to carry such larger containers is valuable. In fact many of the 
current double-stack railcars are longer than earlier designs, and can hold containers up to 53’ 




Figure 7.1: Unit of an articulated double-stack railcar 
 
Source: Brian Solomon, Intermodal Railroading (St. Paul, MN: Voyageur Press [MBI Publishing], 2007), p. 119 
 
Double-stacking was benefiting the railroads, but it was generally the shipping companies 
that initiated and organized stacktrain operations, even though the railroads ran them. One could 
attribute this to the well-known caution of the railroads, but by the late 1980s the rail industry, 
given more flexibility by deregulation and strengthened by consolidation, was somewhat more 
innovative. Perhaps the relevant factor was that the shipping lines actually provided the 
container cargo, and furthermore had an orientation that was inherently more global as they 
spanned oceans and tied together different countries. However, there was one notable exception, 
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a case where a railroad tried to make the jump from domestic to global freight operations. In 1986 
the CSX Railroad bought out Sea-Land (which R.J. Reynolds had spun off in 1984), with the 
objective of gaining the benefits of controlling multiple transportation companies working in 
different modes. 
CSX had been pursuing a more integrated intermodal approach within the domestic scale for 
some time, its ambitions made possible by a 1982 decision of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) to no longer block railroads from owning trucking and shipping companies. 
At about the same time CSX created a trucking subsidiary, Chessie Motor Express.12 In 1984 CSX 
completed the purchase of American Commercial Lines, one of the largest operators of barges on 
the nation’s inland waterways; as with Chessie Motor Express, the addition of the barge carrier 
helped the railroad extend its network of freight movement and become more versatile. Once 
again the ICC played a key part, allowing the merger in a hotly contested decision.13 With the 
1986 acquisition of Sea-Land as well, the possibilities for synergy were evident for CSX: 
…with a new corporate emphasis that CSX planned to place on “seamless” 
intermodal transport, it would be possible—at least in theory—for a container of 
export merchandise that originated, say, in an industrial park outside Toledo, 
Ohio, to travel from there to a local railyard on a highway chassis, west to Saint 
Louis aboard a CSX freight train, down the Mississippi River from Saint Louis to 
the port of New Orleans under the care of an American Commercial barge, and 
at New Orleans be hoisted aboard a Sea-Land container ship bound for 
Rotterdam. Ohio to Holland—aboard four different modes of transport—and all 
of them part of the CSX family.14 
Such ambitions were remarkable—somewhat reminiscent of Canadian Pacific’s transnational 
container system of the 1970s (described in chapter 5), but on a grander scale. The failure of this 
vision to materialize profitably may have been due to CSX’s reluctance to properly invest in Sea-
Land, which it eventually sold to the giant Danish shipping company Maersk in 1999. (American 
Commercial Lines was spun off as an independent company in 1998.) The railroad valued 
continuous profits, and the economics of ocean shipping proved too turbulent for its corporate 
culture. Furthermore CSX was soon engaged in an expensive acquisition of a chunk of Conrail, 
and then faced the challenge of integrating Conrail’s operations into its own.15 But while CSX 
may have been affected by its own particular circumstances, it is notable that there have been 
hardly any successful attempts to tie together infrastructures through direct control across 
various modes and/or nations for the purpose of moving containers more efficiently. The 
tendency rather has been for each provider of transportation to maintain at least a nominal 
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independence, as it specializes in what it does best. The overall coordination of a worldwide 
container trip is typically carried out by the ocean shipping company, by a third-party forwarder 
or logistics specialist, or by the actual corporation whose goods are being moved. With the rise of 
Just-In-Time manufacturing and retailing the latter option has become especially common; 
companies like Walmart and Toyota innovated by controlling and monitoring their supply chains 
with great care in the 1990s, and other corporations now make similar efforts. But the actual 
provision of transportation is usually left to those based in that business. 
In the development of rail containerization since the 1980s the creation of large mechanized 
terminals, where containers are transferred between train and truck, has arguably been as 
important as the changes to rail operations. These intermodal terminals, with their cranes and 
other assorted machines for moving containers about and transferring them, play a key role in 
the national container network. Since intermodal transportation depends on multiple transport 
modes and efficient connections between them, it is necessary to have many such terminals, 
operating efficiently and easily accessible, throughout the domestic network. The number of 
mechanized terminals began to grow in the 1970s; one motive for this rise in mechanization was 
the desire to transfer trailers more quickly, rather than with the slow circus loading process, but 
the possibility of loading containers on railcars was also a major consideration. Over time the 
industry concentrated its intermodal transfers into fewer terminals, which grew larger and 
became mechanized, while abandoning many smaller circus loading facilities. Efficiency was 
better served by running trains long distances from point to point without halting, rather than 
stopping frequently to add or remove a few trailers or containers. This trend continued in the 
1980s, paralleling that decade’s growth in stacktrain traffic. Chapter 9 will examine the 
development and history of these intermodal terminals, especially the massive facilities built 
recently. 
With the dramatic increase in global container traffic on U.S. railroads, it bothers some people 
in transportation policy that the overall rail network does not appear well suited for the new 
routes of the cargo moving upon it. (This concern is in addition to more ordinary worries about 
efficiency, capacity, etc.) A trope that recurs in writings and discussions about American 
railroads, especially in relation to their role in global container traffic, is the apparent difficulty of 
a nineteenth century network trying to cope with contemporary twenty-first century commerce. 
The American rail system was designed primarily for domestic routes and services, in an era of 
national territorial expansion and then unity, and now must handle very different and more 
globalized circumstances. Admittedly there are strains that result. Some corridors, especially 
those carrying containers of Asian imports from West Coast ports to the central and eastern 
regions of the nation, are congested. Particular bottlenecks and obstacles have also emerged. 
Some of the most obvious are at the rail connections to ports, and at major hubs like Chicago and 
Kansas City; particular examples (and the work done to fix them) will be discussed later in this 
chapter. Yet by and large the railroad network continues to move containers reasonably well. So 
while these concerns are justified to some degree, they fail to account for the reality that novel 
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Figure 7.2: Example of clearance-raising work in a tunnel 
 
Source: James N. Carter, Jr. [Chief Engineer Bridges and Structures, Norfolk Southern Railway] “Heartland Corridor 
Clearance Improvement Project,” p. 15 (http://www.arema.org/files/library/2010_Conference_Proceedings/ 
Heartland_Corridor_Clearance_Improvement_Project.pdf, accessed 2/8/12) 
 
When Southern Pacific began running stacktrains in coordination with Sea-Land in the early 
1980s, the railroad acted quickly to enlarge clearances on its Sunset Route, a key line running 
from Los Angeles through the Southwest and on to Texas, Louisiana and the Gulf Coast. This 
historic corridor had originally been a key part of the second transcontinental railroad, completed 
in 1881 (and made possible by the Gadsden Purchase of land from Mexico). With few tunnels 
along it, the Sunset Route was not especially difficult to upgrade. In the mid-1980s Union Pacific 
adjusted clearances on some major routes to and from the Los Angeles area, the San Francisco 
Bay area, and the Pacific Northwest. The most challenging of these was a corridor with numerous 
tunnels going through the Feather River Canyon. This route connects Oakland to Salt Lake City 
through the Sierra Nevada mountains, and was acquired by Union Pacific through its purchase 
of the Western Pacific Railroad in 1983. The cost of raising the clearances on the Feather River 
Canyon route was jointly covered by Union Pacific, APL and the Port of Oakland, which gives a 
good indication of the multiple actors who stood to benefit. In the mid-1990s the Atchison, 
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Topeka and Santa Fe Railway (the “Santa Fe”) raised clearances on its route through the 
Tehachapi Mountains of Southern California.16 
It took longer in general for clearances to be raised in the East. The journey from Chicago to 
New York City is of obvious importance, and there have long been two principal railroad routes 
between the two cities. The “Water Level Route,” once under the New York Central Railroad, 
passes through upstate New York paralleling the Erie Canal and then cuts through Cleveland 
and Toledo, moving largely on level terrain and often alongside some body of water (hence its 
name). The other route, under the control of the Pennsylvania Railroad in its glory days, goes 
through Philadelphia, across the hills and mountains of southern Pennsylvania to Pittsburgh, and 
then through northern Ohio and Indiana; this is a slightly shorter route but a more 
topographically challenging one, highlighted by the famous Horseshoe Curve at Altoona, 
Pennsylvania. Both these corridors possess a long and prominent history. The Water Level Route, 
in the days of the New York Central, had the celebrated 20th Century Limited and Lake Shore 
Limited trains running upon it. The former during its peak was the last word in prestige and 
luxury (and incidentally the setting for the train scenes in Alfred Hitchcock’s North by Northwest). 
Likewise the Pennsylvania Railroad ran the prestigious Broadway Limited upon its route. Freight 
had also moved in great quantities through each route. But for railroad companies in the 1980s, 
more concerned with the present than the past, the problem with both corridors was that their 
clearances did not allow stacktrains. 
In the mid-1980s the Consolidated Rail Corporation—widely known as Conrail—raised the 
clearances between Chicago and Buffalo on the Water Level Route. (Conrail was the government-
run railroad that in 1976 took over several bankrupt Northeastern and Midwestern lines.) This 
still left the Water Level Route with clearance issues from Buffalo to New York, but there was 
another option: the line of the former Erie Railroad, which had been built with a higher clearance 
back in the early and middle decades of the 1800s.17 (This line was also originally built with a 
track gauge of 6’, as opposed to the standard 4’-8½”, but that was later changed.) This route also 
runs through upstate New York but on a pathway south of the Water Level Route through the 
region commonly termed the “Southern Tier.” It had long been less important than the Water 
Level Route, but now, with a minor difference in clearance dimensions suddenly critical, it 
gained an unexpected significance. At the time the line was split between the Delaware and 
Hudson Railway and the New York, Susquehanna and Western Railway (known as the 
“Susquehanna,” or more informally the “Susie Q”). In 1985 Sea-Land and APL began working 
with the two railroads to move stacktrains over the former Erie line between Buffalo and an 
intermodal terminal at Little Ferry, New Jersey (close to Newark), with the Delaware and 
Hudson making the haul between Buffalo and Binghamton and the Susquehanna handling the 
                                                 
16 Solomon, Intermodal Railroading, p. 173; David R. McKenzie, Mark C. North, and Daniel S. Smith, 
Intermodal Transportation—The Whole Story (Omaha, NE: Simmons-Boardman Books, 1989), p. 25. 
17 Solomon, Intermodal Railroading, p. 173. 
 155 
leg between Binghamton and Little Ferry.18 Thus the New York City area was tied into the 
burgeoning national stacktrain network, and better connected to the worldwide system of 
container movement, all thanks to an obscure engineering decision made in the 1800s. By 1989 
clearance improvements were completed by Conrail on the Water Level Route, and most 
container traffic returned to this traditionally more important line. Clearances were also raised on 
the corridor towards Boston—a continuation of the Water Level Route that runs east from 
Albany, rather than south—allowing stacktrains to get all the way to Worcester, Massachusetts.19 
It was inevitable the former Pennsylvania Railroad line through southern Pennsylvania 
would eventually receive similar treatment. A particular impetus for this was the desire to revive 
the fortunes of the port of Philadelphia, whose container traffic was disappointingly low. There 
were various reasons for the downturn in the port’s business, but the lack of access for stacktrains 
was becoming an issue. Thus the state government, various local governments, and the port itself 
came together with Conrail to jointly fund clearance enhancements that were completed in 1995. 
With many tunnels involved in the mountainous terrain, it was an expensive corridor to alter. 
The impact of the improvements was far-reaching, providing better connections not merely to 
Philadelphia’s port, but also those of Newark, Baltimore, Wilmington and Hampton Roads, and 
furthermore improving the rail links of Pittsburgh and Harrisburg.20 
In the midst of such efforts to orient the railroads to carry containers on their global 
pathways, there was also an impetus to better connect with both Canada and Mexico in the wake 
of the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This type of traffic is also 
international but can be regarded as regional rather than truly global, and consists of many 
different types of freight only some of which moves by container. With the burgeoning trade 
generated by NAFTA in mind, the Kansas City Southern Railway, bidding together with 
Transportation Maritima Mexico, gained the Ferrocarril de Noreste in 1996, thus achieving 
possession of several key lines in Mexico. Having alliances already with the I&M Rail Link in the 
Midwest, and Canadian Pacific in Canada, the Kansas City Southern’s reach now spanned all 
three nations.21 The company “billed itself as the NAFTA Line and…began dreaming of through 
Mexico City-Montreal intermodals [container or piggyback trains].”22 Meanwhile in 1997 the 
Canadian National Railway acquired the Illinois Central Railroad, giving it possession of an 
extensive north-south network of lines reaching all the way to New Orleans to complement its 
                                                 
18 Cudahy, Box Boats, pp. 166-167; Stephen B. Goddard, Getting There: The Epic Struggle Between Road and Rail 
in the American Century (New York: BasicBooks [HarperCollins Publishers], 1994), pp. 240-241; Solomon, 
Intermodal Railroading, pp. 87-88, 173. It is unclear which shipping line was the first to send stacktrains on the 
former Erie line, as Cudahy and Goddard identify Sea-Land and Solomon identifies APL. 
19 Solomon, Intermodal Railroading, pp. 87, 173. 
20 National Cooperative Highway Research Program (Transportation Research Board), Rail Freight Solutions 
to Roadway Congestion—Final Report and Guidebook [NCHRP Report 586] (Washington, D.C.: Transportation 
Research Board, 2007), pp. 27-31. 
21 Richard Saunders, Jr., Main Lines: Rebirth of the North American Railroads, 1970-2002 (DeKalb, IL: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 2003), pp. 316-318. 
22 Ibid., p. 318. 
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Canadian system. In 1998 the Kansas City Southern switched Canadian allies, going from 
Canadian Pacific to Canadian National.23 
Today the Mexican portion of the Kansas City Southern network is run by the Kansas City 
Southern de Mexico, part of the Kansas City Southern’s corporate family. (The share of 
Transportation Maritima Mexico was bought out in 2005.) The Kansas City Southern also has 
good links on the U.S. side near the border, and in 2009 rebuilt the old “Macaroni Line” (which 
had been abandoned, with most of its track gone) in Texas to improve its network. Owning the 
Texas-Mexican Railway International Bridge at Laredo gives the Kansas City Southern an 
important rail link to Mexico at the border. Some stacktrains hauling domestic containers move 
on the Kansas City Southern lines in both the U.S. and Mexico, going back and forth between the 
countries.24 Similar developments have occurred along the U.S.-Canada border. In 1995 a new rail 
tunnel large enough for stacktrains was built between Port Huron, Michigan, and Sarnia, 
Ontario, under the St. Clair River. Currently proposals are being advanced for the construction of 
a similar tunnel beneath the Detroit River to allow stacktrains to travel between Detroit and 
Windsor, Ontario, as the existing rail tunnel lacks adequate clearance and would be difficult to 
enlarge.25 (The idea seems unlikely to be realized in the foreseeable future, though.) 
In recent years the process of raising U.S. railroad clearances has continued. Southern 
Pacific’s line through the Donner Pass of Northern California, connecting the San Francisco Bay 
area with Nevada, was able to accommodate stacktrains with normal-height containers, but not 
high-cube 9’-6” high containers or domestic containers.26 Union Pacific, having bought out 
Southern Pacific in 1996, finally raised the Donner Pass clearances in 2009. In this project fifteen 
tunnels were raised, involving about three and a half miles of notching, and two tunnels had 
their floors lowered (which also involves removing and rebuilding track). Various other technical 
improvements were also carried out, such as upgrading to CTC (centralized traffic control), but 
the clearance work was the main thrust of the project.27 The Donner Pass has a particularly 
prominent historical legacy. It played a major role in the nation’s westward expansion into 
California as a route for settlers to pass through, including the notorious party of 1846-1847 that 
was stranded in brutal winter storms and apparently resorted to cannibalism. Trains came 
through the pass in 1868, as the first transcontinental railroad was built at tremendous effort. 
Later the road through the pass was made part of the Lincoln Highway—it remains today as 
                                                 
23 Ibid., pp. 318, 338-340. 
24 Wikipedia, “Kansas City Southern Railway.” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kansas_City_Southern, 
accessed 7/2/11); John R. Stilgoe, Train Time: Railroads and the Imminent Reshaping of the United States 
Landscape (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2007), pp. 156-158; Nate Muhlethaler, “Mexican 
Railroads: Photographic Profiles of Mexican Rail Lines and Operations.” 
(http://mexicanrailroads.blogspot.com/2008/08/kcs-de-mexico-south-from-laredo.html, accessed 7/2/11). 
25 Continental Rail Gateway website, “It’s Time to Build the High-Clearance Replacement Rail Tunnel at the 
Detroit/Windsor Crossing.” (http://crgateway.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=w75XuM2hbig%3d&tabid=74, 
accessed 7/2/11). 
26 Solomon, Intermodal Railroading, p. 173. 
27 Railway Age, “Doublestacks on Donner Pass,” November 24, 2009; Solomon, Intermodal Railroading, p. 173. 
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Route 40—and in the 1960s Interstate 80 was built near the pass.28 The global containers passing 




Figure 7.3: A stacktrain 
 
Source: Brian Solomon, Intermodal Railroading (St. Paul, MN: Voyageur Press [MBI Publishing], 2007), p. 88 
 
Despite the example of the Donner Pass, the bulk of the clearance-raising projects over the 
past decade have been in the East. A recent trend towards greater use of East Coast ports 
(especially in the Southeast) has helped fuel this, but the main cause is simply the challenge of 
lower clearances on the older, eastern lines. A prominent example is the “Heartland Corridor” 
project, a partnership between the Norfolk Southern Railway and a variety of government bodies 
that was completed in 2010. The intent of the Heartland Corridor was essentially to raise 
clearances on a Norfolk Southern corridor between the port of Hampton Roads (i.e., the Norfolk 
area) in Virginia and Columbus, Ohio. The primary focus of the work was in the mountains of 
West Virginia, where many tunnels had to be enlarged. (The route runs through Virginia, West 
Virginia, a small sliver of Kentucky, and Ohio.) Originally built in the late 1800s, the route 
historically was used primarily for coal traffic from the mines, which it still carries to some 
extent. Before the clearance work it had also moved containers carried one level high, but most of 
the containers moving from Virginia’s ports into the Midwest had been routed on a longer path, 
accessible to stacktrains, that led through Pennsylvania. The Heartland Corridor cost more than 
$320 million, including a $69-million intermodal terminal in Columbus. Funding came through a 
                                                 
28 Wikipedia, “Donner Pass.” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donner_Pass, accessed 7/4/11). 
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combination of federal and state funds, along with money from Norfolk Southern, leading to 
some criticism of the idea of public money going to improve the infrastructure of a private 
company. The company’s counter-argument was that the project benefited the economies of the 
three states (Virginia, West Virginia and Ohio), and that furthermore the trucking industry 
essentially gets its road infrastructure provided for free by the government. The work involved 
raising clearances on 28 tunnels, as well as raising 24 other obstructions such as bridges. The 
tunnel work extended over about five and a half miles of track, including notching arched roofs, 
excavating roofs, and lowering tracks. In one case a tunnel had its top removed completely, a 
solution known as “daylighting.”29 
The Heartland Corridor is clearly oriented to global trade, and now serves primarily to 
accommodate the movement of containers on global trajectories. It is revealing that so much of 
the new investment in American rail infrastructure actively seeks to funnel goods into and out of 
the country, rather than promoting connectivity within the nation. (It presumably will have the 
latter effect also, but only incidentally.) Seen in this light, the branding of the project as the 
Heartland Corridor seems cynical if not downright deceptive; such a name with its overtones of 
patriotism and domestic geographic space implies an effort at national unity that is contrary to 
the project’s actual purpose. Here as elsewhere, the space of the U.S. nation-state has been made 
more porous and opened up to a globalized world. This enhanced transnational access is seen by 
some as a positive; an article in USA Today about the Heartland Corridor explains earnestly that 
“it will give poor mountainous areas in West Virginia a chance to enter the global marketplace.”30 
The reality is likely to be more ambiguous, for stacktrains may help West Virginia slightly but in 
general will simply pass through. Ironically, much of the coal that once traveled on the route was 
sent to the port of Hampton Roads for export, so the corridor’s new orientation to 
containerization is reminiscent of the global nature of its older purpose, though the direction is 
reversed. 
A similarly ambitious enterprise, complete with its own catchy title of the “National 
Gateway,” was initiated in 2008 by CSX, the major rival of Norfolk Southern in the east. 
Currently in progress, the National Gateway will be a route similar to what Norfolk Southern 
accomplished with the Heartland Corridor, one that brings stacktrains from certain ports of the 
Southeast and Mid-Atlantic to the Midwest. Its pathway though is slightly more northern than 
the Heartland Corridor, traversing the Appalachians for the most part in western Pennsylvania 
rather than West Virginia. In addition the National Gateway involves substantial work in the 
region of Baltimore and Washington, D.C., and extends south into Virginia and North Carolina. 
The project’s total estimated cost is $850 million, which also includes the construction of a few 
                                                 
29 John D. Boyd, “If You Build it… Stacking Up Hopes in the Heartland,” The Journal of Commerce, September 
6, 2010; Norfolk Southern Corporation, “‘New Thinking, New Resolve, and New Optimism’ Characterize 
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30 Cauchon, “Rail Project Goes Through the Roof.” 
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new intermodal terminals. Not surprisingly, CSX has pushed for government subsidies to help 
pay for some of the clearance work. There are 61 clearances along the National Gateway’s lines, 
in the states of Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Maryland and Virginia, and also in 
Washington D.C., that need to be raised for stacktrains to pass beneath them. The most notable is 
Washington, D.C.’s Virginia Avenue Tunnel, which for a price of $160 million is being made both 
higher and wider so that it goes from single-track to double-track in addition to accommodating 
stacktrains. Construction work on the tunnel is impacting several neighborhoods in Washington, 
D.C., and has aroused some controversy there—another reminder of how the global and local are 
intertwined.31 
Projects like the Heartland Corridor and National Gateway are promoted to an extent far 
beyond a typical railroad improvement project—even their catchy and vaguely patriotic names, 
clearly an exercise in branding, attest to this. With a growing awareness of environmental issues 
and traffic congestion, and the use of rail being seen (quite correctly, in fact) as an approach that 
can lessen both problems, the railroad companies perceive the benefit of promoting their 
activities. Probably the most crucial factor, though, is their desire to get assistance with funding 
from the government. For this purpose presumably a certain amount of promotion and branding 
is worthwhile, both to persuade the general public and hard-headed politicians and 
bureaucrats.32 Predictably, supporters view the resulting projects as models of public-private 
partnership, while critics argue they are the recipients of needless subsidies. 
The alterations of clearances have been the most difficult and expensive of the improvements 
made by the railroad lines for their growing container traffic, especially inasmuch as these 
corridors extend for hundreds or even thousands of miles. But there have also been projects to 
resolve particular traffic bottlenecks that do not involve much distance but are challenging 
nonetheless. A noteworthy example is the Sheffield Flyover in Kansas City. Second only to 
Chicago in its rail traffic, Kansas City is a large hub and connection point for several major lines. 
A crossover of a few busy lines on the east side of the city was regarded as the nation’s third-
busiest rail intersection in the 1990s, due to activity from the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe 
Railway (BNSF), the Kansas City Southern, Union Pacific, and numerous local trains. All told 
about 200 trains were passing through daily, including many stacktrains carrying containers as 
the BNSF tracks are on a major route from Los Angeles to Chicago. Delays were frequent and 
consequently rail grade crossings on the local street network were often blocked by stopped 
trains. Pollution was also an issue. On top of these motivating factors, the city wanted to maintain 
its importance on the nationwide railroad network rather than see trains rerouted elsewhere. The 
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result was the Sheffield Flyover, a project to carry trains on one line raised in the air, above the 
other lines on the ground. The flyover actually consists of three separate bridges, the largest 
being 6,740 feet long while the other two are 890 feet long and 150 feet long. Completed in 2000 at 
a cost of $75 million, it necessitated a complex financing structure in which government bodies 
(mainly the Missouri state government) were extensively involved but the expense was mostly 
borne by the railroads.33 
The most pressing bottlenecks in the nation’s rail system, it is widely acknowledged, are at 
the great heart of the network—Chicago, which remains the premier hub for North American 
railroading and consequently a site of frustrating delays. A common lament is that sometimes it 
takes as long for a train to go from the West Coast to the periphery of the Chicago area as it does 
to get from there to its final destination in the city (or to the other side of the city). Anecdotes 
abound, for instance of the train carrying sulphur that took 27 hours to move across the city, 
moving at an average speed of 1.13 miles per hour. At some points a train engineer must walk 
back the entire length of a train (some freight trains, especially those carrying containers, can be 
over a mile long) to manually operate a switch, and then return to the cabin.34 It seems 
astonishing rail companies tolerate such problems, but they have little choice. As described in 
chapter 5, Chicago’s status as the crossroads of American rail is embedded in the history of its 
growth and the development of the nation’s rail system. The corporate geography of the railroad 
industry also centers on the city, as the six largest North American railroads serve Chicago: 
BNSF, Union Pacific, CSX, Norfolk Southern, Canadian National and Canadian Pacific. Indeed, it 
has long been a key junction point between western and eastern railroad lines. With new 
intermodal terminals being built on giant exurban sites (mainly to have sufficient space for their 
large-scale operations, but also to avoid the traffic of the city), the role of the city proper may be 
diminishing but the larger metropolitan area remains as vital as ever. 
Nevertheless the region’s congestion does provide a motive for railroads to consider 
bypassing it, as appears to be the intent of CSX’s new intermodal terminal at North Baltimore in 
northwest Ohio, for instance. The Chicago Region Environmental and Transportation Efficiency 
program, known by its acronym CREATE and jointly run by the rail companies and various 
governmental agencies, was founded in 2004 in an effort to help maintain the area’s centrality. It 
focuses on the city and nearby suburbs, which have a large number of important intermodal 
terminals and rail yards that are likely to remain significant. CREATE seeks to improve five 
major corridors, including creating road-rail separation at congested grade crossings, building 
flyovers for troublesome rail-rail intersections, and making improvements to tracks and 
signaling. One of CREATE’s most significant ongoing projects is the $140 million Englewood 
Flyover, which addresses a bottleneck where a confluence of freight trains, commuter trains and 
                                                 
33 National Cooperative Highway Research Program, Rail Freight Solutions to Roadway Congestion, pp. 42-45. 
34 John Schwartz, “Freight Train Late? Blame Chicago,” New York Times, May 7, 2012. 
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Amtrak trains causes delays.35 As with the previous examples, CREATE is especially interesting 
because it implicates various scales. There is the global traffic of containers, but there are also 
domestic containers as well as other types of domestic rail freight, in addition to passenger trains. 
The elimination of grade crossings would help local automobile traffic in specific neighborhoods, 
and some of the rail improvements would allow the city’s METRA commuter rail trains to move 
more easily. 
A bottleneck in the U.S. railroad network’s link to global shipping has long been the 
connections at ports. The rise of container shipping brought about a new era for ports, putting an 
emphasis on better connections to the domestic infrastructure. Many of the major ports before 
containerization were bounded in confined urban locations and had surprisingly cumbersome 
transport links—the docks of Manhattan being the quintessential example. With the sheer growth 
in cargo brought about by the container, as well as the emphasis on quick transfers between 
transport modes that the container encourages, many ports shifted to more exurban locations. 
The port of New York essentially moved to Newark, the port of San Francisco went to Oakland, 
and similar shifts happened elsewhere. Infrastructural connections were crucial in these 
decisions; where getting trucks and trains in and out of Manhattan had long been a nightmare, 
Newark was conveniently adjacent to the New Jersey Turnpike and also had good rail 
connections. Likewise Oakland possessed much better transport links than congested San 
Francisco, isolated on its peninsula. With the rise of stacktrains in the 1980s and ‘90s many ports 
and railroad carriers worked to make these links even better, and to bring rail service as near the 
docks as possible so containers could be swiftly moved between ship and train. (While it is 
generally impractical to transfer containers directly from ship to train, or vice-versa, it is desirable 
to bring the trains close, preferably within the port complex.) Newark is an example, as its 
existing links have been greatly improved. Its $600 million ExpressRail project (which also 
connects with the Howland Hook terminal on Staten Island), begun in the early 1990s and 
constantly continued since, has extended numerous tracks directly into the port itself, in addition 
to improving rail links at the nearby intermodal terminals.36 
The railroad connections for the adjacent ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach represented a 
particularly nasty bottleneck by the 1990s. A few rail corridors ran from the ports northward to 
downtown L.A., where they connected to the key lines leading to the rest of the country, 
primarily eastwards. These routes between the ports and downtown were problematic because of 
their numerous at-grade crossings, resulting in slow train speeds, great inconvenience for local 
communities, and excessive noise and pollution. Furthermore their capacity was limited and so 
many containers were being drayed (i.e., carried by local truckers) from the ports to various 
railheads in the downtown area and further afield, resulting in highway traffic and pollution. 
While the trains and trucks were carrying global freight coming from (or bound for) faraway 
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destinations, the problems they caused for the neighborhoods they passed through were certainly 
local in nature. In addition to the pressure from those communities, the ports had their own 
incentive to make changes, as ports are judged by their customers not merely on the basis of their 
internal operations but also the quality of their inland connections. It was therefore in the interest 
of many actors—corporate, institutional and political—to improve the situation.37 
The Alameda Corridor was the result. Again, it is an example of different scales—the global, 
national, regional and local—becoming intertwined. About 20 years in planning and 
development, and 3 years in construction, the Alameda Corridor was completed in 2002 at an 
estimated cost of $2.4 billion. It is a consolidation of the disparate previous lines into one main 
route, which generally goes along the same corridor as a former Southern Pacific line, running a 
distance of 20 miles. Its most notable feature is a giant trench 33’ deep and 50’ wide, triple-
tracked for its entire length and about ten miles long. The trench passes under surface roads and 
hence approximately 200 grade crossings were eliminated, a very substantial benefit for local 
traffic. The corridor has a capacity of up to 100 trains a day (though it typically carries fewer), 
and BNSF and Union Pacific use it by joint arrangement. The cost of the project was covered 
entirely by an assemblage of governmental entities, and in theory the debt will be repaid by the 
user fees paid by the railroad companies, though this arrangement has run into problems.38 The 
success of the Alameda Corridor—on a functional level, if not financially—has led to a related 
project, the Alameda Corridor East, currently in its early stages. This will upgrade the Union 
Pacific rail corridors running east from downtown L.A. and eliminate many at-grade crossings, 
for an estimated cost of about one billion dollars. Similar plans have been tentatively advanced 
for the BNSF line that also runs east from downtown, known as the Orangethorpe Corridor.39 
The high clearances that now exist through so much of the American railroad system, caused 
by the desire to use double-stack cars, created the opportunity to introduce other types of new 
railcars of a similar height. This is a key shift, as the alterations wrought upon the infrastructure 
by globalization bring about deeper changes in the workings of the purely domestic aspects of 
that infrastructure. The raising of clearances in the first place was a crucial change to 
accommodate containerization, but the new designs for railcars would seem to be an additional 
step, as the global spatial regime remolds that of the nation-state in greater detail. (Some of these 
high new railcars have in turn provided an additional impetus for the raising of clearances, 
incidentally, though the desire to allow double-stack cars is invariably the primary motivation.) 
One of these new railcars is the autorack car; an autorack, also known as an auto carrier, is a 
railcar specially designed to carry new automobiles from the factory or port to a location near the 
dealerships where they will be sold. Originally this was done using boxcars, but gradually trucks 
                                                 
37 Steven P. Erie, Globalizing L.A.: Trade, Infrastructure, and Regional Development (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), pp. 147-151; National Cooperative Highway Research Program, Rail Freight Solutions 
to Roadway Congestion, pp. 38-42; Solomon, Intermodal Railroading, pp. 173-174. 
38 National Cooperative Highway Research Program, Rail Freight Solutions to Roadway Congestion, pp. 38-42; 
Solomon, Intermodal Railroading, pp. 173-177; Erie, Globalizing L.A., pp. 152-162. 
39 Erie, Globalizing L.A., pp. 147-151; Alameda Corridor East Construction Authority website, “Project 
Description and Benefits.” (http://www.theaceproject.org/project.htm, accessed 7/4/11). 
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captured most of the business. In the 1960s autoracks entered into use and began to take a little of 
this business back for the railroads, eventually becoming widespread in the 1980s and ‘90s. The 
early autoracks were generally bi-level in design (i.e., holding autos on two levels), with some tri-
level models introduced to carry small cars. But higher clearances allowed tri-level autoracks to 
become common, and for them to carry larger cars, SUVs and minivans. Gunderson’s 
“AutoMax” autorack, for instance, was introduced in 1999 and has a height of 20’-2”, the same as 
that of a double-stack car holding high-cube containers.40 Another new railcar design is the high-
cube boxcar, which as its name implies is simply a taller boxcar—though its height rarely 
approaches the 20’-2” upper limit.41 It is not only freight cars that have expanded their vertical 
dimensions. Since 1978 Amtrak has used a railcar known as the Superliner that carries passengers 
on two levels, but with a height of 16’-2” the car was originally restricted to certain western lines 
with sufficient clearance. Since clearances were raised on some major corridors in the east during 
the 1980s and ‘90s to accommodate stacktrains, the Superliner now sees use on several of 
Amtrak’s eastern routes.42 
The rising use of domestic shipping containers since the 1980s, which move within the U.S. 
and Canada (and sometimes Mexico) by both train and truck, has also impacted the American 
railroads. This topic is the focus of chapter 11, but merits a brief mention here. By the mid-1980s 
American infrastructure had been adjusted to a large degree to handle the global ISO container, 
with the railroad and trucking industries carrying containers in large quantities and a growing 
network of intermodal terminals in place to transfer them. This system now in place, it was 
logical to use it for long-distance domestic freight also, so that trucks could focus on pickup and 
delivery while more efficient trains handled the bulk of the journey. Indeed, as previously noted, 
containers were already occasionally carrying domestic freight, albeit only on their backhauls. 
Yet American and Canadian trailers had grown larger in size since the 1960s and could now hold 
far more than a global container—to use such a container for domestic freight would be 
inefficient. Consequently larger domestic containers were introduced, to be used only in North 
America, in the mid-1980s. To some extent they could move in the same network already created 
for global containers, though some significant adjustments had to be made. The domestic 
containers of the 1980s and early ‘90s were 48’ long, 8’-6” wide and 9’-6” high, and during the 
later 1990s these were replaced by 53’ containers of the same width and height. The railroad lines 
have done well in transporting these containers, but it has been the major trucking companies, 
along with the IMCs (intermodal marketing companies), that have been critical in coordinating 
the overall movement of domestic containers and generally running the networks. (This contrasts 
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with the domestic container systems of the 1920s through the ‘60s which were generally created 
and run by the railroads, with truckers in a supporting role.) In the meantime piggyback has 
declined significantly, especially over the past decade, as the domestic container serves the same 
purpose and has proven to be more efficient. All this is described in detail in chapter 11, and to a 
lesser degree in chapter 8 in the context of the trucking industry. 
More than with trucking or the inland waterways, the U.S. railroad infrastructure has been 
deeply impacted by containerization since the 1980s. The alterations to vertical clearance have 
been especially significant, but particular projects, most notably the Alameda Corridor, should 
not be overlooked either. The depth of these changes is especially ironic inasmuch as the 
container is an object designed to avoid the need for such adjustments by working within 
preexisting transport systems. Yet the transformation has been carried out nonetheless, generally 
by the railroads themselves though often with assistance from government bodies, port 
authorities, and/or shipping lines. Most of these actors are not transnational but work at a 
national, regional or local scale, and they are not merely responding to global forces, but actively 
forming and reshaping globalization. Indeed, as Saskia Sassen would argue, they actively carry 
out globalization. They do so in a railroad infrastructure that is deeply embedded in American 
history, geography and practices, and consequently possesses its own inertia. The flows of 
container movement take place within this network, which is transformed in some ways but still 





Chapter 8 ~ Trucking Put in Its Place 
 
This chapter describes the impact of the shipping container on American trucking from the 
late 1970s to the present. During this period the growth of containerization in trucking has been 
rapid, going hand-in-hand with the rising tide of container use at the worldwide scale and the 
flood of imports into the country. But it has not registered in quite the same fashion as for the 
railroad industry, which as described in chapter 7 experienced some fundamental changes over 
these years. For trucking the increase in container traffic has been more of a purely quantitative 
phenomenon, wherein rising numbers of containers lead to more business, and more trucks 
hauling containers on roads and highways, but few deeper alterations. The nation’s trucking 
system is a vast and bustling network of movement that moves a substantial majority of U.S. 
freight (as measured by volume or value), and so even the great quantity of containers carried 
within it constitutes a small percentage of its overall traffic. Furthermore the trend is increasingly 
for the bulk of long-distance overland container movement to be handled by train, with trucks 
taking care of just the pickup and delivery. This business of hauling containers by truck for 
pickup and/or delivery is known as “drayage,” and it represents a particular sector of the 
trucking business that is fiercely competitive with profits hard to come by. So the prominence of 
trucking in the early decades of containerization, as described in chapter 6, has arguably been 
somewhat reduced, even as sheer volumes have jumped dramatically. There have been some 
important alterations caused by the container, to be sure, especially in major road and highway-
building projects linking to container ports, and this chapter will discuss them. But broadly 
speaking the basic infrastructure of trucking, including the roads and highways it depends on, 
remains much the same (or when it has changed, containerization is not the reason). Actually, the 
greatest shift has probably been in the transport not of global containers, but of domestic 
containers. The major trucking firms have taken a leading role in domestic containerization over 
the past 20 years, using it to gain more business, reduce their costs, and involve the railroads 
while still retaining control over the movement of freight. 
In sum, the trucking industry has been changed significantly, but not dramatically or in a 
genuinely transformative way, by the container’s presence. Much the same could be said of the 
Interstate highways, the key network on which trucking so depends. Largely built out by the 
early 1980s, they have not been altered or expanded dramatically since, though improvements 
(additional lanes, new interchanges, better entrance/exit ramps, etc.) have been frequent. Certain 
key segments have been built or improved to provide better access to ports—this constitutes a 
“globalizing” of the infrastructure—but these are relatively minor changes in the overall network. 
There has been nothing quite comparable to the raising of clearances that railroad companies 
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have carried out widely to accommodate container stacktrains. Probably the most significant 
alteration, from the perspective of trucking, has been the change in regulations and in particular 
the reconfiguration of the spatial regime governing trailer size. As will be described, the 
allowable dimensions for truck trailers have expanded in all three dimensions, with key 
implications for container use in the context of American trucking. But these changes were not 
done with containerization in mind, even if they had important consequences for it. 
The greatest change to American trucking since the 1970s has doubtless been deregulation. 
Trucking was a highly regulated industry from the mid-1930s until about 1980, with the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) maintaining a regulatory structure of limited 
competition and respectable wages. The Teamsters Union also played a large role in ensuring 
decent pay and conditions for drivers. This model began to deteriorate in the 1970s; the 
Teamsters Union lost membership in that decade while the ranks of of nonunionized owner-
operators swelled greatly, for a variety of reasons including the endemic corruption of the union 
and the temporary availability of higher pay for owner-operators.1 (An owner-operator is a 
trucker who, at least in theory, is an independent business or contractor because he or she owns 
and operates the truck.) In the emerging neoliberal spirit of the times, along with pressure from 
shippers and owner-operators, the government commenced to deregulate the trucking industry 
in the late 1970s, and continued on this course in the 1980s and ‘90s. The Motor Carrier Act of 
1980 is regarded as the most significant piece of legislation in this process. (1980 was a banner 
year for deregulation in transportation, as the Staggers Act largely deregulated the railroads in 
that year too.) The result of all these changes has been competition so fierce it is often described 
as cutthroat, the fragmentation of the industry into various specialized sectors, lower prices for 
shippers, the collapse of many larger unionized firms, the rise of many small and large new 
firms, and plunging membership in the Teamsters Union. Along with these trends there has been 
a severe decline in wages and working conditions for drivers, who are now (with some 
exceptions, generally for sectors or firms where unionization survives) badly exploited and 
poorly paid.2 As will be discussed further in this chapter, drivers in drayage are among the most 
exploited and underpaid of all truckers. 
Prior to the 1980s, most trucking operations relied heavily on terminals, essentially 
warehouses with loading docks where freight could be stored and reassembled into new 
groupings for the next trip. While some truck journeys went directly from shipper to consignee 
(the one who receives the goods), in most cases a terminal would be involved at some point. 
Major trucking firms generally handled multiple types of trucking. This changed in the wake of 
deregulation, as the industry splintered into more specialized firms. In particular, a key split 
emerged between truckload (TL) and less-than-truckload (LTL) operations, with the truckload 
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sector growing explosively and becoming almost entirely nonunion, while the LTL sector kept 
some union presence.3 These two types of trucking should be defined. Truckload service is 
simply when the entire cargo is loaded at its origin, typically the shipper, and delivered directly 
to the recipient, typically the consignee. This means the shipper must have a substantial amount 
to ship, enough to fill the entire truck (or most of it), but it is the most efficient and cheapest way 
to ship by truck because no terminals are necessary and the freight need not be unloaded or 
reloaded at intermediate points. The bulk of long-distance trucking is now in the truckload 
sector. In LTL service shippers send out smaller quantities, and so the freight is brought to 
terminals where it is grouped together into volumes sufficient to fill a truck (i.e., freight from 
different shippers is assembled together), which then travels to another terminal where the 
freight is unloaded and sent off to its multiple destinations. 
There are many other important sectors in trucking as well. The parcel and package delivery 
services, such as UPS and FedEx, are massive presences that operate trucks within their larger, 
global operations. (To some extent they compete with LTL firms, as there is overlap in the 
services they provide.) There are numerous other specialized types of trucking serving all sorts of 
purposes, such as tank trucking, refrigerated trucking, flatbed trucking, household movers, 
hauling of new automobiles, transport of hazardous materials, hauling of heavy or oversize 
cargoes, transport of livestock, etc. In addition of course there is drayage, which has grown to be 
one of the larger sectors. The drayage of global containers is a specialized sector unto itself, while 
the drayage of domestic containers is related to the truckload business, and is carried out by the 
largest truckload firms, by railroad companies, and by intermodal marketing companies (IMCs). 
Both of these types of drayage will be described in more detail later in this chapter. 
One key modification to the domestic trucking system, made necessary by containerization, 
was the creation of the trailer chassis that is an integral part of a tractor-trailer combination 
hauling a container. The trailer chassis connects to the tractor as though it were a trailer, and 
serves to hold the container in place. Similar to a flatbed trailer, it differs in being specifically 
designed around the container, with fittings at the appropriate locations to allow for connection 
by twistlock to the container’s corner castings. (Containers do occasionally move on flatbed 
trailers, but this requires cumbersome methods to tie them down and hold them in place—
neither the container nor the flatbed trailer is designed for this.) There are various more technical 
terms sometimes used for trailer chassis, such as container skeletal semi-trailer, container skeletal 
carrier, container skeleton chassis, etc. The word “skeletal” or “skeleton” is indeed applicable, as 
these trailers do not offer a solid flat surface but rather a sort of steel lattice (lighter and hence 
more efficient than a flatbed trailer) that supports the container and holds it in place. 
Mundane object though it is the trailer chassis has a crucial role to play, as it allows the global 
system of containerization to work in the particular context of American trucking. As with the 
specialized railcars designed to hold containers on trains (described in both chapters on the 
railroads), the trailer chassis helps the container insert itself smoothly into the existing American 
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truck and road infrastructure. The chassis acts as a key interface between these two 
infrastructures, the global and national. On the one hand the chassis is designed to carry and 
securely hold the container, a globally standardized object carrying goods on their worldwide 
trajectories of movement. It is of the appropriate size to hold this giant object, and has the 
necessary fittings and attachments. On the other hand the chassis is designed to work in the 
American road system, to function properly in that infrastructure from a physical and regulatory 
viewpoint. Like a typical American trailer it has a total of eight wheels on two axles, and the 
design of its fifth wheel and kingpin fitting allows it to attach in the usual fashion to a standard 
truck tractor—the same tractor normally used for a full-sized tractor-trailer. 
In chapter 6 the trailer chassis is briefly discussed as a necessary part of the development of 
containerized trucking. For the sake of a clear and full description, rather than splitting the topic 
into two different points in the text, the full evolution of the trailer chassis is described here, even 
though it extends back into the timespan covered in chapter 6. From the 1950s into the early 1970s 
a wide variety of containers were in use, as ISO standardization was not reached until the late 
1960s and then took some time to take hold. Consequently specific trailer chassis were designed 
for each type of container, meaning that in practice a different chassis was usually required for 
the container of each shipping line, railroad or other provider. So truckers working with Sea-
Land had to use one type of trailer chassis, while truckers handling Southern Railway containers 
used a different chassis, and so forth. The most obvious reason for the differences was that these 
containers were of varying sizes, but there were also discrepancies in the fittings and methods of 
attachment. Each shipping line or railroad typically provided the necessary trailer chassis to the 
trucking company with which it contracted to move containers. Sometimes flatbed trailers were 
used, but this was awkward and caused particular problems in the attachments needed to hold 
the container in place. Using a flatbed trailer could also lead to vertical clearance issues, as will be 
discussed shortly. A writer in 1970 states that the preference was definitely for using trailer 
chassis, though he grants that “unfortunately there are times when there is a shortage of 
equipment, temporary or otherwise, and the containers are placed on flatbed trucks, for moving 
about.”4 The trailer chassis evolved into a skeletal sort of design very quickly. This is evident in 
early photographs, and also in a 1961 conference paper by E. B. Ogden of Consolidated 
Freightways in which he mentions that both his company and the truckers working with Matson 
were using “skeleton chassis” trailers to haul containers.5 
A book published in 1970, Herman D. Tabak’s Cargo Containers, gives an overview of the 
trailer chassis in use at the time. Bogies are only mentioned briefly, showing that few if any 
container systems other than Flexi-Van used that method.6 The chassis described and illustrated 
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are all of the skeletal type. The author presents several variations in chassis design, but they boil 
down essentially to two types, which he refers to as “parallel-frame” and “perimeter-frame.” 
(These terms do not seem to have become common, as they are not seen elsewhere.) The parallel-
frame chassis features a pair of beams running the length of the chassis between the wheels (i.e., 
fairly close to the middle) with small outrigger beams extending to the edges. The perimeter-
frame chassis has beams that span the entire perimeter of the chassis, along with some beams 
running across. While the perimeter-frame design has some structural advantages, it is more 
expensive. It also holds the container higher up, both because it makes a gooseneck feature (to be 
described shortly) impossible and because the perimeter beams occupy space above the wheels, 
forcing the container to be raised further. The parallel-frame chassis allows the container to be 
held lower down, closer to the wheels, and furthermore makes possible the gooseneck design. 
The author points out that (as of 1970) the parallel-frame chassis was becoming the more widely-
used design.7 On the other hand, in 1973 another writer shows an example of what he terms a 
“typical” American trailer chassis that appears to be perimeter-frame.8 By the late 1980s however 
this was assuredly not the case, as a report on chassis strength and testing in 1987 shows trailer 
chassis designs that are all parallel-frame, though some have the gooseneck feature and some do 
not.9  
The gooseneck feature of the trailer chassis is a subtle yet important aspect of how American 
trucking accommodates the container, for it makes it possible to hold a container a few inches 
lower, allowing it to fit within vertical road clearances. It accomplishes this by dropping to a 
lower position once it is a few feet behind its connection at the fifth wheel to the tractor. At this 
point the tractor is no longer a physical obstacle, and so the frame of the trailer chassis can be 
slightly lower, though it still must be high enough that the container when held in position is 
above the wheels. For this to be workable it is crucial the trailer chassis be of parallel-frame 
design, so that—as already noted—the container can be as close as possible to the wheels, with no 
element of the chassis frame in between to force it slightly higher. The short perpendicular 
outrigger beams are positioned before and after the wheels, so they do not interfere either. 
Where this gets very tricky is at the front of the trailer chassis, where it attaches to the tractor 
via the fifth wheel mechanism and kingpin, for the container is held so low that there is 
seemingly no space for the chassis itself between the fifth wheel and the container. At this point 
the chassis somehow must hold the container in place without actually being below it, yet the 
chassis needs to be present here because it must make the connection via the kingpin to the 
tractor’s fifth wheel. (The way a standard tractor and trailer connect, through the fifth wheel and 
kingpin, is described in chapter 6.) This seemingly impossible task is made possible by a special 
feature of the container’s design, a small recess or niche called the “tunnel” or “gooseneck 
tunnel” in the bottom of the container within which the chassis’ gooseneck fits. The tunnel is a 
subtle adjustment to the otherwise simple rectangularity of the container, an indentation three or 
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four inches deep in the bottom of the container that requires some extra structural reinforcing 
around it but does not alter the floor level of the container’s interior. (So strictly speaking it is not 
a tunnel at all, but a recess or indentation.) It is about three feet wide, and begins at one end of 
the container and extends roughly eight feet down the middle of the container (i.e., running 
parallel to the container’s length). A container has just one tunnel, which is located at the 
opposite end from the container doors. (As the doors of course need to be at the rear when a 
container is on a chassis, for loading and unloading, the tunnel naturally is at the other end, 
where the chassis meets the tractor.) The tunnel has become a standard feature of both global and 
domestic containers. 20’ containers typically do not have a tunnel, however, as they can be placed 
farther back on a trailer chassis so they are behind rather than above the fifth wheel and kingpin. 
In addition 20’ containers are usually 8’-6” high—they rarely come in the high-cube variant—and 




Figure 8.1: Trailer chassis with gooseneck 
 
Source: Chassis King website. (http://www.chassisking.com/products/40-foot- 
container-chassis/40-foot-tri-axle-container-chassis/, accessed 12/15/12) 
 
While these spatial details are complex—and hard to visualize from a written explanation—
the key point to realize is that the gooseneck/tunnel setup allows the container to rest a few 
inches lower than would otherwise be possible. (An additional advantage of the gooseneck and 
tunnel is that together they keep the container more firmly in place.) Though a few inches might 
seem trivial, it is enough to make a key difference in terms of vertical clearance. In the early days 
of containerization, when a 13’ clearance was the norm for American roads, it was generally 
acknowledged that it was only advisable to use an 8’-6”-high container if it were carried by such 
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a gooseneck and tunnel arrangement when moving by truck.10 Similar doubts existed in some 
other nations. Largely due to such issues, the original ASA and then ISO standard for container 
height was set at 8’ rather than 8’-6”. But since many in the transportation industry were 
determined to maximize the volume of their containers, the 8’-6” height eventually triumphed, 
and that in turn made use of the gooseneck and tunnel necessary. 
Today the parallel-frame trailer chassis with the gooseneck feature is universally used in the 
transport of containers by American trucking. The typical clearance for roads has been 14’ instead 
of 13’ for the past few decades (as explained in chapter 6) and hence the gooseneck/tunnel 
arrangement is no longer needed for an 8’-6” high container. Nevertheless it is still used, 
doubtless in part since the system has become so entrenched, but mainly because it is necessary 
for high-cube containers, which with a 9’-6” height precisely counterbalance the additional foot 
of clearance gained by the change from 13’ to 14’. The gooseneck is also used for domestic 
containers, which are 9’-6” high too and likewise have the tunnel in their undersides. So in the 
U.S. (and Canada) the gooseneck/tunnel scheme is a key aspect of how the domestic trucking 
system accommodates the shipping container. (In many other nations the vertical road clearance 
is more generous, or else the fifth wheel connection is made at a lower point, and so containers 
are carried on a more simple flat skeletal trailer chassis without the gooseneck feature. But of 
course the container still has the tunnel in it—virtually all global containers today do.) 
During the 1980s and ‘90s the design of trailer chassis grew more uniform and also more 
sophisticated. One innovation that applied not to the trailer chassis itself but the way it is 
handled was the introduction in the 1980s of a machine, known as a “flipper,” that can rotate 
chassis so as to store them vertically in racks. (Chassis are also sometimes stacked horizontally, in 
another kind of rack.) Given the large amount of space otherwise needed for the numerous trailer 
chassis that must be held in availability, the practice saves valuable space at ports and intermodal 
terminals.11 Another concept that took hold was the slider trailer chassis (sometimes known as a 
“sliding chassis,” “extendable chassis,” or “telescoping chassis”), which possesses a sliding 
mechanism that allows the chassis length to vary so it can carry containers of different lengths. 
This forestalls the need for having trailer chassis of multiple sizes on hand. Once the ISO 
container standards were in place the logic of a slider chassis was evident, as both 20’ and 40’ 
global containers possess the same fittings for attachment and so it is possible for a chassis to 
carry either one if only the divergence in length can be solved. Admittedly there are drawbacks, 
as the sliding device is cumbersome, adds weight, and takes time to adjust. One of the first 
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examples—perhaps the first—of a slider chassis was introduced in 1984 by X-Ten Corporation, 
and was designed to carry any container between 20’ and 48’ in length.12 
Over the 1980s and ‘90s several other slider chassis designs were introduced, and their use 
became widespread. Evidently their advantages are at least to some degree outweighed by their 
drawbacks, however, for while slider chassis are sometimes used the more common practice 
currently is to stick with chassis specific to one length. It should also be noted that it is not 
unusual to carry a 20’ container on a trailer chassis mainly designed for a 40’ container—the 
appearance is awkward as the container only takes up half of the chassis, but the extra fittings 
(i.e., to receive the corner castings at additional points) are in place on the chassis to do so. For 
domestic 53’ containers entirely different and longer trailer chassis are used than for global 
containers, and there have not been any efforts to create a slider chassis that can hold both, or to 
design a domestic chassis that could also hold the smaller global container. Perhaps this is 
because the two businesses, of global container movement and domestic container movement, 
are almost entirely separate anyway in the trucking industry. So a trucking company hauling 
domestic containers has little interest in gaining the flexibility to also haul global containers with 
the same equipment, and vice-versa. 
Aside from getting under clearances, another advantage of holding the container in a low 
position is to put its floor at or near the level of most loading docks. In the U.S. the typical height 
of a loading dock is between 48 and 52 inches, with 48” most common. This dimension obviously 
is tied to the interior floor height (i.e., the flooring on which the cargo rests) of a typical truck or 
trailer, for convenience in loading and unloading. (Smaller trucks and vans for local use have 
lower floors, adding an additional level of complication if the loading dock serves such vehicles 
as well.) Since containers on chassis are often brought to loading docks, it is ideal if they too fit 
into this aspect of the spatial regime of the trucking infrastructure. (As a loading dock is part of 
an actual building, this is perhaps the only point in this dissertation relevant to what is 
traditionally considered “architecture.”) Therefore the height of the container floor, when the 
container rests on a trailer chassis, should be between 48” and 52”. 
The issue was recognized early on, for Tabak writing in 1970 states that: “The usual dock 
heights for highway trailers is 52”. In using a tunnel-type container with a gooseneck chassis this 
same height is maintained. With the flat-frame chassis and the flat-bottom container the height is 
increased about 6”, with resultant awkwardness of handling during loading and unloading.”13 
Another author claims that the height of truck floors (which he puts at 48”) goes back to the days 
of the railroad, when boxcar floors were at this height and trucks sometimes received goods 
transferred directly from boxcars.14 This notion seems unlikely, though not entirely implausible. 
Such accounts suggest the intricacies of how these spatial regimes are interwoven through 
gradually evolving practices and standards. Given that the top of an 8’-6” high container should 
                                                 
12 Fleet Owner, “Telescoping Container Trailer,” Vol. 79, No. 3 (March 1984), p. 56. 
13 Tabak, Cargo Containers, p. 111. 
14 John R. Stilgoe, Train Time: Railroads and the Imminent Reshaping of the United States Landscape 
(Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2007), p. 220. 
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be about 12’-6” off the ground to keep a six-inch buffer below the previous standard 13’ clearance 
(and the top of a 9’-6” high container must be about 13’-6” off the ground to maintain this six-
inch buffer below the current standard 14’ clearance), this means the bottom of the container is 
four feet above the ground. Thus the container’s interior floor, about six inches higher, will be 
roughly 54” high, and therefore lines up fairly well with a 52” loading dock, and is at least in the 
vicinity of a 48” loading dock. 
The challenges that arise when containers are carried on trailer chassis in the U.S. are not 
only spatial and dimensional, for weight also is a problem. The regulations that govern truck 
weight on American roads are complex (as they vary depending on the number of wheels and 
their positioning), but the bottom line is that the maximum legal weight for the cargo of a 40’ 
container moving on a standard trailer chassis is about 44,000 pounds. Given that a 40’ container 
is structurally certified to hold up to roughly 60,000 pounds, the potential for problems is 
evident. The container may be loaded to a legal weight in its own right (though even that is not 
always the case), but when moving by truck the overall weight of the tractor, trailer chassis, 
container and cargo, combined with the way all this is distributed on the wheels, violates the law. 
The problem does not arise with most types of cargo, as goods like electronics or clothing fill the 
volume of the container well before they approach such a substantial weight, but for denser cargo 
(paper products, ceramic tiles, resins, coffee, etc.) it is frequently an issue.15 (For the railroads this 
is usually not a concern, as they can accommodate heavier cargoes.) A government study in the 
late 1980s found that about one-third of all containers passing through U.S. ports were too heavy 
to be legally hauled over the road, even though nearly all of them did move by truck for some 
segment of their journey.16 
Such overweight containers cause greater wear and tear on roadways, and on the trailer 
chassis as well, and make for more hazardous driving conditions and a greater likelihood of 
accidents. The issue is not limited to trucks carrying containers; truck weights can be a problem 
for normal tractor-trailers moving within the U.S., and the system of weigh stations exists to 
control this. But while a trailer like a container hides the nature of its cargo, at least with a normal 
trailer the freight is loaded and unloaded at points within the U.S., where it can be seen. The 
contents of imported global containers have been loaded in another country, making knowledge 
or verification more difficult. Compounding the problem is the wide range of rules for road 
weights in other nations, and their sometimes erratic enforcement; a weight that is illegal in the 
U.S. might be legal (or commonly allowed in practice) elsewhere. Many European countries, for 
example, permit heavier trucks than the U.S. Furthermore, it is not easy for foreign shippers to be 
                                                 
15 Transportation Research Board (National Research Council), Intermodal Marine Container Transportation, 
Impediments and Opportunities [special report 236], Washington, D.C., 1992, pp. 84-94; Yehuda Hayuth, “The 
Overweight Container Problem and International Intermodal Transportation,” Transportation Journal, Vol. 
34, No. 2 (Winter 1994), pp. 18-24. 
16 Transportation Research Board, Intermodal Marine Container Transportation, Impediments and Opportunities, 
pp. 84-85. 
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cognizant of the regulations in every nation their containers might go.17 The very seamlessness of 
container movement, such an advantage at the global scale, becomes problematic at the national 
level. 
Another contributing factor is that nearly everyone has an incentive to cheat; shippers and 
forwarders want to make money by loading their containers as fully as possible so they skirt the 
rules, while shipping lines do not wish to lose customers so they fail to hold the line. Ports often 
prefer to turn a blind eye as well, or else they lobby their state governments for higher weight 
limits on the roads leading to the port. Enforcement is typically lax in any case.18 Aside from 
regulators and government officials, the excessive weights are of most concern to drayage 
operators, who feel greatly pressured to accept overloaded containers. Drivers worry about the 
fines and punishments they may face, issues of liability, wear and tear on their equipment, and 
dangers on the road. Consequently over the years much of the debate over container weights has 
come from them. In the mid-1980s it first became a major issue when drayage firms and drivers 
in both the Los Angeles and New York/New Jersey regions vigorously raised their concerns.19 
The aforementioned study of the late 1980s further publicized the problem, and since then the 
topic has been constantly discussed and debated. The Intermodal Safe Container Act, which was 
passed in 1992 and finally took effect in 1997 after various delays and modifications, sought to 
improve the situation, but the basic quandary remains. Illegal container weights remain a 
constant concern in the shipping industry, especially for regulators, and a source of frequent 
complaints among drayage truckers. The divergence between the standards and practices of the 
global infrastructure and conditions in a particular nation cannot be easily resolved. 
The availability of trailer chassis, provided by the shipping lines, was important in 
encouraging trucking firms to get on board with containerization. By the late 1970s trucks were 
hauling containers all over the country, as container movement extended further beyond ports 
and deeper inland. In addition the ISO’s container standardization had been largely achieved not 
just in theory but in practice by this time (except for a few holdouts), and that made it easier to 
move containers in the trucking network. No longer was it necessary to have the appropriate 
trailer chassis on hand for each company’s container. The standardization of containers made a 
whole host of procedures simpler and allowed for consistency of equipment also; if a container 
had to be transferred between truck and train, the crane or other device for the job was designed 
for (and only for) ISO containers. Most important of all, there was a growing number of 
containers that needed to move overland within the domestic American territory, and a lack of 
large-scale competition from the railroads for this traffic. But gradually the railroad companies 
grew interested in the container business, and in the 1980s they emerged as serious participants 
                                                 
17 Transportation Research Board, Intermodal Marine Container Transportation, Impediments and Opportunities, 
pp. 89-91; Hayuth, “The Overweight Container Problem and International Intermodal Transportation,” p. 
22. 
18 Transportation Research Board, Intermodal Marine Container Transportation, Impediments and Opportunities, 
pp. 91-94. 
19 Ibid., pp. 86-87. 
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in long-distance container movement, largely due to the efficiencies of stacktrains. The trend has 
continued since, and hence today most lengthy overland container journeys are done primarily 
by rail, with truckers fitting into this system by handling the pickup and delivery of containers, 
trips that are local or regional in nature. The long-distance movement of containers by trucking 
has certainly not been eliminated, but it is now relatively uncommon in comparison to the great 
quantity carried by train. 
This does not mean trucking’s role has become trivial. On the contrary it occupies a vital 
place in the container network, as only by truck can most containers be picked up at their origin 
or delivered to their destination. Despite the success of the railroads in recent decades the 
American transport network is still obviously oriented mainly to the motor vehicle, and this 
certainly applies to freight transportation as well. Factories, warehouses and distribution centers 
are typically only accessible by truck. This pickup and delivery is also the most labor-intensive 
part of the container’s journey, as each truck requires its own driver and the actual loading or 
unloading of a container takes some time and usually involves other workers also. The container 
remains an object fundamentally designed around the needs of trucking—particularly in its 
spatial dimensions—and the truck remains the most indispensable transport mode for its 
movement. For those containers that do not go far inland but remain within a few hundred miles 
of the port, trucks typically handle the entire trip since the railroads are only more efficient for 
long distances (generally above 500 miles). In addition, the transfer from ship to train often is not 
made within the confines of the port, and so many trucks carry containers on local journeys 
between a port and nearby rail terminal. In the Chicago area trucks even do a substantial 
business hauling containers between the different rail terminals. 
While the terms “pickup” and “delivery” imply trips that are short, this is not invariably the 
case. The railroad lines have set up giant new intermodal terminals that serve large regions, and 
so a truck may travel a substantial distance to deliver or pick up a container. (The development of 
the intermodal terminals, where containers are transferred between train and truck, is described 
in chapter 9.) Many containers departing from or arriving in the Detroit area, for example, are 
actually transferred to or from trains in the Chicago area, with the 300-mile trip between Detroit 
and Chicago handled by truck. Such hauls of a few hundred miles to and from rail terminals are 
common, and give the trucking companies plenty of business. 
The term “drayage” is widely used in the trucking industry to refer to the movement of 
containers by truck. The word has a historical derivation, formerly referring to the short journeys 
made by horse-drawn carts called drays to connect rail depots or ports with local customers. But 
usage of the term varies. Some regard all container movements by truck as drayage. Others 
distinguish between short local journeys and long-distance line-hauls, defining only the former 
as drayage; this way of thinking retains the basic concept of drayage as a local trip involving the 
pickup or delivery of goods that is a small segment of a longer journey. But even when this 
distinction is made, it is unclear what the cut-off point is between local drayage and long-distance 
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trucking—it could be a distance of anywhere between 50 miles and 200 miles.20 At present it 
seems slightly more prevalent to use the term drayage to refer to any container journey by truck, 
no matter what the distance, and the dissertation follows this usage. It is often assumed, 
however, that a drayage trip is relatively short—the word carries this implication. 
The trucking of global containers the short distance between ports and their associated 
intermodal terminals, distribution centers, cross-docking facilities and warehouses has become a 
distinctive part of the container trucking business, especially at major ports. Often it is called 
“port drayage” or “harbor drayage.” This industry has gained a reputation for its exploitative 
nature, paying lower wages than is usual and with its drivers suffering under onerous conditions 
and struggling to get by. Drivers (or the firms that employ them) can generally only afford the 
oldest and most polluting trucks. Port drayage in Southern California, serving the massive ports 
of Los Angeles and Long Beach, is a particular focus of attention due to its polluting impact, 
contribution to congestion on local highways, and poor working conditions. Programs over the 
past decade or so have been put in place at these two ports to cut down on the pollution caused 
by a number of sources, including drayage, and to incrementally improve the conditions of 
drivers. These were achieved through heavy pressure, including lawsuits, from environmental 
and labor activists, with local communities (which receive the brunt of the pollution’s impact) 
playing a prominent role.21 Several other American ports have pursued similar, though more 
modest, efforts to reduce pollution. The traffic caused by trucks hauling containers has also been 
wrestled with, though efforts to expand highways for this purpose generally meet with little 
success. Limitations in government funding at all levels, and vociferous opposition from 
neighborhoods already suffering under excessive traffic that is both noisy and polluting, tend to 
limit the expansion of the roads and highways serving the ports. This is all to the advantage of 
the railroads, seen as a less negative presence, and so traffic congestion at ports has been a 
motivating force to create better and closer rail connections to them.22 
The dynamics of port drayage, with the short journey distances, fairly simple and 
inexpensive nature of the operation, limited educational and/or training requirements for drivers, 
and wide-open field of competition, make it a business sector with few barriers to entry. This 
results in relentless competition and negligible profit margins. The business is handled by many 
small firms that in turn contract with the drivers, who are classified as individual owner-
operators while the firms endeavor to keep physical assets off their books. As a book on logistics 
and labor comments, “everyone in the transportation industry surrounding the ports recognizes 
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that the port truckers are at the bottom of the food chain.”23 Drivers come and go quickly, often 
leaving in frustration or disappointment. Another reason drivers leave is because port drayage 
can be a stepping stone for them, as within six to twelve months they are likely to have a shot at 
working in a better sector of the trucking business, for superior pay and working conditions.24 
Paradoxically, the situation can actually get worse when business is bustling, as slower delivery 
times and a larger workload make it even harder for drivers to break even. 
Perhaps it is no coincidence that in American trucking the sector most tied to global trade, the 
business of drayage at ports, has been the one notorious for low wages, harsh working 
conditions, and a complete lack of unionization. While it may be hard to show a direct 
connection, it seems intuitive to link the bad conditions of port drayage truckers to the 
globalization they are participating in. Drayage is one of the few remaining points in American 
containerized movement where the work is labor-intensive. The general trend underlying 
container use has been to replace labor with capital and technology, as cranes, stacktrains, 
container ships, straddle carriers and a variety of other devices help keep employment to a 
minimum (and occasionally lead to high wages for the fortunate few who remain employed, as 
with skilled crane operators and some unionized West Coast longshoremen). The destruction of 
working-class jobs along the docks is integral to the story of containerization—it is part of the 
container’s original purpose—but one can perceive a similar dynamic in other aspects of 
container transport. Stacktrains holding up to 200 or more containers, for instance, are operated 
by just a few railroad employees. Container ships that hold thousands of containers are even 
more efficient in minimizing labor per container. No such labor-saving efficiency is possible in 
drayage—each truck, and hence each container moving by truck, requires a driver. It is the one 
segment of the chain of container movement that is labor intensive. 
The ongoing struggles and issues related to port drayage serve as a reminder that the 
particular qualities of metropolitan areas and regions have continuing relevance. As the 
worldwide system of container movement passes through, these places do not function as 
flattened locales that exert no friction against a global matrix—on the contrary their own qualities 
are important. In turn, the particular characteristics of the global infrastructure are important in 
terms of how they impact various localities, as the seamless nature of container movement does 
not mean its impact is insignificant. The competition between ports is increasingly based not only 
on the efficiency and quality of the ports themselves, but on their transport connections with their 
hinterlands and indeed the entire nation. Yet it is not merely a question of their infrastructures, 
but other factors too. For example, the large immigrant community of a region like Southern 
California represents a source of cheap labor easily exploited in port drayage. The global and the 
local constantly impact each other, through their varying characteristics and particular powers, 
and despite its local nature drayage can play an active role in the formation and character of 
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global supply chains. As a recent government report on port drayage points out, “despite their 
local orientation, drayage operations are nevertheless a component of a much longer 
international supply chain.”25 
In the past few years the problems of port drayage have gained greater recognition, and some 
efforts have been made to improve it. Some of the larger drayage companies have expanded to 
cover multiple ports, or bought out smaller competitors, in an effort to offer a more uniform 
service. Roadlink, currently the largest of the independent drayage firms, has grown in this 
manner and now spans the U.S. and Canada with drayage and warehousing services.26 In 
addition some very large players in the business have purchased drayage companies, 
presumably in order to assure better control over the movement of their own containers—after 
all, a chain is no stronger than its weakest link. Since the early 1980s Maersk has had a subsidiary, 
Bridge Terminal Transport, that is the largest drayage provider in the U.S., and which contracts 
with other customers in addition to Maersk. In 2006 Hub Group, one of the largest intermodal 
marketing companies (IMCs) that manage the movement of domestic containers, bought out the 
major drayage firm Comtrak.27 In spite of such adjustments, though, most drayage is still done by 
small or medium-size companies that specialize solely in that business. 
In recent years some trucking companies, especially larger ones, have chosen to engage in 
several different sectors of the trucking business, rather than concentrating on one specialty as 
was usually the case previously. Some have branched out into warehousing and cross-docking 
also, as they try to attain a higher degree of vertical integration so as to handle a larger portion of 
the supply chain. The business of taking care of all aspects of transportation and storage, 
essentially handling an entire supply chain (whether at the domestic scale or globally), is known 
as third-party logistics, or 3PL for short, and has grown since the 1980s. Quite a few 
manufacturing and retail companies have abandoned their in-house transportation units and 
contracted the business to 3PL providers. In recent years some 3PLs have expanded into 
trucking—and some trucking firms have expanded into the 3PL business.28 The trucking, logistics 
and warehouse company NFI (best known for trucking, originally its sole business) served as an 
example of these practices in a recent article in a trade journal. The article describes how a 
container of olive oil bottles was drayed by NFI from Newark to an intermodal terminal in New 
Jersey, then sent by a railroad that contracted with NFI to Chicago, where NFI again drayed it to 
a nearby distribution center also run by NFI, at which point the olive oil was unloaded from the 
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container and stored, then gradually taken as needed by NFI trucks to retailers within 250 miles.29 
While this account may well have been cherry-picked to provide an idealized version of such 
operations, it nevertheless illustrates how extensive the activities of some truckers can be, beyond 
simply hauling containers from point A to B. 3PL firms do not always directly handle the entire 
movement of freight, however; sometimes they contract with local or regional trucking 
companies to do so. These local or regional truckers can thus tend to their own specialties, at their 
own scale of operations, even as they participate in global supply chains. The reverse can also 
happen—a local, regional or national trucking company charged with handling a global 




Figure 8.2: 40’ container moving by truck 
 
Source: Flickriver [So Cal Metro] (http://www.flickriver.com/photos/southerncalifornian/48724692/, accessed 12/15/12) 
 
One highly specialized type of container trucking consists of the movement of containers 
inside a port terminal. Specialized tractor-trailer trucks are used to move containers around the 
extensive port facilities, including taking them to and from the dock’s edge where cranes move 
the containers between the trucks and the massive ships. These trucks also bring containers to 
and from the storage areas in the terminal, where the containers are stacked up. If there is an 
intermodal rail terminal within the boundaries of the port facility, then the trucks provide access 
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to it. Since it does not move over public roads but only inside the port, such a truck does not need 
the container to be firmly attached to it—it is simply placed on the chassis, which does not 
possess connections for twistlocks but rather has raised edges to prevent the container from 
sliding off. That is regarded as sufficiently safe, as the trucks move relatively slowly and the port 
is a controlled space outside the public realm. The truck’s tractor differs from that of a typical 
truck tractor, being smaller with seating for only one person. As should be evident from this 
description, a container is not transferred directly from the ship to the normal truck that will 
actually take it to its inland destination, nor is a container arriving at the port by normal truck 
brought all the way to the ship by that same truck; such procedures would be impractical for 
various reasons, the main one being the impossibility of getting the timing right. Rather, 
containers going in either direction are held for a time at the port, with the specialized trucks 
shuttling them about. (There are devices known as straddle carriers that also move containers at 
ports—these have the advantage that they can stack containers also.) Since these trucks only 
move around inside the port they constitute part of the internal workings of the port facility 
itself, and for the purposes of this dissertation are not viewed as actors in the national domestic 
infrastructure. Hence their role is only briefly mentioned here. 
Over the period from the 1970s to the ‘90s several key changes were made to trucking’s 
spatial regime in the U.S., with the allowable trailer size gradually expanding to a significant 
degree. The steady growth in trailer dimensions over the years reflected the spatial affordances 
offered by the Interstate highways and the suburban landscape of sprawl, along with vigorous 
lobbying from the trucking industry. Because laws and practices differ from state to state, and the 
federal regulations are complex and often defer to the states, it is hard to identify exact years 
when larger trailer sizes took effect. Generally a larger size would be introduced in a few states, 
gradually take hold in more states, and eventually be instituted on a nationwide basis. 
Furthermore legalization did not mean instantaneous conversion, as it took a few years for 
practices to shift and for new trailers to come into use and replace existing ones. In this fashion, 
45’-long trailers were introduced in the early 1970s and gradually became the standard over the 
course of that decade. They gave way to 48’ trailers in the early 1980s, with a crucial federal law 
(the Surface Transportation Act) passed in 1982 making the 48’ trailer allowable on highways in 
every state and raising the permissible trailer width from 8’ to 8’-6”. Over the mid- and late 1980s 
the 53’ trailer entered use in many states, and this became the national standard by the mid-1990s 
and remains so today.31 
The maximum allowable overall length of the truck (the tractor plus trailer) is generally 80’ at 
present, though this varies slightly from state to state. Ever since the late 1960s a 14’ vertical 
clearance on roads has been typical—as discussed in chapter 6—leading to a standard trailer 
height of 13’-6” with a 6” gap between the top of the vehicle and obstructions above. The giant 
53’ trailer currently in widespread use appears to be as long, wide and high as the federal 
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government is willing to allow, given that its size has not been expanded since the mid-1990s. (A 
few states do permit trailers 57’ long. A more controversial practice is to have multiple trailers 
pulled by one tractor, which is allowed by some states on certain highways.) It would seem 
anything larger than a 53’ trailer is recognized as beyond the bounds of what is practical and safe 
given the physical reality—the spatial standards and characteristics—of American highways and 
roads. (The trucking industry does not see it this way, of course, and incessantly lobbies for 
bigger trucks and/or trailers, and for the expanded use of multiple trailers.) So the 53’-long trailer, 
8’-6” wide and 13’-6” high, is a fundamental part of the spatial regime of American trucking at 
present. 
If one follows the usual conception of globalization as making national and global practices 
more closely aligned, one would expect global container sizes to continue to follow the American 
trailer template, or else one might anticipate the reverse, that American trailer sizes would 
meekly follow global container dimensions. Neither came to pass. What happened instead is that 
the two spatial types after being in harmony for a brief period have increasingly diverged, with 
the global container remaining the same while the American trailer was steadily enlarged. The 
expansion of American trailer size has had no impact on the global container, despite the direct 
causal link that originally held between the two. (The U.S. and some European nations at various 
times in the 1990s and the 2000s pushed for the ISO to expand the container to a 45’ or 48’ length 
and an 8’-6” width, with a distinct lack of success.) Meanwhile the global container, even though 
its importance has risen so dramatically over the decades, has failed to exert control over the 
dimensions of the American trailer which has followed its own progression. The global and the 
national are not locked together into some ever-tightening connection; they mutually influence 
each other, but also fluctuate on the basis of many other factors. Their interconnections are 
complex and nuanced, rather than the rigid dynamic one might expect from paradigms of a flat 
world or neoliberal hegemony. 
The growth of domestic containerization since the 1980s, with larger containers that reflect 
the current American 53’ trailer size, makes the point even more evident. The domestic container 
network, a system that operates only within the U.S. and Canada (and to some degree Mexico), 
exploits the bigger dimensions allowable for American trailers. The use of domestic containers 
clearly reveals the divergence of the global and national spatial regimes. Yet there are additional 
factors to consider, for the domestic container network is in many ways built on the system that 
has been put in place to carry global containers in North America; in other words, it is the 
“globalization” of American infrastructure that helped bring about domestic containerization. 
Chapter 11 provides a detailed account of the creation and development of the domestic 
container. But since its existence so clearly derives from the new and larger trailer sizes, a brief 
description is given here that emphasizes its effect on American trucking. 
The container systems introduced by the railroads in the 1920s and again in the 1950s were of 
course primarily domestic in nature (and are described in chapter 5), but as global containers did 
not yet exist those systems were not consciously intended as separate domestic networks. The 
first truly domestic container, it would seem, was a 44’-3” long design introduced by the 
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Canadian Pacific Railway in 1979. This had little impact beyond Canadian Pacific’s own 
operations, but eventually in 1985 American President Lines (APL) introduced a domestic 
container with a 48’ length, 9’-6” height and 8’-6” width, and this rapidly became a standard as 
others followed suit. This in turn was gradually replaced by the current 53’-long domestic 
container (also 9’-6” high and 8’-6” wide), which became the standard over the 1990s. The 
volumetric advantage of this container in comparison to the global ISO container is significant: 
two 53’ domestic containers possess roughly the same capacity as three 40’ global containers. 
Domestic containers have castings to receive twistlocks not only at the corners, but also at the 
same 40’ points as global containers, so they work with existing cranes and other such devices, 
and can be attached to global containers. New trailer chassis (and new railcars, too) had to be 
developed to carry these larger containers. In recent years domestic containerization has caught 
on so widely that piggyback to a large extent has faded from the scene. 
While it was railroads and shipping lines that pioneered domestic containerization, trucking 
companies quickly moved into the business in the 1990s, led by the three biggest long-haul 
trucking companies, J.B. Hunt, Schneider National and Swift, all working in the truckload sector. 
These firms had already established extensive and sophisticated operations across the nation, and 
saw domestic containerization as a way to introduce greater efficiency to their systems. Whereas 
in the 1950s the container was often perceived as a means for railroads to take business from 
trucking, now the truckers realized it could play a role in their own operations; by contracting 
with a railroad company to cover the bulk of the distance, certain long-distance trips can be made 
less expensive. (Many drivers also appreciate being able to remain in one area and spend their 
nights at home, instead of living on the road.) The trucking firm still deals with the customer, 
organizes the overall journey, and takes care of pickup and delivery. Hence it is the major 
trucking companies, along with intermodal marketing companies (IMCs), that have become 
dominant in domestic containerization. (The IMCs, such as Pacer Stacktrain and Hub Group, own 
few assets but arrange with truckers and railroads to carry cargo in containers for customers.) 
This is in sharp contrast with the drayage of global containers, in which it is small and relatively 
weak firms that participate in the business. The key difference seems to be one of control, and 
ultimately profitability. In domestic containerization the trucking companies coordinate the 
entire trip and deal with the customers on both ends, while for global containers the truckers are 
minor and relatively powerless, subservient to larger companies (shipping lines, shippers, 
logistics providers, etc.) that are controlling the overall movement of goods. 
Another consequence of the spatial difference between the global container and American 
trailer is the practice of transloading, which over the past decade has increased. (This is also 
discussed at greater length in chapter 11.) Transloading basically consists of the shifting of cargo 
from global containers either to tractor-trailer trucks or domestic containers, generally at a facility 
relatively near the port or at least in the same general region. Given that the greatest benefit of the 
global container is its ability to hold cargo all the way from origin to destination, transloading 
would appear inefficient. But the larger volumetric capacity of trailers and domestic containers 
(as already noted, just two domestic containers or trailers have a comparable capacity to three 40’ 
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ISO containers) is sometimes enough to override the advantage of a seamless journey. 
Transloading also offers an opportunity to redistribute a container’s cargo. Consequently in 
recent years transloading has grown popular, and so some global containers that otherwise 
would move deep into the domestic territory are instead only going a slight distance and then 
returning to port. 
As the railroad companies increasingly engaged in transporting global containers between 
ports and inland intermodal terminals in the 1980s, the provision of trailer chassis at these 
terminals—where they were needed so trucks could haul the containers to their final 
destinations—was a challenge. This was especially the case since the shipping lines generally 
supplied the chassis for their own containers, so that even if plenty of chassis were available to 
carry a container the terminal could only use one belonging to the same line whose container it 
was. This would seem to negate the whole benefit of standardizing containers in the first place. 
Clearly such practices were inefficient, and with a pool of trailer chassis available to all—
sometimes known as a “neutral” pool—the provision of chassis is less wasteful. In the 1980s the 
Burlington Northern Railroad was the first railroad to create such a pool, at its Cicero terminal in 
Chicago. Thus shipping companies could contract with the railroad to carry containers from the 
West Coast to Chicago without worrying about having to supply chassis in Chicago. The 
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway (commonly known as the “Santa Fe”) formed chassis 
pools at its intermodal terminals in Chicago and Los Angeles soon after, and some other railroads 
followed suit.32 
But at ports it has remained, until very recently, standard practice for shipping lines to have 
possession of the trailer chassis, which they supply to drayage firms. This has been the case ever 
since the shipping industry, as opposed to the railroads, began to drive containerization in the 
late 1950s and ‘60s. In order to persuade American truckers to carry containers instead of using 
the trailers they preferred, the shipping companies agreed to supply the necessary chassis. Once 
this became customary it grew entrenched, even though in nearly all other countries the trailer 
chassis has long been supplied by a forwarder, logistics company, or the trucking firm itself.33 
Shipping lines gradually became discontented with this exceptional American system. A trade 
journal in 2003 noted that they “once viewed chassis as a marketing tool but now consider them 
an expensive headache.”34 The headache is particularly painful because the quality of trailer 
chassis is a constant point of contention between shipping companies and drayage firms; truckers 
often complain about the condition of the chassis they are provided with—a complaint that is 
frequently justified. As with the problem of overweight containers, described earlier, drayage 
truckers feel they lack the leverage to refuse a chassis in poor condition that is dangerous or 
illegal to use, but must risk the consequences. The question of legal responsibility for such 
chassis—which typically resides with the truckers—has been much debated. In general the 
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drayage firms have been unable to alter the equation, but they enjoyed a rare victory when a 2002 
California law made the provider of the chassis (i.e., not the trucker, but the shipping line or 
leasing company) responsible for its safe condition.35 
In 2009 Maersk, the largest of the shipping companies, decided to retreat from owning 
chassis, and some other lines have since followed suit, triggering debate in the industry and 
uncertainty among drayage trucking firms. At present there are roughly 650,000 trailer chassis for 
global containers in the U.S., with about half owned by shipping lines and half by leasing 
companies that operate chassis pools. The role of these leasing companies—some of which are 
owned by or have links to shipping lines—is likely to grow as they increasingly supply truckers. 
Moreover many trucking companies may become more active in providing their own trailer 
chassis. All in all, this shift looks to be a further burden on drayage providers. While in some 
respects it is more logical for the trucking firms to take responsibility for the chassis, they would 
prefer to be adequately paid for it. Given how relentlessly the shipping lines, forwarders and 
others squeeze the drayage truckers, that is unlikely to be the case. Currently the price of a new 
trailer chassis is roughly $8,000 and it costs about $11-15 per day to rent one, so while it is not a 
major expense it can make a difference for a trucker on the edge of breaking even.36 Consequently 
most drayage firms for obvious reasons would prefer the shipping lines continue to provide 
chassis. A few figures in the trucking industry have hypothesized, though, that it would be to 
their advantage to own the chassis and thus take complete control of the land-based segment of 
container movement.37 It is hard to believe that in practice this would really work to the truckers’ 
benefit, however. 
In addition to container movement, the “globalization” of U.S. trucking also consists of 
regular tractor-trailer trucks passing over the nation’s land borders. Growing trade with Canada 
and Mexico, generally not containerized though some of it does travel in domestic containers, has 
led to an increase in transnational cargo carried by trucks on American roads. In fact the largest 
trading partner of the U.S. has long been Canada—this remains true today in spite of the 
immense attention devoted to China—and Mexico is also very significant. In the wake of the 1994 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, Mexico and the U.S. that 
reduced tariffs and other trade barriers, trucks have flowed more freely over the U.S. border to 
both the north and south. 
The prospect of such traffic was used in the 1990s and 2000s to justify a proposed major 
highway, Interstate 69, running north-south through the American heartland from the Canadian 
border in Michigan to the Mexican border in Texas. I-69 already runs from Port Huron, Michigan 
to Indianapolis, but its enthusiasts envisioned this continuing all the way to southeast Texas. Due 
to the economic recession, severely limited government funds, and a general reluctance to engage 
in large-scale infrastructural projects, grand plans for I-69 have been abandoned. A few short 
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segments were built in Mississippi and Indiana, and an existing parkway in Kentucky was 
designated part of I-69, but while construction does continue in southwest Indiana for the most 
part I-69 has been forgotten in the midst of more pressing matters. (The Indiana segment under 
construction, tying Evansville to Indianapolis, is now conceived as a regional project.) Though 
unlikely to be realized in the foreseeable future (if ever), I-69 is significant as perhaps the only 
major new highway of an entirely national scale to be seriously proposed in the past few decades, 
and as a project emblematic of a transnational agenda. As with any highway project many of its 
boosters saw it as a generator of growth in particular places, while others perceived it as a vital 
national connection on a larger scale. But the key additional aspect to I-69 was its transnational 
purpose, to move freight not just within the national territory but beyond it, so that the space of 
the nation-state would be a portion of a larger space, a giant territory spanning three nations. 
Indeed, some early proponents of I-69 labeled it “the NAFTA highway” as a selling point. This 
exercise in branding soon boomeranged on them, provoking an outraged reaction from 
Americans resentful of NAFTA and fearful of manufacturing jobs moving south over the border, 
and so the rhetoric of globalization disappeared from the arguments of I-69 enthusiasts.38 
Such visions of transnational highways in the Americas are not new—since the 1920s some 
have promoted a grand Pan-American highway, though to little effect. In fact one of the main 
boosters of I-69 is the son of a man whose truck manufacturing company participated in early 
proposals for the Pan-American highway, sending a representative to the Pan-American 
Congress for Highways of 1925 in Buenos Aires.39 Less grandiose but more practical ambitions 
often focus on a specific link between the U.S. and its neighbors, such as the projected new bridge 
between Detroit and Windsor, Ontario, that will supplement the existing privately-run 
Ambassador Bridge. Currently the annual flow of goods between Detroit and Windsor, 
comprising traffic on the current bridge, tunnel and ferries, is approximately $120 billion and 
represents about 25% of all trade between the two nations.40 So there is plenty at stake in this 
particular border connection. The bridge is another example of how major new road-related 
infrastructure is likely to be global or transnational in nature. Meanwhile to the south Mexican 
trucks finally were cleared to enter the U.S. in October of 2011, a long-delayed and extremely 
controversial result of NAFTA. Here the significance of the change is not directly related to the 
infrastructure, but rather is of a regulatory nature. Nevertheless it is no less important, as it opens 
the likelihood of large numbers of Mexican trucks coming onto U.S. highways (and vice-versa), 
making the border in effect more porous and the domestic infrastructure more globalized.41 
As is evident from these examples, the system of trucking consists not only of the trucks 
themselves but also the roads they move upon. The two are not as integrally connected as trains 
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and tracks, but are still linked and together form a freight infrastructure. Thus the impact of the 
shipping container on the trucking system is not confined to the trucks themselves, or the 
business of trucking, but extends to the highways and local roads, now traversed by innumerable 
containers moving on trucks. Given the massive amount of domestic freight that moves by 
trucking over the American road system, trucks hauling containers represent a small percentage 
of this vast network, and their impact is modest in most places. But on roads and highways 
serving ports the situation is different, and congestion has risen sharply at some of these 
bottlenecks due to the influx of containerized traffic. Consequently there have been many efforts 
to improve road access to ports, and in particular to assure good highway connectivity. This 
ambition goes back to the earliest days of the highways, long before modern containerization; 
when the Pennsylvania Turnpike was completed in 1940, with the prospect of war in the air, 
President Roosevelt and turnpike commission chairman Walter Jones were already discussing the 
possibility of extending it to the Philadelphia Navy Yard, and from there improving the roads to 
the Brooklyn Navy Yard in addition.42 Such thinking was relatively rare at the time, however, 
and it was common for traffic to clog up the roads leading to the docks. 
The rise of containerization put an emphasis on better connections at ports, and the new or 
expanded container ports of the 1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s were often located at exurban sites where 
they would be more directly accessible to highways. It was fortuitous that the Interstate 
highways were being built at approximately the same time, and the logic of connecting them to 
important ports—or siting ports near the new highways—was evident. Even at the beginning of 
Sea-Land’s operations in 1956, Newark had the virtue of easy access to the newly built New 
Jersey Turnpike, a sharp contrast to the insufferable traffic and delays at the docks of Manhattan 
and Brooklyn. Likewise the port of San Francisco was congested and depended on severely 
constricted routes, being geographically isolated on its peninsula, while the east side of San 
Francisco Bay was convenient to the new Interstate highways, and so by the late 1960s Oakland 
had become the dominant port of the region. (Another reason for the creation of new ports in 
more distant locations was that containerized operations required far more space, especially 
given the increase in the total amount of cargo, and most of the old ports in their tight urban 
settings could not be easily expanded.) 
In terms of port access, the Los Angeles region did not fail to live up to its reputation for 
highway infrastructure. Two key north-south highways connect the ports of Los Angeles and 
Long Beach with the rest of the highway network: the Long Beach Freeway and the Harbor 
Freeway, the latter revealing its purpose merely through its name. Each was built primarily in the 
1950s and ‘60s, in large part to provide a connection to the ports, which were shifting to 
containerization in roughly the same period.43 The presence of these new links was no minor 
detail, for an advertisement for the port of Los Angeles in 1966 highlighted the value of such 
highway access: “From dockside the famous high speed Harbor Freeway moves cargo inland 
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over super highways. Eastbound, there’s not even a traffic signal for 225 miles inland!... Remember, 
a direct route is available.” The advertisement’s fantastical drawing showed a ship moving along 
a highway, just to make the point of continuous movement more clear.44 (This is an interesting 
counterpoint to a Sea-Land advertisement of about the same time, described in chapter 6, in 
which trucks were shown moving on an imaginary highway extended over the ocean. 
Containerization by its nature seems to invite such conceptions and metaphors of transport 
modes overlapping and passing through each other.) Today the Long Beach Freeway and Harbor 
Freeway fulfill their intended purpose all too well, as they are frequently overloaded with heavy 
traffic, much of it tied to the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. The Long Beach Freeway 
suffers in particular from this congestion, but proposals to expand or extend it in the early 2000s 
predictably ran into a storm of well-justified opposition from local communities and 
environmentalists, and went nowhere.45 
For a much longer highway extension to a port in a very different part of the nation, North 
Carolina, public opinion was more favorable and political willpower stronger. Over the course of 
the mid- and late 1980s Interstate 40, which previously ended slightly east of Raleigh, was 
extended southeast about 120 miles all the way to Wilmington on the coast. This was meant to 
improve access to the southeast corner of the state in general, but better port access was a 
significant consideration, and it has helped Wilmington grow into a more prominent container 
port.46 For shippers in North Carolina the new highway segment cut the cost of trucking to the 
port by roughly 25%.47 Recently another port-related highway project in the Southeast has been 
under debate: a proposed highway in Georgia to connect Savannah with Augusta, possibly 
continuing all the way to Knoxville, Tennessee. Seemingly quite unnecessary (Savannah is 
already served by Interstate 95 running north-south and Interstate 16 going northwest to 
Atlanta), and with very little chance of being realized, the idea nevertheless attracted some 
interest. Georgia governor Nathan Deal was one of its supporters, and while campaigning in 2010 
he argued that “with the deepening of the port of Savannah, we must improve our infrastructure 
so we can move goods from ships fast and efficiently to other parts of the state and throughout 
the Southeast.”48 
An important highway or road extension to a port can also be a very short link, where the 
distance is small but the gain in accessibility and convenience is substantial due to a difficult 
bottleneck being resolved. Unfortunately such an upgrade may be very expensive. An example 
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currently under construction is the Port of Miami Tunnel, a public-private partnership to build a 
tunnel under water to Miami’s port on Dodge Island. The tunnel will supplement the port’s 
existing bridge connection and provide a direct link to Interstate 395 (and via I-395 to I-95 only 
about a mile west) so trucks hauling containers will no longer need to travel on surface roads in 
downtown Miami. Thanks to the expansion of the Panama Canal, and dredging work to deepen 
the port’s channel to 50’, it is anticipated the port will soon be receiving an increase in 
containerized cargo. Critics claim the project is unnecessary and too expensive, and question 
whether the present access situation—actually only a few blocks through downtown—is really so 
bad. They also argue that the project’s budget is likely to balloon beyond the current estimate of 
roughly one billion dollars.49 Whatever the arguments for and against the tunnel, the most salient 
fact is that it (like other recent road and highway linkages to American ports), represents a 
tremendous effort and expense put forth for the sake of connecting the territory of the nation-





Figure 8.3: Port of Miami Tunnel 
 
Source: Huffington Post, “Port Of Miami Tunnel Reaches Halfway Point,” August 1, 2012 (http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2012/08/01/port-of-miami-drilling_n_1728059.html, accessed 12/15/12) (Image is #7 in slideshow) 
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Projects like the Miami tunnel substantiate Graham and Marvin’s “splintering urbanism” 
paradigm in some ways. Certainly such projects, and the massive amounts of money spent on 
them, indicate the strength of the desire to more tightly link American infrastructure into the 
global flows of containerized freight. But it is difficult to see evidence of a splintering or 
fracturing of infrastructure in such efforts—while some domestic transport routes are indeed 
prioritized, the cohesion of the overall network is not threatened. While it may now be 
“globalized,” the U.S. system of highways and roads remains an infrastructure of extraordinary 
extent and power, tying the entire nation together with great effectiveness. It has not at all been 
splintered or fragmented. Indeed, the success of the container is tied to such expansive networks; 
it flourishes by insinuating itself throughout a national territory and infrastructure, not by being 
limited in any way. Anywhere a truck can go, a container can go. 
The alterations to American trucking wrought by the shipping container are not as significant 
as for the railroads. Where the rise of double-stacking led to a fundamental change in rail’s 
spatial regime, the changes in trucking’s spatial regime since the 1950s have transpired for 
reasons unrelated to the container. The impact of the container has been felt more in the vast 
quantity of them now hauled on American roads and highways, albeit often for distances that are 
only at a local or regional scale. The infrastructure essentially holds its character, one steeped in 
American history, practices and geography, even as the nature of the freight moving upon it 
changes radically. In this way the container carries out a quiet revolution, one all the more 
remarkable for being so unobtrusive. As with the railroad companies, it has largely been the 
trucking firms that have implemented this aspect of globalization, simply by carrying containers. 
But they have not invested much into it, nor profited greatly from it, being limited to short routes 
while rail makes the longer journeys and the shipping lines maintain their dominant power. (For 
domestic containerization the situation is somewhat different.) Some truckers have been able to 
broaden their activities into more parts of the supply chain, but for the most part in recent 
decades the trucking industry seems to have been put in its place with regard to containerization, 
and is rather constrained. Even as trucking moves an enormous number of containers all over the 
nation, and especially around ports and intermodal terminals, it finds itself changed to only a 
moderate extent. The preexisting infrastructural network of the nation-state maintains its 





Chapter 9 ~ Sites of Transfer 
 
Containerization within American infrastructure is not only a process whereby the railroad 
and trucking systems are altered, adjusted and reconfigured to accommodate the shipping 
container. Almost as crucial has been the creation and development of intermodal terminals 
where containers are transferred between these two transport modes. As use of the container 
typically involves the use of multiple transportation infrastructures, the points of transfer become 
critical nodes, and are expected to rapidly handle large quantities of freight. This is most evident 
in the radical changes to port design brought on by containerization—a port representing the 
most crucial transfer point, between oceanic (shipping) and land-based (trucking or railroad) 
transportation, that links the foreign and domestic. But the inland facilities for the transfer of 
containers between truck and train are also essential, and from the viewpoint of domestic 
infrastructure these facilities are of central importance; they are critical to the proper functioning 
of a containerized system within the nation-state, and also reveal the impact of globalization 
upon the national infrastructure. This chapter describes the development of these intermodal 
terminals over the years, and discusses their role in the American network of container 
movement. There are a variety of terms used for these sites, which are not traditional rail yards or 
depots, and no one title has become standard. Perhaps the most common is “intermodal 
terminal,” or simply “terminal,” and the dissertation follow this usage. Other phrases often used 
include “inland port,” “intermodal facility,” “intermodal yard,” “container terminal,” and 
“container yard.” 
The sites of these intermodal terminals are selected carefully, strategically located where the 
existing infrastructures intersect, typically at points along railroad main lines and close to 
highway exits. Furthermore they are usually in metropolitan regions, where a substantial flow of 
goods and quantity of interchange is assured. While some intermodal terminals are former rail 
yards that have been converted to this new purpose, and others are provisionally placed at 
locations with limited space and traffic congestion, the newer terminals are usually on vast 
greenfield sites about two miles long and half-a-mile wide, on the outer periphery of 
metropolitan areas. Giant interventions though these may be, it is significant that they are located 
at intersections of the rail and road systems; just as containerization generally works within those 
two existing infrastructures, so the new intermodal terminals are sited to exploit those 
infrastructures as they are currently constituted, rather than fundamentally reshaping them. It 
would be too difficult to build entirely new highways or railroad lines, and in any case it is not 
necessary. Here once again, globalization is carried through the working systems already in 
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place, via the preexisting infrastructures. It does impact those infrastructural systems in some 
novel and unexpected ways, however, and its effects are by no means insignificant. 
The intermodal terminals, and the transfers of freight that take place there, hearken back to 
older practices. During the nineteenth century, freight that moved by railroad was usually 
carried by wagon or cart on a local basis between the station, depot or spur and the actual origin 
or destination of the goods. This was known as local cartage or drayage, and in some places 
specialized carts known as drays were built for the purpose; these were often designed for easy 
access from the side rather than the rear, since they would be pulled up alongside boxcars for the 
actual transfer of cargo. (As noted in chapter 8, the term “drayage” has been retained and now 
applies to the business of moving containers by truck. “Cartage” is occasionally used to refer to 
trucking in general.) Manufacturers and warehouses sought to be as close as possible to railroad 
lines, or to have their own spur lines, but nevertheless a substantial amount of local cartage was 
necessary to serve them. In addition goods had to reach a multitude of businesses and residences 
scattered throughout cities and towns. So cartage played a key role in moving freight along local 
roads, in order to link all these users with the railroad depots. 
In the late 1910s trucking began to gain use for short deliveries, and during the 1920s trucks, 
generally operated by small local companies, largely replaced wagons in the cartage business.1 
Initially this did not pose a threat to the railroads at all, and in fact some railroad companies 
actually joined the “Good Roads” movement and promoted better roads—paved roads in 
particular—as they perceived that if local traffic moved more easily it would benefit their own 
business. Trucking was seen as a local component of the movement of cargo dominated by rail, 
not as a long-distance alternative in its own right. This attitude changed over the course of the 
1920s, as trucking tentatively entered into long-distance service and started to offer real 
competition to the train, but despite such inroads the railroads remained dominant until after the 
Second World War. Thus transfers of goods between train and truck, so the truckers could handle 
local deliveries and pickups for the railroads, were frequent. A design typology for the railroad 
freight depot developed to efficiently handle these transfers: a long low narrow building, with 
large doors and loading docks on both sides, alongside which the train (or at least a set of 
railcars, typically boxcars) would pull up on one side while trucks backed up to it on the other 
side. Such a building was typically known as a freight house (or freight station), and its purpose 
was to facilitate fast and easy transfers of freight from one mode to the other without a great deal 
of long-term storage. In some respects this design prefigures the layout of contemporary facilities 
for cross-docking, in which cargo is shifted from one truck to several trucks, or vice-versa, 
through a long low narrow building. 
These buildings were utilitarian in nature and of simple construction, as one might expect, 
but in major cities they could be quite large and might become local landmarks. Freight houses 
were basically linear in their typology; they could be very long but were usually narrow and low-
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slung. Smaller examples were often built of wood, but larger ones invariably of brick or masonry. 
Sometimes requiring freight to be shifted quickly, a major freight house typically had many large 
doors on each side.2 The typology predates the motor vehicle, for buildings were also designed in 
this way to allow freight to transfer easily between trains and wagons. In the railroad hub of 
Chicago it is not surprising there were numerous freight houses, with the earliest built in 1850.3 
For many railroad companies freight houses were so common that a standard design existed, 
which could be adjusted for local conditions.4 Some freight houses still stand, an example being 
one about 200 feet long in Ypsilanti, Michigan, built in 1878 by the Michigan Central Railroad.5 A 
much larger facility in Kansas City, 500 feet long by 40 feet wide and built in 1877, has been 
renovated and now contains three restaurants.6 
One particularly impressive example was the Santa Fe Freight Depot in downtown Los 
Angeles, built in 1907 by the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway (widely known as “the 
Santa Fe”). The reinforced concrete structure, which still stands, stretches an astonishing quarter-
mile in length but is only 40 to 60 feet wide (the width varying at different points) and 29 feet 
high; when in use it had 120 bays, each with doors opening to both sides.7 Given the building’s 
date of construction, horse-drawn wagons were obviously used in the beginning, but eventually 
trucks took their place. (The building is now known for housing the Southern California Institute 
of Architecture, which carried out extensive renovations to the interior.) Its long narrow 
footprint, maximizing the interface to trains on one side and wagons or trucks on the other, hints 
at the emphasis placed on the rapid transfer of great quantities of freight; the building was 
designed for interchange more than storage. A similar though smaller example, presumably 
intended for trucks from the beginning, was the Denver and Rio Grande Western Freight Depot 
in Pueblo, Colorado, about 400 feet long but relatively narrow and short, built in 1924 by the 
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad.8 (The building now houses the Southeastern Colorado 
Heritage Center.) A few years later in 1929 the Santa Fe built another such depot—known locally 
as the Santa Fe Freight Depot (as with the earlier building in Los Angeles)—in downtown 
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Phoenix close by the city’s passenger train station, though this one (which still stands and has 
been converted into county government offices) was only about 300 feet long.9 
In the postwar era long-distance trucking, supported by new highways, made facilities like 
these less essential, as the truck itself could go the entire distance from origin to destination, 
cutting out the train completely. But interchange between train and truck did not vanish. In fact 
some new terminals, designed and used along lines roughly similar to the old freight houses with 
boxcars accessing one side and trucks the other, were built in the postwar years. A description of 
one such building from the early 1960s notes that “the disparate freight…is passed out of the 
boxcars on to close-positioned dollies revolving on an electrically powered belt to waiting 
trucks.”10 Another new freight house, constructed in 1960 by the Union Pacific Railroad, was 
about 1,300’ long and 100’ wide (site constraints made it even more elongated than usual), 
entirely free of columns in its interior, and also had a mechanized circuit of moving dollies. 
Boxcars actually entered into the building on tracks along one side, while on the other side trucks 
had access on the exterior. The structure even had a distinctive architectural appearance, thanks 
to a series of 30 concrete barrel vaults, each running transversely, that comprised its roof.11 But 
such buildings became the exception as interchange diminished between the two modes of 
transportation. 
Another factor contributing to the gradual decline of these buildings was the intermodal 
practices of piggyback and containerization, both of which essentially began in the 1920s (as 
discussed in chapter 5). As trailers and containers hold their goods within them, no depots, 
warehouses or buildings of any sort are necessary at the transfer point. In piggyback the “circus 
loading” technique was used to move trailers on and off flatcars, while containers were shifted 
between truck and train by a crane or other mechanized device. In either case the transfer was 
typically done at a rail yard, or else a spur, siding or some other convenient location—there were 
no facilities specially designed for the purpose. Given that these practices were done at a 
relatively small scale and accounted for a trivial percentage of overall rail operations (and also 
considering that the trailers and containers were quite small compared to those of today), it is not 
surprising that in the 1920s and ‘30s they could be accommodated at existing sites, even if some 
new equipment had to be put in place. 
At least one new facility was created to handle container transfers, however. This was a 
terminal in Enola, Pennsylvania, built in 1932 by the Pennsylvania Railroad for their 
containerized operations. The purpose of the facility actually was not to transfer containers 
between train and truck, but rather between different trains and/or railcars. This makes it quite 
unusual in the history of containerization, as container transfer facilities normally are primarily 
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designed for moving the containers between train and truck—if a container needs to be shifted 
from one train to another, a truck usually functions in an intermediate role. (The Pennsylvania 
Railroad’s containers were rarely transferred to trucks anyway; unlike other containerized 
operations of the time and since, the containers usually remained on the flatcars to which they 
were firmly attached. The system was in this regard more comparable to an LCL operation, and 
not truly intermodal in nature.) In the Pennsylvania Railroad’s containerized operation all 
containers were routed through Enola, which was already a major junction point for the railroad 
and geographically well suited for the purpose. Two gantry cranes specially designed for the 
facility spanned seven tracks, running back and forth (on their own rails) as they quickly shifted 
containers from one railcar to another. The terminal ran at all hours, as speed was of the essence 
for this sort of freight, and received 30 to 40 trains, with about 800 containers handled, each day.12 
But the first generation of containers faded in the 1930s, and while piggyback gained 
momentum during that decade it then dropped off in the 1940s. Piggyback reemerged and began 
to flourish during the 1950s, but even then captured only a very small slice of domestic freight 
movement. For the most part the railroads and trucking went their own ways, and the businesses 
regarded each other with suspicion or outright hostility. The playing field was increasingly 
slanted in favor of trucking, as the popularity of the automobile led to massive road-building 
projects that were to the great advantage of truckers. The railroads found their operational 
flexibility limited by heavy regulations, imposed with good reason in previous decades but now 
outdated, while truckers enjoyed a more favorable regulatory environment. Locked in rivalry, the 
two sides had little motivation to work together, even in circumstances where it could be to their 
mutual advantage. 
In addition, policymakers tended to stifle rather than encourage cooperation between modes. 
There were some exceptions. In 1923 the U.S. Chamber of Commerce issued a report urging 
collaboration between the transport modes, and specifically suggesting that railroads concentrate 
on longer journeys with truckers handling the shorter trips.13 In the same year landscape architect 
Warren Manning, in his “A National Plan Study Brief,” recommended that highways, railroads 
and waterways run parallel to each other where possible, and that “facilities for freight 
interchange” be created to exploit this multiplicity of transport modes.14 In the late 1920s and 
early ‘30s the federal government got involved, as an ICC (Interstate Commerce Commission) 
researcher named Leo Flynn argued that the various modes of transportation, in particular the 
railroads and trucking, needed to cooperate more effectively. Further he recommended the 
railroads be freed from some of their overly burdensome regulations and truckers be more 
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extensively regulated.15 When the Interstate highways were being planned in the 1950s and ‘60s, 
once again a smattering of forward-thinking individuals argued for a less fragmented, more 
cooperative and holistic approach—in short, for intermodalism. But they had little success and 
such thinking would remain rare until the 1990s. (The evolution of intermodalism in policy and 
practice is covered in more detail in chapter 12.) 
But there was one bright spot: the return of piggyback in the 1950s, and its success in 
subsequent decades. For many railroad companies, ever more desperate for business in these 
years of decline for their industry, the opportunity offered by piggyback was welcome. But the 
method of transferring trailers between truck and train, known as “circus loading” thanks to its 
origins in the 1800s when circus wagons were put on trains this way, was slow and cumbersome. 
(It was once regarded as advanced, and the German military was most impressed in 1901 upon 
witnessing circus loading carried out by the Barnum & Bailey Circus, touring Germany at the 
time.16) Trailers were generally moved onto a train by backing them up a ramp and along a series 
of railcars—the gap between railcars being temporarily spanned by a flat device called a bridge 
plate—into the correct spot. For removing trailers, the actions were done in reverse. Either way 
the process was laborious and slow, and loading was especially tricky as it involved the trailer 
being moved—in a perfectly straight line—by a truck tractor driven backwards for several 
hundred feet over multiple railcars. Using a crane or some other lifting device, known as 
“mechanization,” made it much easier and faster, but this was rarely done time due to the 
expense of acquiring the equipment. As piggyback gained popularity a tremendous number of 
these transfer points were created in the 1950s and ‘60s all across the U.S., but usually they were 
not entirely new facilities but rather were at an existing rail yard or some other convenient site. 
Since ramps were used in the transfer process, the facilities themselves were often called 
“ramps.” (The term is still widely used for piggyback facilities, even though they are now 
mechanized and no longer have actual ramps, and on occasion even for container terminals, 
which have never had ramps at all.) 
Most of these facilities were small and somewhat provisional, and given the modest amount 
of traffic they typically handled there were no economies of scale to be realized from mechanized 
operations. But a few facilities grew large, consisting of numerous tracks each with its own ramp; 
the Southern Pacific Railroad’s Los Angeles Transportation Center for example eventually 
expanded to 17 tracks and ramps. The time spent loading and unloading trailers was immense 
for such an operation. It was additionally awkward because the order of trailer movement was 
fixed; the last trailer put on a train had to be the first taken off (unless the railcars themselves 
were rearranged, but that was also complex and time-consuming). For such bustling sites of 
transfer the logic of mechanization was evident, as a crane or side-loading device could work far 
more efficiently and eventually justify its cost. The idea was hardly a radical breakthrough, for 
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cranes had been used for many years to transfer large objects and assemblages of goods, 
including containers, between train and truck. The first mechanized device specifically designed 
for moving trailers on and off trains may have been a lift crane built by the Paceco Corporation in 
1961 for the Pennsylvania Railroad’s facility in Kearny, New Jersey. In 1964 another such crane 
was put in place at the same railroad’s 47th Street terminal in Chicago. In the mid-1960s cranes 
made by Drott and Le Tourneau also entered service for several railroads. Like most of the cranes 
intended for moving containers between train and truck, these were gantry cranes, albeit moving 
on wheels instead of rails. Another mechanized device for trailer transfers, a side-lift machine 
informally known as a “piggypacker,” also came into use in the mid-1960s and quickly proved 
popular. The piggypacker is somewhat analogous to a massive forklift, and was adapted from 
devices used in the logging industry.17 (In the 1950s the Pennsylvania Railroad apparently 
considered the possibility of shifting trailers sideways between railcars and platforms set at the 
same height, without mechanized lifting equipment, but it is unclear if this was ever carried 
out.18) 
As of the close of the 1960s mechanized piggyback terminals were still very much the 
exception, but it was recognized in the industry that for busy terminals mechanization was 
desirable, given the economies of scale associated with it.19 Some of the larger and more 
successful terminals were swamped with traffic, and the traditional circus loading techniques 
simply could not keep up; a trade journal commented in 1973 that “for high-volume terminals, 
the circus-load/unload facility just can’t be made to do the job.”20 By this time is was also evident 
too many piggyback terminals had been built, and that a more efficient approach would 
concentrate transfers at fewer facilities, each mechanized and capable of handling greater 
volumes. Over the course of the 1970s the railroads therefore closed numerous small transfer 
facilities and emphasized select larger ones that were mechanized with cranes or piggypackers. 
In addition to the advantages mechanized terminals offered, the railroad companies were 
realizing the benefit of sending dedicated trains long distances directly between major nodes, 
rather than stopping occasionally to load or unload a few trailers or add or drop some railcars. A 
system of hubs, in other words, was evolving.21 These trends continued into the 1980s. The 
number of intermodal trailer facilities had reached an estimated 2,100 in 1965, with just 63 of 
them mechanized, but by 1990 the figure was all the way down to 231, of which 196 were 
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mechanized.22 Moreover, these operations were larger and more sophisticated; a piggyback 
transfer facility was now often a large terminal specially designed and laid out for the purpose. 
Writing in 1989, McKenzie, North and Smith commented that: 
The pig [piggyback] ramp is gone, and has been replaced by the intermodal 
hub. The old piggyback hands that used to “chain ‘em down” would scarcely 
recognize the new facilities. Spacious, paved, lighted and dominated by massive 
machinery, today’s intermodal hubs have nearly become machines themselves, 
dedicated to achieving levels of efficient throughput unimagined by the most 
optimistic planners of the 1960s.23 
Facilities for container transfer lagged behind in the 1950s and ‘60s, mainly because 
containerization itself did not gain much popularity with the railroads until the arrival of global 
containers in substantial quantities in the 1970s. As described in chapter 5, American railroads 
used small containers in the 1920s and ‘30s, and larger ones in the 1950s and ‘60s, but the practice 
though it gained a measure of success was not truly widespread and could not justify dedicated 
terminals. The transfer of containers was usually done at rail yards or other existing facilities, 
sometimes alongside circus loading operations, in a fairly ad-hoc manner. Mechanization—in the 
form of either cranes or side-lifters—was necessary from the beginning, since a container cannot 
be moved to or from a railcar otherwise. (There are two exceptions. First, a container can remain 
on a trailer chassis that is carried by piggyback and shifted by circus loading with ramps; this has 
been done on occasion and was especially common in the late 1960s and ‘70s when railroads 
began to move growing numbers of containers but lacked mechanized terminals at inland 
points.24 Second, in the case of Flexi-Van and a few other containerization systems the container 
was transferred by sliding and/or rotation methods, without mechanization.) The cost of this 
mechanization helped discourage the railroads from implementing containerization in these 
years. 
When marine containers entered the picture, thanks to the innovations of Sea-Land and 
Matson in the late 1950s, they were occasionally carried by train but not so often that large-scale 
specialized facilities were needed, other than at some ports. The lack of container equipment in 
general, especially mechanized devices to lift them, might be one reason the railroads did not 
pursue the container business with much alacrity at this time. Another obstacle was the need to 
ensure a trailer chassis would be provided at the inland facilities for each container arriving by 
train. For the few railroad companies that had developed containerization on their own, their 
container systems were usually incompatible with those of Sea-Land or Matson, or with the new 
ASA standards. One railroad that did take the initiative was Southern Pacific, which served 
several ports on the West Coast and Gulf Coast and showed an early interest in carrying the new 
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shipborne container traffic. In the mid-1960s the railroad began using its own version of the 
piggypacker for transferring both containers and trailers at several different facilities.25 But 
Southern Pacific was an exception, as most railroads resisted containers. This state of affairs 
continued through the 1960s—even as containerization made great strides in the world of 
shipping—but in the 1970s progress began to pick up and container traffic on the railroads rose 
significantly. Since mechanized terminals were coming into use for piggyback, railroads were no 
longer so reluctant to invest in similar equipment for container transfer. Still, in the 1970s and 
early ‘80s the transfer of containers between train and truck, though it was mechanized, was 
typically done in a rather ad-hoc way at existing facilities. 
Intermodal terminals designed specifically for container transfer began to appear at inland 
sites in the American heartland in the late 1980s as containerization grew more widespread in the 
railroad industry. The need was growing for more efficient container transfer operations between 
train and truck not only at or near major ports (where such facilities generally already existed), 
but at inland locations. The rising prominence of double-stack railcars (and entire trains pulling 
such railcars, known as stacktrains) helped bring about this shift—containers were now being 
carried in such large quantities that bigger and more efficient facilities were necessary for 
interchange with trucks. As stacktrains grew more common and the economies of scale became 
evident, it made sense to build new terminals entirely designed to handle containers as efficiently 
as possible. The first was the Global I terminal in Chicago, built in 1986 by the Chicago and North 
Western Railway, in cooperation with Union Pacific and the shipping company American 
President Lines, on a site that had previously been the Wood Street rail yard.26 The use of the 
word “global” in the terminal’s name signaled the nature of the containerized goods passing 
through and was an acknowledgment of the transnational nature of this new node deep in the 
heart of the domestic infrastructure. The separation of the national and the global was subtly 
blurred by such a facility that extended the reach of high-volume container movement; a 
manager of the Chicago and North Western said in 1985 that Global I would be an “inland 
port,”27 and a writer in a trade journal used nearly the same phrase soon after, stating that it 
would be “in effect, an inland container port.”28 Its location in Chicago was fitting, for as the 
historic and enduring center of the nation’s railroad network that city had already secured a key 
place in the burgeoning container system; as of 1987 Chicago was on 17 of the 20 busiest U.S. 
intermodal (container or piggyback) rail routes.29 
In 1990 the Chicago and North Western opened Global II, another terminal in Chicago 
designed for container transfer, next to its Proviso rail yard. But in spite of specialized new 
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terminals like Global I, Global II and a few others—and aside from the  facilities at or near 
ports—most container transfers in the 1980s and ‘90s continued to be at facilities that offered a 
mix of other operations as well, such as piggyback trailer transfers (by now mostly mechanized) 
and traditional railcar switching (as in a true rail yard). This was the case even for many of the 
largest nodes of container transfer: two examples in Chicago were the Burlington Northern 
Railroad’s Cicero Yard and the Santa Fe’s Corwith Yard. Eventually though these two facilities—





Figure 9.1: Container transfer at an intermodal terminal 
 
Source: Joe Perry, Chasing Steel blog (http://www.chasingsteel.com/blog/2010/ 
2/20/union-pacifics-ictf-an-amazing-complex.html, accessed 12/15/12) 
 
As already noted, many ports had by this time already developed intermodal terminals 
either within or just outside their boundaries. A facility like this can arguably be seen as 
fundamentally a component of port operations, rather than the nation’s internal domestic 
infrastructure, since in effect it allows containers to be transferred between ship and rail (with a 
short truck haul being necessary to make the connection). Such terminals nevertheless are 
certainly relevant to the national infrastructure because they play a key role in linking it to ocean 
shipping. Containers had been transferred between truck and train at (or near) ports since the late 
1950s, albeit infrequently in the early years. At the Milwaukee Road’s Stacy Street yard adjacent 
to Seattle’s port, for example, an area for Flexi-Van transfers was built in 1959, and in the 1960s 
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facilities for both TOFC and COFC were put in place. By 1971 a piggypacker was operating, 
shifting both containers and trailers from truck to train for their rail journeys to destinations far 
east, most often Chicago.31 By the mid-1970s such intermodal terminals close to ports were 
common, at least at the major container ports, but they were not especially large and not 
necessarily focused solely on containers. Such facilities grew more extensive in the late 1970s and 
especially the 1980s, and as they increasingly dealt exclusively with containers, and were 
designed and laid out for that purpose, they can be regarded as intermodal terminals. A terminal 
at North Bergen, New Jersey, near Newark, opened in 1985 and is of particular interest because it 
was built and operated by Sea-Land rather than a railroad or port.32 As with American President 
Line’s deepening involvement in the railroad industry at about the same time (described in 
chapter 7), the Sea-Land facility revealed the new desire of shipping lines to venture into the 
nation’s domestic infrastructure, rather than adhering to their traditional role of only handling 
transportation over the ocean. 
The more common practice was for these terminals to be created by the ports and/or 
railroads. One such case was the Intermodal Container Transfer Facility (ICTF) in Long Beach, 
California, jointly opened in 1987 by Southern Pacific and the ports of Long Beach and Los 
Angeles, which immediately enjoyed great success. At the time it was noted for its 
unprecedented size—some claimed it was the largest such facility in the world. Previously the 
port’s containers were trucked all the way to and from railheads near downtown Los Angeles 
about 25 miles away from the two ports, often through heavy traffic, and the ICTF, just five miles 
away, made the transfer between ship and train far more convenient.33 Like Chicago, the Los 
Angeles region was establishing itself as a key node in container movement by rail, seizing the 
opportunity made possible by the explosive growth in imports from Asia, the success of the two 
ports, and its historically important position in the American rail network. San Francisco’s port 
made similar efforts, opening a smaller intermodal terminal in late 1986, but in the long run this 
drew little traffic since the port itself could not compete with Oakland across the bay. Oakland’s 
port in fact opened an intermodal terminal soon after. Meanwhile in the Pacific Northwest the 
ports of Seattle, Tacoma and Portland were building and/or enlarging their own intermodal 
terminals in the mid- and late 1980s, in collaboration with either Burlington Northern or Union 
Pacific.34 
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Whether at ports or inland sites, these new terminals dedicated entirely to container transfers 
represent a new typology of rail operations, very different from traditional rail yards or freight 
yards, and also different from piggyback terminals. Generally they are characterized by multiple 
railroad tracks separated by wide lanes of pavement so trucks can move between them. The 
convergence of the two transport modes is expressed quite legibly in such a layout, as they are 
literally intertwined with each other. (Such a typology is not always present, as some small 
terminals are laid out on a less systematic basis—and in addition space constraints can distort the 
ideal layout.) Rolling cranes known as gantry cranes (“rubber-tired gantry cranes,” strictly 
speaking, as gantry cranes traditionally move on rails) are able to pass over both trains and 
trucks and thus can shift containers from one to the other. Piggypackers and other side-lift 
devices may be used as well. There are also sometimes straddle carriers, which are similar to 
gantry cranes but much narrower in their dimensions and without the ability to move the 
container sideways. 
From the early days of containerized terminals, a key issue has been the storage and 
organization of the trailer chassis used to carry containers by truck. There are a plethora of 
chassis to be stored at a terminal, including those that have brought containers to railcars and 
those waiting along the tracks to receive containers. In addition it was often the case that different 
shipping lines would provide their own chassis to the truckers they were contracting with to haul 
their containers, and so it was not allowable to simply use the most convenient chassis to carry a 
container; the container had to be carried by a chassis owned by the appropriate shipping line. 
This meant far more chassis than necessary were held at terminals. The problem has been largely 
resolved by the use of chassis pools (sometimes known as common pools or neutral pools), in 
which chassis are put in circulation for all users and a rental fee is charged accordingly. The other 
way the chassis space problem has been solved, or at least minimized, is through machines that 
flip the chassis into vertical positions and store them in racks designed for that purpose.35 These 
are especially common at the more constricted urban terminals where space is at a premium. 
Over the course of the 1980s and ‘90s the design and layout of these terminals gradually 
improved. This evolution was recorded in trade journals of the railroad industry and in 
government publications.36 The result was not one fixed design, as the setup for each terminal 
depends on a multitude of factors like the space available, the way trains arrive and depart, how 
quickly containers will be picked up and dropped off, the budget available, the access roads, 
whether containers are to be stacked or stored on chassis, and the preferences of the railroad 
company. But the terminals did get more efficient as the learning process advanced, larger tracts 
of land were used, and the railroads were able to put more money into them. By the late 1990s the 
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rough contours of terminal design were fairly well-established, just in time for a new wave of 
giant terminals to be built. 
One commonality to virtually all the terminals has been the intertwining of rail and road; as 
already described, the railroad tracks alternate with lanes for the trucks to move, thus 
maximizing the points of contact and potential transfer between the two modes. This no longer 
holds true in a few brand-new terminals, however, which represent a significant change in 
terminal design. At these new facilities, located in Memphis and in North Baltimore, Ohio, and to 
be discussed in more detail shortly, a massive new type of gantry crane is used, one that is rail-
mounted and extends over numerous railroad tracks and truck lanes, basically covering the 
entire area of interchange. Such cranes, dramatically higher and wider than the gantry cranes 
normally used at the terminals, make it unnecessary for rail and road to be interwoven; instead it 
is possible for the railroad tracks to run adjacent to each other, with several trucking lanes also 
clustered together, and the crane is able to span them all. 
The design of the terminals reflects the spatial regime of the three infrastructures that must 
be accommodated. First, there is the container itself—the devices for lifting containers obviously 
must grip or attach to the container spatially, and containers must be stored, either on trailer 
chassis or on the ground (in which case they can be stacked). Usually both methods are used, 
with short-term storage on chassis and longer-term storage stacked on the ground. Second, there 
is the trucking infrastructure, as tractor-trailer trucks have a particular width, length and height, 
along with a minimum turning radius, that must be taken into account. Third, there is the 
railroad infrastructure, the least flexible of the three. Typically the railroads prefer to use 
stacktrains in the range of 5,000 to 9,000 feet in length, as such sizes maximize their economies of 
scale. The new terminals are laid out to accommodate such trains, and hence are almost two miles 
long. Their width can be far less, but is still substantial. A few terminals, such the one at Elwood, 
Illinois (to be discussed shortly), provide space for a train to turn around completely by making a 
semicircle, but since trains require a vast turning radius this is very rare. Instead most terminals 
are laid out adjacent to rail lines, so the trains need not turn around to exit but can pull into the 
facility and eventually depart by continuing forward or reversing direction. The width of such a 
terminal is generally between 1,500 and 2,000 feet.37 
In the past decade most of the largest new container terminals have been built on fresh sites, 
often in exurban settings where more space is available but a metropolis is still close by. As early 
as 1980 this trend was envisioned by the trade journal Railway Age, which commented that “for 
some terminals—mostly those built close to city cores and with little if any room for expansion—
the only solution may be to pack up the cranes and the sideloaders and go lay track and pour 
concrete out along an Interstate where expansion can be better accommodated.”38 Such sites are 
selected carefully at points served by both important rail lines and major highways, and in a 
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sense the terminals act as junction points for these two domestic infrastructures, the railroad and 
highway networks. Their creation was long overdue, for the development of the Interstate 
highways was a missed opportunity in terms of intermodalism as opportunities for interchange 
and adjacency were ignored. This perpetuated a division already in evidence between the two 
transport modes whose coexistence was marked primarily by competition rather than 
cooperation. Key intersections of highway and rail corridors thus came about incidentally rather 
than by design, and some of these locations now possess an importance not previously 




Figure 9.2: Operations at a contemporary intermodal terminal 
 
Source: CenterPoint Intermodal Center website (http://www.centerpoint 
-intermodal.com/providers.html, accessed 12/15/12) 
 
The regions, cities and towns where the terminals are sited have their own histories and 
characteristics. Some have long possessed multiple and important infrastructural connections, as 
they lie along major transportation corridors. Their status is not random but rooted in American 
history, geography and topography, and those factors remain applicable in the new era of 
globalization. As emphasized in previous chapters, shipping containers travel over preexisting 
routes of movement. The sites where they pause to be transferred are also usually locales of some 
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preexisting significance. A historical presence in the nation’s railroad network is especially 
important, as it is too costly and time-consuming to build new rail lines. Just as containerization 
has led to a renewed stress on historically important rail corridors (as described in chapter 7), 
likewise it has put an emphasis on major nodes of the rail network. One journalist explains: 
“Railroads are generating development in the same way they spawned towns and industrial sites 
over a century ago. Warehouse complexes are popping up next to new rail yards [intermodal 
terminals] designed to load and unload trains carrying containerized goods.”39 A report for the 
real estate industry notes that “after decades of decentralization of industrial development 
encouraged by the trucking industry and the interstate highway system, a decided 
recentralization trend is resulting in a new clustering of industrial/distribution facilities in select 
U.S. markets with intermodal capabilities.”40 
The point should be qualified by noting that although this “recentralization” has benefited 
places with a prominent presence in the national rail network (Chicago, Kansas City, etc.), the 
new intermodal terminals—and most of the facilities associated with them—are usually sited on 
the periphery of such regions, not in the urban core or even the inner-ring suburbs. So they fit in 
well with low-density suburban or exurban sprawl, rather than the urban context traditionally 
associated with railroad hubs. In some cases in fact they actually drive sprawl; a new terminal 
might concentrate a set of facilities around it, but its greenfield site is likely to make the entire 
complex represent additional sprawl. So the renewed importance of rail nodes does not 
necessarily equate to a rise in traditional urban density (as would more likely be the case with 
passenger trains). 
Several of these terminals are located on land previously used as military bases or for some 
military purpose. This is unsurprising given the need for a very large area available for 
development with good rail connections, combined with the gradual shuttering of many military 
sites that then become available for other uses. (Given the massive amount of goods and people 
the armed forces must move swiftly, they have always depended on having premium 
infrastructural access. It is easy to draw parallels between military practices and contemporary 
methods of freight movement, as both are so tightly coordinated and precisely organized; in fact 
the very word “logistics” has a military derivation.) The most prominent example is the giant 
BNSF facility at Elwood, Illinois, built on a site that was originally part of the massive Joliet Army 
Arsenal, a sprawling 23,000-acre complex where the army manufactured munitions from World 
War II through the Vietnam War. The arsenal was closed in 1976, commencing a long process of 
remediation and redevelopment for several uses, the terminal and its surrounding logistical and 
distribution uses representing only a small chunk of the entire territory.41 The infrastructure and 
geography that made the place so valuable for the army were equally vital to this new use: “The 
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Army chose the location for the Arsenal in the 1930s based on its central inland position, rail 
access to both coasts, and nearby industrial suppliers—the same factors that shape its 
redevelopment.”42 There are other examples, albeit smaller: a recently-developed terminal in 
Kansas City, serving the Kansas City Southern Railway, is located at the former Richards-Gebaur 
Air Force Base, while a small new terminal in Marion, Ohio, developed for Schneider National 
trucking, was formerly a military supply depot. For these sites too, both rail and road 
infrastructure were already in place.43 
As already noted, Chicago has long played a dominant role in the American railroad system 
and consequently today its metropolitan area is a prime location for intermodal terminals. It is 
worth rehearsing the history of the city, especially in relation to transportation infrastructure. It 
was founded in 1833, at a location where portage between the Great Lakes and the Mississippi 
River watershed was most convenient. In that time when inland waterways were the primary 
avenues of movement, Chicago was inherently well-situated. But it displayed great energy and 
initiative in attracting the next dominant mode of transportation, for the city was singularly 
successful in drawing new railroad lines to it. The first train arrived in 1838, and others quickly 
followed as the city surpassed Midwest competitors like St. Louis and Cincinnati by making itself 
into a great rail hub for both freight and passenger traffic. Chicago became a key node where the 
major railroad companies of both the east and west terminated, making transfer and interchange 
even more likely. By the early 1900s it had grown meteorically to become the nation’s second-
largest city. In the second half of the twentieth century it adapted fairly well to the declining 
status of the railroad industry, making itself a central point for the national highway and air 
travel systems also. With regard to the latter it was especially successful—for many years 
Chicago’s O’Hare Airport was the busiest in the world. 
When the railroad industry revived in the 1980s and ‘90s Chicago was well placed to benefit, 
as it had never lost its status as the nation’s central rail hub. Since the six largest North American 
railroad companies (the Union Pacific Railroad, the BNSF Railway, the Norfolk Southern 
Railway, the CSX Railroad, the Canadian National Railway, and the Canadian Pacific Railway) 
meet in Chicago and nowhere else, its status is further reinforced. But the region has become a 
node of a somewhat different sort. Previously its primacy was in the domestic rail system, as the 
goods passing through were generally flowing along paths within the territory of the nation-
state. This was fitting and seemed inevitable for a city so centrally located in the American 
heartland. (Even when freight had an ultimately foreign destination or origin, the railroads had 
little concern for that, as there was little coordination of movement on a global scale.) But today 
circumstances are altered, as containers trace their trajectories on a worldwide scale even as they 
move by train through places deep inside the national territory. 
Hence Chicago is now a key node for containers that ultimately move and are coordinated 
globally, not just domestically. Admittedly containers are only one type of cargo the railroads 
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haul, and most of their other freight (including domestic containers) moves at a domestic scale. 
But the container does represent a substantial portion of the contemporary railroad business, and 
a particularly sizable percentage of its profits. In the process containerization has to some extent 
globalized Chicago’s railroad operations, especially in its role as a site of interchange. Indeed, the 
Chicago area now handles an astonishing quantity of containers, more than any other such 
inland hub in the world. If the Chicago region were regarded as a port, the number of containers 
coming and going would rank it as the world’s third-largest behind only Singapore and Hong 
Kong. The impact on the area’s economy is tremendous; one estimate puts the number of people 
employed in the distribution industry (including freight transportation, warehousing, etc.) at 
300,000. It is also estimated that buildings devoted to distribution-related uses (distribution 
centers, warehouses, etc.) in the area add up to 1.3 billion square feet of space.44 
Three particularly large intermodal container terminals have been built in the Chicago region 
in recent years. The first, officially known as Logistics Park Chicago, was built in 2002 for the 
BNSF Railway in Elwood, a small exurban town about 30 miles southwest of the city. (Elwood is 
next to Joliet, a much larger town, and this terminal is sometimes identified with Joliet.) The 
second was built in 2003 for Union Pacific in Rochelle, a town roughly 70 miles west of Chicago, 
and is named Global III as it is the third terminal in the already noted sequence of Chicago-area 
terminals operated by Union Pacific. The terminal at Elwood was far more successful than that in 
Rochelle, however, and so Union Pacific in 2010 opened a terminal in Joliet, officially titled the 
Joliet Intermodal Terminal, only a few miles down the road from the BNSF facility in Elwood. 
The terminals of Elwood and Joliet have drawn a cluster of distribution centers and other freight-
related facilities (warehouses, cross-docking operations, container storage, etc.) to the area, some 
of which are hardly less massive than the terminals themselves. Such a complex is clearly suited 
to a setting of exurban sprawl rather than an urban context. 
The Elwood and Joliet terminals were both developed by CenterPoint Properties, a developer 
that specializes in such projects (though they are operated by the railroads). CenterPoint 
promotes the entire complex as the CenterPoint Intermodal Center. The entire site is about 6,000 
acres, most of that space being not for the terminals themselves, which each cover about 800 
acres, but assorted distribution, warehousing and logistics uses.45 Some of the largest buildings 
are of staggering size. A group of seven giant rectangular buildings in Elwood adjacent to the 
terminal offer an extreme example: while their dimensions vary, the largest is roughly 2,600 feet 
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by 700 feet while the smallest is about 1,200 feet by 500 feet.46 Two of these buildings serve as a 
massive distribution center for Walmart and together make up 3.4 million square feet.47 Such 
facilities benefit from proximity to the terminals, as the length of the drayage trip—the movement 
of the container by truck—is minimized. In the case of Walmart, the developer reportedly 
demonstrated that the location would save the company about $15 million annually compared to 
another site farther off.48 
The phrase “inland port,” perhaps hyperbole when used for a typical intermodal terminal, 
seems accurate in the case of the Joliet-Elwood cluster of facilities. Most of the terminals are not 
surrounded by so many distribution-related buildings, nor are they generally needed. But any 
node where containers are transferred in large numbers from one transport mode to another still 
acquires some significance; it is a temporary pause, and this necessitates a large facility and also 
raises the possibility of further operations since the container’s movement is being halted in any 
case. When that is combined with the additional work of unloading (or loading) the container, as 
at a distribution center, more possibilities emerge. The Joliet-Elwood area, as a part of the larger 
Chicago region, is exploiting precisely these opportunities, and has emerged as a giant hub for 
logistics and freight operations.49 
Another notable “inland port” is the Alliance Global Logistics Hub in Fort Worth, Texas. 
While its intermodal terminal (served by both BNSF and Union Pacific) is not quite so large as 
those at Elwood and Joliet, the Alliance complex also contains its own airport, Fort Worth 
Alliance Airport, which is almost entirely dedicated to air freight. In addition there are numerous 
distribution centers and other logistics-related buildings clustered about. A similar though 
smaller example is the Rickenbacker Inland Port in Columbus, Ohio, which also has an airport (a 
former Air Force base) primarily dedicated to air freight, along with a rather modest intermodal 
terminal operated by Norfolk Southern and various buildings for distribution. So far these two 
developments are unique; inland ports are typically envisioned as junctions for just rail and road, 
especially since the business of air cargo has its own very distinct qualities and containers 
virtually never move by plane. (There are specialized containers for air cargo, but they are 
entirely different, much smaller, and do not shift to other transportation modes.) It should also be 
emphasized, again, that most of the intermodal terminals do not generate such a cluster of related 
developments around them, but only a few facilities. This is especially the case since many 
terminals, especially the older ones, are on sites hemmed in by existing neighborhoods and 
buildings. Often they were previously rail yards or freight depots, and are located in urban 
settings or simply at older sites surrounded by development around them. The new global 
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infrastructure of containerization still must fit into settings that possess their particular historical 
contingencies, spatial constraints and geographical opportunities. 
Often these historical factors are transportation-related. Just as Chicago has a prominent 
heritage of infrastructural connections, so Joliet possesses its own historical links to regional and 
national transportation systems. For Joliet the story begins with waterways, as it is located on the 
Des Plaines River and the Illinois and Michigan Canal was built through the city in the mid-
1800s. Soon after the canal’s construction the railroad reached Joliet in the 1850s, and its 
importance continues today in passenger transportation as both Amtrak and Chicago commuter 
rail have stops in town. The arrival of the automobile only furthered the city’s provision of 
infrastructure, as both the Lincoln Highway and Route 66 ran right through, and later Interstates 
80 and 55 were built giving direct access to the city. Clearly Joliet has a long history as a key point 
on transportation routes running southwest from Chicago, as well as routes running east-west 
that bypass Chicago by skirting its southern edge. From all these connections Joliet has derived a 
modest measure of importance, which has been furthered by its new status as a logistics center. 
The sites of many other intermodal terminals lack this kind of historical legacy in 
transportation, however. Rochelle is an example. It is admittedly the case that the town has long 
been an infrastructural junction—it had the good fortune to have two major railroad lines 
crossing in the town, which are still important corridors. In the period of early highways it lay 
along the Lincoln Highway, like Joliet, and on Highway 51 going north-south, and today 
Interstates 88 and 39 run very close by. Thanks to all these routes intersecting at Rochelle, the 
town gave itself the nickname “The Hub City.” It is indeed an impressive collection of 
infrastructure for a rural town of 10,000 people in the Illinois countryside. But it seems to have 
done little to boost the town itself, which is merely situated at the intersection of corridors 
connecting more important places. A similar example is North Baltimore, Ohio, where CSX 
recently opened a major new intermodal terminal. As with Rochelle, the North Baltimore site is 
unusual for such a terminal in being rural rather than exurban; it is not in or near a metropolitan 
area, though it is within 175 miles of Detroit, Cincinnati and Cleveland. The town possesses 
excellent highway links, with Interstate 75 running right past and the crucial Ohio Turnpike 
(jointly comprised by Interstates 80 and 90) only 30 miles away. Equally important is the rail 
access. A newspaper article explaining the town’s appeal for CSX notes that “North Baltimore is 
strategically located along a CSX line that was once the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad’s main line 
between Chicago and the East Coast. Three vital north-south CSX lines intersect that line within 
15 miles to the east or west…”50 Despite all this infrastructure, however, North Baltimore has 
derived little benefit from it and remains a small town. 
What makes North Baltimore and Rochelle so ideal for the interchange of shipping containers 
between the railroad and trucking systems is their location at significant intersections of these 
two infrastructures. But what is of interest is that these are relatively accidental and unplanned 
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intersections. As Keller Easterling and others have commented, the Interstate highway builders 
did not think in intermodal terms, but rather laid out their system as a separate network with 
little thought for possible interchanges and transfers with the railroads. Likewise the railroad 
companies until recently gave little consideration to how their older network could link to the 
highways. So locations with good access to both infrastructures typically did not receive this as 
part of any plan, but simply by random chance or geographic fortune. (Of course major cities 
inevitably would receive premium connections to both, but that is not our concern here.) Only 
now do such sites gain an importance previously unforeseen, as the benefits of interchange 
between train and truck become evident. Despite the example of Rochelle and New Baltimore, 
such locations need not be in the countryside. In fact the more typical site is near a major city, 
where the intersection of infrastructures, suddenly now valuable because of their joint presence, 
is combined with the usefulness of proximity to a metropolitan area. (The need to find a giant 
greenfield or brownfield site available for development, and the desire to avoid traffic 
congestion, generally prevent these new terminals from actually being sited in the city.) An 
example is the new intermodal terminal operated by Union Pacific in West Memphis, Arkansas 
(technically in nearby Marion, but usually referred to as being in West Memphis). West Memphis 
as its name implies is just west of Memphis, across the Mississippi River; it lies at the crossing of 
Interstates 40 and 55, and a few railroad corridors run through or past it. This infrastructure is 
primarily tied to the bridges leading over the river to Memphis, and merely funnels through 
West Memphis on the way, but it put the town in a good position to attract an intermodal 
terminal. 
Though large facilities like these are the crucial hubs of the intermodal freight system, there 
are also some small terminals scattered about the nation. One such minor terminal opened in 
2010 in rural Minot, North Dakota, with the primary purpose of loading containers with grain 
grown in the Dakotas and bound for Asia. Grain typically does not move by container, but as 
these containers would otherwise return to Asia empty it makes a convenient cargo for the 
backhaul. The little terminal, known as the Port of North Dakota, has its rail service provided by 
BNSF while empty containers are relocated there under the coordination of the shipping line 
OOCL.51 The case of Minot illustrates that intermodal terminals on occasion can be sited in 
remote locations. But even here infrastructural access matters: while Minot is about 75 miles from 
a highway, and is very far from any metropolis of significance, it is conveniently located along a 
BNSF mainline. 
In addition to these terminals far inland, the terminals at or close to prominent ports are of 
great importance in the domestic container network, as obviously they are necessary for the 
transfer of containers from ship to train, or vice-versa. (As already discussed, containers are 
almost never shifted directly between ship and train, so a separate terminal must exist, ideally 
within the port’s boundaries but more often close by.) The development of some of these 
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terminals near ports in the 1970s and ‘80s, in particular the Intermodal Container Transfer Facility 
(ICTF) serving the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, has been described. Rising container 
quantities are putting pressure on such facilities, and so Union Pacific is actively planning to 
expand the ICTF. (Union Pacific bought out Southern Pacific, which originally ran the ICTF.) 
Meanwhile plans are afoot for an even bigger and more modern terminal named the Southern 
California International Gateway, to be built and run by BNSF (Union Pacific’s main rival in the 
West), that will also serve the two ports. The projected cost for this facility, which has run into 
community opposition and lawsuits but nonetheless seems likely to reach fruition eventually, is 
an impressive $500 million.52 
It is the railroad companies that generally build and operate the intermodal terminals. Even 
when the terminal is built and the land owned by a separate developer—CenterPoint Properties 
and the Allen Group being the most prominent developers that specialize in this business—it is 
still meant for a particular railroad company, which then operates it. The trucking companies, 
and various other logistics providers and IMCs (intermodal marketing companies), obviously use 
the terminals heavily, and logistics providers depend on them, but it is the railroads that directly 
run them. There does not seem to be any reason why this has to be the case—one could imagine 
trucking companies or shipping lines, or some third party, handling the terminals. But the 
railroads have a long tradition of operating rail yards, piggyback terminals, freight depots and 
other facilities where railcars are shifted or freight is loaded and unloaded, so container terminals 
are a logical continuation of this. And it is generally the railroads that have the most to gain—
they are seeking to draw container traffic to them, which could otherwise move by truck over 
their entire land-based journeys. Furthermore they are large and well-capitalized corporations, 
able to invest in such terminals. But a recently built terminal in Marion, Ohio, is an exception, as 
it was created and is run by the trucking firm Schneider National. CSX and the Kansas City 
Southern Railway provide rail service to this small facility, which opened in 2006 and is 
strategically located near several manufacturers in northern Ohio.53 It remains to be seen whether 
this is a harbinger of the future or merely an exceptional case. 
The construction costs of the container terminals, and the associated complexes around them, 
are hefty and give an indication of how valuable they are to the railroads—and of the significance 
of the container’s impact. Just as the railroad companies have spent hundreds of millions of 
dollars improving their corridors to accommodate stacktrains (as described in chapter 7), so they 
have paid comparable sums on their new terminals. The aforementioned CSX terminal in North 
Baltimore, Ohio, that opened in 2011 came at a price of $175 million.54 CSX is spending $100 
million on a terminal in Winter Haven, Florida, and Norfolk Southern is spending $130 million 
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for one outside Memphis.55 The planned Southern California International Gateway is expected 
to cost roughly $500 million, as already noted. Often the cost of the surrounding facilities is even 
greater, though much of it is not borne by the railroads. This was the case for the CenterPoint 
Intermodal Center, whose total cost (including both the Elwood and Joliet terminals and the 
many facilities in the vicinity) ran to the staggering sum of approximately $3 billion.56 
Another way to gauge the importance of the terminals as functional nodes in the overall 
freight transportation system is by the number of containers transferred at them between train 
and truck. Each container transfer is conventionally called a “lift” in the industry. A typical figure 
for annual lifts at a terminal is somewhere between 100,000 and 400,000. While there are assorted 
minor terminals that shift fewer containers, the railroads generally aim for the economies of scale 
involved in larger ones, and so the bulk of the traffic goes to substantial terminals that shift at 
least 100,000 containers per year, and in many cases more than 300,000. The new terminal in 
North Baltimore, Ohio, for example, is projected to handle over 630,000 lifts yearly in the near 
future (though a small percentage of this may be trailers moving by piggyback rather than 
containers).57 At the BNSF terminal in Elwood, probably the busiest intermodal container 
terminal in the world, approximately 800,000 lifts are done each year.58 This astonishing 
quantity—about 2,200 container transfers daily—is actually comparable to a reasonably large 
port; it would probably rank somewhere between eighth and twelfth in a listing of the busiest 
American container ports. (An exact comparison is difficult because ports give container statistics 
by TEU [twenty-foot equivalent unit], and a TEU can represent either one 20’ container or half of 
a 40’ container, while a lift represents a container of any size.) 
The intermodal terminals are in a sense an extension of the global network of trade deep into 
the interior of the nation-state’s territory. The term “inland port,” sometimes used as a synonym 
for a terminal, indicates the concept quite directly. Stacktrains bring massive numbers of 
containers from the coastal ports to these inland sites, which hence in a sense become subsidiary 
gateways, extensions of the real ports. The gateway function is not entirely new for such settings. 
Chicago for instance has long been a gateway for freight, due to the railroad in particular (a 
dynamic brilliantly described by William Cronon in Nature’s Metropolis). But it previously 
occupied this role in the context of domestic territory, serving as a gateway between its 
Midwestern hinterland and the rest of the U.S. Now Chicago is increasingly a global gateway, 
positioned between its hinterland and the rest of the world. As theorists of “splintering 
urbanism” would argue, Chicago’s infrastructure has been globalized. This process takes place 
within a rhetoric of globalization as well; the promotional materials for a particular terminal, or 
for a city or region’s freight capability, invariably display a map with it at the center and arrows 
extending out to the rest of the world. No matter whether the place is important (Chicago) or 
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minor (Minot), it is imagined—at least by transportation and logistics providers, and perhaps 
local economic development officials—as a key node tied into global flows. Which in a sense it is. 
But such visions of a vast global space, a smooth and unrestricted field of movement and 
dynamism, obscure the reality of what happens on the ground at specific locations. The 
supposedly “placeless” global flows must encounter particular places with their own qualities 
and histories. Just as previous chapters of the dissertation have argued that the specific qualities 
of the American railroad and trucking systems—their histories, topographies, practices, cultures, 
etc.—are of key importance in how the container moves on them, so the characteristics of the sites 
of intermodal terminals are also relevant. Such factors are perhaps even more applicable for the 
terminals because at these places the shipping container actually comes to a full stop, no matter 
how briefly. In this stop or pause, global movement loses its mythical status as a flow, and must 
confront a particular local reality. The rhetoric of globalization is obsessed with flows, but people 
and goods cannot be in motion forever—sometimes they must pause and occupy actual places.59 
The global network “touches down” at such locations, and gets entangled in issues of planning, 
local politics and culture. 
The geographer Julie Cidell, in several articles on the exurban terminals outside Chicago, 
thoughtfully considers these issues. As Cidell notes, most of the large new terminals are sited in 
places envisioned by their residents as suburban or small-town locales. Typically people wish to 
hold to those identities, even as they (or their political leaders) hope for some development and 
growth. The developers of the terminals, and the railroads that run them, must deal with these 
various local forces: 
On the edges of metropolitan areas, suburban planners are dealing with the 
pressures of population growth, changes in land use, and the maintenance of a 
robust tax base. In a world of flows and networks, these planners work within 
bounded territories. As the basis for land use planning within the USA, these 
small territories are still highly relevant despite the supposedly placeless world 
structured by the global logistics network.60 
The confrontation or cooperation that occurs between the global network and local places is 
affected not only by such practical needs and physical qualities, but also by how these localities 
imagine and conceive of themselves. Cidell uses the term “suburban spatial imaginary” to 
capture this dynamic. While Joliet and Elwood welcome growth and jobs, planners and residents 
have concerns about the traffic and oversized buildings that come with logistics-related land 
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uses. Often they pursue retail and office development, which they see as more beneficial, with 
greater vigor.61 
Global and local forces constantly reshape each other. Cidell describes how Will County 
(containing both Joliet and Elwood) was one of the nation’s fastest-growing counties during the 
2000s, as housing and other uses spread further and further outwards from Chicago. The logistics 
industry concentrated its activities on the county, driven by the need to find large plots of land 
available for development with good rail and road access. The history of Joliet’s infrastructural 
connections, and its position close to Chicago, were obviously relevant. For the most part local 
politicians and policymakers do not woo logistics-related businesses to come, but do accept them. 
They generally do not associate an intermodal terminal with the glamour of being a vital node on 
a global network. The particularities are fine-grained as well—one part of town might be 
unsuitable for development because its parcels are too small, or because of probable traffic 
problems. Tax policies, municipal boundaries and zoning codes are all critical in their own 
ways.62 Localities actively deal with this new type of industry, and regulate it as they see fit. 
Some modest new zoning rules for instance have been put in place to make the distribution 
centers and container storage facilities less unsightly, or to shield them from view. This may 
discourage the siting of some of these developments in Will County, but planners are not 
especially bothered by that possibility.63 
The intermodal terminals are also entangled in local working conditions. Here the issue is 
generally not the terminals themselves but the distribution centers, warehouses and other 
facilities nearby which have become controversial for the low pay and shabby treatment of their 
workers, who are often classified as “temporary” employees. As with the conditions for port 
drayage drivers discussed in chapter 8, the workers in these facilities are often badly exploited in 
innumerable ways.64 Yet potentially they do possess a certain amount of leverage, for the places 
where they work are crucial linchpins in the global logistics operations of particular companies. 
The grievances at Walmart’s distribution center in Elwood, for instance, have recently grown so 
strong that lawsuits in relation to unpaid wages are ongoing and a protest (shutting down the 
facility for a short period of time) even took place, attracting media attention. The situation is 
complicated by the layers of companies involved—Walmart contracts with a logistics specialist to 
run the distribution center, which in turn uses temp agencies that actually hire the employees.65 
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Wilson, Getting the Goods: Ports, Labor, and the Logistics Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 
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army/, accessed 6/27/13) 
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The intermodal container terminals represent key points in the globalization wrought by the 
shipping container on the American transportation system. But where other impacts have been 
specific to a particular infrastructure, such as the railroads or trucking (or the inland waterways, 
subject of the next chapter), the terminals are at the intersection of those two systems and do not 
belong clearly to one or the other. The terminals differ also because they are not alterations 
carried out along routes passing through space, but rather are focused at particular points. As we 
have seen, though, these sites are closely related to the corridors of the rail and road networks. 
Thus they reflect the preexisting networks of the nation-state, but also the new dynamic 
introduced by containerization. Furthermore, in their siting the terminals inevitably become 
intertwined with a host of local and regional conditions, which the global network of 





Chapter 10 ~ Slow Going on the Inland Waterways 
 
For most of human history the easiest way to move cargo was by water. For this reason 
among others, rivers loom large in the history of humanity—the Rhine, Yangtze, Indus, Mekong, 
Amazon, Nile, and Mississippi are just a few of the names of great significance. Rivers were also 
crucial to agriculture and other purposes—for supplying drinking water, powering water wheels, 
and so on. Most of the world’s great cities were founded on rivers, either inland or on the coast, 
even though their riverine origins are far less relevant today. Throughout history there were 
activities to alter flows of water, but in recent centuries people have been more aggressive in 
modifying rivers for transportation purposes, such as by dredging and building locks, and have 
also built canals of great length and size through the landscape. The United States is no 
exception. Rivers and canals played a vital role in the American transportation network before 
the coming of the railroad, and though diminished they retain substantial importance today. 
Furthermore in North America the Great Lakes represent an additional and unique component of 
the water-based network of movement. All these routes of transportation through the domestic 
territory—rivers, canals and lakes, often used in combination—are commonly grouped under the 
term “inland waterways.” 
This chapter describes the efforts that have been made to move shipping containers along the 
American inland waterways, a transportation system that despite its historical significance and 
continuing relevance for freight movement has had little success carrying containers. The idea of 
using inland waterways in the U.S. to move containers has been advanced frequently since the 
1960s. Such an operation is often known as “container-on-barge,” or COB, and can have 
advantages over trucking and railroads in both cost and sustainability. But despite efforts 
spanning several decades to put this network to use carrying containers, for a variety of reasons 
inland waterways are rarely used for that purpose in the U.S. Given the logical reasons for doing 
so, however, it is possible this may change in the future. Inspiration could also come from the 
European experience, as COB has been successful there for many years and continues to grow. 
There is another type of shipping that also carries domestic freight: coastal shipping. This can 
be regarded as similar to the inland waterways not only because it serves domestic as opposed to 
transnational purposes, but also since its ships are often relatively small in comparison to those 
that travel the ocean. On the East Coast and Gulf Coast in particular the nature of the coastline 
(including the intracoastal waterways that extend for much of this distance) means that shipping 
is sheltered from oceanic conditions. This allows for a type of shipping similar to that moving on 
inland waterways, including barges and other boats of various sizes. As with inland shipping, 
the practice of coastal shipping has dropped off over time due to the growth of the railroad and 
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trucking infrastructures, but it remains widespread for certain bulk goods. On occasion 
containers have moved by coastal shipping, but not often; as with the inland waterways there is 
the potential for that to be done on a far wider basis. Given these similarities and parallels with 
inland shipping, coastal shipping is also briefly covered in this chapter. 
The early history of American expansion saw the use of inland waterways for transportation 
to a degree beyond most nations. The reason lay in the innumerable waterways in the eastern 
half of the country, which was the region of primary growth and development from the founding 
of the original British colonies into the early nineteenth century. Even as expansion continued 
into the West—which with its mountains and deserts lacks long navigable waterways, and was 
typically traversed by the railroad and stagecoach—the bulk of the country’s people and 
economic activity remained in the East. This vast region, from the Atlantic Ocean to the edge of 
the Great Plains, contains many rivers that are wide and flow reasonably slowly without many 
rapids, and hence are ideal for transport. The most important are those of the Mississippi River 
watershed, primarily the Mississippi, Ohio, Illinois and Missouri rivers. Various smaller rivers 
along the Atlantic, like the Hudson, Connecticut and Delaware rivers, aided early colonization. 
The Great Lakes as already noted are a crucial addition to the riverine system, adding a massive 
series of waterways to the north that connect to the ocean via the St. Lawrence River. To this 
already impressive system of inland waterways numerous canals were added, the most 
important of course being the Erie Canal connecting the Great Lakes with the Hudson River. The 
resulting network represented an extraordinary system for the movement of both people and 
goods. A traveler in 1836 emphasized “the abundance of its [America’s] vast and navigable 
rivers, its great bays, straits, and lakes, all of which contribute to a coherent interior navigation 
system incomparable to that of any other continent.”1 
Given this bounty of corridors providing for water-based movement, it was to be expected 
Americans would put them to good use. The poor condition of American roads was another 
factor in favor of the waterways. It was not long before some began dreaming of water-based 
movement across the entire continent; Thomas Jefferson, along with others of his time, had hopes 
that something of this sort was possible, albeit with a short portage at some point. The journey of 
Lewis and Clark from 1804 to 1806, commissioned by Jefferson while president, was done in part 
with the intention of locating such a route, but their portage of 340 miles between the Missouri 
and Clearwater rivers, much of it through rugged mountains, was far longer than had been 
hoped for.2 Meanwhile there was a more immediate need to tie together the areas up and down 
the East Coast that represented the bulk of the nation’s population, and also to connect them with 
the settlements expanding further inland on the other side of the Appalachians. In keeping with 
such goals the “Gallatin Plan” of 1808 (titled Report on Roads, Canals, Harbours, and Rivers), one of 
the foundational texts in American national planning, proposed a number of ambitious road and 
                                                 
1 G.T. Poussin, quoted in: Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space 
in the 19th Century (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1977), p. 94. 
2 John Warfield Simpson, Visions of Paradise: Glimpses of Our Landscape’s Legacy (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1999), p. 74-75, 77. 
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canal-building projects. Albert Gallatin, author of the plan, was Secretary of the Treasury under 
Jefferson and clearly shared the president’s visionary ambition, as he argued for the federal 
government taking the lead in the creation of this transportation infrastructure. Though the 
Gallatin Plan as such failed to gain support, in the long run many of its suggested routes would 
receive some kind of infrastructural connection (in some cases by railroad rather than road or 
canal).3 
Americans began to build canals in the late 1700s. While a few were constructed, many more 
were suggested—some proposals being highly fanciful given the grade change or distance 
involved, while others were more realistic. One ambitious proposal that did come to fruition was 
the Erie Canal, whose completion in 1825 revolutionized American transportation and 
development. While the Gallatin Plan had envisioned a canal on a similar route through upstate 
New York, it was the state of New York and not the national government that built the Erie 
Canal. Up to then the predominant infrastructure of freight movement in the frontier region was 
the Mississippi River watershed, a vast network of rivers, including the Ohio, Illinois and 
Missouri as well as the mighty Mississippi itself, that ultimately flowed south to New Orleans. 
That city consequently saw tremendous growth and looked forward to an even brighter future, 
as did other metropolises on this far-flung riverine network like Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, 
Louisville, St. Louis and Memphis. The Erie Canal flipped the script, creating a connection 
through upstate New York that propelled the movement of goods and people throughout a vast 
network based on the Great Lakes, the rivers that linked them together, and the port of New York 
City. This did not eliminate the importance of the Mississippi River and its tributaries, which 
continued to flourish and whose cities kept growing, but dominance began to decisively shift 
north. 
The Erie Canal brought development to a chain of cities in upstate New York, but more 
importantly it worked to the benefit of New York City, which was able to outstrip its eastern 
rivals (mainly Boston, Philadelphia and Baltimore) and grow into the nation’s premier 
metropolis. It was also to the advantage of Chicago, well located at the point of shortest portage 
between the Great Lakes and Mississippi River watershed. (The Illinois and Michigan Canal, 
completed in 1848 to connect the Chicago River with the Illinois River, eliminated even this 
portage.) In short, the Erie Canal helped further national infrastructural unity, but it also 
reshaped that unity to the advantage of certain cities and regions which possessed both inherent 
geographical advantages and entrepreneurial vision. Economically, the canal’s importance was 
tremendous. Upon its opening, the rate for a ton of freight moving between Albany and Buffalo 
dropped from $100 to $10. The efficiency of the canal, and of water-based travel in general in 
these pre-railroad days, was evident from its impact on patterns of freight movement. For 
example, it was cheaper to move goods between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh by using the canal 
and other water-based routes, a long circuitous trip geographically, instead of going directly 
                                                 
3 Robert Fishman, “1808 - 1908 - 2008: National Planning for America,” Rockefeller Urban Summit, July 2007, 
pp. 1-6; Ronald E. Shaw, Canals for a Nation: The Canal Era in the United States, 1790-1860 (Lexington, KY: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1990), pp. 22-24. 
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overland. The sheer quantity of freight on the canal grew to an astonishing extent; as of 1854 it 
carried 83% of American grain being shipped.4 
In these years the transport of goods on rivers was mainly downstream, as they could be 
easily floated in that direction on flatboats and rafts, while getting cargo upstream was a 
challenge. (On canals and lakes this was not an issue, of course, as there was no flow of water to 
contend with.) Such freight was usually natural resources like timber and grain, and this was a 
good fit with the economic and geographic pattern of the time, as the American interior was 
essentially a giant territory exploited for natural resources (by agriculture, logging, etc.) and 
relatively thinly settled. But one-way movement imposed limits on growth. The invention of the 
steamboat, which put the steam engine of the Industrial Revolution to good use, changed the 
situation. Following Robert Fulton’s success with his North River Steamboat (widely but 
incorrectly known as the Clermont), introduced on the Hudson in 1807, steamboats—sometimes 
termed riverboats when they traveled on rivers—began to appear on rivers and lakes, and were 
widespread by the 1830s. Rapid growth followed, especially at key waterside sites like New 
Orleans, Cincinnati, Buffalo, St. Louis, Chicago, and Memphis. Larger steamships that could 
move along the coast—and across the ocean—came into use slightly later. This new 
infrastructure of steam-powered water-based movement was only dominant for a short time 
before the railroad began to cut into its traffic in the 1850s, but in its heyday its importance was 
undeniable. It also took a place in the cultural imagination of the nation, as the writings of Mark 
Twain and movies like Showboat reveal. For Americans lengthy trips by water were the default 
mode of transportation, and a lively sociability sprang up on steamboats and canal packets.5 
Some of the grander steamboats were positively palatial in their accommodations and 
furnishings. 
The success of the Erie Canal stimulated efforts to build other canals, as areas with 
insufficient water access sought to better their situation. In addition to canal-building a wide 
range of projects were carried out to improve shipping on natural waterways, such as 
constructing locks to deal with falls, and dredging to ensure sufficient depth. By the 1840s the 
railroads were starting to gain a foothold, and the advantages of that new technology were 
becoming evident to some, but the construction of canals continued in many places. Like 
Jefferson before, some dreamed of a national territory bound together by an infrastructure of 
inland waterways. In 1846 the prominent politician Thomas Hart Benton (not to be confused with 
the painter of the same name, his great-nephew) proposed that the U.S. be tied together from 
coast to coast by a series of waterways, with canals making connections where needed.6 
The paucity of waterways in the West and Great Plains made such visions untenable. Such 
waterways as did exist were often not navigable, being either too rapid, excessively shallow, or 
overly subject to fluctuations in their flow. The Platte River, for example, extends across most of 
                                                 
4 K. Jack Bauer, A Maritime History of the United States: The Role of America’s Seas and Waterways (Columbia, 
SC: University of South Carolina, 1988), pp. 138, 140. 
5 Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey, pp. 107-109. 
6 Ibid., pp. 111-112. 
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Nebraska, and proved useful to settlers for drinking water and irrigation, but is too shallow for 
navigation. Ultimately the Missouri River, which Lewis and Clark used for a sizable portion of 
their journey, did not prove especially useful for navigation either (though it is navigable for 
some of its length). Closer to the West Coast, on the other side of the Rockies, there are a few 
rivers of value for navigation, such as the Columbia and Snake rivers in the Pacific Northwest 
and the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers in California. But they do not reach far inland, and a 
vast geographic space—the mountains and plains—separates them from the waterways of the 
East. Yet even if the concept of using water-based infrastructure to bind together the entire 
territory of the nation proved impractical, the ambition was noteworthy. Though they could not 
reach into a vast extent of the country, the waterways played a vital part in stringing together 
many parts of the nation, and creating an infrastructural unity in its eastern regions. 
Development and prosperity often followed. 
In addition to the lack of navigable waterways in the western regions, the more important 
factor reducing the importance of water-based movement, and ending the impetus to build 
canals, was of course the railroad. Rail in particular had a substantial edge in speed, and so it 
quickly took passenger travel, and goods that needed to move quickly, including mail and 
packages, away from the water. Trains had the all-important edge of not being bound to the 
water, and so the flexibility of the domestic transportation network was greatly increased by their 
growing presence. However, for most freight movement rail was actually no cheaper than the 
steamboats and canal packets that were so well established. For cargo that did not need to travel 
quickly, bulk goods especially, the inland waterways remained competitive. This was also the 
case for coastal shipping, which continued to be important. Over time the ships that moved along 
the coast and on the lakes grew bigger and more efficient, while on rivers and canals the 
steamboats were gradually replaced by barges pushed in groups by towboats. The growing size 
of these carriers meant that many of the older and narrower canals, the Erie Canal in particular, 
became obsolete. 
The late 1800s and early 1900s were a period of more sophisticated efforts to alter inland 
waterways, as technological advances allowed engineers to reshape and “improve” rivers to 
make them more amenable for transportation. While canal construction had for the most part 
ended, the process of transforming waterways was just hitting its stride. Transportation was not 
the only goal of such alterations, as flood control, agriculture and municipal water systems (i.e., 
drinking water) were also factors. Government involvement increasingly came at the federal 
level, as issues involved multiple states and the engineering challenges were best met by federal 
expertise. This actually dates back as far as the 1820s, when the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, at 
the behest of national legislation, first became involved in such work. In the 1870s Congress 
began to enact legislation on a somewhat more regular basis that appropriated funds to improve 
waterways and harbors. 
Progress was slow for the next few decades, however, and so in 1907 the Inland Waterways 
Commission was set up, followed by the U.S. National Waterways Commission in 1909. The 
latter organization worked particularly hard to encourage cooperation between waterborne 
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transportation and railroads—an early effort towards intermodalism. World War I deepened 
government involvement in the entire transportation infrastructure, including waterways, as 
private enterprise proved utterly inadequate to the demands of wartime logistics. This led to the 
establishment of the Inland Waterways Corporation in 1924, founded and run by the federal 
government, which operated the inland water carrier Federal Barge Lines.7 (The viability of such 
an operation eventually proven, Federal Barge Lines was sold to private interests in 1953.) In 
addition, the waterways were not neglected by those far-sighted transportation planners in the 
1920s and ‘30s who promoted cooperation and intermodalism between the various transport 
modes. While their main focus was on the railroad and the automobile, they routinely mentioned 
waterborne transportation as well.8 
As with the railroads and highways, then, the inland waterways transport network has long 
been a national system, planned and implemented with many national concerns in mind, and 
functioning at least to some extent at a national scale. It can best be compared to roads and 
highways, perhaps, in that its routes of movement have been built, improved and maintained by 
the government, while private enterprise (with the exception of Federal Barge Lines) is 
responsible for actually hauling goods. Of course rivers and lakes are not “built” by anyone, but 
the government has altered and maintained them to such an extent that the comparison is 
reasonable. With railroads in contrast the actual construction has typically been done by the 
corporations, though government involvement is still by necessity very heavy, most notably for 
the taking of property by eminent domain (or through land grants) in order to make rail corridors 
possible. 
The changes to rivers done for the purpose of allowing or improving navigation generally fall 
into two categories. The more modest type of alteration is to improve river channels through 
dredging, widening and removing obstacles, but not to construct dams or locks. In this case an 
open channel remains and the river is regarded as free-flowing. This is the case with the 
Mississippi River between St. Louis and New Orleans, for instance. The more dramatic alteration, 
for a river with rapids, difficult obstacles, or that simply flows too quickly, is to “canalize” the 
waterway. This typically means building a series of dams and locks (and perhaps some canals, 
though not necessarily) so water can continue to flow, changes in elevation can be 
accommodated, and ships or barges can move easily and safely. The Ohio River, the Illinois 
River, and the Mississippi River north of St. Louis are all canalized, as are many other rivers 
across the nation. While canals were built in the nineteenth century to get around particular 
rapids and waterfalls, the practice of canalizing long stretches of river did not become feasible 
until the early 1900s. In 1910 the federal government initiated work to canalize the Ohio River all 
the way from Pittsburgh to its confluence with the Mississippi at Cairo, Illinois; the project was 
finally finished in 1929. Work to canalize the Upper Mississippi (north of St. Louis) was begun in 
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1934.9 Such early projects were generally overhauled and greatly improved by another round of 
more technologically advanced dams and locks in the post-World War II period. 
The Ohio and Illinois rivers flow into the Mississippi River, as does the Missouri River which 
despite its great length (and its own history of engineered alterations) is not as heavily used for 
transportation as those others. Many less important rivers of course also flow into these rivers. 
The Mississippi River’s watershed therefore represents, in the tremendous extent of its 
waterways, the greatest pathway for waterborne inland movement in America. The main means 
of freight movement over this system is now generally by barge, often with multiple barges 
connected together and pushed by a towboat. (The terminology is confusing, as a towboat does 
not in fact tow or pull barges behind it but rather pushes them in front.) Just as the railroad and 
road infrastructures have spatial dimensions that are crucial to their workings—spatial regimes, 
as I have called them—so do the inland waterways. For the many waterways of the Mississippi 
watershed, the one most crucial dimension is the minimum depth of nine feet that is put in place 
and constantly maintained by the work of the Corps of Engineers. This depth applies to the entire 
navigable extent of these rivers: the Mississippi all the way to St. Paul, the entire Ohio (up to its 
origin in Pittsburgh), the entire Illinois (including the canals connecting it to Lake Michigan), and 
the Missouri up to Sioux City, Iowa. The importance of this particular depth can be gauged from 
the name of the project done from 1927 to 1940 by the Corps to improve navigation on the Upper 
Mississippi: the Nine-Foot Channel Project. 
Obviously such a dimension is directly tied to how low a fully loaded barge, ship or boat can 
rest in the water. On many of these waterways a minimum width of 300 feet is maintained, which 
of course controls how wide a barge, or group of barges held together (that being the more 
common situation), can be. The size of locks imposes an additional constraint, though a tow of 
multiple barges can go through a lock in stages—the barges being disattached from each other 
and then reattached. But obviously a single barge can be no larger than the lock. On the Upper 
Mississippi the typical lock is 110’ wide and 600’ long, meaning the largest barge could be just a 
bit smaller in each dimension. Most barges are not nearly so large, however—the most common 
size is 195’ in length and 35’ in width. These dimensions are linked to the lock size, as a connected 
group of such typical barges, if it is composed of three barges by three barges, measures out to a 
105’ width and 585’ length, just able to squeeze within a 110’ x 600’ lock. 
Such uniformity in the spatial regime helps convert a series of local and regional waterways 
into a larger system that approaches a national scale. It would be an exaggeration to say the 
spatial regime of inland waterways is comparable to the uniform track gauge of the railroads, or 
the minimum lane width of the highways, for the waterways are not unified at the national level 
and do possess variations. But it is significant nonetheless. To be able to use the same barge on 
voyages all the way to and from the distant points of New Orleans, St. Paul, Chicago and 
Pittsburgh is a formidable advantage, and it is a standardized spatial regime that makes it 
possible. This type of standardization is of course not limited to the U.S. As early as 1810 a 
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commission of the Corps des Ponts et Chaussées argued, in the rationalistic tradition of French 
bureaucracy, that their nation’s rivers and canals required waterways of uniformity so as to knit 
together a national network: “Since these divers waterways make up one and the same system, 
they must accommodate the same boats… so their locks must be of a uniform size.”10 As with the 
railroads, the word “gauge” can be applied to such standardized dimensional systems for inland 
waterways, though the term is rarely used in this context in the U.S. In 1879 the Freycinet gauge 
(named after Charles de Freycinet, French Minister of Public Works at the time) was introduced 
in France, and gradually most of the canals and locks across that nation would be built to this 
standard of a 128’ (39 m) length, 17’ (5.2 m) width, 7’-3” (2.2 m) depth and 12’ (3.7 m) clearance 
above the water.11 
Improvements to the Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio and Illinois have continued in the postwar 
era and up to the present, both to maintain the channels and to allow for larger barges. Given the 
dominance of trucking and the railroads for freight movement, however, the need for expensive 
construction projects is often questioned, and they are frequently condemned as subsidies or 
“pork.” In 1978 barge operators for the first time began to pay a fuel tax into the Inland 
Waterways Trust Fund to cover a portion of these costs. In the 1980s a nascent environmental 
awareness entered into the decision-making process; this did not reduce the desire to modify the 
rivers, channels and canals, but added new concerns to be heeded.12 The Corps of Engineers, ever 
more dedicated to satisfying the barge industry and politicians in the region, got embroiled in a 
scandal in the early 2000s over the quantitative methodology it was using to justify new 
construction on the upper Mississippi. The result was not the elimination of the project, though, 
but its expansion to deal more thoroughly with environmental factors.13 
The dominant role of the Mississippi and its tributaries should not obscure other inland 
waterways of importance, such as the Mobile River, the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, the 
Hudson River, the Chesapeake and Delaware Ship Canal, the Columbia River, the Snake River, 
the Sacramento River and the San Joaquin River. Equally important are the intracoastal 
waterways that run along most of the Gulf Coast and also much of the East Coast. But most 
significant is the giant system of inland navigation formed by the Great Lakes. These massive 
lakes, interconnected by a series of rivers and canals and linked to the sea by the St. Lawrence 
River, constitute a massive system that reaches from the Atlantic Ocean deep into the North 
American heartland of both the U.S. and Canada. Like the Mississippi Watershed it occupies a 
vital place in American history and in the geography of the nation’s transportation—and has also 
been of great importance for Canada. While lakes have been used for waterborne transportation 
in many places throughout history, there is no parallel to the Great Lakes system, in terms of its 
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extent and size, anywhere in the world. This network of water movement has a character very 
different from other inland waterways, for conditions on the giant lakes can be rough and 
consequently real ships are needed, rather than the barges with their flat bottoms that move on 
rivers and canals. 
While the Great Lakes have long been used for waterborne movement, their connection to the 
ocean was more tenuous. The St. Lawrence River provides a natural corridor, as it flows from 
Lake Ontario to the Atlantic, and allows for deep-sea access as far inland as Montreal. But the 
river contained rapids that were not navigable between Montreal and Lake Ontario. In addition, 
the link between Lake Ontario and Lake Erie was made more challenging by that minor obstacle 
known as Niagara Falls. The construction of the Welland Canal in 1829 created a route in Canada 
between those two lakes, avoiding the falls. A few years earlier the Erie Canal had established the 
revolutionary connection between Lake Erie and the Hudson River, thus tying the Great Lakes to 
the U.S. East Coast. But over time the canal’s limitations in size became an issue—ships or barges 
of substantial size could not move through, and so transfers of freight at Buffalo (and sometimes 
Albany) were necessary. It was enlarged several times to accommodate larger barges, but making 
such a long corridor deep enough for the big ships of the Great Lakes was out of the question. 
The solution lay with the St. Lawrence River. During the mid-1800s it had become navigable, 
as the Beauharnois and Lachine canals were built from 1842 to 1848 to provide a way around the 
river’s rapids. The Great Lakes were now open to direct traffic with the Atlantic, but the canals 
and locks were insufficiently large to accommodate most ocean-going ships—an issue that would 
recur over time. Likewise, the ships that plied the lakes generally did not venture into the ocean. 
Expansions and improvements were made to the St. Lawrence’s channels and canals in the early 
1900s but this problem remained, although shipping on the lakes and river was greatly boosted 
by such improvements and some ocean shipping did come.14 Finally in the 1950s the most 
dramatic expansion yet was carried out: the St. Lawrence Seaway, finished in 1959 to great 
fanfare. The seaway itself extends from Montreal to Lake Erie, and its existence in effect allows 
large ships to traverse the entire system of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River, all the way 
from northern Minnesota to the ocean. This incidentally put an end to what little freight traffic 
the Erie Canal still possessed. 
The channels and locks of the St. Lawrence Seaway allow for ships with maximum 
dimensions of a 730’ length, 75’ width and 25’-6” depth. (As it is ships that move on the lakes the 
depth required is far greater than for a river or canal, upon which barges move.) At the time this 
seemed adequate to attract many ocean-going ships, but it would not be that way for long as ship 
sizes steadily got larger and by the 1970s the seaway was clearly undersized. Proposals for 
additional expansion have gained little traction since that time, and the ocean-going traffic on the 
seaway and lakes is modest. Another drawback with the seaway is that it freezes over for a few 
months in the winter (as do many northern inland waterways). Today only about 10% of the 
Great Lakes’ traffic consists of oceanic craft, called “salties,” while the other 90% are “lakers” that 
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stay within the lakes and rivers. The lakers that traverse the entire extent of the seaway are of 
course limited in size to the same extent as the salties. But those lakers that stay on the upper 
lakes (Superior, Michigan, Huron and Erie) can be somewhat larger, as their size is controlled by 
the Soo locks on the St. Marys River between Lake Superior and Lake Huron, whose dimensions 
are more generous than the locks of the seaway. (The Welland Canal is part of the seaway and its 
locks impose the same limits as the rest of the seaway, so these larger lakers cannot reach Lake 
Ontario.) 
Given the dimensional limits for depth, today there is no question of major ocean-going ships 
entering most inland waterways. There are a few exceptions, but they are rare and do not extend 
far. On the Mississippi River a 40’ depth is maintained up to Baton Rouge, Louisiana, a distance 
of 234 miles. The Sacramento River Deep Water Ship Channel connects that city with San 
Francisco Bay; it is 30’ deep and runs 43 miles. There are some other similar examples. These 
depths, though superior to that of the St. Lawrence Seaway, are still too shallow—except for the 
Mississippi to Baton Rouge—for the largest ships. Furthermore ship lines generally prefer to 
reach their ports as soon as possible so they can unload, reload and turn around, so they are 
reluctant to go far inland anyway. (Some major ports for ocean-going vessels, such as 
Philadelphia and Portland, are actually located on rivers a very short distance upstream from the 
sea, and so the distinction between a coastal port and inland port can be blurry. In general—and 
for our purposes—the topic of inland waterways does not include these short waterways of 
substantial depth that lead to major ports serving ocean shipping, and these ports are regarded as 
coastal ports rather than inland ports.) 
The failure or impossibility of oceanbound container ships to reach into inland waterways 
has obviously made it more challenging to move containers on these waterways. In addition the 
transport of freight by inland waterways is very slow compared to trucks and trains; this is not 
such an issue with bulk goods, which are not on tight schedules (and are much harder to move 
by truck or train given their massive quantities and/or weights), but for most freight it is a 
drawback, especially in an era of tightly managed just-in-time supply chains. The failure of 
inland ports to develop container facilities has been another strike against them. But the basic 
issue has little to do with the shipping container, since even before containerization the inland 
ports generally were not receiving much in the way of direct ocean-going freight. Actually the 
container offers a way to improve the situation: since it makes transfers between transportation 
modes easier, it becomes feasible to shift freight between ocean-going ships and the barges or 
small ships of inland waterways. (With breakbulk packing methods this would be too time-
consuming and expensive—the logical choice is to put the freight straight into trucks so it is only 
transferred once.) While the lack of speed is an issue, it should not be an absolute roadblock. Not 
every container must move quickly (with supply chains sometimes reliability is actually more 
important than mere speed), especially those carrying bulk goods or empty ones being 
repositioned. Furthermore some inland waterways are quite short and so the time lost would be 
insubstantial, while getting beyond the traffic slowdowns of the port’s metropolitan region could 
be beneficial. 
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The situation in the 1970s was complicated by the existence of a cargo-carrying system for 
ocean shipping that seemed highly amenable to the use of inland waterways: Lighter Aboard 
Ship, better known by its acronym LASH. Through LASH operations, ships carried unpowered 
barges (known as lighters) directly on board the ship, and used a shipboard crane to place them 
in or remove them from the water. The freight was carried on these barges, which when properly 
towed or pushed could move between the ship and the port terminal, with the advantage of 
being able to handle very shallow depths which also allowed them to move on inland waterways. 
(Thus the ship itself did not need to dock in port, and that was especially helpful if modern 
terminal facilities were lacking.) By its very nature then LASH was well suited to the use of 
inland waterways. LASH has faded away, and today is almost entirely obsolete except for certain 
specialized purposes, but in the 1970s and early ‘80s many LASH ships were built and put into 
use, and the practice seemed poised to become a significant part of the shipping business. A 
similar system known as Seabee was introduced by the Lykes Brothers shipping line; Seabee 
differed from LASH in that the barges were larger, and they were brought onto the ship by 
means of an elevator-like device at the stern, rather than a crane. The LASH and Seabee systems 
were not entirely incompatible with the use of containers, and in fact occasionally carried them 
(an example will be described shortly), but in general they were perceived as being in 
competition with containerization, and their eventual failure cleared the way for the container to 
completely dominate non-bulk cargo shipping. 
As the use of shipping containers grew in the 1960s and ‘70s, there were hopes that some of 
the Great Lakes ports would handle this new cargo. But the trend toward building ever larger 
container ships, some too large for the St. Lawrence Seaway’s locks, made this difficult. 
Furthermore the practice of container shipping increasingly concentrated on the rapid 
turnaround of ships and on maximizing their ocean crossings, so there was a reluctance to serve 
ports any more distant than necessary. Cruising all the way down the seaway and through some 
of the lakes did not fit with this new shipping paradigm; it was more logical to use coastal ports 
and then trucking or rail overland to reach the Midwest. Nevertheless some efforts were made. 
The British shipping company Manchester Liners had established trans-Atlantic service to a few 
Great Lakes ports in the early 1950s before completion of the seaway, using relatively small ships 
carrying breakbulk freight. In the late 1960s and early ‘70s shipping over the Atlantic was rapidly 
switching to containerization, and so in 1971 the company began the first container ship service 
on the Great Lakes, running routes across the Atlantic and stopping at Detroit and Chicago. This 
proved uneconomic and was soon modified, with the ocean-going ships of Manchester Liners 
terminating at Montreal and feeder vessels continuing into the seaway and lakes.15 This feeder 
operation could be regarded as domestic in nature, as it linked two points within North America 
(though strictly speaking across the national border between the U.S. and Canada). But it did not 
last long either, especially as the Great Lakes ports failed to develop better facilities to handle 
                                                 
15 J.R. Whittaker, Containerization (2nd ed.) (Washington, D.C.: Hemisphere Publishing [John Wiley & Sons], 
1975), pp. 211-212. 
 226 
containers. Since that time there has been little container transport on the Great Lakes or St. 
Lawrence Seaway. 
It appears the first regular container transport on the Mississippi River was initiated by the 
Lykes Brothers shipping company in 1971. As already noted Lykes Brothers introduced the 
Seabee system of barges carried on ships, and this operation was used to carry containers on the 
river. Containers were transported on Seabee barges between St. Louis and New Orleans, where 
the barges were placed on ships headed to Europe. The amount of traffic was modest, for only 
about 4,000 TEUs (twenty-foot-equivalent units, i.e., one 20’ container or half of a 40’ container) 
shipped annually. The Seabee barges held 24 containers, though they could be reconfigured to 
hold 32 containers when necessary. A few normal river barges, able to hold 36 containers, were 
also used. Most of the freight consisted of diapers, exported by an American manufacturer to 
Europe. But when the company decided to construct a factory in Europe for making the diapers 
there, this cargo was no longer available and not enough alternative freight could be found to 
replace it. The operation ended in 1973.16 
In 1981 another COB operation was planned on the Mississippi, with the intent of using St. 
Louis as the inland port once again. But the Illinois Central Gulf Railroad responded to the 
projected service by lowering its rates on container transport, and the idea was abandoned. In 
1983 Tricontinental Shipping and Terminal Services, known as Tricon, and the Riverway Barge 
Company started up a service, using terminals at several locations on the river, but this failed as 
Tricon went into bankruptcy. Alter Barge Lines briefly continued the service, but chose to 
terminate it in 1984. In the very same year Leaseway Transportation briefly initiated its own COB 
operation, only to drop it near year’s end. Once again rate-cutting by the Illinois Central Gulf 
Railroad made it hard to achieve profitability. But larger issues probably cut deeper. Located at 
the mouth of the Mississippi, New Orleans was the key to the system, the point where containers 
were transferred from barge to shore and then onto the larger ships of the ocean. But the city 
never established itself as an especially important container port in the first place, and the growth 
of landbridge container transport by rail, from the West Coast to the eastern portion of the 
country, meant that Gulf Coast ports were not in a competitive position.17 For shipping 
companies the logical approach was to utilize either East Coast or West Coast ports—going into 
the gulf made the voyage longer with no compensating benefit. 
Another effort at COB service on the Mississippi River was launched in 2004, this time by the 
barge company Osprey Line, which also sought to run barges carrying containers on the 
intracoastal waterway of the Gulf Coast. Osprey’s main operation on the Mississippi went 
between New Orleans and Memphis, but it sometimes extended further north on the Mississippi, 
and Louisville on the Ohio River and Chicago reached by the Illinois River were also occasionally 
accessed. The containers were primarily global containers carrying international freight; attempts 
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to interest domestic shippers in using the service did not bear fruit. The service apparently was 
modestly successful for a few years, but ended in 2009, though the line’s COB along the Gulf 
Coast is still offered on an inducement basis (i.e., not regularly scheduled, but available to 
interested shippers).18 Various ports in the Mississippi River watershed sporadically express 
interest in COB, and proposals for a special terminal to handle COB in New Orleans have been 
floated, but so far little seems to come of it. 
While efforts on the Mississippi have faltered, a COB operation on the other side of the 
nation has thrived. The western regions of the nation, as already discussed, are not generally 
conducive to movement by inland waterways. There are a few exceptions, but even these are not 
comparable in scale or importance to the great waterways of the East. One is the system in the 
Pacific Northwest comprised by portions of the Columbia and Snake rivers, which extends from 
Lewiston, Idaho, to the Pacific Ocean. This navigable segment, while quite long in its own right, 
is only a modest part of the overall course of these two lengthy rivers. The Columbia begins in 
British Columbia and makes its way southward into the U.S. where it enters Washington and 
continues south for a time before abruptly turning westward and demarcating the border 
between Washington and Oregon as it makes its way to the Pacific Ocean. The Snake originates 
in Wyoming and flows west through Idaho, north along the border between Idaho and Oregon, 
and then west into Washington where it enters the Columbia. The rivers do have a history as a 
transportation corridor, but not one comparable to the major eastern waterways. Their role has 
loomed larger in hydropower and irrigation, and the many dams built since the 1930s also had 
the effect of eliminating certain rapids once present and thus helped create a channel more 
amenable to shipping. Of course shipping requires locks to get past the dams, and these are 
provided along the navigable segments of the rivers. The port of Portland functions as the 
gateway for the Columbia-Snake system, and is the point where cargo is transferred between the 
barges that ply the rivers and the ships of the ocean. (Portland is actually on the Columbia River 
105 miles inland from the ocean, but it is accessible to ocean shipping as that portion of the river 
is sufficiently deep.) 
During the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries various projects were carried out to make 
the Columbia and Snake rivers more easily navigable. Frequently the transformations came 
through dam construction, in which the main objective was irrigation and/or hydropower but 
navigation was also accommodated. The Columbia-Snake system gained its present form in 1975 
upon completion of the Lower Snake River Project. The route is 465 miles long in total, but its 
extent of inland navigation runs 360 miles from Lewiston to Portland (the remaining 105 miles 
being the deeper channel from Portland to the ocean), with a minimum depth of 14’. The 
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waterway has grown into a prominent corridor for the movement of bulk goods by barge, 
especially wheat exports from Oregon, Washington, Idaho and Montana. More surprisingly, it 
has continuously carried shipping containers through COB service since the 1970s, in quantities 
that (while small in the overall scheme of things) have risen over time. This is far and away the 
most successful example of moving containers on an American inland waterway. Initiated in late 
1975, just 130 containers were carried that year, but in 1976 the operation ramped up and 6,330 
TEUs were transported, and by 1985 the annual quantity reached about 30,000 TEUs.19 It has 
plateaued at roughly 40,000-50,000 TEUs in recent years. Currently about one quarter of the 





Figure 10.1: COB on the Columbia-Snake river system 
 
Source: Port Dispatch [Port of Portland website] (http://www.portofportland.com/publications/PortDispatch/ 
post/Locks-Reopen-Following-Extended-Closure-for-Maintenance.aspx, accessed 12/15/12) 
 
The success of COB on the Columbia-Snake system is due to several factors. The port of 
Portland worked hard to support the concept, doubtless seeing its own prosperity as linked to 
the rivers that are such a valuable transportation link to it. For instance, the port sold surplus 
container cranes to some of the inland ports for nominal prices. Portland, the inland ports, and 
the barge lines cooperated extensively in building up the network and setting rates. The key 
factor is probably the nature of the freight, as the cargo in these containers is not time-sensitive 
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and is of low value, so a few extra days of transit on sluggish barges is not an issue. Most of the 
cargo is similar to bulk in nature, consisting of items like forest products, potato products and 
hay cubes. An important cargo in the early years was paperboard.21 Most of the containers 
returning upriver are empties being repositioned. The barges with containers are grouped with 
other barges carrying bulk goods, and the assemblage of barges is pushed by a towboat. If it were 
only the container barges being transported the arrangement might not be profitable, but since 
these barges can “tag along” in larger groups the additional expense is modest. A number of 
barge lines provide the service. The barges are loaded and unloaded at Terminal 6 in Portland, 
the same terminal where deepwater ships dock, so this adds more convenience and makes the 
transfer of containers easy. 
One way to achieve better cooperation between transportation modes is to form alliances or 
mergers, or for corporations powerful in one mode to pursue business in the other. Previous 
chapters have discussed how the railroad and trucking industries pursued these goals on 
occasion. Shipping lines also following this logic at times—the extent of American President 
Lines’ involvement in rail operations during the 1980s is described in chapter 7. Perhaps the most 
notable effort came from a railroad that bought a shipping company, having already (with less 
fanfare) purchased a barge line as well. As described in chapter 7, the railroad company CSX in 
1984 took a controlling interest in the major barge company American Commercial Lines, a 
transaction that had to be approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The potential for 
efficient joint containerized operations seemed strong, especially when CSX made the 
blockbuster move in 1986 of acquiring Sea-Land, the shipping company formerly run by Malcom 
McLean that had been pivotal in the development of the shipping container. But having made 
this apparent commitment to intermodalism, CSX was unable or unwilling to follow through. In 
1998 CSX spun off American Commercial Lines into an independent company (and in 1999 sold 
Sea-Land to Maersk, the giant Danish shipping line), and so its possible involvement in COB 
went unrealized. As with the railroads and trucking, corporations ultimately chose not to aim for 
the synergies of controlling multiple modes, but rather to focus on their core specialties. 
Cooperation, often achieved only gradually over time and with difficulty, must happen between 
different companies, sometimes thanks to pressure exerted from intermediaries or institutions. It 
is fair to say that in the U.S. this sort of cooperation between modes, and the supporting presence 
of institutions, is still being developed for COB. 
In addition to the movement of freight on inland waterways, there is also shipping that takes 
place along the coast. As noted earlier such coastal shipping is in many ways comparable to that 
of inland waterways, as it is domestic rather than transnational. Along much of the American 
coastline, especially the East Coast and Gulf Coast, there are routes largely sheltered from ocean 
conditions—the intracoastal waterways already mentioned—and so barges can even be used. 
Malcom McLean’s original Sea-Land container service was an example of coastal shipping, as it 
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Freight Research Program, North American Marine Highways, p. 33. 
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ran between New York and ports in the Southeast. Likewise the pioneering container operations 
in the Pacific Northwest during the 1950s were coastal in nature. (Technically a few of these were 
international rather than domestic, as they traveled between American and Canadian ports, but 
they were certainly coastal at any rate.) But by this time coastal shipping was in decline for the 
most part, as railroads and trucks were taking away its traffic. After Sea-Land abandoned 
container transport along the coast to focus on the more profitable global business, there was 
little if any coastal shipping of containers.  
In recent years a few modest efforts have been launched to build up some coastal shipping of 
containers. Generally the objective is to serve minor ports where the ocean-crossing container 
ships do not stop. This brings containers closer to their final destination or point of origin, 
resulting in much shorter container trips by truck or train, which is a positive in terms of the 
environment and traffic congestion. Unfortunately it has been difficult to make the concept pay 
off. The case of Osprey Line’s activity along the Gulf Coast has already been mentioned. Another 
example was the Port Inland Distribution Network (PIDN) centered around the New York region 
and supported by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Initiated in 2002, the PIDN 
consisted of railroad operations and movement on an inland waterway (the Hudson River, 
linking to Albany) as well as projected coastal shipping by barge to small regional ports like 
Bridgeport, Connecticut, Providence, Rhode Island, and Camden, New Jersey.22 But within a few 
years the program disappeared. A more longstanding operation, one that appears to be 
moderately successful, is that of Columbia Coastal Transport, which since 1990 has been using 
barges to shuttle containers back and forth between various Northeastern ports. While the 
specific points served have varied over time, the company’s general practice has been to connect 
major container ports. Hence it differs from what the PIDN was seeking to achieve, but the 
underlying benefits in terms of the environment and reduced road traffic still apply.23 
While COB has seen repeated failures in the U.S. the situation is quite different in Europe. In 
the early 1970s COB service was established on the Rhine River by the barge line European 
Waterways Transport, which began the operation with just two barges each carrying about 50 
TEUs. Cranes were installed at the inland ports of Mannheim, Strasbourg and Basel along the 
river. The service grew steadily; as of 1977 the volume of container movement on the Rhine was 
40,000 TEUs per year, and by 1985 it reached 220,000.24 By the late 1990s about 25 barge operating 
companies were carrying containers. The average barge capacity was 180 TEU, and 
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approximately every two hours a barge departed from the port of Rotterdam, heading up the 
Rhine towards any of the 32 inland ports in place by that time.25 Since the 1990s the practice has 
expanded further, and spread to other European waterways. From 1995 to 2005 the volume of 
containers transported annually on European waterways grew from roughly 500,000 TEUs to 
about 4 million TEUs. Traffic on the Rhine accounts for approximately half of this. At the ports of 
Rotterdam and Antwerp, two of the largest ports in the world, as of 2005 about 25% of the 
containers passing through were transferred to or from barges. Barge capacities vary greatly but 
are generally between 30 and 200 TEUs; the extremely large new JOWI-class barges however can 
hold around 500 TEUs.26 The European barges are usually (though not always) self-powered, as 




Figure 10.2: COB on the Rhine 
 
Source: Rhinecontainer website [News], “Transbox extends fleet,” January 9, 2012 
(http://www.rhinecontainer.nl/en/news/60/Transbox%20extends%20fleet, accessed 12/15/12) 
 
COB has grown rapidly on French waterways since the late 1990s, with the Seine River 
benefiting most thanks to the presence of Paris inland and the major port of Le Havre at the 
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river’s mouth. (A large amount of COB service in France is also provided by the Rhine, as already 
described, since that river runs along the nation’s eastern border for a substantial stretch.) 130,000 
containers journeyed on barges into and out of the Ile-de-France (the greater Paris region) in 
2009.27 Several inland ports along the Seine have expanded and acquired cranes and equipment 
to handle containers, the largest being at Gennevilliers, and more are under development. By one 
estimate, 13% of the merchandise brought into the Ile-de-France now comes by barge.28 An 
important new waterway project that is just beginning construction in northern France, the 
Seine–Nord Europe Canal, will (if completed) create a better connection between the Seine and 
the waterways of northern France and Belgium, which in turn tie into the Rhine. (It would be 
very hard to imagine such a major inland waterway project being attempted in the U.S. 
nowadays.) 
It is not only major European waterways that now move containers by barge—smaller ones 
are getting into the picture. The Manchester Ship Canal in England is just 36 miles long, running 
from Liverpool on the coast to Manchester inland. It was a massive infrastructure project of its 
time, opened in 1894, that allowed the largest ocean-going ships to access Manchester directly. As 
ships grew bigger the canal became obsolete, but recently its fortunes have revived through the 
use of barges that ply the waterway carrying freight between the port of Liverpool and points 
inland. While most of the freight is in bulk goods, COB has also been introduced; the idea came 
from the success of COB in continental Europe and the barges were acquired from the 
Netherlands. As of 2011, 10,000 containers moved on the canal annually, roughly 5% of 
Liverpool’s container traffic. As elsewhere, the environmental benefits of this transport mode are 
highly touted, but the service is also competitive economically. Though the distance may seem 
trivial, there is an advantage to getting beyond the local Liverpool traffic and slightly inland, 
including savings in fuel consumption.29 The time lost, in comparison to truck or train transport, 
is relatively inconsequential; as one importer of wine points out, “it takes six hours for the 
journey, but considering the wine has taken six to seven weeks to get here, that’s a small 
percentage in the overall lead time in the supply chain.”30 Currently there is talk of implementing 
COB on other British canals, and generally of exploiting the nation’s waterways more effectively. 
London in particular offers possibilities, with the appealing option of taking some trucks off its 
clogged roads and moving their cargo instead by the city’s little-used canals and rivers. 
It is hard to pin down the reasons for the diverging fates of COB in Europe and North 
America, but several factors are notable. The giant ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp both possess 
direct access to the Rhine, Europe’s most important waterway for freight movement, making 
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COB a logical choice to pursue. This contrasts with the largest North American container ports, 
which generally have no access to significant waterways. As distances are not far in Europe, 
perhaps the difference in time between barge and truck or train is not so significant as in the U.S. 
As of the late 1980s, in fact, European COB was actually competitive with both trucking and rail 
with regard to speed.31 While barges obviously do not move as swiftly, various issues slowed the 
other two modes down. Problems with traffic make trucking less appealing, and the various 
national railroads have not done well in coordinating freight movement across borders. The 
overwhelming environmental advantages of COB are also appealing to Europeans, who display 
more concern for sustainability than Americans. Perhaps once a system is well established and 
has gained a critical mass, further gains are easier. In certain European countries the shipping 
companies, shippers and port authorities are motivated to use COB and do not view it as 
anything unusual, whereas in the U.S. it has just never gained a foothold outside of the Pacific 
Northwest. 
At present some renewed attempts are being made to put COB in place on American inland 
waterways. With roadways so congested the option of inland waterways looks brighter, 
especially as the nation’s reluctance to build new infrastructure puts a priority on using existing 
systems more efficiently. There is definitely capacity for more cargo transportation on the 
waterways. Another advantage of carrying containers by barge or ship is that there is no limit on 
the weight of a loaded container (other than what the container itself is certified to hold). This is 
also the case for rail, but trucks are limited in their total weight and thus the weight of the 
containers they haul. The high price of oil also works in favor of water-based movement, and so 
does a general consciousness of environmental problems. The environmental advantages of 
waterborne transport are overwhelming—not so much because the engines that power barges are 
particularly efficient or non-polluting, but due to the economies of scale involved in one barge 
holding so much cargo. The amount of energy required to move freight by inland waterway is 
about 60% that of rail, and only about 15% that of trucking. (The figures for coastal shipping are 
even better than for inland waterways.) On one gallon of gasoline a ton of freight can be carried 
50 miles by truck, 202 miles by train, and 514 miles by barge. In terms of polluting emissions, 
barges possess a similar advantage, being slightly ahead of trains and far better than trucks—
although barges do have one drawback, high emissions of sulphur dioxide.32 Perhaps most 
important of all, many calculations show that moving containers by barge or ship, if a reasonably 
direct inland water route is available, is slightly cheaper than truck or train. 
But the slow speed of movement on inland waterways is a drawback for American COB, for 
as already noted contemporary supply chains are typically predicated on speed. Consequently 
the best freight for containers moving on waterways tends to be bulk goods, or cargo similar to 
bulk in its nature (as with the COB on the Columbia-Snake river system), which need not move 
so quickly. Some American shippers of bulk goods are showing a new interest in using 
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containers, in fact, since so many containers otherwise return to Asia empty that it makes sense to 
fill them with something. Another niche COB can fill is the repositioning of empty containers, 
which must get to where they will next be filled. Such “empties” typically need not move 
quickly. While this might seem a trivial matter, the transporting of empties accounts for a 
substantial percentage of container movements. It should also be noted that speed is not 
invariably crucial in supply chains—sometimes reliability and consistency count more heavily. So 
while American COB has generally failed thus far, there is some justification for the new round of 
initiatives. 
One modest new operation is 64 Express, a COB service on the James River in Virginia that 
travels the 90 miles between the port of Hampton Roads and Richmond. (The name refers to the 
highway the river runs parallel to, Interstate 64, but despite the term “express” the barges of 
course move more slowly than trucks.) The James River’s depth is maintained at 25 feet and so it 
is only accessible to moderately sized ocean-going ships—most of its traffic is now by barge. It 
was once an important transportation corridor for Virginia, and George Washington was 
involved in a project to build a canal that would extend its waterway further west, a segment of 
this ultimately being built as the James River and Kanawha Canal. If fully completed this effort 
would have connected the James with the rivers on the other side of the Appalachian Mountains 
that flow into the Mississippi River watershed. This would have given the river a national 
significance—but as it fell short the James has been limited to a minor regional role ever since. 
Using just one barge at its inception in late 2008, 64 Express is run by James River Barge Line and 
transported about 6,000 containers over its first 12 months. The primary shippers using the 
service are paper and packaging maker MeadWestvaco, which has a factory in Virginia from 
which it exports products, and cigarette maker Altria which imports tobacco.33 A government 
grant of $2.3 million helped the project get off the ground, and while margins are evidently 
tight—“we have exceeded expectations in every way except for the economics,”34 commented the 
owner of the line—volumes have grown slightly over time.35 
A similar example are the COB operations currently under development that will run in 
Northern California between the port of Oakland and the inland ports of Stockton and West 
Sacramento. As with the James River the distances are short, each location being within 80 miles 
of Oakland. But traffic on the highways from Oakland inland (Interstates 80 and 580) is especially 
heavy, so while the distances are not great the advantage of getting beyond the Bay Area and into 
the Central Valley of California is substantial. In some of the publicity the projected service is 
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called the M580/I80 Marine Highway Project, so as with 64 Express the notion of it as an 
alternative to road transport is made explicit. A grant of $30 million, part of the Transportation 
Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) program, made it possible to begin the 
project by helping the ports do the necessary work on their terminals, including buying new 
container cranes. The two barges were purchased by the ports, but the service will be run and 
marketed by a private operator.36 
Stockton and West Sacramento are accessible to ocean shipping by a combination of river and 
canal, but as with the James River the channels are not sufficiently large for the ships now 
typically used. Inland movement on waterways was significant to the history of Northern 
California, with the San Francisco region being connected to Sacramento (and points further 
north) by the Sacramento River, and to Stockton (and points south of it) by the San Joaquin River. 
(These rivers have also been critical to the vast irrigation projects of the Central Valley.) For 
transportation the rivers were never as important as the major eastern waterways, especially 
since their distances are not comparable and furthermore the railroads were already developed 
by the time of large-scale settlement in California. Nonetheless they had some value, and over the 
twentieth century were gradually improved through a combination of dredging and canal 
construction into the Sacramento Deep Water Ship Channel and the Stockton Deep Water Ship 
Channel, which the container-carrying barges will ply. Again it is evident that the routes of the 
containerized global infrastructure are built upon older corridors with their own character and 
legacy, embedded in the history and geography of the nation as well as specific local and regional 
factors. 
The principal rivers of Alabama are not especially noteworthy and for a long time were 
limited to a minor role in transportation. This changed in 1984 when the Tennessee-Tombigbee 
Waterway, often referred to as the “Tenn-Tom,” was completed after a lengthy period of 
construction that began in 1972 and cost roughly $2 billion. While the idea of such a connection 
had been contemplated as far back as the 1800s, by the 1970s the building of new canals was rare 
indeed. Nevertheless President Nixon approved the project as part of his “Southern Strategy” to 
boost the fortunes of the Republican party in the Southeast. Essentially a combination of canal 
and enlarged rivers, the Tenn-Tom stretches 234 miles through Alabama and Mississippi, and 
links the main rivers of Alabama, which flow into the Gulf of Mexico in Mobile, to the Tennessee 
River, which flows into the Ohio River and hence is part of the Mississippi watershed.37 It was a 
massive undertaking often described as the largest earth-moving project ever, with 310 million 
cubic yards of soil excavated—by way of comparison, the figure for the Panama Canal was 210 
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million cubic yards.38 Widely regarded as a boondoggle, the Tenn-Tom has over the years gained 
at least a semblance of a respectable amount of traffic. With this modern canal in place, its 
dimensions sufficient for contemporary barges, the rivers of Alabama have gained a heightened 
value for inland navigation. Given the canal’s existence, and the opening of a container terminal 
at the port of Mobile in 2008, COB became a logical possibility, and in 2010 a federal grant of 
$1.67 million was issued to initiate a COB operation between Mobile and Itawamba, Mississippi, 
an inland port on the waterway. The money is intended to pay for purchasing nine barges and 
converting them to carry containers.39 It remains to be seen if and when the service will begin. 
If COB actually does happen on the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, it would represent a 
relatively new waterway taking a role in the global infrastructure of containerization. While the 
globe-spanning networks of container movement depend on the existing infrastructures of the 
nation-state, in the process those domestic infrastructures can be reshaped and their relative 
importance altered. Similar cases have been discussed in previous chapters (such as the 
burgeoning container traffic on the rail corridors leading out of the Los Angeles region). For 
inland waterways the impact of containerization so far has obviously been far less than for 
railroads and trucking, so it is presumptive to expect comparable transformations. Yet similar 
patterns and shifts may emerge. The possibility that COB operations could be in place on the 
Tenn-Tom and not the Mississippi, Illinois or Ohio rivers would seem an unusual prospect, given 
the relative importance of these waterways historically. Likewise it is interesting that the only 
COB service with long-term success has been on the Columbia-Snake rivers, a waterway that is 
substantial but can hardly match the longer and more heavily-used ones of the East. 
The idea of carrying containers on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway continues to 
percolate. As part of the proposed Atlantic Gateway project to improve infrastructure and build 
one or more new ports in Novia Scotia, there was discussion in 2008 and 2009 of moving 
containers on the lakes and seaway. Some of the lake ports, such as Oswego, Toledo, Buffalo and 
Toronto, began positioning themselves for the possible traffic, and in 2010 Toledo acquired 
versatile cranes that can handle containers among other types of cargo.40 But since that time little 
has been heard of the project, though it seems to be still on the drawing board. A less ambitious 
but perhaps more practical initiative was that of the Canadian company Great Lakes Feeder 
Lines, which in 2008 began services with the Dutch Runner, a ship capable of holding various 
cargoes including containers. The hope was to move containers between various Great Lakes 
ports and Montreal or Halifax, where they would be transferred to or from ocean liners, or else as 
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a feeder between Halifax and Montreal.41 In 2010 an agreement was announced between Great 
Lakes Feeder Lines and the Port of Cleveland to use that port for containerized operations that 
would connect with Montreal.42 The ship’s versatility provided for other options, however, and 
perhaps that was fortunate; it is unclear if the Dutch Runner ever carried containers in a regular 
service, but the idea definitely did not become a long-term success and it is not moving 
containers currently. 
The movement of containers by inland or coastal waterways is not merely a matter of 
functionality and economics. The imaginative conception of local places, and their role in a 
globalized present that is somewhat mythologized, cannot be ignored. As with the intermodal 
terminals (described in chapter 9) where containers are switched between train and truck, an 
inland port that handles containers—no matter how few—can fancy itself a key node on global 
networks. The prestige can also accrue to a waterway carrying containers. In websites and 
brochures such visions recur, often accompanied by maps decorated with arrows and concentric 
circles showing how a particular corridor or location supposedly represents a vital link in world 
trade. The sentiment is reflected in a quote from the CEO of the Cleveland-Cuyahoga County 
Port Authority when prospective (but apparently never-to-be-realized) container operations were 
announced for Cleveland’s port in 2010. He stated that “Cleveland would be the first city on the 
Great Lakes that will have a pin on the global map when it comes to container service.”43 
The modest recent burst of COB activity reflects federal encouragement, as the Obama 
administration, through the efforts of Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood (who served in 
that post from 2009 to 2013), has steered money and support to intermodalism and more energy-
efficient options. This has occurred both on the passenger side of things—where it 
understandably gets more publicity, as with high-speed rail for instance—and the freight side. 
While the railroads have received the lion’s share of the funding, LaHood emphasized the 
benefits of inland and coastal shipping as well. In 2010 the Department of Transportation’s 
Maritime Administration (MARAD) created the America’s Marine Highway program, which 
since that time has been a source of funding for projects (including several of those already 
described). Given the congestion on the nation’s highways and the available capacity on 
waterways, in addition to the environmental advantages of water transport, this emphasis is 
eminently logical.44 But it is of course in contrast to the typical U.S. policy in recent decades—
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especially during Republican administrations—which has prioritized road construction and 
motor vehicle activity. 
The need for attention to inland waterways is acute, as they have been long neglected and the 
condition of many is deteriorating. While moving containers by waterways is optional (though 
desirable), many bulk goods are transported in massive quantities over these waterways, and so 
the nation is more dependent on them than is commonly realized. As of 2008, 11% of American 
freight, as measured in ton-miles, moves by inland waterways or coastal shipping.45 If measured 
by value rather than weight the figure is much lower, as bulk goods are typically heavy and of 
low value, but the statistic nevertheless indicates the waterways’ great importance. For certain 
freight like grain and other agricultural produce, and also for coal, timber, gravel and metal ore, 
the waterways are crucial. Over half of American grain exported abroad, for instance, moves by 
barge on waterways in order to reach ports where it is transferred to ocean-going ships. The 
rivers of the Mississippi watershed are especially critical to these grain shipments; when traffic 
on a stretch of the Lower Mississippi was briefly closed due to flooding in 2011, one 
representative of corn farmers lamented that “when it [the Mississippi] shuts, there’s really no 
alternative.”46 The reverse problem loomed in December of 2012 as a drought led to 
extraordinarily low water levels on the Mississippi that threatened barge shipping because the 
nine-foot depth was no longer assured. 
Only time will tell if these vital waterways, or the coastal shipping lanes, can gain a share of 
the vast traffic of shipping containers moving on domestic routes within their longer global 
journeys. Another intriguing option, untried so far, would be to move the larger domestic 
containers (that only move within North America) by waterway. Considering the amount of bulk 
freight transported on inland waterways, it would seem reasonable for containerized freight to 
follow suit. Given the importance of the inland waterways in American history, and their 
continuing role in freight transport, it would be fitting as well. This is what has transpired in the 
railroad and trucking industries, which gradually have been adjusted—in some ways 
transformed—to carry the container. The particular characteristics of barge shipping, especially 
its slowness, do represent an obstacle; this is exacerbated by the sheer size of the U.S. and the 
length of its major waterways. But if and when COB gains a stronger presence and truly takes 
hold, it will do so for the most part within the infrastructure of the nation-state that already 
exists, and will move along the country’s well-established paths of movement. 
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Chapter 11 ~ The Emergence of the Domestic Container 
 
Most early versions of the shipping container, from the turn of the century to the mid-1950s, 
were intended to work within the national scale. There were a few exceptions, containers 
designed to move by ship across the ocean as well as overland, but they were unusual cases. By 
the early 1960s the situation was reversed, as containerization henceforth was driven primarily 
by the shipping industry, not railroads or trucking. The idea of container use became implicitly 
global, even though it was not until the mid-1960s that container ships would actually start to 
make transnational journeys. Likewise in the 1960s the ISO managed to reach agreement on a 
standard for the now-global container. In the meantime domestic container systems, introduced 
by several American and Canadian railroads from the 1920s through the 1950s, did a slow fade. 
They were of course largely replaced by the new global ISO containers, but in terms of purely 
domestic freight intermodalism they were superseded by piggyback operations in which truck 
trailers were carried by train. The idea of using a container to carry cargo moving entirely within 
the U.S. essentially disappeared, as piggyback proved more successful and easier to implement. 
Even as the railroad lines began to haul global containers in the 1970s and ‘80s, they had little 
interest in using them for domestic freight except occasionally on backhauls where they would 
otherwise travel empty. This finally started to change in the late 1980s when domestic 
containerization reemerged, featuring containers larger than the standard global containers. The 
trend has continued since, with so much success in recent years that it is now piggyback that is 
becoming rare. The rise of this domestic container system, spanning the U.S. and Canada, is the 
subject of this chapter. 
While domestic containers are larger than global containers, they are essentially designed to 
work within the systems that by now are so well developed for carrying those global containers 
within the national infrastructure. As such, the rise of domestic containerization represents an 
interesting reversal. The global container took its dimensions from American containers 
developed in the 1950s and ‘60s, which in turn were spatially derived from the spatial regime of 
American trucking—in short, from the domestic national infrastructure. With the overwhelming 
popularity of the container over subsequent decades, by the 1980s the domestic infrastructure 
was being reshaped to serve the container (as has been detailed in previous chapters). With a 
network of trains, trucks and intermodal terminals now in place to move containers, it made 
sense for domestic freight to utilize this system also. So the global container generated the 
conditions that made domestic container operations feasible. Where global containerization had 
previously come largely from an American template, now a new American system was following 
in the footsteps of the global. Yet the rise of the domestic container also points to an opposing 
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trend: a divergence between global and national systems, and in particular their spatial regimes. 
The overwhelming success of the standard global container did not prevent an alternative, 
domestic design from flourishing. What drove this separation, above all, was the growing 
difference between the spatial regime of the global container and the American truck trailer—the 
former remained unaltered, while the latter changed. Consequently the nation’s container 
network has become less, not more, homogeneous, as separate global and domestic container 
systems now exist. They overlap in some ways, and are distinct in others. 
The use of containers to carry domestic freight in the 1920s and ‘30s, and again in a second 
round of larger containers in the 1950s and ‘60s, has been covered in earlier chapters, so only a 
brief account is given here. While such containers of course moved by both train and truck, it was 
typically the railroad companies that introduced them and coordinated their movement. The 
containers of the 1920s and ‘30s were generally not large, being 5’ to 10’ long in each dimension. 
Those of the 1950s and ‘60s were bigger, typically 20’ to 40’ long and about 8’ wide and high—the 
Flexi-Van container of the New York Central Railroad was the most prominent and widely used 
example. But these domestic container systems eventually failed; even as shipping lines 
increasingly ventured into containerization in the 1960s, railroads were switching away from it 
(at least with regard to domestic freight) in favor of piggyback. 
But even as domestic containerization faded over the course of the 1960s, the railroad 
companies were getting involved, albeit in halting steps, in carrying the containers brought to 
and from ports by shipping lines. The development of “bridge” operations (i.e., landbridge, 
minibridge and microbridge, as described in chapters 5 and 7), in which railroads carried these 
global containers overland, was especially important, as it involved long distances where the 
advantage of trains over trucks was undeniable. These containerized rail movements gradually 
expanded over the 1970s, and motivated some railroads to reconsider the container’s possibilities 
for domestic freight. As early as 1970 the Missouri Pacific Railroad announced a new domestic 
container service called Containerpak, which used 24’-long containers; the system was meant to 
provide the option of linking into ocean shipping, but its primary purpose was for domestic 
operations.1 Containerpak did not gain much traction, though, and disappeared quickly. 
Rather than trying to establish containerization for domestic freight, a more promising 
strategy at this point in time was to use otherwise empty containers on their backhaul routes. 
Containerized global freight generally moved in only one direction by rail, for it was hard to find 
cargo that replicated a particular route in the opposite direction. This was especially the case with 
the rapidly growing Asian imports in the 1970s, as the U.S. was sending little back to Asia in 
return (a problem that of course would only worsen in subsequent decades). Hence the railroads 
were stuck with empty containers on their long backhauls to West Coast ports. (Truckers hauling 
containers faced a similar issue, but as their routes were shorter—typically local or regional 
rather than national in scale—the problem was not as pressing.) The solution was obvious: to 
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carry domestic freight going west in these containers. Given that the containers had to move 
anyway and would otherwise carry nothing, it made sense to offer extremely competitive rates 
for domestic traffic so as to get some benefit out of them. The first to do so was the Canadian 
Pacific Railway. (The major Canadian railroads have a tradition of involvement in multiple 
modes of transportation, and also the advantage of networks that reach from coast to coast across 
North America.) In the early 1970s Canadian Pacific began carrying domestic freight, retail goods 
in particular, in containers moving westward in backhaul from Toronto and Montreal to 
Vancouver.2 
Once domestic freight was being carried in this way it was only logical to consider using 
larger containers, ones that would exploit the maximum allowable dimensions for domestic 
movement rather than being limited to the global standard. The idea was slow to reach fruition in 
actual practice, presumably in part because the previous generation of domestic containers had 
failed during the 1960s. As of 1973, a trade journal commented that “domestic containerization in 
the U.S. is, for the most part, a concept, an idea, with probably fewer advocates than it has foes.”3 
Finally in 1979 Canadian Pacific, evidently persuaded by the success of its backhaul operation 
with global containers, introduced a domestic container. It had a length of 44’-3”, nine inches less 
than the 45’ maximum length of a Canadian trailer at the time, and hence was larger than the 
standard 40’ global container and also any previous domestic container. (It was also slightly 
lighter than a global container, as it did not need to endure shipboard travel or the uncertainties 
of other nations’ road and rail infrastructures.) By 1981 Canadian Pacific had over 1,000 of these 
containers in use, and its executives were proclaiming—perhaps prematurely—that boxcars 
would soon be replaced by railcars holding containers. The railroad also briefly put a 29’-5” long 
container, designed for carrying heavier bulk goods, into domestic use. Both types of domestic 
containers were carried on the same flatcars Canadian Pacific used to transport global 
containers.4 
In the meantime the struggles of American railroads continued for much of the 1970s, and 
they were slow to follow Canadian Pacific’s lead. Finally in the late 1970s the remaining 
companies, now better organized and with reduced workforces, began to forge a modest 
recovery, which accelerated in the 1980s in the wake of deregulation. The transport of global 
containers was a significant part of rail’s improved fortunes, especially once double-stacking 
emerged in the 1980s. Continuing growth in piggyback operations also provided a boost. All in 
all, intermodalism (i.e., carrying trailers and containers) was working well for the railroads: in 
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1970 it had accounted for only 5% of total rail carloads, and by 1985 the figure reached 15%.5 In 
the late 1970s the shipping company American President Lines (APL) began working with the 
freight forwarding company Transway to get domestic cargo for its returning westbound 
containers, which were being hauled by rail across the U.S. In 1984 APL commenced stacktrain 
operations and once again partnered with Transway to find domestic cargo for the backhaul. 
Within a year most of APL’s containers heading west by rail were carrying cargo, primarily 
domestic in nature, and soon APL abandoned its partnership with Transway and began offering 
domestic freight services on its own. APL was perhaps the shipping line that most 
enthusiastically embraced container movement by rail in the U.S., especially double-stacking, 
albeit in partnership with the railroad companies that did the actual hauls. Still it was surprising 
that a shipping line rather than a railroad seized the initiative, and reveals that APL perceived the 
former boundaries of global versus domestic shipping had become less relevant thanks to 
containerization. Deregulation also helped make this blurring of the global and domestic 
possible.6 
Several other Pacific shipping lines and western railroads followed suit in the mid-1980s, 
working to fill their backhaul containers. The practice aroused controversy in the freight 
industry, as the low rates undermined truckers and even at times the railroads themselves. 
Nevertheless a variety of trucking firms and forwarders were eager to seize the opportunity; in 
some cases they sent freight that otherwise would have moved over the road, while in other 
circumstances they switched from piggyback. For trucking companies hauling freight from 
certain major cities in the eastern half of the country—such as Chicago, Houston, New York, 
Atlanta, etc.—to a western destination, the economics of using a container and putting it on a 
stacktrain could be compelling. A trade journal in 1986 reported the price of moving a container 
by rail from Chicago to the West Coast as approximately 54 cents per mile, while carrying the 
same freight by truck cost roughly 70 cents per mile. The train also had an advantage in speed, 
since stacktrains typically go from origin to destination without stopping.7 
The container system was growing pervasive within the U.S. territory and infrastructure, 
impacting not only the railroads and trucking but also leading to the creation of more and better 
intermodal terminals. This burgeoning network was set up to handle global ISO containers, but 
once in place was amenable to domestic freight also. The benefits originally envisioned for 
domestic containerization—that trains would haul freight long distances, while trucks 
concentrated on pickup and delivery—had been carried out mainly through piggyback instead 
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since the early 1960s. But now containers were shuttling across the nation in large quantities, 
driven by global trade and shipping lines, with an entire system set up to serve them and 
domestic freight often moving inside them on their backhaul runs. Indeed, as of 1985 it was 
estimated that of the containers headed westward by rail that contained freight (i.e., not counting 
empty containers), 80% of this freight was domestic rather than foreign. (The statistic appears to 
be for coast-to-coast container moves, so it may have been less for shorter journeys.) The figure 
for freight going east was 100% foreign, indicating that the network remained fundamentally 
oriented to international trade, with domestic freight serving only as backhaul cargo.8 It seemed 
logical, as Canadian Pacific had already deduced, to introduce containerized services entirely for 
domestic movement. Aside from Canadian Pacific, though, no railroad or other operator 
attempted to move domestic freight in containers expressly intended purely for that purpose. But 
interest was growing, especially since stacktrains were starting to make containerization more 
economical than piggyback. The Association of American Railroads commissioned a study on the 
topic from the consulting firm of Temple, Barker & Sloane, released in 1986, that came to 
generally optimistic conclusions about the feasibility and potential profitability of domestic 
containerization.9 
Since the dimensions of American trailers had grown larger over the years (as described in 
more detail in chapter 8), such domestic containers potentially could be bigger than global ISO 
containers. The national and global spatial regimes had essentially fallen “out of sync,” an ironic 
turnabout given that the dimensions of the ISO container derived largely from American 
standards of the early 1960s. Domestic containers could also be lighter than global containers, in 
spite of their greater size, since they did not need to endure the rigors of shipboard use and being 
stacked five-high. This meant slightly more weight in cargo could be held. The logic was 
compelling, and eventually it was APL that once again stepped forward, introducing domestic 
containers near the end of 1985. They were 48’ long, 9’-6” high, and 8’-6” wide, and thus larger 
than standard global containers (most often 40’ long, 8’-6” high and 8’ wide) in all three 
dimensions. (A global container can also be 9’-6” high, in which case it is called “high-cube”; this 
was relatively rare in the 1980s but is common today.) Several container leasing firms, including 
Transamerica, Itel and XTRA, introduced similarly sized domestic containers soon after.10 
The decision to go with the 48’ container for domestic use represented a key shift in the 
evolution of containerization in the American context, as the national system made a break with 
the spatial regime of the global system. The 40’ ISO container, along with the 20’ container that 
functioned in a modular way with the 40’ unit, had become the unchallenged global standard, 
but the American (and Canadian) national network would not remain in sync with it merely for 
that reason. Even though American shippers were already filling 40’ containers with domestic 
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cargo, as part of their backhaul movements on longer global journeys, the global standard still 
did not prove sufficiently powerful to be imposed for purely domestic purposes. Since the mid-
1980s global containers and domestic containers have coexisted and both systems have 
flourished; differentiation has emerged rather than being stifled. 
Yet in spite of the divergence between the two systems, domestic containerization owes its 
existence in large part to the global system. It was the emergence of global containerization, 
extending deep into the national territory and transforming American infrastructure, that laid a 
path (and to some extent a template) for the domestic container. Double-stacking, originally 
developed to haul global containers, is arguably the key factor that makes the container more 
cost-effective than piggyback for intermodal domestic freight. The terminals where domestic 
containers are transferred between truck and train are generally the same as where global 
containers are handled (a few exceptions will be noted later), and most were built primarily for 
such global cargo. So the domestic container to a substantial degree moves within a network put 
in place for the ISO container, to handle global trade. This applies at a more minute scale as well; 
domestic containers have corner castings (i.e., points for connection) not merely at their corners, 
but also at the same locations where standard global containers have corner castings. Even 
though domestic containers are 6” wider than global ones, these castings are nevertheless 
configured so as to make connections possible between the two container types. This means a 
domestic container can be attached to a global container, with one stacked atop the other, which 
is especially valuable in stacktrain operations. Likewise the cranes and other equipment for 
moving containers at intermodal terminals generally can also handle domestic containers. Of 
course some important alterations are necessary to make the system work for domestic 
containers, and these will be noted. But in general the overall system need not dramatically 
change. 
Following APL’s lead, many others adopted the 48’ domestic container in the mid- and late 
1980s, and its use began to catch on. This included Canadian Pacific, which finally dropped its 
unique 44’-3” container and switched to the 48’ unit in 1989.11 It was necessary to introduce new 
and larger trailer chassis to carry these containers when they moved by truck, but that was not a 
major hurdle. For movement by rail the new double-stacking techniques were quite convenient, 
as it was possible to put a domestic container on the upper level of a double-stack railcar, where 
it could extend further in each direction beyond the 40’ container (or two 20’ containers) below it. 
As already noted, two such stacked containers can be attached together by twistlocks despite 
their different sizes, since the castings (connection points) line up. Soon Trailer Train, the most 
prominent maker of intermodal railcars, began work on developing a larger railcar for double-
stacking that would able to hold a 48’ container on the bottom as well. In 1988 APL became the 
first to use trains (operated by railroad companies) composed entirely of cars holding only 
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domestic containers.12 48’-long domestic containers were also brought into service in the late 
1980s by the Burlington Northern Railroad. Burlington Northern worked to establish their use 
and maintain control and quality, founding a subsidiary unit in 1988 called BN America to offer 
domestic container service. The CSX Railroad, having bought out Sea-Land in 1988, created 
CSX/Sea-Land Intermodal (CSLI) and began domestic container operations in 1989. CSLI entered 
into agreements with other railroads, notably the Southern Pacific Railroad, in order to extend 
this network as far as possible.13 Government-owned Conrail also acted quickly, for in 1990 its 
trucking subsidiary Conrail Mercury placed an order for domestic containers.14 
Trucking firms were not far behind. In 1989 J.B. Hunt Transport Services announced a 
partnership with the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway (widely known as the “Santa Fe”) to 
offer piggyback services. At the time it was unprecedented for a large trucking company like J.B. 
Hunt to engage wholeheartedly in piggyback; the typical piggyback arrangement was for a 
railroad to work with minor truckers who specialized in hauling the trailers at the local level. 
What J.B. Hunt had in mind was quite different, as it sought to replace some of its well-
established long-distance truck routes with an intermodal approach. This was a significant shift, 
as major trucking companies since the 1930s and ‘40s typically moved their freight by trailer all 
the way from origin to destination. (One exception had long been United Parcel Service, which 
engaged in piggyback on a regular basis, but it represented an entirely different business model 
from an ordinary trucking firm.) But J.B. Hunt recognized the railroads’ superior efficiency over 
long distances. Labor costs, and difficulties in getting and keeping truck drivers, were another 
motivating factor. J.B. Hunt and the Santa Fe gave their partnership the futuristic title Quantum, 
and actual operations started in 1990 and gradually expanded, leading J.B. Hunt to cut similar 
deals with other railroad lines. Its competitors initiated similar services, with the trucking 
company Schneider National entering into cooperation with Southern Pacific and Conrail. All 
these operations were still piggyback, however. Finally in 1992 J.B. Hunt introduced its own 
domestic container service, purchasing a large quantity of 48’ containers along with the necessary 
trailer chassis. Working with the railroads, J.B. Hunt established containerized operations that 
functioned as a substitute for some of its longer trucking routes.15 The business proved successful 
in the years ahead, and other major trucking firms eventually emulated it. 
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Transportation—The Whole Story, pp. 105, 218. 
13 McKenzie, North, and Smith, Intermodal Transportation—The Whole Story, pp. 218-220; Norris, Spatial 
Diffusion of Intermodal Rail Technologies, pp. 290-291. 
14 U.S. General Accounting Office, Intermodal Freight Transportation: Combined Rail-Truck Service Offers Public 
Benefits, But Challenges Remain, Washington, D.C., Report #GAO/RCED-93-16, 1992, pp. 53-54; David J. 
DeBoer, Piggyback and Containers: A History of Rail Intermodal on America’s Steel Highway (San Marino, CA: 
Golden West Books, 1992), p. 168. Conrail Mercury is referred to in some sources as Mercury Motors. 
15 Marvin Schwartz, J.B. Hunt: The Long Haul to Success (Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 1992), 
pp. 112-116; Agis Salpukas, “When Trucks and Trains Unite,” New York Times, June 21, 1992; Gus Welty, 
“Truckers Are Some of Our Best Customers,” Railway Age, Vol. 195, No. 4 (April 1994), pp. 33-38; Christian 
H. Voigtleander, Intermodal Freight Transportation – An Integrated Analysis of Strategy and Operations, Thesis 
 246 
In a book published in 1992, Piggyback and Containers: A History of Rail Intermodal on America’s 
Steel Highway, David DeBoer carried out various calculations to evaluate which domestic 
intermodal method was preferable out of several options. DeBoer had a lengthy background in 
the railroad industry, particularly intermodalism, so his calculations though not highly complex 
doubtless reflected these experiences and were well grounded in the reality of rail operations. He 
put forth six options; the nuances are not relevant here, but they comprised two different ways of 
carrying trailers on railcars, two different ways of carrying containers single-stacked on railcars, a 
combined trailer/boxcar known as RoadRailer (to be discussed further shortly), and the double-
stacking of containers on railcars. It was assumed that the unit being hauled, be it trailer, 
container or RoadRailer device, was 48’ long. DeBoer laid out his results in terms of the cost of 
moving one unit 1,000 miles on a 6,000’-long train, and concluded that double-stacking was 
definitely the cheapest choice at $312, with all the other options lying in a fairly tight range of 
$400 to $430.16 (Incidentally, DeBoer found that the overall train cost was actually greatest for 
double-stacking—what made it most economical on a unit basis was the dramatically greater 
number of containers carried.) A study done slightly earlier in 1984 by the Association of 
American Railroads came to similar conclusions, comparing several options and finding that 
double-stacking had the lowest cost by a wide margin.17 
Time has borne out these findings, for since the 1990s the trend has been steadily, albeit 
slowly, towards offering domestic intermodal services in the form of double-stacking containers. 
Piggyback’s arc has been gradually downward: it continued to flourish in the 1990s, did only 
moderately well in the first decade of the 2000s, and lingers today on some routes. Likewise the 
transport of containers by rail in the older single-stack arrangement has been reduced. But in the 
early 1990s these developments were still in the future; for the moment piggyback dominated 
domestic intermodalism and the rapid growth in double-stacking was primarily meant to 
accommodate global containers. 
One important change in the 1990s was the shift in domestic container length from 48 feet to 
53 feet. 53’-long containers had actually been introduced in 1988 by APL, but at the time could 
only be used in a few states that were allowing 53’-long trailers. By the mid-1990s the 53’ length 
for trailers was in place nationally (as described in chapter 8), and 53’ domestic containers 
logically followed. These 53’ containers gradually replaced their 48’ brethren, and today remain 
the standard for domestic containerization (as the 53’ trailer remains the national standard for 
trucking). As with 48’ containers, 53’ containers are 8’-6” wide and 9’-6” high. Their widespread 
adoption made it necessary for the railroads to develop a new round of even bigger railcars able 
to hold them in double-stacking, and larger trailer chassis also had to be developed. But as 
domestic containerization was still finding its footing in the mid-1990s, moderately successful but 
                                                                                                                                                 
(M.S. Operations Research), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994, pp. 14, 64-72; DeBoer, Piggyback 
and Containers, p. 169. 
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not yet prevalent, the changeover to the 53’ container was not too burdensome. The tremendous 
growth in domestic containerization that has emerged since has been carried out through the 53’ 
container. 
One other method of domestic intermodal freight transportation, the RoadRailer, merits a 
brief mention. This is a combination of a trailer and railcar, able to function either way; it has 
wheels with tires for normal road movement, but also possesses steel wheels, which retract 
upwards when not in use, for travel on rails. A RoadRailer unit also has the connections to link 
into a truck tractor as part of a tractor-trailer or another RoadRailer unit as part of a train. 
(Connecting RoadRailers to other railcars is trickier, though, and so RoadRailer units typically 
travel as a group at the end of a train—or else the entire train consists only of RoadRailers.) In 
theory the use of RoadRailers should result in savings, but in practice it has rarely worked out 
that way, as the technology tends to be unwieldy and does not fit well with normal railroad 
operations. The concept may appear powerful in its versatility, but in reality requires too many 
features and functions awkwardly because it must do too much on its own. (It is instructive to 
contrast this with the elegant simplicity of the shipping container, which instead depends on 
specialized railcars and trailer chassis.) Consequently the RoadRailer has gone through cycles of 
use and abandonment. 
The concept was first implemented under the name “Railvan” by the Chesapeake and Ohio 
Railway in the 1950s and early ‘60s on certain routes in Michigan. It faded in the mid-1960s, but 
reemerged in the late 1970s thanks to the efforts of a former New York Central Railroad 
employee named Robert Reebie, who founded the Bi-Modal Corporation to develop a new 
version of the Railvan. In 1978 Bi-Modal introduced the RoadRailer, which was tentatively used 
in the early 1980s by a variety of railroads; evidently most of them were unimpressed since they 
did not stick with the new technology for long. The RoadRailer’s greatest success was with 
Conrail, which used it on the Water Level Route in upstate New York for 19 months. This too was 
dropped in 1984, but in the same year Bi-Modal came out with a new version of RoadRailer, 
which featured steel wheels that were set up between the units and could be removed for trailer 
operation. In 1986 the Norfolk Southern Railway introduced its Triple Crown service, which used 
RoadRailers extensively and quite widely during the late 1980s and 1990s. A few other railroad 
and trucking companies also tried RoadRailer, but did not stay with it for long. In the late 1990s 
Amtrak even used RoadRailers for a few years, hitching them behind passenger trains, but this 
was terminated in 2004. Norfolk Southern continues to operate RoadRailers to this day, but in 
relatively small numbers.18 Ultimately RoadRailer has never been truly successful, and perhaps 
ranks as an idea more clever than practical. 
J.B. Hunt’s enterprising move into domestic containerization in the early 1990s was a 
forerunner of things to come; since the 1990s it has been trucking companies—along with 
intermodal marketing companies (IMCs), to be discussed shortly—that have played a leading 
role in running the domestic container network. The railroad companies are of course still 
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important, since they carry the goods most of the distance, and with complete ownership of their 
particular corridors can negotiate from a strong position. In addition the railroads proudly 
publicize their role in domestic containerization, promoting its environmental credentials and 
role in reducing traffic on roads. Nevertheless they generally are not running the operations 
(with some exceptions that will be noted), but rather contracting to haul cargo a certain distance 
for a trucking company or IMC. The trucking firms coordinate the operation, deal with the 
shipper, and use their trucks to handle pickup and delivery at each end. This was starting to 
become evident as early as the mid-1990s. One researcher, analyzing the evolving trend in in 
1994, commented that trucking carriers would continue to “hold themselves accountable for 
every mile of service and handle all shipment status reports, billing and claims themselves. The 
role of the railroads in the intermodal shipment is downplayed to one of silent partner, and the 
emphasis is on seamless service. Thus, truckers make intermodal part of their service portfolio.”19 
In the 1990s the other two dominant long-haul trucking carriers, Schneider National and 
Swift Transportation, followed J.B. Hunt by also entering into domestic containerization. The 
container services of these truckers, which have grown steadily over the years, generally follow 
the model detailed above, where they take responsibility for the overall operation and then 
contract with the railroads for the segments the trains will cover. The containers themselves are 
owned by the trucking companies, and emblazoned with their logos. These operations are large 
in scale and very significant to the major firms; it was estimated that as of 2010 over half of J.B. 
Hunt’s revenue derived from intermodal movements.20 
In the late 1990s another major presence in domestic containerization came on the scene: the 
intermodal marketing companies (IMCs). Working with shippers to coordinate intermodal 
freight movement across railroads and trucking, the IMCs account for a substantial portion of the 
domestic container business. They work extensively with the railroad companies, on whom they 
depend. IMCs are “asset-light” and their value is in coordinating overall movement rather than 
operating either of the transport modes, but they generally do own or lease the containers and 
chassis at least. The two largest IMCs are Pacer Stacktrain and Hub Group. The latter has existed 
in some form since 1971, but its role as an IMC took off in 1998 when it introduced the “Hub 
Group Fleet” and acquired 2,000 containers.21 Pacer Stacktrain is a subsidiary of Pacer 
International, which was founded in 1997 by Don Orris, who as an executive at APL had been 
crucial in the original development of stacktrains in the early 1980s. In 1999 APL chose to spin off 
its stacktrain business, which Pacer International snapped up and rebranded as Pacer 
Stacktrain.22 
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Figure 11.1: 53’ domestic containers moving by stacktrain 
 
Source: Eddie’s Rail Fan Page website (http://eddiesrailroad.blogspot.com/2007/ 
01/bnsf-railways-corwith-yard-south-hump.html, accessed 12/15/12) 
 
In recent years the practice of domestic containerization has been so successful that many 
major trucking lines, such as Knight, U.S. Xpress, Marten, Con-way and Averitt, have entered 
into it. For any but the largest companies, however, the economies of scale in containerization are 
difficult to achieve, and if they proceed into the business they tend to use containers supplied by 
railroads or IMCs.23 The trucking firm NFI, for example, bought 500 containers only to find the 
quantity was insufficient. As one of NFI’s executives commented, “if you’re going to own your 
own assets, 500 containers just doesn’t give you enough density, unless you decide you’re just 
going to operate from Point A to Point B and back again. What we really needed in order to get 
our foot into the ballgame was somewhere between 3,000 and 5,000 containers…”24 So NFI chose 
instead to use containers and trailer chassis made available by the railroads. 
In addition to the truckers and IMCs, some railroad companies offer domestic container 
services of their own. CSX runs the largest of these systems, and also advertises its “green” 
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credentials most heavily to the general public. In addition two of the largest IMCs, UMAX and 
EMP, are jointly run by groups of railroads. UMAX is offered by CSX and the Union Pacific 
Railroad, while EMP is offered by Norfolk Southern and Union Pacific, with cooperation from 
several other railroads. It is puzzling to some that the railroads do not run more of the domestic 
intermodal network themselves, considering their central position within it. But the railroad 
business revolves around volume, and railroad companies prefer dealing with large customers 
who can provide substantial amounts of freight. The typical shipper cannot do so, but major 
trucking companies and IMCs are able to amass bulk volumes from an agglomeration of 
individual customers. So the railroads rarely deal directly with intermodal shippers or coordinate 
logistics for them, leaving such tasks to trucking firms and IMCs. As one railroad manager puts 
it: “The railroad companies provide wholesale transportation. They sell it cheaply to the trucking 
companies, providing them with bulk rates. The trucking companies do logistics while the 
railroads do not, which is why we [the railroads] end up selling transportation wholesale.”25 
The way domestic containerization has played out in American trucking is in sharp contrast 
to the industry’s involvement with global containers. As detailed in chapter 8, global containers 
are handled by a sector of the trucking industry known as drayage, and drayage firms are a 
minor link in much longer chains of movement over which they have virtually no power. 
Drayage truckers generally contract to haul containers relatively short distances, and do not 
control or have any involvement in the container’s overall movement. They have little or no 
contact with shippers, and are often small and unsophisticated operations that compete on price, 
being largely at the mercy of the shipping lines or logistics companies that hire them. In the realm 
of domestic containerization the situation is quite the reverse. Here it is often the major trucking 
firms that dominate the business and control a container’s entire journey. The truckers deal with 
shippers, trace the container’s movement, take care of both pickup and delivery, carry out the 
billing, and contract with the railroads for certain portions of the journey. For the railroad 
industry on the other hand the difference between handling global and domestic containers is not 
dramatic. In either case the railroad has little concern with what goes on beyond its own tracks, 
but simply contracts to haul a particular quantity of containers on a specific route and to carry 
out container transfers at an intermodal terminal. For global containers the railroad usually 
contracts with a shipping line or logistics provider, while for domestic containers it is likely to be 
with a trucking company or IMC, but the situation is comparable either way. 
There are a few railroad corridors especially suited to domestic containerization, and some of 
these have been improved by the railroad companies. One example is the Crescent Corridor, a 
series of routes under the control of Norfolk Southern running from the Northeast to the 
Southeast and Gulf Coast that is currently receiving clearance work so it can handle double-
stacking. Unlike the Heartland Corridor and the National Gateway, two other major rail 
corridors in the East that have seen their clearances raised to accommodate stacktrains mainly 
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carrying global containers, the Crescent Corridor is primarily oriented to domestic 
containerization. In particular it is expected to reduce truck traffic on Interstate 81, running from 
Pennsylvania to Tennessee, as more freight should be carried by containers going by rail 
instead.26 In a case such as this the railroad company is honing its strategy with domestic 
containerization in mind. Likewise the railroads have created a few intermodal terminals that 
only serve domestic containers, such as the BNSF Railway’s facility in San Bernardino, 
California.27 But these are atypical cases—in general global and domestic containers move on the 
same routes (often on the same trains), and are transferred at the same terminals. 
A recurring issue with domestic containerization has been the interior dimensions and 
volumetric capacity of the container in comparison to a standard truck trailer. The typical 
American trailer, as used in a normal tractor-trailer setup, contains a volume that shippers have 
become accustomed to. This volume, in all three dimensions, has become intertwined in a 
relationship with the size of pallets, packing crates, boxes, and so forth. With such a spatial 
regime in place, a variation of just an inch can be critical. That is especially the case as shippers 
and truckers relentlessly work to exploit the available volume, seeking to fit as much as possible 
into it. If domestic containerization is to work as a substitute for long-haul trucking, clearly the 
ideal situation would be for the interior of the container, in terms of all three of its dimensions, to 
be identical to that of a standard trailer. It seems unlikely this goal is reachable, however. 
While the domestic container is the same length and width as a trailer, structural differences 
(a container must be of stronger construction) mean it is difficult to make the inside dimensions 
of length and width identical. The castings at the 40’ points (i.e., not at the corners, but placed to 
align with the corner castings of an ISO container) are also an issue, as they may intrude slightly 
into the interior, especially at the ceiling. Generally the interior height, rather than width or 
length, has been the key problem. Because of construction details, and since a trailer is one unit 
while a container and chassis are two units attached together, it is very difficult to get uniformity 
in height. The differences do not seem significant, but in such a competitive business a tiny drop 
in volume can motivate truckers or shippers to use trailers rather than containers. As of the mid-
1980s the volume of a 48’ domestic container was 3,470 cubic feet, while that of a 48’ trailer was 
3,556 cubic feet.28 A government document from the early 1990s, also referring to 48’ domestic 
containers, noted that while a standard trailer had a 9’-2” internal height (usually expressed as 
110”, a figure that has remained the same to the present, though models from different 
manufacturers can vary slightly), the figure for domestic containers was 8’-11”.29 Since that time 
the lengths of containers and trailers have gone to the 53’ dimension, but in spite of new (and 
presumably improved) container models the volumetric discrepancy of roughly 100 cubic feet 
remains. Current information from various sources gives a volume of about 3,900 cubic feet for a 
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domestic container, and 4,050 cubic feet for a typical trailer.30 (The importance of the height issue, 
incidentally, is revealed by the text now prominently placed on the back of most Pacer Stacktrain 
containers, proclaiming their 110” inside height.) So a shipper can be sure a domestic container 
has about the same volume as a trailer—but not quite. 
On the other hand, the difference between the volume of a global container and a domestic 
container (or trailer) is very substantial. Two 53’ domestic containers (or 53’ trailers) hold 
approximately the same volume as three 40’ global containers. This is due not merely to the 
greater length of the domestic container, but also its edge in height and width. The disparity 
gives logistics providers a powerful motivation to transfer the goods that arrive by ship in 40’ 
containers into larger 53’ units, which may be either trailers or containers, for their overland 
travel. This is known as transloading, and offers the additional advantage that freight can be 
redistributed at the same time. (A global container usually carries just one type of freight, and it 
may be advantageous to redistribute its contents into smaller batches that join loads headed to 
various places. This sort of redistribution is frequently desirable anyway once a container reaches 
the U.S. or gets to a distribution center, so transloading can logically take place at such a point.) 
The practice also allows global containers to be quickly returned to ports, where the shipping 
lines are eager to get them back as soon as possible. Transloading is not actually done at ports, 
but usually at facilities close by or in the same metropolitan region. 
Transloading has expanded over the past decade or so, though it is still carried out for a 
relatively small percentage of the global containers entering the country. The practice works in 
favor of the trucking industry, for as freight moves from global containers to domestic containers 
it is taken out of the networks coordinated by shipping lines and generally shifted into the 
domestic systems—whether containerized or traditional—run by trucking firms. Transloading is 
especially common in the Los Angeles region, as the massive amount of incoming containerized 
freight is handled by a multitude of distribution centers, warehouses and other facilities where 
goods are unloaded, stored, redistributed and reloaded.31 (For cargo transloaded to domestic 
containers, the region also offers many intermodal terminals where those containers can be 
transferred to stacktrains.) The phenomenon of transloading seems to contradict the basic 
premise of global containerization, that containers would move seamlessly deep into national 
territories, and across transportation modes, all the way from origin to destination. To some 
extent it can even be seen as a reversal of the process of global containerization that has 
transformed worldwide freight movement, and reached so deeply into American space, since the 
1960s. (Such transloading is less common elsewhere, for the simple reason that aside from the 
U.S. and Canada few nations have domestic containers and/or trailers that are so much larger 
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than ISO containers.) This counters some of the more simplistic notions of globalization; the 
supposedly placeless, undifferentiated terrain of the global is revealed instead to be variegated, 
with particularities of place and nation that possess significance. This does not invalidate the 
power and importance of global networks, but rather reveals their nuances in more detail. 
Over the years domestic containerization has flourished and become a very significant 
business in its own right, one that has altered the nature of domestic freight transportation. The 
efficiency of the overall containerized system, a process largely fueled by the growth of the global 
container network within American infrastructure, was a key factor in this. But the divergence of 
two key spatial regimes—the global container versus the American trailer—has been crucial in 
causing the domestic container to be distinct from the global standard. Even as the national 
infrastructure was globalized by the presence, at times transformative, of the global container, its 
own qualities, practices and ongoing history were instrumental in creating a separate domestic 
standard. The practice of domestic containerization, in turn, is part of a larger trend towards 






Chapter 12 ~ Intermodalism as Transportation Policy 
 
The shipping container is an example of the intermodal approach to transportation. 
Intermodalism is the idea of viewing a journey as composed of a series of transport modes, and 
seeking to improve the entire journey rather than just the separate segments. This often involves 
special attention towards points of interchange where a passenger or cargo shifts from one mode 
to another. During the past 20 years or so intermodalism has become a significant part of 
transportation policies and practices in the United States. As the American transportation 
infrastructure is increasingly built out, and there have not been recent technological advances in 
speed, the value of thinking intermodally is more evident. (The technological improvements 
affecting transportation in the past few decades have been oriented more to efficiency and 
comfort than speed, such as air-conditioning, guidance systems, improved safety, etc.) It is not 
enough simply to concentrate on improving specific transport modes—one must consider the 
entire journey, and hence the transfers between modes. This becomes all the more the case as the 
dominance of the motor vehicle is gradually reduced and other modes gain at least a modest 
share of use. The shipping container has provided an additional impetus, on the less noticed 
freight side of transportation, for the development of intermodalism, as it can be shifted easily 
between modes without the loading and unloading of its cargo. (In fact, in the American freight 
business the term “intermodal” is now usually synonymous with containerization.) 
In terms of both passenger and freight movement, intermodal thinking tends to mitigate 
against the ingrained American preference for the motor vehicle. When one moves by car, or 
moves goods by truck, the natural tendency is to go directly all the way from origin to 
destination in this one mode. Indeed, the extraordinary power of the motor vehicle lies largely in 
its unique ability to do this, to handle an entire trip on its own. But there are inefficiencies, along 
with social and environmental costs, associated with an over-reliance on motor vehicles, and 
intermodalism encourages a more balanced approach that maximizes efficient use of the 
available infrastructure. Clearly there is a social and political dimension, not hard to parse in the 
American context, tied to intermodal transportation. This is more obvious with regard to 
passenger movement, where the intermodal approach generally promotes public transit (though 
not to deny car use, but merely to put it in its proper place). But in freight also the intermodal 
option is recognized as a more progressive and environmentally sustainable path. 
In a broad historical perspective, transportation of substantial speed is a recent phenomenon, 
commencing with widespread railroad use in the nineteenth century. With the coming of the 
railroad and steamship, and especially once the automobile and airplane were added to the mix, 
the speed of movement rose so dramatically that the time required for transfer between modes 
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became a bottleneck. But the issue that initially reared its head was actually that of coordinating 
between various providers of the same mode. The classic example was the rise of the “Union 
Stations”; during the early decades of the railroads it was common for each railroad company to 
build and operate its own station in a city or town. In most small towns only one railroad 
provided service anyway, but in larger metropolises there would be several stations, each serving 
its own particular railroad, resulting in burdensome transfers from one to another. (The term 
“Penn Station,” most famously applied to the station in New York but also to many other 
stations, derives from this; a Penn Station served the Pennsylvania Railroad.) The inefficiency 
inherent in this situation grew obvious, and cities strove to persuade or force railroads to unite 
their operations at one station, typically termed a “Union Station.” Consequently a plethora of 
Union Stations emerged in the U.S. in the late 1800s and early 1900s—the most famous being in 
Chicago, Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles—many of which endure to the present day. Similar 
efforts were later made in some cities to bring together diverse bus services at one main station, 
the classic example being the creation of the Port Authority Bus Terminal in New York City in 
1950. 
On occasion emphasis was also placed on transfers between different transport modes. In the 
early twentieth century railroad companies often owned or otherwise controlled bus lines, and 
hence had a vested interest in making interchange convenient between train and bus—at least for 
their own passengers. An example was the Pennsylvania Greyhound Bus Terminal in New York, 
built in 1935 and located across the street from Penn Station; as the Pennsylvania Railroad had 
partial ownership of Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, the adjacency of the two stations was 
logical. Greyhound finally and with great reluctance relocated its operations to the Port 
Authority Bus Terminal in 1962, and the Greyhound station was demolished not long after 
(though it did outlast Penn Station, which tragically met the wrecking ball in 1962). Greyhound’s 
shift to Port Authority made train-bus transfer more difficult for those interchanging between 
Greyhound and the Pennsylvania Railroad, even as it improved transfers between Greyhound 
and other bus lines.1 Another instance of convenient transfer between modes, from an even 
earlier period, were the many combined train and ferry terminals on the west side of the Hudson 
River across from Manhattan that existed around the turn of the century. These were particularly 
important in the years before the construction of the rail tunnels under the river, as any train trip 
to New York from the west necessarily involved a ferry ride. 
But in general such synergistic thinking was lacking with regard to the linkages between 
diverse modes of transportation; instead the tendency was for each mode to deal with its own 
functioning, and to work only towards its own improvement. A few farsighted thinkers, 
however, began to push for a different and more holistic vision. One was Warren Manning, a 
landscape architect who in 1923 published “A National Plan Study Brief,” which called for 
transcontinental highways that in places would run parallel to railroads and waterways. He 
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proposed that highways and trucking should function, in relation to the railroads, “as feeders 
rather than competitors.”2 In the same year the U.S. Chamber of Commerce published a report 
that urged cooperation between the various modes instead of “wasteful competition,” and 
suggested the railroads concentrate on longer journeys while truckers focus on shorter trips.3 In 
1926 and again in 1930 an employee of the ICC (Interstate Commerce Commission) named Leo 
Flynn was sent out across the nation to collect testimony about transportation problems, with a 
particular focus on the flagging fortunes of the railroad companies and the issues created by the 
unregulated state of trucking. Flynn concluded that railroads should have less regulation and 
more freedom to drop unprofitable lines, and that a regulatory framework was needed for the 
trucking industry. Furthermore he argued for better cooperation among the various types of 
transportation, and though his main focus was on railroads and trucking he also took into 
account waterways and newly-emerging air travel. His report caused a stir in Washington, D.C., 
and he was called to testify at a hearing of the Senate’s Interstate Commerce Committee in 1932. 
The chair of the committee was James Couzens, a senator from Michigan who had previously 
worked for Henry Ford; predictably biased for the truckers and against the railroads, he criticized 
Flynn severely. Some of the other senators were more sympathetic.4 
An important voice for transportation coordination was Harold Moulton, an economist who 
specialized in transportation and the first president of the Brookings Institution. In the early 
1930s Moulton assembled a committee, chaired by former president Calvin Coolidge and 
including several other major figures, to examine the nation’s transportation system. It concluded 
that better coordination, and a more systematic national transportation policy, was needed. By 
the early 1930s most transportation experts agreed, broadly speaking, with this diagnosis. The 
troubles of the Depression, especially for the railroad industry, created a heightened a sense of 
urgency about the troubles of the transportation industry.5 But since these problems afflicted the 
railroad companies most particularly, the impetus for greater coordination tended to come from 
them, or from those sympathetic to their concerns. Even when such suggestions came from 
neutral sources, they would have had the effect of boosting the railroads. As with Leo Flynn, 
there were many who supported lessening the regulatory burden of the railroads, while creating 
some regulations for trucking. In particular some suggested the railroad lines should be allowed 
to provide transportation, of both freight and passengers, by motor vehicles and on inland 
waterways. 
                                                 
2 Keller Easterling, Organization Space: Landscapes, Highways, and Houses in America (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1999), pp. 87-89. 
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Some regulation of trucking was inevitable—even some of the truckers supported it, as they 
saw their legitimate business undermined by fly-by-night “gypsy” truckers—and it finally began 
at the federal level with the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. Making the appropriate adjustments to the 
regulations surrounding the railroad companies was more difficult, however, given the animus 
felt so strongly, and by so many, against them. The government meanwhile poured ever more 
money into road and highway construction, and Americans took to their automobiles with 
enthusiasm. Manufacturers and other businesses increasingly were free to move away out of the 
urban cores and away from railroad lines in general, as trucking provided a new flexibility. 
Governmental efforts to assist the railroads, and to encourage a more coordinated and balanced 
transportation system, were half-hearted, and the railroad industry continued to decline. This 
was briefly reversed in World War II, as mobilization led to massive use of the rail network (and 
substantial profits for the industry), especially given the shortages of rubber and gasoline that 
limited motor vehicle use. But the respite was only temporary, and the postwar years saw more 
suffering for the railroad companies. 
The development of the Interstate highways was the coup de grace, as it allowed long-distance 
trucking to be carried out on a massive scale across the entire country—as well as longer and 
faster automobile trips by ordinary citizens. Yet a few individuals envisioned the new highways 
as components in a well-coordinated transportation network, linking to other transport modes at 
transfer points. The planner Lawrence Halprin and industrial designer Egmont Arens were 
among these figures, though their ideas could be on the fanciful or overly futuristic side. The 
more practical Wilfred Owen was a bureaucrat who advocated for intermodalism and 
cooperation between modes over a long career as a transportation expert. An earlier 1944 
government report titled Interregional Highways had also recommended an intermodal approach.6 
Sadly such ideas gained little attention, and the various modes of transportation remained largely 
separate and uncoordinated, with the motor vehicle and airplane steadily ascendant while the 
railroads declined. 
Lamenting the lost opportunity to generate interchange between modes, Keller Easterling 
condemns the Interstate highway system as a “dumb network with dumb switches” that cannot 
take advantage of “multiplicity, differentiation and diversity.”7 She argues that multiple 
transport modes “increase the possibility of switching between systems to produce a better fit 
between task and carrier. The system is rich with these potential switch sites for interchanges and 
urban terminals.”8 While Easterling’s techno-jargon can be problematic, she makes a valid point. 
Transportation planners showed a lack of imagination as they built roads and highways across 
America. The private sector was equally confined in its vision of what transportation could do, as 
competition rather than cooperation was the order of the day. The rise of containerization in the 
1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s helped break down some of these divisions, at least in terms of freight 
movement, for the container by its workings encouraged the use of multiple modes. But it was 
                                                 
6 Easterling, Organization Space, pp. 98-109. 
7 Ibid., p. 77. 
8 Ibid., p. 78. 
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the dramatic increase in container transport by rail in the 1980s and ‘90s that really propelled 
freight intermodalism. 
Another trend, also starting in the 1980s, made people in the industry more aware of the 
benefits of coordinating various modes of transportation. This was the development of express 
package delivery services offered by companies like United Parcel Service (UPS) and Federal 
Express (FedEx), who typically took direct control of every segment of their transportation 
networks, which primarily consisted of trucks and airplanes. To this physical involvement they 
added an emphasis on information, taking advantage of the evolving digital revolution to 
coordinate and track their packages as had never before been done. From their American origins, 
UPS and FedEx have built up extraordinary global networks in which multiple infrastructures 
are exploited with the goal of moving packages most quickly and efficiently from point A to B. 
The focus is ultimately on the package itself, and the various transportation systems are simply a 
means to its delivery. One can easily draw analogies with the container, or with the individual 
human being in passenger transportation. 
Use of the phrase “intermodal” with regard to transportation began in the late 1960s—earlier 
instances are rare indeed—and took off over the 1970s and ‘80s.9 In the 1980s the concept started 
to become a significant focus of attention for people in transportation, including those in both 
business and public policy. This is reflected in a rising number of government reports, scholarly 
writings, and articles in trade journals that deal with the topic of intermodal transportation and 
refer to it by name. Clearly the success of the shipping container (and also piggyback) had much 
to do with the new interest in intermodalism. But this new awareness was happening for 
passenger transportation too—without a doubt, a broader comprehension of the issue was 
emerging. 
The need to use existing infrastructure more efficiently, to better leverage the assets already 
in place, was becoming evident. This led to a particular focus on places where transfers are made 
between transport modes—on the creation of such nodes, and improving access to them. It also 
reflected a realization that the construction of major new transportation projects was now less 
likely. By the early 1990s the American transportation system was essentially “built out,” with the 
Interstate highway network for the most part completed and few other construction projects 
ongoing. While road-building has been constant since then, in parallel with the continuing 
expansion of sprawl (until the past few years of recession), such projects are generally at a local 
or regional level, do not involve the construction of new highways, and mean little at the national 
scale. The railroad industry has experienced growth (as has Amtrak), but that has not involved 
the creation of new rail corridors. Few new airports have been built, though many have 
expanded. 
In short, the era of national infrastructure construction was fading, as the impetus of the 
nation-building project (and perhaps the unity of the nation) was in decline. It had arguably 
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reached its peak with the construction of the Interstates in the 1950s, ‘60s and early ‘70s, but the 
shift to globalization and worldwide trade, and to a more laissez-faire and less state-oriented 
approach, began as early as the 1970s and was strongly evident in the 1980s and ‘90s. A host of 
other factors, some positive and some negative, also played a role: the larger sense of the public 
interest faded, corporate power expanded as government action fell, certain technological limits 
were reached, environmental awareness grew, and construction costs rose. The general public 
had become vastly more dubious about building new infrastructure, thanks to the NIMBY (“not 
in my backyard”) mentality and a pervasive skepticism. Traffic engineers meanwhile found that 
building new roads tended to just make people drive more, rather than reducing traffic. The one 
important new transportation technology during this period was high-speed rail, but the U.S. 
showed little interest in it (building only a very limited high-speed corridor in the Northeast) and 
effectively ceded leadership in its use to other parts of the world. With so little new infrastructure 
being developed, clearly there would be a need to utilize what existed as efficiently as possible. 
As an article written in the late 1990s argued, “the political discourse about transportation will, of 
necessity, shift in focus from the development of new links to more efficient use of existing links. 
This is in recognition of the fact that the basic modal infrastructure of the United States is now in 
place and will not expand significantly in the foreseeable future.”10 
A key point in the growth of American intermodalism was reached with passage of the 
landmark federal Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, better known by its acronym 
ISTEA, in 1991. (Strangely enough, the terms “intermodal” and “intermodalism” were not 
actually defined in this legislation.11) Interest in intermodalism was enlarged greatly by the act, 
which was a watershed moment for intermodal transportation as it gained official government 
support both practical and symbolic in nature. The administration of President George H. W. 
Bush actually had little desire to boost public transit, bicylists or pedestrians, but rather wanted 
to improve links between highways, ports and airports. It was left-wing advocates who pushed, 
with surprising effectiveness, for supporting multiple modes of personal transportation. The final 
result was legislation that managed to make all the factions reasonably content.12 
ISTEA changed the transportation landscape in several ways. For our purposes the most 
relevant was a new emphasis on intermodalism. But ISTEA also embodied two seemingly 
contradictory tendencies. On the one hand it gave more autonomy to local and state governments 
in what transportation projects they prioritized and how they spent federal money. Yet it also 
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emphasized global connections, such as ports, airports, border crossings, etc.—and not just those 
facilities, but the transport links to them. Seen in this light ISTEA fits to some degree with 
Graham and Marvin’s “splintering urbanism” thesis, for it represents a diminishment of the 
nation-state’s unifying agency as local and regional divisions emerge, and simultaneously is an 
effort to integrate national, regional or local infrastructures into larger global systems. But it 
would not really be accurate to describe ISTEA’s changes as a splintering or fracturing of 
domestic infrastructure; global connections and local autonomy have been enhanced, to be sure, 
but the basic infrastructural coherence at the national scale remains. 
The growth of local and state autonomy (and responsibility) in transportation planning 
actually began quietly in the 1970s. The Interstate planners and builders, typically engineers, 
were often condemned in the 1960s and ‘70s for ramming highways through neighborhoods, 
especially in cities where their routes invariably passed through areas populated by racial 
minorities. Critics also argued for the provision of federal funding in support of public transit 
and bicycling, instead of only road-building. Meanwhile some conservatives sought more 
autonomy as well, as they resented federal sway over local and regional matters; obviously they 
were hostile to public transit, but they wanted the power to support their own preferred road 
projects. In the early and mid-1970s the Nixon and Ford administrations, along with Congress, 
began to make changes that funneled a bit of funding to public transit and granted greater 
decision-making powers to cities and regions. A small portion of the Highway Trust Fund was 
taken away from road construction and dedicated to public transit instead. In addition, 
metropolitan regional agencies known as Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs), which 
had only just been created in the late 1960s, were given great involvement in transportation 
planning, including the allocation of federal dollars.13 
In the 1980s the process continued. To some degree this was a result of deregulation, but 
primarily it was caused by policy shifts: 
Despite nominal increases in federal support… public support for transportation 
infrastructure and services increasingly became a state and local government 
responsibility. Central federal direction in transportation reduced its reliance on 
the two key control mechanisms used by governments—regulation and finance. 
This meant that planning for transportation, faced with evident federal 
disinterest and a dearth of either tools or money to pursue national 
transportation goals, increasingly became attuned to local and state concerns.14 
ISTEA, coming in the early 1990s, was a logical continuation—and confirmation—of the trend. 
The recognition of intermodalism’s importance was new, but perhaps came out of several factors 
that mitigated the previous dominance of the motor vehicle: an enhanced environmental 
awareness, growing opposition to road-building, the growth (albeit modest) of public transit 
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systems, the revival of the railroad industry, the survival of Amtrak, the growth in air travel, and 
the boom in containerized and piggyback freight movements. The greater awareness of the value 
of intermodal thinking was formalized in the creation of the Office of Intermodalism, within the 
U.S. Department of Transportation, by the ISTEA legislation. 
ISTEA’s provision for greater local and state control over how transportation dollars would 
be used was a reversal of the more top-down approach typified by the Interstate highways. (The 
contrast should not be overdone, however; the Interstates required extensive negotiations with 
the states, and among them.) In summarizing the most important aspects of ISTEA in a report 
two years after its passage, Robert Martinez, an official with the Department of Transportation’s 
Office of Intermodalism, devoted the first two of his three points to describing how the act shifted 
power to the local and state level. He stated that ISTEA “designates states and localities as the 
primary determinants of how transportation policies are set,” and added that it “provides 
unprecedented flexibility to transfer funds from one category to another to achieve transportation 
goals determined by state and local officials.”15 (Only in his third point did he acknowledge what 
many regard as ISTEA’s most critical aspect, its focus on intermodalism.) Martinez provided a 
rationale for this significant alteration in transportation policy: “ISTEA’s unparalleled funding 
flexibility allows states to spend transportation funds on programs, projects, and modes that are 
significant to them because, simply put, the transportation priorities of California differ from 
those of Connecticut.”16 
In the early and mid-1990s ISTEA’s impact on transportation priorities was relatively minor, 
since putting greater decision-making power in the hands of local, regional and state officials did 
not necessarily lead to changes. Often these policy-makers and politicians were as wedded to the 
automobile infrastructure as national leaders long had been. In suburban areas especially, where 
the growth machine depended on the continued expansion of automotive access, local officials 
were happy to use their newfound power over transportation spending to target their favored 
road-building projects. Others, however, were quick to recognize the opportunities ISTEA 
created for alternate modes of transportation. Ultimately the priorities and decisions varied from 
locality to locality, and from state to state. ISTEA gave new power to the MPO that existed for 
each major metropolitan area, but how that power was wielded obviously depended on whose 
interests the MPO tended to serve, or where its priorities lay.17 
ISTEA was not a piece of legislation that remained permanently in place. It was succeeded in 
1998 by the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), that in turn being 
succeeded in 2005 by the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A 
Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), which in turn was followed in 2012 by the Moving Ahead for 
Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21). (The names of these acts seem to grow progressively 
more convoluted and ridiculous.) These acts were each of great importance in their own way, of 
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course, but none were watershed shifts in transport policy as ISTEA had been. (The SAFETEA-
LU legislation of 2005 was a predictably wasteful and automobile-oriented product of the George 
W. Bush presidency, and contained the funding for the notorious “bridge to nowhere” in 
Alaska.18) However it must be kept in mind that ISTEA’s importance is not merely in the 
legislation itself, but in the changing approach to transportation, the rising use of intermodalism, 
that was gaining momentum at the same time—and which has continued to the present. This was 
helped significantly by ISTEA but surely would have transpired regardless, fueled by the larger 
changes taking place. Even the conservative eight-year presidency of George W. Bush, though 
marked by an emphasis on road-building as opposed to public transit, and a whole-hearted 
devotion to the profitability of the oil industry, could not halt the underlying shift in American 
transportation. 
In the larger context of ISTEA and intermodalism, it is worth noting briefly that the impact of 
intermodal thinking on passenger transportation has also been substantial since the 1990s. This 
has tended to be to the advantage of public transit systems, along with long-distance rail and bus 
operations. Particularly notable is the creation of multimodal stations that merge railroad and bus 
facilities into a single terminal, or least the locating of such stations adjacent to each other. This is 
a seemingly obvious idea, yet until recently it was not uncommon for a city’s train and bus 
stations to be entirely separate facilities spatially distant from each other, making passenger 
transfers between one and the other unnecessarily difficult. Boston is a representative case; the 
city’s principal train station is South Station, located downtown, while the main bus station for a 
long time was a Greyhound station in the Back Bay district about a mile away. This state of 
affairs persisted until 1995 when a new bus station, the South Station Bus Terminal, was built 
adjacent to the train station. In smaller municipalities it is possible to combine the train and bus 
stations into one building, which has the added benefit of merging the waiting area, ticket booths 
and restrooms. An example is Syracuse, New York, where separate train and bus stations were 
combined in 1999 into the new William F. Walsh Regional Transportation Center. (Evidently the 
previous facilities were not at all missed, as a contributor to Wikipedia writes that the new station 
“replaced the highly unpopular downtown bus station and even more unpopular Amtrak station 
in East Syracuse.”19) Another trend has been the development of better airport connections to 
public transit systems and even Amtrak. A host of major construction projects were carried out in 
the 1990s and 2000s to improve these links. In some cases this involved the creation of a direct 
subway connection, as with the extension of BART to reach the San Francisco Airport, while in 
other instances it was a matter of the airport building a short link to a nearby subway stop, as 
with the “AirTrain” people-mover at J.F.K. Airport in New York. Arguably the most impressive 
feat is to establish a direct link between an airport and a nearby Amtrak station, as has been done 
at the Newark, Milwaukee and Baltimore airports. 
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With regard to the shipping container, ISTEA’s most important aspect was the boost it gave 
to the intermodal way of handling freight, along with its emphasis on developing stronger links 
to global transport systems. Planners and transportation specialists did not neglect freight 
movement, and sought to apply intermodalism into national practice. This translated into 
particular emphasis on two areas: connections to ports, and connections to intermodal terminals. 
(Border connections with Mexico and Canada were also taken into account, but much less 
emphasized, even though the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] was on the 
horizon and eventually began in 1994. Such border crossings do not involve an intermodal 
component the way ports do.) The quality of linkages to ports was not a novel concern, though 
the seamlessness of container movement and the growing quantity of global freight heightened 
its importance. But the issue of links to intermodal terminals was an entirely new problem, one 
that had not been raised before at the level of national policy. The newfound awareness of its 
relevance was due to ISTEA’s emphasis on intermodalism and global trade, and also in part to 
the growth of transfers (of both containers and trailers) at these terminals. Rationalization and 
mechanization in the railroad industry caused a reduction in the number of terminals, 
concentrating traffic even more heavily at the remaining terminals which became major nodes. 
(The development of these intermodal terminals is the subject of chapter 9.) 
Even as ISTEA gave more autonomy and responsibility to localities and states, it singled out 
particular links and nodes as being of national significance. Beneath the rhetoric of ISTEA’s 
emphasis on “national” projects, it is not hard to see a globalizing agenda. The focus on 
intermodalism was convenient, in the context of freight, because it served to assist a push 
towards globalizing the transport system, to link it more deeply into the burgeoning global 
container network of movement. The contrast with the previous creation of the Interstate 
highways, a project that bound the nation-state together internally, is instructive. ISTEA set up a 
new nationwide highway network, the National Highway System (NHS). For the most part the 
NHS was simply a new conception for the existing highways, including the Interstates and other 
highways, but it also covered other routes and arterials regarded as vital for any reason. This 
allowed for various connections to ports and intermodal terminals to be included in the NHS and 
made eligible for funding.20 
Attention to such links, it was argued, would boost national transportation and also make the 
nation more competitive globally. In the foreword to a report on ISTEA and the NHS, released by 
the U.S. Department of Transportation in 1993, it was written (under the name of the Secretary of 
Transportation Federico Pena) that the new transportation system created by ISTEA “will lower 
the price of American manufactured goods and services by reducing the time and money spent 
on transportation. Those savings, in turn, will enable American companies to compete better in 
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markets at home and around the world—and create more American jobs.”21 The result of course 
has been precisely the opposite, as ISTEA’s emphasis on improving transportation links to the 
rest of the world has helped make imports cheap and caused great harm to American 
manufacturing and its employees. It is the price of goods manufactured abroad, not at home, that 
has been lowered—and the competitiveness of foreign manufacturers that has been enhanced. In 
fairness, ISTEA deserves only a smidgeon of the blame for something that has been the product 
of so many larger trends (the container itself being far more significant), especially since the 
legislation only made slight changes to a domestic network that was already well established. In 
addition, no one could have predicted all its effects. It also should be stressed that intermodalism 
is by and large a worthy policy to pursue. 
Improving the nation’s connections to the worldwide container network had positive impacts 
too, both for citizens and the economy. American consumers have benefited immensely from the 
cheaper prices of so many goods they buy. Many retailers have flourished, and American 
companies that manufacture their products abroad have also reaped the rewards. So the point 
here is not to condemn the globalization of American infrastructure, but to note its consequences 
and some of the misleading ways it has been promoted. It has in particular been part of a larger 
national shift from production to consumption that has all sorts of implications. The Department 
of Transportation’s optimistic words in the early 1990s about American competitiveness and the 
national interest prefigure the patriotic rhetoric used by the railroad companies more recently to 
promote their corridors for stacktrains—and to plead for government subsidies to help build 
them. As noted in chapter 7, a name like the Heartland Corridor carries an evocation of the 
nation-building tradition that belies its actual purpose, which is to carry goods moving in global 
trade. 
As a result of ISTEA’s emphasis on intermodal connections, a bureaucratic process was 
initiated in the early and mid-1990s to identify road-based links—in both passenger and freight 
movement—and decide which were of paramount importance. These would be proposed for 
inclusion in the NHS. The result was an impressive list of connections, comprising a total of 
about 2,000 miles that included roughly 1,400 links to all types of facilities, including ports, 
airports, bus stations, Amtrak stations, intermodal terminals, public transit stops, ferry terminals, 
etc. Obviously the typical connection was quite short; the concept was meant to deal with 
bottlenecks and choke points that despite their limited length were key links in a longer chain.22 
As the Federal Highway Administrator, Kenneth R. Wykle, pointed out in the late 1990s, in 
specific reference to road connections for freight movement: 
There are 163,000 miles in the National Highway System [NHS]. There are 2,000 
miles of connectors that we believe severely constrain the capacity of this great 
highway system. Freight flows rapidly across our NHS system but then comes to 
a virtual stop as vehicles come off exit ramps out to congested, narrow streets 
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with multiple stoplights leading to our seaports, airports, rail terminals and 
stations, and major manufacturing areas. If we focus on less than two percent of 
the system, we can significantly increase productivity.23 
The new attention to intermodal freight transportation and particular links could be laser-like 
in its focus on specific choke points. An example was the “Kedzie stoplight” on Kedzie Avenue at 
the entrance to BNSF’s Corwith intermodal container terminal in Chicago. With no traffic signal 
in place, the daily movement of about 2,000 trucks in and out of Corwith was a major problem 
not only for local traffic but also for the terminal and hence BNSF’s intermodal operations. 
ISTEA’s emphasis on intermodal connections helped lead to a solution in the late 1990s. As the 
street layout at the time was not suitable for the addition of a traffic signal, the project involved a 
reconfiguration of the intersection, the repaving and broadening of three miles of the street, and 
the construction of sidewalks and gutters, in addition to the signal, for a total cost of $4 million. 
These changes not only improved access to the terminal but also enhanced its connection to 
Interstate 55, Kedzie Avenue being the short but vital link between the highway and Corwith. 
The project was an exemplary instance of ISTEA’s novel focus on intermodal links, and was even 
referred to as “the ISTEA poster child.”24 It also illuminated how upgrading access to global trade 
could involve alterations deep inside the domestic territory, not just in the vicinity of ports and 
borders. 
In tandem with such road-building efforts, there have been numerous projects to improve 
railroad access at particular bottlenecks. Most were not directly tied to ISTEA, but reflected the 
new wave of intermodal thinking. Many of these projects have been described in chapter 7, and 
most were public-private partnerships carried out jointly by railroad companies and government 
agencies (as opposed to roads where government of course is the sole builder). The most 
extensive case of government involvement—perhaps the one case where the government actually 
took the lead—was in the largest, most expensive and most complicated of these projects, the 
Alameda Corridor, which vastly improved rail access to the ports of Los Angeles and Long 
Beach. Several other projects have also boosted rail links to various ports, but equally significant 
are those that, like the Kedzie project in the context of trucking, made alterations to the rail 
infrastructure deep inside the national space. A good example was the Sheffield Flyover, which 
resolved a nasty bottleneck in Kansas City. 
Arguably the greatest advantage of intermodalism is its greater sustainability in comparison 
to the longstanding American preference for the motor vehicle. This is most evident in passenger 
transport, where the environmental credentials of buses and trains are widely known to be 
dramatically better than automobile (or airplane) use. But a similar pattern holds for freight, 
where the advantage is substantial since the intermodal approach embodies a preference for 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Daniel Smith, “Freight Projects of National Significance: Toward a Working Definition,” in: 
Transportation Research Board (National Research Council), Policy Options for Intermodal Freight 
Transportation [special report 252] (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1998), pp. 206-207; Smallen, 
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using rail for the bulk of a freight journey. The dynamic is slightly different, however. One might 
consider a truck as analogous to a bus, since both are large motor vehicles, but while a bus is a 
very sustainable way to move people, a truck is an environmentally harmful method of moving 
goods relative to a train. A better analogy is to regard each container as a unit, and to realize that 
a truck typically moves just one unit at a time while a train can carry hundreds. What makes a 
container-laden train so much more efficient than a truck is its economies of scale, as it can hold 
as many as 250 containers. (By the same token carrying containers by ocean shipping is in a sense 
sustainable, despite the highly polluting technology the ships use, since one container ship holds 
thousands of containers. But the ideal environmental solution would be to produce goods closer 
to home and avoid the ocean shipment entirely.) 
The environmental edge of the train is vast. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that 
when the movement of freight is measured in BTUs per ton-mile (i.e., the number of British 
thermal units consumed in moving a ton of freight one mile), the figure for trucking is 3,500-4,000 
BTU/ton-mile, versus only 350-500 BTU/ton-mile for rail. In other words, the railroad is about 
nine times more efficient. (Air freight is even worse than trucking, and by a wide margin.) 
Calculations for CO2 emissions also give a very substantial advantage to rail.25 While such rough 
estimates do not apply in every case, as particular circumstances may vary, rail is without a 
doubt invariably superior by several orders of magnitude. Little wonder the railroad lines are so 
fond of trumpeting their sustainability. (Moving containers on inland waterways, or by coastal 
shipping, is even more environmentally friendly than moving them by train, as noted in chapter 
10.) For those in transportation policy and planning, such statistics provide a convincing 
justification for supporting containerized rail operations and piggyback while discouraging long-
distance trucking. The environmental advantages of moving freight intermodally have long been 
evident, as in the early 1970s the OPEC oil crisis and a newfound environmental awareness 
already had some seeing the benefits of using rail for most of the journey.26 The issue was of 
sufficient interest that Argonne National Laboratory carried out a study in 1980 to quantify the 
amount of fuel and money that would be saved by the use of piggyback under three future 
scenarios, and found that piggyback did generate a reasonably substantial advantage. Argonne 
estimated the difference between piggyback and trucking in terms of energy use, incidentally, at 
800 BTU/ton-mile.27 (This figure seems small in light of the statistics given above, but perhaps it is 
because piggyback still involves local truck use, as well as terminal operations.) It has only been 
in the past decade or so, however, that these advantages have been more widely publicized, and 
have led to some modest shifts in public policy—albeit with fierce resistance from truckers, road 
                                                 
25 James J. Winebrake and James J. Corbett, “Improving the Energy Efficiency and Environmental 
Performance of Goods Movement,” in: Daniel Sperling and James S. Cannon (eds.), Climate and 
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1973), p. 32; Robert D. Bartley, “TOFC and COFC: There’s Big New Growth Ahead for Both,” Railway Age, 
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27 Railway Age, “How Much Energy Can Intermodal Save?” Vol. 181, No. 14 (July 28, 1980), p. 28. 
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builders and the oil lobby. Higher gas prices of course have also been a key contributing factor in 
these changes. 
An irony of the intermodal movement is that it renews the use of older transport 
infrastructures, and earlier technologies, that were long slighted. In passenger transport 
intermodalism supports public transit buses and trains, which were in decline from the 1920s to 
the ‘80s but have since rebounded. In freight transport the intermodal approach is greatly to the 
benefit of the railroads, and has the potential to favor inland waterways also. The revival of the 
railroads (for both freight and passengers) is perhaps a sign that the modernist desire to 
constantly advance into the future, to apply the newest technology at all costs, has been 
moderated by a more practical and thoughtful willingness to draw on the available technologies, 
and to build a system that is efficient rather than wasteful. At the risk of putting forth an overly 
grandiose and theoretical interpretation, one might posit that the current emphasis on a system 
that uses all modes of transportation is postmodern in nature, multivalent rather than univalent, 
in its willingness to utilize multiple technologies from various eras as is convenient. Older modes 
of transportation, generally more energy-efficient, possess greater value in such a scheme. 
This does not mean the intermodal approach is in any way “low-tech.” Many of these older 
transport modes utilize the most up-to-date technologies to maximize their performance. A 
modern diesel-electric train engine is incomparably better than a coal-powered steam model, for 
instance. What is equally significant and perhaps less obvious is that the revolution in 
information technology and digital networks has transformed transportation in many ways, and 
generally worked to the advantage of intermodalism. As Rainer Alt, Paul W. Forster and John 
Leslie King argue perceptively in a 1997 article, the rise of intermodal freight transportation has 
been tied to the use of information technology to better coordinate and track journeys. Such 
technologies are integral to just-in-time manufacturing, delivery and inventory techniques as 
well. So the transportation infrastructure increasingly works in tandem with, and is controlled 
and coordinated by, the information infrastructure.28 
As this has evolved, it has gotten easier for multiple links in a transport chain to be meshed 
into a well-organized and efficient whole. Previously there were substantial inefficiencies in 
using several modes of transportation, and often the logical decision for sheer simplicity’s sake 
was to go with trucking for an entire land-based journey. Today’s vastly better information 
technology, along with improved cooperation between transport providers, makes the use of 
multiple modes more feasible. That is a particular boost to global freight movement, which by its 
nature must rely on multiple modes anyway. As a discrete and exact unit the shipping container 
to some degree lends itself to this newfound attention to information and data. But what is 
equally important is that the seamless nature of container movement, its ability to be transferred 
so quickly from one transport mode to another, is well suited to contemporary information 
technology that is so rapid and flexible in its own right. (Indeed, in the early days of 
containerization a lack of information, or the inability to transmit information rapidly enough, 
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often represented a bottleneck, as the containers moved so swiftly between modes that traditional 
record-keeping and paperwork could not keep up.) 
With the American transportation infrastructure essentially built up and fully in place, the 
challenge is to better manage and coordinate it. For a variety of reasons the U.S. now has little 
appetite for building new infrastructure, and so policy-makers, planners, business people and 
logistics experts are concentrating on using the intermodal approach to more efficiently leverage 
what exists. The rise of the shipping container has been an important factor boosting the 
intermodal approach in freight movement, while at the same time this approach has in turn 
further strengthened containerization. Policy-makers now have reason to view the container’s 
use in a positive light, especially if the bulk of its overland journey is done by rail or barge. That 
is particularly the case with domestic containerization, which takes the place of a trip that would 
otherwise occur entirely through trucking. In a nation whose transportation practices have grown 





Chapter 13 ~ Conclusion 
 
The age of modernity is characterized technologically not merely by machines, but by 
systems and networks. These infrastructures tie together people and societies, but if we regard 
them spatially it is evident they also bind together sites, places and territories. They have played 
a key role in the past few centuries, as Rosalind Williams points out: 
As the Age of Enlightenment faded into the Age of Improvement, the spatial 
basis of Western society began to be reorganized along ever-extending networks 
of transportation and communication, which were also networks of economic, 
political, and intellectual power. As the physical networks continued to be laid 
down in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in layer upon expensive layer, 
they legitimated themselves in a self-reinforcing cycle of hegemony.1 
The importance of such physical networks was not entirely new, of course; after all the Romans 
were famous for their roads and aqueducts. But from the eighteenth century onward (first in 
certain European nations, then gradually elsewhere) the systems started to acquire a new level of 
complexity and grew more deeply interwoven, in parallel with modernity. In sum, they became 
infrastructures. 
The presence of infrastructure, and its central importance, thus appears to be a fundamental 
characteristic of the modern condition. Infrastructures of movement, involving flows of people 
and goods, seem especially characteristic of modernity. While humans obviously have always 
possessed some capacity to move (on foot, if all else fails), it is fitting that human civilization has 
become increasingly characterized by dynamic and constant motion over the nineteenth, 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The Industrial Revolution was the original cause of this 
transformation, as it brought into being the steam engine that powered early railroads and 
steamships; better trains and ships, along with motor vehicles and airplanes, have followed since. 
The “space of flows” to which Manuel Castells often refers is not a new phenomenon, though it 
has certainly advanced markedly in recent decades. The consequences of this modern frenzy of 
movement are not only technological and economic, of course, but extend to society and culture 
too.2 
                                                 
1 Rosalind Williams, “Cultural Origins and Environmental Implications of Large Technological Systems,” 
Science in Context, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Autumn 1993), p. 395. 
2 For more on movement and modernity, see Tim Cresswell, On the Move: Mobility in the Modern Western 
World (New York: Routledge, 2006). Also see Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1918 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003 [orig. 1983]), pp. 109-130. 
 270 
As chapter 4 relates, such infrastructures have been foundational components of the modern 
nation-state. Yet they have also long extended far beyond national borders, creating transnational 
connections for trade, movement and ultimately power. The Europeans of course improved their 
links with each other, but also ventured out over the oceans, utilizing increasingly better 
technologies for navigation. These explorations led to colonialism and eventually imperialism, a 
worldwide condition that in some regards can be seen as a precursor of contemporary 
globalization. During the nineteenth century in particular global networks of movement and 
communication flourished and grew more advanced.3 Amidst such practical advances, more 
idealistic notions also sprung up, most notably Saint-Simonism. This movement, popular in 
France during the early and mid-1800s, followed upon the ideas of Claude Henri de Rouvroy, 
comte de Saint-Simon, though it gained greater force only after his death. Saint-Simonism 
espoused utopian and vaguely socialist notions of harmony between people, and saw technology 
as a key tool to advance such aspirations. The Saint-Simonians had an immense enthusiasm for 
infrastructural networks, which they perceived as potentially global in scope, and as many of 
them went into engineering or business they had opportunities to pursue this agenda. Probably 
their greatest concrete accomplishment was the Suez Canal, for the Saint-Simonians were 
instrumental in its conceptualization and construction.4 Saint-Simonism prefigures certain 
elements of the enthusiasm some proclaim for globalization today. In particular, its espousal of 
global infrastructures as tools for harmony and progress parallels the thinking of today’s 
promoters of globalization, though the technologies at hand are different. And even though 
Saint-Simonism’s socialist tendencies run counter to free-market ideology, it is undeniable that 
there is a certain utopian strand in the pronouncements of some of today’s prophets of 
globalization. 
The nineteenth century was also strongly characterized by infrastructural development in the 
service of nation-states. Indeed, the Saint-Simonians themselves were active at the domestic level, 
and played a prominent part in the building of railroads in France. The role of American 
railroads in binding together the young nation, and ensuring its hold over an expanding 
territory, is a classic example of infrastructure and the nation in this period. Even in colonized 
territories, the infrastructures the imperialists put in place for their own purposes often 
eventually morphed into vital systems of unity and nation building—sometimes before 
independence was actually achieved—as Manu Goswami describes in the case of the Indian 
railroads.5 This link between infrastructure and the national scale remained very much in place 
for most of the twentieth century, with the Interstate highways arguably representing its 
apotheosis in the American context. But in the 1970s it started to wane as worldwide 
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infrastructures began to take the lead, both reflecting and driving larger trends toward a more 
globalized world. 
One way to view this rise of global infrastructures is to celebrate it, in the style of Thomas 
Friedman’s The World Is Flat and similar encomiums, as part of the wonders of globalization. 
Another reaction is to condemn it as integrally tied to inequality, being linked to social and 
spatial fracturing and the formation of enclaves, as many scholars in the “splintering urbanism” 
paradigm maintain. This dissertation has sought for the most part to steer a path between these 
two extremes, each of which possesses some insights but also a few distortions. It is more 
interesting to consider how the elements of the nation-state, including its infrastructures, become 
constitutive of the new global condition. If infrastructure is part and parcel of modernity, surely it 
is equally important in our current situation, whether we call it postmodern, late modern or still 
just modern. This is especially true since so many global networks actually utilize the previously 
built infrastructures of the nation-state, as this dissertation has emphasized is the case with 
containerization. 
Saskia Sassen presents an interesting idea along these lines about the nature of globalization. 
As discussed in chapter 4, this dissertation draws on her view that globalization is largely 
implemented by actors working within the scale of the nation-state. Sassen puts forth this claim 
as she seeks to understand how the economic and political conditions of globalization are being 
put in place—she has little concern with infrastructure specifically. But she makes a further 
argument that also may be relevant. Essentially she hypothesizes that the organizational 
structures of the previous era, that of the nation-state, now play a role in carrying out 
globalization. While Sassen’s verbiage can be dense, the idea merits consideration: 
…the new does not invent itself. I interpret foundational change and the 
ascendance of novel formations [of globalization] as in good part a function of 
capabilities shaped and developed in the period preceding the one under 
examination—in this case, that of the formation and ascendance of the nation-
state. The conditionality explaining the outcome [globalization]…is that at least 
some of those earlier capabilities [of the nation-state] become lodged in novel 
organizing logics [of globalization].6 
This argument seems to suit the process of containerization plausibly well. Early versions of 
the shipping container were used at various national (or local or regional) scales before it shifted 
to the global, and its dimensions and other qualities derive in many ways from national 
infrastructures. But a deeper and more subtle point is that infrastructure’s foundational role in 
the modern nation-state can continue, perhaps in a more complex form, into globalization. 
Infrastructure has been part of a technological process of rationalizing and standardizing the 
contours of human existence, and while previously it carried this out in order to serve, reinforce, 
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constitute and/or reflect the nation-state in multiple ways, now it does likewise for the larger 
world scale. 
But it does not only work at the global scale. As many scholars have pointed out, 
globalization has transpired simultaneously with increasing local and/or regional autonomy.7 The 
splintering theorists generally are in accord with this view, demonstrating how local enclaves are 
more and more plugged into worldwide networks even as they may be divided from adjacent 
neighborhoods. In her emphasis on “overlapping” territories Sassen makes a similar point, as she 
argues that the local has now become a more critical scale than previously. The importance of the 
local is not entirely novel, obviously, since before the rise of the nation-state it was even more 
central than today. But the dynamic is now entirely different, as local places are able to link into 
global networks, and through them to other localities, with ease. Thanks to this “scale bending,” 
as Neil Smith terms it, the nation-state is made slightly less essential.8 
Yet the national scale surely remains crucial, and in recent years as some of globalization’s 
hype has receded this has become more evident. As Ellen Meiksins Wood points out: 
…capitalism remains dependent on extra-economic conditions, political and 
legal supports. Until now, no one has found a more effective means of supplying 
those supports than the political form with which capitalism has been 
historically, if not causally, connected: the old nation state. As much as ‘global’ 
capital might like a corresponding ‘global’ state, the kind of day-to-day stability, 
regularity, and predictability required for capital accumulation is inconceivable 
on anything like a global scale.9 
In addition to such economic considerations, innumerable political, social and cultural factors 
also ensure the nation-state’s continued importance for the foreseeable future. But Wood’s focus 
on economics seems particularly relevant to the worldwide network of containerization, which as 
a functional and commercial system is most powerfully tied to economics (though by no means 
does it lack relevance to political, social and cultural factors). This global economic scale can seem 
out of sync with the continuing national and local. Indeed, Wood makes the interesting claim that 
globalization “is characterized less by the decline of the nation state than by a growing 
contradiction between the global scope of capital and its persistent need for more local and 
national forms of ‘extra-economic’ support, a growing disparity between its economic reach and 
its political grasp.”10 
                                                 
7 For instance, see Neil Brenner, New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood (Oxford: 
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8 Neil Smith, “Scale Bending and the Fate of the National,” in Eric Sheppard and Robert B. McMaster (eds.), 
Scale and Geographic Inquiry: Nature, Society, and Method (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 192-
212. 
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Whether these varied scales are truly in “contradiction,” though, is subject to debate, as is the 
assumption that they normally would—or eventually should—replicate each other. This 
dissertation tends to question such a notion. As Sassen emphasizes, it may be more productive to 
view national and local scales as actively constructing the global. While noting the importance of 
global institutions like the U.N., WTO and ISO, she argues that many of the forces driving 
globalization “take place deep inside territories and institutional domains that have largely been 
constructed in national terms in much of the world. What makes these processes part of 
globalization even though they are localized in national, indeed subnational, settings is that they 
are oriented towards global agendas and systems.”11 Such a viewpoint acknowledges 
globalization’s importance, while also perceiving the ongoing relevance and agency of other 
scales, none of which take a back seat to the worldwide scale. Some of the more thoughtful works 
within the splintering paradigm take a similar position, but unfortunately most splintering 
theorists tend to adopt a more top-down vision in which the global has primacy. 
National, regional and local qualities can help or hinder a global infrastructure, but in 
addition they will affect it and perhaps reshape it in some way. With regard to the shipping 
container, this dissertation has demonstrated that the spatial regime of national transportation 
infrastructures, in particular the railroad and trucking systems, along with the spatial regime of 
the container itself, are key determinants in how this happens. Particular places matter greatly. 
Such a statement is not a revelation in the context of most discussions—in terms of culture for 
instance, we all know that the U.S., Thailand and Paraguay are very different. But when it comes 
to technology, and especially banal infrastructural systems, the nuances of place can be harder to 
appreciate. It becomes too easy to make sweeping assertions about a placeless and generic 
globalized reality. Writers like Manuel Castells, with his concept of the “space of flows,” and 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, with their notion of “smooth space” (a term they borrow from 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari), promote images of globalization where significance and 
power are simultaneously everywhere and nowhere.12 Such mystical assertions of globalization’s 
zeitgeist, whether expressed through technology or capitalism, have fallen somewhat out of 
fashion in the past few years. But in a less grandiose form the underlying assumptions persist. 
In the North American context, the built landscape most emblematic of this “space of flows” 
or “smooth space” would surely be that of suburban and exurban sprawl—the anonymous 
territory of generic big-box stores, dull strip malls, anodyne subdivisions, expansive industrial 
parks, and humble apartment complexes. The system of freight logistics, with its tractor-trailer 
trucks, railroad lines, intermodal terminals, truck stops, rail yards, and giant warehouses and 
distribution centers, fits well into this landscape of sprawl. American logistics is banal and 
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anonymous in appearance (much like the container itself), and greedy in its demands for vast 
expanses of land. While the logistics system obviously supplies goods to cities and rural areas 
too, its natural habitat, so to speak, would seem to be sprawl. In their article “The Logistics 
Landscape,” Charles Waldheim and Alan Berger seek to illuminate the potentially interesting 
interconnections between logistics and the American landscape.13 But while the article has many 
interesting facts, details and images, the authors overstate their argument by claiming that 
logistics has dramatically reshaped the nation’s built form and geography. 
Waldheim and Berger rightly point out that the contemporary American geography is 
entwined with massive flows of resources, but their claim that the resulting landscape is 
unprecedented goes too far. They state: “The recent shift to an internationally distributed 
economy has produced a new form of landscape, a landscape of logistics. This logistics landscape 
is among the more significant transformations of the built environment over the past decade.”14 
Shortly after, they add that “this [logistics landscape] is arguably among the most significant 
transformations in the built environment over the past decade, one that has yet to be fully 
described or theorized.”15 Such pronouncements are uncomfortably similar to the grandiose 
proclamations of those who identify a new flat world, one dominated by global flows that pass 
through splintered infrastructures. For all their far-reaching claims, what Waldheim and Berger 
actually describe is typical American sprawl, the nation’s well-established suburban and exurban 
geography, and they fail to articulate what makes the so-called “logistics landscape” different. 
The space of logistics is largely embedded in the sprawl that already exists, and while it may alter 
and add to this sprawl in some novel ways (especially in places like Joliet-Elwood, as described 
in chapter 9), it generally does not bring about fundamental change. In fact, containerization in 
the American context has brought a renewed emphasis back to the spaces along and adjacent to 
American railroad corridors (as also noted in chapter 9), which to some degree actually 
represents a return to historical patterns. 
In his book Country of Exiles, about the loss of a sense of place in American culture, William 
Leach ponders this realm of logistics and what it means for the nation. He places these 
ruminations squarely within a strand of American thinking that goes back at least to the 1950s, 
one concerned over the country’s loss of place, its excessively easy mobility, and the increasingly 
generic quality of its built landscape.16 But while Leach is aware that containerization has made 
freight movement more seamless, and opened up the national territory to global flows, he offers 
few insights, instead retreating into a predictable lament about the loss of local character, the 
clogging of roads by giant tractor-trailers, and the transitory nature of Americans’ attachment to 
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the places they inhabit.17 As this dissertation shows, the changes wrought by the shipping 
container, and more broadly by logistics networks, have transpired in ways that can be identified 
with some specificity, rather than just contemplated in broad musings. Furthermore the impact 
has not been entirely negative with regard to sprawl, traffic and road-building, given that 
containerization and intermodalism have boosted the railroads so greatly, which in turn takes 
countless trucks off the road and lessens the need to pave over yet more land. 
These changes to the American transportation infrastructure have political and social 
ramifications. The growth of manufacturing outside the U.S., especially in East Asia, has 
devastated employment in American manufacturing, with the nation’s working class suffering 
the consequences. More or less simultaneously, it has led to a flood of cheap imports, boosting 
the nation’s quality of life in some ways but also bringing about ever more consumption. While 
consumerism in American life traces back over a century, the decades since the 1970s have seen 
rampant consumption—and a throwaway culture—at a level not previously imaginable (though 
the recession of recent years has caused some Americans to reexamine this lifestyle). A host of 
economic and political shifts—reductions in trade barriers, the corporate desire to drive wages 
down, automation in manufacturing, the rise of neoliberal ideology, the decline of unions, the 
lack of a U.S. national economic strategy, the eagerness of East Asian nations to enter into 
manufacturing, etc.—are of course the primary causes of these transformations. But the 
development of the physical transport infrastructure of globalization has been an important 
factor too. In this the role of the shipping container is evident, and many writers have linked the 
container, and the ports through which it passes, to globalization and imported goods. The 
alterations to domestic American infrastructure made for the purpose of accommodating 
containerization, described throughout this dissertation, are less commonly understood in this 
way. Yet they too are integral to the Faustain bargain the nation has struck in which imported 
consumer goods are plentiful and cheap while manufacturing jobs disappear. 
The extent of this transformation is not limited to the burgeoning movement of containers 
within American territory, but also the way they move. Whether by intent or not, American 
transportation providers have been able to significantly reduce the number of people employed 
in shuttling containers around the nation. This has transpired primarily through the use of 
stacktrains in the railroad system, for though railroad jobs pay reasonably well, the number of 
employees necessary to operate a train is small. Such a train, often carrying about 200 containers 
a very long distance, in effect takes the place of innumerable truck trips, causing trucking 
companies to employ dramatically fewer drivers than would otherwise be the case. Where the 
use of trucking for transporting containers remains widespread, in short drayage trips around 
ports and intermodal terminals, the trucking industry has been very successful in driving wages 
down—in comparison with other types of trucking, drayage jobs are notorious for their low pay 
and long hours. While trucking companies initially did not welcome railroad competition for the 
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movement of containers, they eventually learned to embrace intermodalism: small drayage 
providers have flourished (albeit without substantial profits), and since the 1990s major long-haul 
trucking firms have used domestic containers in partnership with rail. 
It is widely recognized that the reduction of longshoremen’s employment was a key 
motivation driving containerization, at least in the beginning. Though the motive may be less 
clear and the impact less direct, the development of the American railroad infrastructure to serve 
the container should be understood in a similar way. Projects like the Heartland Corridor, 
Sheffield Flyover and Alameda Corridor ultimately cut into the employment of truck drivers. 
(Given the environmental advantages of rail, along with the decline in pay and working 
conditions for truck drivers over recent decades, this is not necessarily a bad thing, but it still 
merits note.) All this is not to argue that containerization has been solely implemented for such 
purposes; the efficiency introduced by the container is undeniable, and to struggle against it 
would seem a Luddite endeavor. But these political and social aspects are integral to 
containerization, not merely incidental.18 
Technological and scientific advances have helped humanity construct networks of ever 
greater scope and breadth. From the local to the regional to the national, and now the global, 
these infrastructures have transformed human existence, at the levels of governance, society and 
economics. The dream of the Saint-Simonians has in a sense been achieved—albeit only in its 
technological dimensions, as it goes without saying that their utopian aspirations remain 
unfulfilled. Infrastructural systems now span the globe with unprecedented effectiveness, and, at 
least in some particular ways, undeniably do draw the world closer together. These networks 
also control human civilization in many ways, and determine, through the provision and quality 
of their connections, who wields power and who is left out. As Rosalind Williams puts it: “The 
pathways of modern life are also corridors of power, with power being understood in both its 
technological and political senses. By channeling the circulation of people, goods, and messages, 
they have transformed spatial relations by establishing lines of force that are privileged over the 
places and people left outside those lines.”19 Perhaps this is one of the ultimate end results of our 
technologies. It is the culmination of generations of infrastructural development, largely carried 
out through (or at least within) the nation-state in recent centuries. The new global 
infrastructures are, to draw on Sassen’s argument, often founded in or emerging from the 
capabilities of the nation-state. As such these infrastructures are not neutral, nor do they 
represent a fresh start; for better or worse they perpetuate many of the dynamics inherent in 
previous systems. The temptation to view an infrastructural innovation like the shipping 
container as a revolutionary breakthrough, though understandable and somewhat justified, can 
obscure these continuities. 
                                                 
18 In certain cases technological “innovations” actually cause reduced production and/or efficiency, and 
clearly are only introduced for sociopolitical reasons, such as to eliminate unions. This is sometimes the case 
with automation. See David F. Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
19 Williams, “Cultural Origins and Environmental Implications of Large Technological Systems,” p. 395. 
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Most of all, it is vital to remember that the national, regional and local scales play a formative 
role in the creation of these global networks. These scales, and the actors within them, possess 
agency not only inasmuch as they react creatively to globalization, but also because they 
constantly shape and reshape the global reality. Even as worldwide organizations like the ISO 
play a key role, globalization is still primarily implemented at the local and national scale. The 
global is made manifest where it meets the national and/or local, through what transpires in 
actual places. These places in turn possess agency, as they react with or against the global, 
adjusting it in ways that may be minor or far-reaching. Globalization is contingent in countless 
ways; it does not stem from a vague universality or inherent zeitgeist, but instead comes from 
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